The Point Mass as a Model for Epistemic Representation. A Historical and Epistemological Approach by Foligno, Antonella
	 
Dipartimento di Scienze Pure e Applicate 
Corso di Dottorato di Ricerca in Scienze di Base e Applicazioni 
 
Ph.D. Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
THE POINT MASS AS A MODEL  
FOR EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION. 
A HISTORICAL & EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
 
 
Tutor:                    Candidate: 
Chiar.mo Prof. Vincenzo Fano         Dott.ssa Antonella Foligno 
 
Curriculum Scienze della Complessità 
Ciclo XXX – A. A. 2016/2017 
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: M-FIL/02 
	 
 
 
 
 
 
T o  M a r t i n a  a n d  G i a d a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If our highly pointed Triangles of the Soldier class are  
formidable, it may be readily inferred that far more formidable are  
our Women. For, if a Soldier is a wedge, a Woman is a needle; being,  
so to speak, all point, at least at the two extremities. Add to  
this the power of making herself practically invisible at will, and  
you will perceive that a Female, in Flatland, is a creature by no  
means to be trifled with.  
    But here, perhaps, some of my younger Readers may ask how a  
woman in Flatland can make herself invisible. This ought, I think, to  
be apparent without any explanation. However, a few words will make  
it clear to the most unreflecting.  
    Place a needle on the table. Then, with your eye on the level of  
the table, look at it side-ways, and you see the whole length of it;  
but look at it end-ways, and you see nothing but a point, it has  
become practically invisible. Just so is it with one of our Women.   
When her side is turned towards us, we see her as a straight line;  
when the end containing her eye or mouth – for with us these two  
organs are identical – is the part that meets our eye, then we see  
nothing but a highly lustrous point; but when the back is presented to  
our view, then – being only sublustrous, and, indeed, almost as dim  
as an inanimate object – her hinder extremity serves her as a kind of  
Invisible Cap. 
 
 
 
[E. A. Abbott, Flatland. A Romance in Many Dimensions, 1882] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
Mathematical truth, unlike a mathematical construction, 
is not something I can hope to find by introspection. It does not exist in my mind. 
A mathematical theory, like any other scientific theory is a social product. 
It is created and developed by the dialectical interplay of many minds, not just one mind. 
When we study the history of mathematics we do not find a mere accumulation of new definitions, 
new techniques, and new theorems. 
Instead, we find a repeated refinement and sharpening of old concepts and old formulations, 
gradually rising standard of rigor, and an impressive secular increase in generality and depth. 
Each generation of mathematicians rethinks the mathematics of the previous generation, 
discarding what was faddish or superficial or false and recasting what 
is still fertile into new and sharper form. 
 
 
 
[N. D. Goodman 1979, p. 545] 
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	 1 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
 
Any casual philosopher of science writing in the twentieth century cannot help but 
showcase the recurrent presence of Newton’s science of mechanics in introducing her 
diverging views on the nature of (physical) science. Newton’s Principia embodies a 
powerful and coherent research program for linking mathematical representations with 
real-world structures. A crucial passage where Newton himself expresses clearly what 
he is up to in his Principia occurs in a scholium to section 11 of the first book:  
 
In mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with their proportions consequent upon 
any conditions supposed; then, when we enter upon physics [my emphasis], we compare those 
proportions with the phenomena of Nature, that we may know what conditions [or laws] of those 
forces answer to the several kinds of attractive bodies. And, this preparation being made, we argue 
more safely, concerning the physical species, causes and proportions of the forces.1  
 
The first two books of his treatise deal with forces treated abstractly; they contain 
purely mathematical exercises in determining the implications of the laws of motion 
under different conditions. The investigation of all sorts of systematic relations which 
occur in physical phenomena is constructed by the means of mathematical models,2 
which function as instruments of theoretical measurement, and which in turn allow the 
determination of parameters that characterise forces from parameters that characterise 
motion. In a later stage, or what Newton describes as “enter[ing] upon physics”, these 
models are put to use in the third book to measure the characteristics of the forces that 
can be found in our solar system.  																																																								
1 Newton (1687) 1726, p. 218.  
In mathesi investigandae sunt virium quantitates et rationes illae, quae ex conditionibus quibuscunque 
positis consequentur: deinde, ubi in physicam descenditur conferendae sunt hac rationes cum 
phaenomenis; ut innotescat quaenam virium conditiones singulis corporum attractivorum generis 
competant. Et tum demum de virium speciebus, causis et rationibus physicistutius disputare licebit. 
2 Hereafter, the terms ‘mathematical model’ and ‘mathematical object’ are used interchangeably.  
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This powerful methodology has the scope to function as an example for 
emphasising how the world could be formally defined with mathematical models, which 
can additionally be used for deductive reasoning, simplifying computations and 
mathematical proofs. Moreover, these models can also be used in physics for 
representational, explicative and predictive purposes. Examples of them include 
numbers, equations, functions, relations, and so on. Geometry too has its own 
mathematical objects, such as points, lines, planes, and solid figures.  
The philosophy of science deals with the ontological commitments relating to the 
nature of those objects. Are they mind-dependent objects arbitrarily produced by the 
scientific community for practical and speculative purposes? Or are they rather mind-
independent objects, which have their own autonomy and existence?  
The fact that mathematics represents the best way we have today of representing 
the world in which we are embedded, allows us to use those objects – no matter what is 
the nature of their existence – as a model for representing physical phenomena in the 
natural world. They are also considered to be useful for mathematical manipulation and 
clarification, but they represent only idealized states which, strictly speaking, do not 
exist ontologically. To clarify this point, I suggest to the reader an example, which will 
also be the case study throughout the research presented in this dissertation.  
 
Let us look at the point mass3 as a mathematical entity which is used as a model for 
epistemic representational purposes of the phenomena under observation. First, let me 
define this entity with reference to its current definition taken from modern rational 
mechanics.4  																																																								
3 The term ‘point mass’ can be found in the literature under several different expressions, including 
‘material point’, ‘mass point’, ‘point particle’ and ‘point charge’. Hereafter the terms ‘material point’ and 
‘point mass’ will be used synonymously in order to indicate either small bodies or their mathematical 
idealizations with the geometrically unextended point, or a point of a continuum model of matter. Of 
course the smallness in question refers to the extension of the space considered; for instance at the 
astronomical scale, the planets could be considered as punctiform. Moreover, I think that the expression 
‘material point’ is not anachronistic, because it helps to refer to the materiality of the object, whilst at the 
same time the term ‘point mass’ is appropriate because of its explicit reference to mass.  
4 The term ‘rational mechanics’ is used here in distinction from the mere mechanics of the past, in order to 
ensure that when we speak about modern mechanics, we are aware that statics, dynamics and kinematics 
	 3 
 
The material point – regarding its kinematic aspects (i.e. position, trajectory, velocity, acceleration, 
etc.) – could be considered as a geometrical point. However, under the action of a force it still 
should be considered as a natural body. Using this schematic representation it might be possible, on 
the one hand, to obtain the fundamental dynamic laws which underlie its behaviour; but on the other 
hand the material point’s dynamics will give us the fundamentals of mechanics. Therefore the laws 
of motion of any kind of body could be established just considering that body as an aggregate of 
material points.5 
 
In this respect, the point mass is a theoretical and abstract entity which has dimensions 
that can be considered negligible when compared to a problem under examination. Not 
only that, all the forces acting on it can theoretically have the same site of application. 
The point mass in this sense is a useful mathematical and physical idealization for the 
analysis of various physical phenomena.  
The aim of this dissertation is twofold. Firstly, I will aim at showing the role that 
models play in the philosophy of science as epistemic instruments for representing the 
dynamic and variegated aspects of the phenomena in the physical world. Secondly, I 
will intend to support this first aim by providing extensive analysis of a single case 
study, namely the point mass – which is one of the fundamental models of today’s 
mathematical physics – by pursuing a hypothesis concerning its possible development. 
In this respect my thesis aims to show that some mathematical models – in this 
particular case, the point mass – derive from a process involving the objectification of 
scientific practice, instead of being considered as abstractions from natural properties or 																																																																																																																																																																		
are all part of the same discipline, they only have a different approach to the study of bodies. Moreover, it 
is a discipline of indisputable and highly formalised principles. Throughout this approach, the natural 
world is mapped onto a mathematical environment to perform calculations, after which these results are 
reported to the physical world by an inverse process of mapping.	
5 Cf. Levi-Civita and Amaldi 1929, p. 314: “Il punto materiale, per ciò che riguarda i caratteri puramente 
cinematici (posizione, traiettoria, velocità, accelerazione, ecc.), andrà, per la sua stessa definizione, 
considerato come un punto geometrico; ma, di fronte all’azione delle forze, non cesserà di comportarsi 
come un corpo naturale. La semplicità schematica degli aspetti cinematici dei moti di un punto materiale 
ci permetterà di coglierne le leggi dinamiche fondamentali; e la Dinamica del punto fornirà la base di 
tutta la meccanica, in quanto [...] le leggi del moto di ogni altro corpo, di cui non sia lecito trascura- re le 
dimensioni (rispetto a quelle della ragione spaziale in cui ha luogo il moto), si possono stabilire, 
considerando codesto corpo come un aggregato di punti materiali.” The accompanying English trans. is 
my own.   
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objects. The outcome of this thesis will be to emphasise the idea that the point mass is a 
useful idealization used in mathematical physics as a model for epistemic 
representation.  
The first objective is to define what an epistemic representation actually is. 
Following Contessa (2007) and Swoyer (1991), we can maintain that a scientific model 
is an epistemic representation insofar as it gives a representation of any particular set of 
physical phenomena under observation, even though the knowledge drawn about it does 
not correspond to what we directly observe in nature. There is, in fact, an epistemic gap 
between the conclusions that we infer from the model and what we directly observe in 
nature. In this respect, the model of a certain system is an epistemic representation of 
reality, insofar as it allows the user – by following a certain set of rules – to infer some 
conclusions and acquire some knowledge concerning that particular system of reality. 
Therefore, those conclusions need to be “translated”, before one can judge them in a 
certain respect. The model is first built in such a way that it is easier to study than the 
target-system, and this factor therefore allows us to derive results. Second, it is assumed 
to represent its target system, in which representation stands for something like a 
licence to draw inferences. Representation allows us to ‘carry over’ results obtained in 
the model to the target-system, and hence to learn something about that system by 
studying the model.  
This approach aims at emphasising the cognitive role played by the scientific 
community, in the sense that every conclusion drawn about the model is only partial and 
should be interpreted by taking every feature of the model as a denotation that stands for 
a piece of the modelled system. More precisely, every user takes the model to stand for 
the target system, and, moreover, the user is also able to perform valid surrogative 
inferences from the model to the target. This requires that the user interpret the 
surrogative inferences in order to acquire knowledge about the phenomenon under 
observation. Every user is a cognitive agent, who is able to develop representations of 
the world and make judgements about both the world and their representations of it. 
In an attempt to understand what it takes to develop a mathematical representation 
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of nature, the historiographical purpose of this dissertation – to which Chapters 2-4 are 
dedicated – is invoked to support the idea of considering the point mass as part of the 
phenomenon that Enrico Giusti has labelled the ‘objectification of procedure’.6 His 
hypothesis states that mathematical objects are obtained from idealizations of 
procedures through three stages: i) ‘as’ investigative tools ‘within’ demonstrative 
procedures; ii) by becoming common elements that are used for solving problems, for 
which reason they also became objects of study, depending on a specific practical 
context; and iii) by becoming new and abstract mathematical objects (e.g. as mediators 
between the world and the scientific theories or models of intelligibility) which deserve 
to be studied on their own.  
First, I should point out that the sequence of these stages is not always clearly 
determined, and it is not always possible to distinguish between them. However, as we 
shall see in the arguments in favour of this methodological approach, our case study fits 
almost perfectly within this threefold development. The claim is not to establish who 
was able to identify this mathematical object, but rather to find an answer to the 
question: ‘When and in which demonstrations does the idea of the point mass first 
become conceptualised as such?’.  
Traditionally, mathematical objects or models emerge from two different 
approaches, which are commonly labelled the Newtonian approach – that we have 
already seen above in the introductory example – and the Baconian approach. In the 
first of these, the so-called ‘top-down’ 7  approach, we start with an assumed 
mathematical model of a natural or technical system, and deduce its behaviour by 
solving the corresponding dynamic equations under certain initial conditions. Then, 
after one has established the main general foundational principles that are deemed to be 
valid in our field of research, we turn to apply that model to the piece of world under 
observation, proceeding by means of approximations.  
																																																								
6 The original Italian expression is oggettivizzazione delle procedure: see Giusti 1999.  
7 That is, one starts with a concept, and then one figures out what this concept means or how it fits 
together by breaking it down.  
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The second approach, or so-called ‘bottom-up’8 approach, is mainly used in 
scientific practice, because physicists, chemists, biologists or engineers start by mining 
data in an unknown field of research, and only at a second stage reconstruct the 
behaviour of the system from these data, in order to guess the type of its dynamic 
equations.  
My dissertation’s research intends to show that our case study does not derive from 
either of these two classical approaches, and that therefore not all the mathematical 
models derive from an act of abstraction from natural objects, any one of which 
describes certain physical (and qualitative) properties. Rather, from my perspective, 
some mathematical objects – and my case study of the point mass – formalize the 
practical enquiry and the heuristic or mechanical demonstrative procedures carried out 
by the scientific community.  
 
This dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the role of 
models in science, which are seen not solely as tools that provide a means for 
interpreting a formal system, but also as tools for representing the world. After this, 
each of the three subsequent chapters – Chapters 2, 3 and 4 – is devoted to one of the 
stages of the objectification of procedure. However, none of them pretends to deliver an 
exhaustive introduction to the historical period under observation, but each respectively 
sketches out only a historiographical perspective. For example, my discussion of 
Archimedean mechanics in Chapter 2 does not follow a straightforward chronological 
approach, because I wish specifically to pursue the claim that I made use of a portion of 
treatises that have been recently discovered (e.g. The Method, which was rediscovered 
only at the end of the nineteenth century). However, this aspect should not be seen as a 
limitation and defect of my reconstruction, because, although Renaissance 
mathematicians did not have direct access to this last Archimedean treatise, it can be 
maintained – and I will prove this assertion throughout my dissertation – that there 
exists a direct methodological affiliation between the two lines of thought (i.e. those in 																																																								
8 That is, one starts with the observation of behaviour or events, and then one notices a pattern and builds 
up to a model or broader metaphor.	
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the Archimedean and the Renaissance eras). The only point of dissonance between the 
Archimedean outcomes and the Renaissance works was the purpose that they had in 
mind when they were carrying out their research.  
 
Let me now turn to provide an overview of the structure of this dissertation.  
 
The first chapter begins by aiming to examine the various perspectives relating to the 
structure of scientific theories. It will, however, only give an overview of the 
philosophical context in which the notion of the model assumes a decisive role in 
science. We shall focus on the different kinds of theoretical models (e.g. abstraction, 
idealizations and analogies) commonly used in scientific practice in order to represent 
physical reality and simplify computations. Only in the last section of the first chapter 
will we emphasise the surrogative role fulfilled by a model; in fact, models are more 
often used as surrogates of states of affairs which are taken into account for a certain 
purpose, i.e. as a source from which every user can infer conclusions specifically 
relating to that model. These conclusions in turn need to be translated from the users in 
advance, in order to reach some scientific conclusions about that part of reality in itself.9  
In Chapter 2, we shall see that the first stage of the objectification of procedure 
relates to ancient Greek geometry, where its main impact lay in those demonstrations in 
which the notion of the centre of gravity – which is of central importance – shares some 
essential properties with the modern notion of the point mass. The point mass, as a 
mathematical entity having an algebraic meaning, is not yet present in Greek geometry; 
rather it is the centre of gravity that functions as a demonstrative tool detached from 
some of its geometrical features. This stage corresponds to the enquiry made within the 
field of Archimedean equilibrium concerning the application of the law of the lever, 
according to which geometrical objects stand in equilibrium at distances that are 
inversely proportional to their extensions. This constitutes one of the foundational 
principles of statics imported into a geometrical context. My emphasis focuses on the 																																																								
9 For the approach, see further Contessa 2007 and 2010. 
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fact that Archimedes should be held among the first authors to give importance to the 
heuristic and mechanical meaning of geometrical demonstrations. His heuristic practice 
can be read as a ‘physicization’ of mechanics, which allows us to consider only the 
quantitative relations between bodies, without considering some of their attributes (e.g. 
mass and spatial dimension).  
Chapter 3 next introduces the restoration phase of the ancient Greek mathematical 
tradition and the legacy of Archimedes between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
period. In particular, this Chapter is dedicated to the School of Urbino and its 
rediscovery of the ancient Archimedean treatises, not only from a philological but also 
from both a mathematical and a speculative point of view. In order to show the different 
approach of the Renaissance towards mechanics, and the use that scholars made of the 
notion of the centre of gravity, our focus will lie with the practical and theoretical 
contributions that Renaissance scientific humanism provided: i) in consolidating the 
new way of doing and conceiving mechanics; and ii) in the second stage of the 
objectification of procedure, namely that, as can be seen in several treatises published 
between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by Urbino School mathematicians – such 
as Federico Commandino and Guidobaldo dal Monte – it was possible to switch 
attention onto the practical use we can make of geometrical elements, such as the centre 
of gravity. This notion became fundamental in various practical contexts linked to the 
scienza de ponderibus (science of weights), the aim of which was to solve and formalize 
static problems concerning heavy bodies, with particular reference to those hanging 
from a balance. Moreover, the concept of the centre of gravity is also useful to solve the 
so-called “Equilibrium Controversy”, which addresses the question whether or not a 
deflected balance will return to its horizontal position, a controversy which, though it 
had already seen its birth during the Medieval period, was only during the Renaissance, 
and following the rediscovery of all the Archimedean corpus on statics and hydrostatics, 
applied to the science of machines and to other purely practical contexts. It is only at the 
end of the Renaissance, at the turn of the seventeenth century, that the work of Luca 
Valerio promoted the introduction of a philosophical, almost epistemological, debate 
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over the meaning of physical properties applied in a formalized mathematical context. 
The Renaissance mathematicians worked towards the foundational programme of 
constructing an epistemological debate about the analysis of the conditions under which 
mathematical principles can and should be considered to be true of physical things. A 
purely mathematical treatment of physical reality was achievable due to the awareness 
that, in contrast, a solely empirical and mechanical approach is insufficient to 
understanding the ways in which the physical world behaves.  
Chapter 4 is devoted to modern rational mechanics. In pursuing the aim of 
understanding what it takes to develop a mathematical representation of nature by 
means of an idealized and abstract model, we will see that seventeenth-century 
mathematical physics represents the framework for the completion of the third stage of 
the objectification of procedure, insofar as it was at this time that the centre of gravity 
became an independent object of study as the point mass , i.e. as an idealized entity 
used to represent physical objects and to which we can ascribe natural properties, such 
as volumetric extension, mass and forces. The point mass is still a representational 
geometrical point whose features are idealized, but it now assumes the role of being an 
independent object of research, which is useful for building the foundational principles 
of rational mechanics. We shall see how Galileo was able to shift the investigative 
methodology used in the field of mechanics to a more theoretical and physical 
perspective, by showing how the purely practical operations carried out through 
machinery could be used to interpret the working principles behind nature. Or, in other 
words, within Galileo’s research we can observe that he uses machines as aids in a bid 
to confer a discursive structure onto the phenomenal world. 
Within the second part of this chapter, I will examine the more metaphysical 
contributions of Thomas Hobbes concerning the rule of human imagination in building 
our representational model of physical phenomena and the point mass. Finally, in the 
last part of this chapter, I will examine the way in which the model of the point mass 
began to be used from a purely mathematical point of view, in order to represent, with 
purely algebraic language, a series of states of affairs which were not only made up of 
	 10 
simple rigid bodies, but which were also typified by a higher level of complexity. This 
represents the climax of the procedure of objectification of our centre of gravity. Now it 
is no longer a geometrical tool shifted along the arms of a real mechanical balance, but 
instead a mathematical entity, investigative tool and a model of intelligibility – which is 
explicitly introduced for the first time in Newton’s and Euler’s research – that has two 
main characteristics: i) it is the centre of mass of any rigid body, no matter how it is 
shaped; and ii) it is the point of applicability of all the forces – gravity, works, pressure 
and so on – acting on a stationary or a moving body, be it travelling in uniform motion, 
in a state of acceleration or in parabolic motion.  
The analysis of this scientific practice allows us to reach the conclusion that models 
serve to understand how the world works and not to help us argue about the ontological 
claims of what we can observe or think about the nature of the physical world itself. 
Models have an epistemic value that is strongly dependent on the interpretation that we 
– as users – attribute them with respect to their specific and (crucially) context-
dependent rules.  
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C h a p t e r  1  	
Mode l s  f or  Sc i en t i f i c  Represen ta t ion  
 
 
In mechanics we investigate the velocity of a moving body or the length of the path 
covered by a moving body by neglecting or omitting a series of quantitative or 
qualitative properties, because we deem them superfluous to the purpose at hand. 
Population biologists study the evolution of a species which procreates at a constant rate 
by considering it as an isolated ecosystem. These descriptions are descriptions of a 
modelled system, and scientists use models to represent aspects of the real world’s 
system.  
 Most philosophers of science today seem to agree on two basic points. The first is 
that models play a central role in science, in that they are one of the primary means by 
which scientists represent the world in a mathematical form. The second is that models 
are not truth-apt, or, in other words, they are not capable of being true or false due to the 
fact that they are not linguistic entities, and therefore scientific models are much more 
like portraits or representations than something capable of being true or false. Indeed 
they can be defined only as more or less accurate or faithful to reality. However, this 
has not always been so. In fact, up until the 1960s, models did not play a central role in 
what we now standardly call the philosophy of science. Rather, scholars only began to 
acknowledge the importance of models with increasing attention after the decline of the 
so-called Received View of theories.10 This line of argument was more emphatically 
considered a mature version of logical empiricism, according to which the proper 
characterisation of a scientific theory consisted of an axiomatisation in first-order logic. 
In other words, scientific theories are portrayed as semi-interpreted formal systems, or 
as sets of axioms which house empirical rules of interpretation. As Morgan and 
Morrison write, “[t]he theory itself was explicated in terms of its logical form with the 																																																								
10 See further Putnam 1962. 
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meanings or semantics given by an additional set of definitions, the correspondence 
rules. That is to say, although the theory consisted of a set of sentences expressed in a 
particular language, the axioms were syntactically describable.”11 One way to work out 
these problems was to provide a semantics for a theory (T) by specifying a model (M) 
for the theory, that is, by specifying an interpretation on which all the axioms of the 
theory are true. Instead of formalising the theory in accordance with first-order logic, 
one defines the intended class of models for a particular theory. Since the 1960s, the 
Semantic View of theories, which is considered nowadays the mainstream view 
concerning the structure of scientific theories, has become dominant.12 By ‘semantic’, 
we refer to the fact that a model provides a realisation through which the theory is 
satisfied. This is so because the notion of a model is defined in terms of truth. In other 
words, the claims made by a theory are true in the model, and in order for M to be a 
model, this condition must hold. This also brings us back around to the second item on 
which philosophers of science seem to agree, namely that models are not truth-apt. As 
Giere puts it: 
 
Semantic notions such as meaning and truth entered the logical empiricist picture of theories only 
indirectly by means of the interpretative rules employed. A minimal sort of interpretation serves to 
introduce the important semantic notions of “structure” and “model”. Imagine some axioms 
formulated in a simple first-order language, L. A structure for L is a set of objects, O, and a function 
that assigns subsets of O to one-place predicates of L, ordered pairs of objects to two-place relations, 
and so on. A model of a theory T, expressed as axioms in L, is any structure in which the axioms of 
T are true. The concept of model, being defined in terms of truth, is therefore a semantic, as opposed 
to syntactic, concept. Whether any given structure is indeed a model of T requires independent 
determinations of the truth of axioms. This may be done mathematically if O is a set of 
mathematical entities, such as integers, or empirically if O is a set of physical objects, such as 
planets. In any case, models are non-linguistic entities – sets of objects, not set of statements.13  																																																								
11 Morgan and Morrison 1999, p. 2. 
12 Historically one of the first scientists who emphasised the role of models in science was R. B. 
Braithwaite in his book, Scientific Explanation. A study of the function of theory, probability and law in 
science (1968). We will return to this reconstruction in the next section. 
13 Giere 1988, p. 47. Giere’s view follows in Suppes’s footsteps, in stipulating that models are not 
linguistic entities. 
	 13 
  
Let me clarify some points to this approach. First, it was presented in three different 
variations, all of which related to the assumption that models are not truth-apt: i) Suppes 
1962; ii) van Fraassen 1967 and 1970; and iii) Giere 1988.14 Secondly, this view still 
allows for axiomatisation, provided that one can state a set of axioms whereby the 
models of these axioms are exactly the models in the defined class. One could still 
formulate axioms in a first-order language in the manner of the syntactic view; the 
difference, however, is that now it is the model – rather than the correspondence rule – 
that provides the interpretation for the axioms.  
Moreover, there is another commonly held view concerning the value of models, 
which dates back to the end of the last century. This is the so-called “models-as-
mediators” view, which focuses on what a model is in itself and how it is able to 
function in an autonomous way. Giving importance only to the relationship between 
theory and models draws our attention away from the processes of constructing models 
and manipulating them, both of which are nevertheless crucial in gaining information 
about the world, theories and the model itself.15 In addition, this account focuses on the 
ways that models and theories interact, in an attempt to understand the dynamics of 
modelling and its impact on the broader context of scientific practice. In other words, 
models hereby work as instruments of investigation, in mediating between abstract 
theories and a concrete target system.  
To sum up, models since the second half of the twentieth century have started to 
play a crucial role in the philosophy of science. Since models are non-linguistic entities, 
according to the general view advocated by semanticists, they can be designated as 
mind-independent objects and thus as part of the physical reality. However, according 
to the “models-as-mediators” account, the Semantic view does not provide a 
satisfactory account of the role provided by models in scientific practice. The question 
that arises at this point is: In virtue of what is a model to be considered a representation 																																																								
14 We will return to consider this tripartite division in the next section. Here I simply introduce the 
Semantic approach from a general perspective, in order to help the reader to focus the role that models 
play in the philosophy of science, and in no way do I claim the aim of completeness. 
15 Morgan and Morrison 1999, p. 8.	
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of something else? Or in other words: What is it for an object (that is not a word or a 
sentence) to represent a phenomenon scientifically? The last century’s literature has 
shown widespread disagreement over what it means to say that a certain model 
represents a certain state of affairs, as well as over how a certain model represents a 
certain system. As far as philosophers of science are concerned, the increased interest in 
the subject of scientific representation has disappointingly not been accompanied by an 
increase in our understanding of how models represent any particular target system of 
reality. The willing student in fact collides with a cluster of interpretations which all 
have different labels, such as the ‘inferential conception’ 16 , the ‘isomorphistic 
conception’17, the ‘similarity conception’18, and the ‘structural conception’.19 And so it 
seems very hard to find, even nearly a half-century later, a well-defined set of worked-
out solutions to the questions posed above. There is only one aspect that seems to 
connect all these different interpretations, namely the way in which scientists usually 
connect the data of physical reality with the abstract features of models, a process that 
requires at least two steps. These two steps are: i) interpretation, with the intention that 
elements of an abstract model are provided with general physical interpretations, such 
as mass, position and velocity; and ii) identification or denotation, namely of elements 
of a representational model which are identified with elements of the real system. In 
scientific practice, these two acts are not usually well distinguished, and hence one of 
the first issues to address should be whether or not we, as theorists of science, need to 
give a more detailed account of this dichotomy. In other words, are representational 
models directly related to empirical or observational data, or are they related to models 
of data?20 Even more precisely, does the interpretation of a model give us a specific 																																																								
16 Suárez 2004.  
17 van Fraassen 1980. 
18 Giere 1988. 
19 Suppes 1960-62.		
20 See Frigg and Hartmann 2010, p. 5, who writes: “A model of data is a corrected, rectified, regimented, 
and idealized version of the data we gain from immediate observation, the so-called raw data. 
Characteristically, one first eliminates errors (e.g. removes points from the record that are due to faulty 
observation) and then present the data in a ‘neat’ way, for instance by drawing a smooth curve through a 
set of points. These two steps are commonly referred to as ‘data reduction’ and ‘curve fitting’. When we 
investigate the trajectory of a certain planet, for instance, we first eliminate points that are fallacious from 
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account of some part of physical reality in itself, or do we need a certain set of context-
dependent rules, in order to interpret and translate the information derived from models 
to physical reality?  
 There are at least two different lines of thought here, which try to give an answer to 
these questions. On the one hand, some theorists account for a theory of representational 
models by which models stand for the physical reality in itself, and so in this respect 
models are considered as spatio-temporally independent entities. These theorists suggest 
that this line of argument recalls a realistic stance, inasmuch as their theories are based 
on the idea that there is an intrinsic relation between the vehicle and the target. By 
assuming that a model has a counterpart in physical phenomena, we are allowed to 
interpret knowledge relating to the model as knowledge regarding the target system in 
itself.  
 On the other hand, other scientists account for a different interpretation of the 
representational role of models. This viewpoint, which is known as the ‘agent-based 
construction’, has been most strongly advocated by Ronald Giere, who argues the 
following:  
 
[…] [I]t is tempting to think that there is a binary representational relationship between the model 
and a system in the real world that it represents. I [sc. R. Giere] agree[s] with Suárez (2003), 
however, that, whether based, for example, on either similarity or isomorphism, no such binary 
relationship exists. We need to introduce agents who consciously use the models to represent things. 
And once we have agents, we must consider the purposes for which they are doing the 
representing.21 
 
This second line of argument evokes firstly the idea that the model and the real situation 
are distinct, and secondly that, since the user can draw conclusions about the target from 
the observation and the examination of the vehicle, it is therefore symptomatic that a 
																																																																																																																																																																		
the observation records and then fit a smooth curve to the remaining ones. Models of data play a crucial 
role in confirming theories because it is the model of data and not the often messy and complex raw data 
that we compare to a theoretical prediction.” For further see Suppes 1962. 
21 Giere 2008, pp. 129-130.  
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vehicle is an epistemic representation of that target (for that user).22 This entails that the 
representational role of models and their epistemic functions derive from a triadic 
relation that involves a vehicle (the model), a user (i.e. an agent such as the scientist) 
and a target.  
 Despite the fact that, in the last twenty years or so, this issue has been one of the 
most discussed issues in the literature, and besides the fact that it is also one of the few 
issues on which theorists seem to agree23, this triadic relation has not been sufficiently 
taken into account in the present dissertation. To be exact, at least the cognitive role 
played by the user is neglected. However, our strategy shows affinities with both R. 
Giere and G. Contessa, inasmuch as it aims at looking at: i) the epistemological 
meaning of the representational role fulfilled by models, specifically the role played by 
the model of the point mass for representational purposes; and ii) the scientific practice, 
namely consideration of the point mass as a mind-dependent object, which exists only 
in the mind of the scientists and every user, and which is defined as a social 
construction, i.e. as the product of a deep theoretical analysis of the practice relating to 
the development of mechanics, physics and mathematics within a certain cultural 
context and a certain scientific community. In order to clarify the epistemological 
meaning of models as forms of representation, and the fact that the model building 
practice is rooted in scientific practice, our strategy is based on two factors. On the one 
hand, our approach will focus on the way in which a particular physical notion – the 
centre of gravity – has been used to solve geometrical and mechanical issues; and on the 
other hand, it will look at the way in which the model-building practice has become an 
accustomed modus operandi that takes its origins from the scientific practice. More 
precisely, our main hypothesis is that the model of the point mass takes its origins from 
an act of abstraction relating to the practical and mechanical techniques of weighing. 
 Our investigation converses with a significant part of this scientific practice, 
extending from ancient geometry to modern mathematical physics. It is only by looking 																																																								
22 Thanks for this point go to G. Contessa, who has clarified it in his doctoral dissertation, entitled 
Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and their Representational Function, published 
in 2007.  
23 See e.g. the work of Suárez 2002 and 2003; Frigg 2002; Giere 2004.  
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at the scientific practice, intended as it is as the technical development of a series of 
mechanical devices and instruments of precision, that we can describe the development 
of such a notion through three stages. We will call our working hypothesis the 
‘objectification of procedure’, a process which follows a historical reconstruction which 
will be presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 The result of this analysis, as it is presented in this chapter, is that, broadly 
speaking, a model of scientific representation is given by a cluster and an overlapping of 
model-building practices, despite the fact that idealization, abstraction, approximation, 
and so on, really have different meanings and functions. As we will see more clearly 
below, it will become evident that in the model-building, these processes can coexist 
and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
 Thus, the purpose of the remaining three chapters is twofold. Firstly our aim is to 
proceed through the three stages of the objectification of procedure, in order to find an 
answer to the following question: When and in which demonstrations does the idea of 
the material point – or point mass – stand out? This question is motivated by the 
attempt to undertake a plausible reconstruction of the point mass’s theoretical 
development. In this attempt, the idea is not to see in the geometrical notion of the 
centre of gravity – or barycentre – a precursor of the mathematical model of the point 
mass, but rather to look at the way in which the conception of the point mass has been 
treated in other fields of study, such as mechanics and physics, especially for practical 
purposes. Secondly, we shall review the scientific practice and its historical scientific 
purposes, in order to enquire into the theoretical origins of the ‘idealizing’ technique. 
Again here we are not looking for precursors; I do not mean to prove that there has to be 
an ‘inventor’, or that, given that idealization is usually labelled a ‘Galilean idealization’, 
this automatically means that it was invented by Galileo. In fact, we shall see that, in the 
work of Galileo, idealizations played an important role, but several affinities with his 
contemporaries’ theoretical techniques can be outlined. By highlighting the different 
performative components developed between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
we will gain a more complete picture of the different levels at which a representative 
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model functions.  
 The first item on the agenda is reviewed in § 1.1, namely a brief examination of the 
various perspectives relating to the structure of scientific theories. Directly related to 
this question, there is a second issue which represents the main interest of this chapter, 
that is the investigation of the role attributed to models, which are nowadays considered 
one of the principal instruments of modern science. More precisely, in § 1.2, we shall 
see the different kinds of modelling techniques (e.g. abstractions, idealizations and 
analogies) which are commonly used in scientific practice in order to represent physical 
reality and simplify computations. After this, § 1.3 will focus on the roles attributed to 
models, be it representational, explanatory or predictive. Here we will argue that models 
are used as surrogates of states of affairs which are taken into account for a certain 
purpose, i.e. as a source from which every user can infer conclusions specifically related 
to that model. These are conclusions which need to be translated by the users in 
advance, in order to reach some final scientific judgment about that part of reality in 
itself.24  
 
 
1.1 The Structure of Scientific Theories 
 
How does science represent the world? How does a scientific theory link itself to the 
world? What is the best characterisation of the composition and function of scientific 
theories? Which tools can and should be employed in order to describe and remodel 
scientific theories? Is the understanding of practice and the application of those tools 
necessary for a comprehension of the core structure of scientific theories? 
 In the last century there has been a notable increase in interest in questions of this 
kind. Within the philosophy of science, three families of perspective on the structure of 
scientific theory were operative: the Syntactic View, which is perhaps better known as 
the Received View, the Semantic View, and the Pragmatic View. The baptism of each of 																																																								
24 For further details, see Contessa 2007 and 2010. 
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these schools of thought is a result of how the three different aspects of language – the 
grammar, the meaning and the use of the whole language’s tools – are perceived to be 
dominant: each school stands respectively for theory as syntactic logical reconstruction 
(the Syntactic View), theory as semantically meaningful mathematical models (the 
Semantic View), and theory structured as complex and as closely tied to theory 
pragmatics in its function and context (the Pragmatic View).  
 According to the Syntactic View, which was mainly developed by Rudolf Carnap25 
and Carl Hempel26, later influenced by among others Hans Reichenbach27 and Otto 
Neurath28, and which emerged from the work of the Vienna Circle and Logical 
Empiricism29, the structure of a scientific theory is conceived as a reconstruction in 
terms of sentences cast in a meta-mathematical language. The axiomatic method for 
building the foundations of science includes various theoretical instruments, e.g. 
predicate logic, set theory, and model theory. The Syntactic View questions the logical 
language that should be used to recast any particular scientific theory. As Carnap puts it:  
 
[…] [P]hilosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science – that is to say, by the logical analysis of 
the concepts and sentences of the concept and sentences of the science, for the logic of science is 
																																																								
25 Above all Carnap 1939 and 1966 [reprinted in 1972].  
26 See e.g. Hempel 1958, pp. 142-163.  
27 Reichenbach 1938. 
28 Neurath 1932 [reprinted in 1983, pp. 91-99].	
29 Logical Empiricism is a philosophical movement that flourished between the 1920s and 1930s in Europe 
and in the 1940s and 1950s in the United States. It is acknowledged as the primary source for current 
investigation on this subject. Logical empiricism was explicitly “foundationalist” with regard to a 
different point. First of all, it was foundationalist in the sense of the logicist program of Principia 
Mathematica, published in 1910-12 by A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell; for them, logical notions are 
more basic and clear than mathematical ones. After this, Carnap, with his Logical Construction of the 
World (1928, 1967), having been inspired by Russell himself, attempted to develop a foundational 
program for the arithmetical dimension of every subject, such as geometry, physics, biology or 
psychology, and even sociology. They did not seem to doubt either that science needed philosophical 
foundations, or that they possessed an adequate method to the task. Moreover, they did not show any 
interest in a descriptive account of how science works. Rather their main aim was to provide science with 
logical and epistemological foundations. For an historical and concise overview of Logical Empiricism, 
see the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia: R. Creath, “Logical Empiricism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.); 
On line: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/logical-empiricism/.  
In addition to this brief overview, see Giere 1988, pp. 22-28. 
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nothing other than the logical syntax of the language.30 
 
Logical languages allow us to reconstruct theories which – by definition – are sets of 
sentences in a given logical domain language.31  
 The structure of a syntactic scientific theory consists of terms, sentences, and 
languages. The vocabularies for these separate components are of three kinds: 
theoretical, logical and observational. The theoretical concepts can be classificatory, 
comparative or quantitative. Logical terms include logical quantifiers and logical 
connectives. Predicates and relations are considered observational terms.  
 Terms are bound together into a triple set of possible sentences: theoretical 
sentences, correspondence sentences, and observational sentences. TS is defined as the 
set of theoretical sentences, including axioms, theorems, and laws of the theory.32 CS is 
defined as a set of correspondence sentences connecting theoretical sentences to 
observable phenomena or to the system of reality. Finally, OS is defined as the set of 
observational sentences which contains only observational vocabulary, and which may 
be further restricted in its logical strength, for example to first-order logic, or molecular 
sentences.33 
 The whole language’s domain of science consists of two kinds: the theoretical and 
non-observational language, LT, and the observational language, LO. This central 
distinction can be found in almost all the works published by Carnap on the Received 
View. 34  The former includes theoretical vocabulary, while the latter involves 
observational terms. Both of the languages contain logical terms. Moreover, the 																																																								
30 Carnap 1937, xiii.  
31 See for example Campbell 1920, p. 122; Hempel 1958, p. 46 and Carnap 1928, § 156.  
 These views have been denominated in many ways: the Received View by Putnam (1962), Hempel 
(1970) and Craver (2002); the Syntactic or Axiomatic View by van Fraassen (1970 and 1989 
respectively); the Syntactic View by Wessel (1976); the Standard Conception by Hempel (1970); the 
Orthodox View by Feigl (1970); and finally the Statement View by Moulines (1976, 2002) and 
Stegmüller (1976). 
32 Theoretical sentences include the laws of Newtonian mechanics and the laws of the Kinetic Theory of 
Gases, all suitably axiomatised. Primitive theoretical sentences (e.g. axioms) can be distinguished from 
derivative theoretical sentences.  
33 Carnap 1956, p. 41. 
34 See for example Carnap 1923, pp. 99-107; 1966, ch. 23. 
	 21 
theoretical language includes and is constrained by the logical calculus of the axiomatic 
system adopted and labelled as Calc. This calculus specifies the grammatical nature of 
sentences as well as appropriate deductive and non-ampliative inference rules, such as 
the modus ponens, which is pertinent to theoretical sentences; Calc can itself be written 
in theoretical sentences. A scientific theory is thus taken to be a syntactically formulated 
set of theoretical sentences (axioms, theorems, and laws) together with their 
interpretation by means of correspondence sentences. However, Carnap35 maintained 
that the bipartition between theoretical and observational language is not fixed because 
the choice of the observational domain is partially context-dependent.  
 The classical Carnapian view, however, assumes that there are at most countably 
many observable objects, and his suggestion was to map them “injectively to the natural 
number, and [to] trea[t] theoretical terms as applying only to the natural numbers and 
objects that can be constructed from the natural numbers with the help of Cartesian 
products or powerset.”36  
 The theoretical syntactic language aims at describing the structure of the world by a 
set of correspondence rules CS, whose functions are: i) to interpret the theoretical terms 
of the theories, and ii) to reduce the objects of physical reality to theoretical terms. 
However, in order to understand the vitality and the heterogeneity of physical reality, 
we need to understand the axiomatic system of physics. At this point, scientific theories 
require observational interpretation through correspondence rules, which are defined as 
a part of the scientific theories’ structure which serves as the glue between theories and 
observations.  
 From 1965 to 1969, Carl Gustav Hempel – who was also one of the main 
supporters of the Received View – had criticized and gradually abandoned the Received 
View not only in its theories but also due to its reliance on syntactic axiomatization, in a 
series of talks which were only published posthumously.37  
 Before entering into a detailed analysis of the reasons for the decline of the 																																																								
35 Carnap 1932, p. 224 [reprinted in 1987, pp. 457-470]. 
36 Lutz 2014, p. 5.	
37 The main supporters of the Semantic View regarding the structure of a scientific theory are Hempel 
1970 and Suppe 2000. 
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Syntactic View, let me first provide some historical remarks on the notion of ‘model’. 
The beginning of the tradition relating to models can be traced back to the second half 
of the nineteenth century, in particular to the works of scientists such as William 
Thomson, James Clerk Maxwell, Heinrich Hertz (especially), and Ludwig Boltzmann. 
Boltzmann’s article in the Encyclopedia Britannica is commonly associated with the 
belle époque of this ‘modelling attitude’, which has done nothing but continue to 
flourish and inform much scientific practice during the twentieth century (despite its 
philosophical detractors such as Pierre Duhem, who famously disparaged it in Duhem 
1906). Within the philosophy of science, this traditional approach mainly constituted 
opposition to logical empiricist reconstructions of knowledge that pursued this 
modelling tradition, and in its place continued to emphasise the essential role of models, 
model-building, and analogical reasoning in the sciences. Thus, for example, Norman 
Campbell’s masterly Physics: The Elements (1920) had a very considerable influence in 
advancing the case for modelling among some British scholars of the second half of the 
last century, such as Max Black (1954) and Mary Hesse (1962). During the 1950s, the 
Campbellian idea of models as an alternative interpretation of a certain calculus, i.e. that 
“if, for instance, we take the mathematics used in the kinetic theory of gases and 
reinterpret the terms of this calculus in a way that makes them refer to billiard balls, the 
billiard balls are a model of the kinetic theory of gases”38, was re-proposed by 
Braithwaite in his Scientific Explanation (eds. 1953 and 1968), in which he tries, above 
all, to explain the parts played by mathematical reasoning and by theoretical concepts 
and ‘models’ in the organisation of scientific theory. Braithwaite argues that what is 
needed is a preparedness to think explicitly about modes of thinking, and the way in 
which scientific language and symbolism is used in the expression of a scientific theory. 
He maintains that it signifies a great deal to show why theoretical concepts – i.e. atoms, 
electrons, forces acting on punctiform bodies or fields of force and so on – find their 
way into scientific theory and exactly how mathematico-logical deductions are 																																																								
38 R. Frigg and S. Hartmann, “Models in Science”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 
Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), p. 11;  
On-line at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/models-science/. 
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involved, in order both to give a precise meaning to the notion of a model for a 
scientific theory, and to discuss the proper and the improper use of such models. In the 
hierarchical structure delineated by Braithwaite, propositions of both the theory and the 
model are correlated via a one-to-one correspondence. Or to put this in other words, 
propositions which are logical consequences of propositions of the theory have 
correlates in the model which are logical consequences for the correlates in the model of 
these latter propositions in the theory, and vice versa. However, the theory and the 
model have different epistemological structures, inasmuch as, in the model, the prior 
logical premises determine the meaning of the terms that occur in the representation in 
the calculus of the conclusions; whereas in the theory, the logically posterior 
consequences determine the meaning of the theoretical terms that occur in the 
representation in the calculus of the premises. In order to clarify this point, Braithwaite 
uses the metaphor of the zip-fastener: the calculus is attached to the theory at the 
bottom, and the zip-fastener moves upwards; the calculus is attached to the model at the 
top, and the zip-fastener moves downwards. According to Braithwaite,39 to think about a 
scientific theory by thinking about a model represents an alternative to thinking about 
the theory by explicitly thinking about the calculus that represents it. For to think about 
the model is to think about an interpretation of the calculus which functions with respect 
to the order in which the interpretation is effected, as well as with respect to the order of 
deduction in the same direction as the order-deriving formulae within the theory. The 
model is a straightforward interpretation of the calculus, and has its own advantages 
because it avoids the complications and difficulties involved in having to think 
explicitly about the language or other forms of symbolism by which the theory is 
																																																								
39 In this respect Braithwaite refers to Hertz, who says that “we make for ourselves internal pictures or 
symbols of external objects, and we make them of such a kind that the necessary consequences in thought 
of the pictures are always the pictures of the necessary consequences in nature of the object pictured [...] 
when on the basis of our accumulated previous experience we have succeeded in constructing pictures 
with the desired properties, we can quickly derive by means of them, as by means of models, the 
consequences which in the external world would only occur in the course of a long period of time or as a 
result of our own intervention.” This quotation comes from Hertz 1894, the English trans. of which dates 
back to 1899, p. 1.   
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represented.40 Braithwaite, following in Hertz’s footsteps, stood among the advocates of 
the idea that the correctness or incorrectness of images – or models, which are a product 
of our mind – are both contained in the results of experience, which is in turn used to 
build up the images itself. In other words, the correctness of the model can be tested 
from this perspective only a posteriori to an empirical investigation. 
 The philosophers of science in the 1960s do not desist in thinking in terms of 
models, and the reason for the decline of the Received View relies on the fact that the 
advocates of the opposite Semantic View asked themselves the question, Why should we 
imprison mathematics and mathematical scientific theory in a syntactically defined 
language, when we could directly investigate the mathematical objects, relations, and 
functions of scientific theories?41 Moreover, according to the semanticists, the main gap 
in the syntacticists’ thought was that they did not consider methods of data acquisition, 
experiments, and measurements to be philosophically interesting. To state this point 
more exactly, Frederick Suppe42 summarized the main lines of the Positivistic Received 
View’s failure as follows:  
 
1) its observational-theoretical distinction is untenable;  
2) correspondence rules constitute a heterogeneous confusion of relationships 
of meaning, experimental design, measurement, and causal relationships, 
some of which are not properly parts of theories; 
3) the notion of partial interpretation that is associated with more liberal 
correspondence rules is incoherent;  
4) theories are non-axiomatic systems;  
5) symbolic logic is an inappropriate formalism;  
6) theories are non-linguistic entities and thus theories are individuated 
incorrectly.  
 																																																								
40 Braithwaite 1968, pp. 88-93. 
41 On which see further Suppe 2000, pp. 102-115. 
42 Ibid.	
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Therefore, the main objection which attracted them towards the Carnapian stance was 
that, although they had already reached an extremely high level in syntactical 
interpretation, its semantic account “was a mere impressionistic story, not yet described 
with any formal rigor.”43 Indeed, the only linguistic component in this account that 
received a direct semantic interpretation was – according to Suppe and the semanticists 
in general – the Observational Vocabulary OS. Hence, according to Suppe the main limit 
of the syntacticists was that they usually adjusted their logical analysis according to the 
observable reality they wanted to express by means of the theoretical language’s 
components. However, Fano has expressed the idea that the Received View still 
represents the best approach we have for understanding the empirical meaning of 
theoretical models, insofar as it plays a normative role in defining objectively which 
scientific concept (or concepts) we – as users – should assimilate.44  
 However, for those who supported the Semantic View, the basic question remained 
unchanged: Which mathematical tools – currently called models – are actually used in 
science?  
 Broadly speaking, the Semantic View “identifies theories with certain kinds of 
abstract theory structures, such as configurated state space, standing in mapping 
relations to phenomena. Theory structures and phenomena are referents of linguistic 
theory-formulations.”45 According to the semanticist, the idea is that the whole set of a 
theory has a structure identifiable with suitably connected families of models. Some 
proponents of the Semantic View move the meta-mathematical apparatus from 
predicate logic to set theory. Others insist that the structure of scientific theory has to be 
purely mathematical in nature. The main points of agreement have been the following: 
i) that models are non-linguistic entities in the sense specified earlier; and ii) that, for an 
empirical understanding of the world, we should analyse theory structures by employing 
models rather than predicate logic. The semanticist’s efforts mainly consist in analysing 
																																																								
43 Lutz 2014, p. 8.	
44 Fano 2005, pp. 71-72. 
45 Suppe 2000, p. 105. 
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the mathematical structures, functions, objects and relations at the very basis of any 
scientific theory.  
 To state this in greater detail, as we have already said in the previous section, the 
Semantic View comes in three formulations: i) Suppes (1962), ii) Van Fraassen (1967 
and 1970) and iii) Giere (1988). All of these formulations aim at understanding and 
promoting a plausible theory in reply to the following problem: How do we connect 
theory and data by means of observation and experimental and measuring techniques? 
Each author attempts this task by using different strategies of characterising and 
comprehending a theory’s structure from a semanticist point of view, respectively the 
set/model-theoretical approach, the state-space approach, and the pragmatic and 
cognitive approach. Let us survey what was accomplished by each of these approaches. 
 On the one hand, the set-model theoretical approach derived predominantly from 
the work of Tarski and was later articulated by Suppes and his associates.46 Set theory 
denotes a general language for formalizing mathematical structures as a cluster or 
collection of abstract objects. Model theory investigates the relations between formal 
axioms, theorems, and laws of a particular theory, as well as models (i.e. mathematical 
structures) which provide an interpretation of that theory, or otherwise which make 
theory’s axioms, theorems and laws true. 
With regard to the second program, there are a few items that deserve our attention, 
which can help us to understand ‘why’ and ‘how’ the Syntactic View was eventually 
replaced. Firstly, the semantic conception abandoned the corresponding rule in favour 
of an enquiry into the epistemology of experimental design, data analysis, 
instrumentation, and calibration. Secondly, the goal of the semanticists was to map the 
relations between a configured state-space and a system within the theory’s scope. 
Thirdly, they investigated the semantic relations between theories, their formulations, 
and the reality without making any excessive ontological commitments. In this way, a 
leading semanticist such as van Fraassen could argue in favour of the idea that not all 
the elements constituting a theory have a direct relation with an ontological state of 																																																								
46 van Fraassen 1989, p. 67.  
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affairs in physical reality. With regard to this point, van Fraassen in 1967 undertook to 
find a solution by using a method which he labelled ‘semi-interpreted languages’, 
according to which “languages are interpreted as referring to logical spaces providing 
full semantic interpretations for theorising languages. Ontological commitments are left 
unconstrained, being a matter of which logical-space points one wishes ontologically to 
commit.”47 Fourthly, the semantic view generated the so-called realism/antirealism 
controversy.48 Fifthly, thanks to the semantic view, a better understanding of modality in 
science has now been reached. Thus, according to the proponents of the semantic view, 
scientific theory can be reduced to meta-mathematical language. The state-space 
approach emphasises the mathematical models of actual science, and draws a clear line 
between mathematics and meta-mathematics. For this reason, the structure of a 
scientific theory is identified with a cluster of mathematical models which constitute it, 
rather than with any meta-mathematical axioms which are “yoked to a particular 
syntax”.49 To be precise, a state-space is defined as a N-dimensional space, where each 
of the variables of a theory corresponds to a single dimension and each point in that 
space represents a possible state of a real system. An actual, real system can take on, 
and change, states according to different kinds of laws, namely the laws of succession, 
which determine possible trajectories through that space the laws of co-existence, which 
specify the permitted regions of the total space; and the laws of interaction, which 
combine multiple laws either of succession or of co-existence, or of both. For the 
advocates of the state-space approach, meta-mathematics has to be considered as a part 
of mathematics.  																																																								
47 Suppe 2000, p. 106.  
48 The realist/antirealist debate concerns the nature of the relationship between theory structures and the 
world, and it involves ontological commitments associated with theories. The realist account claims that 
some sorts of similarities exist between models and phenomena in the real world; moreover, those 
similarities are restricted only to the observable aspects of the world. More precisely, the realist stance 
identifies Loc functions onto every state variables, and maintains that a theory is empirically true only in 
the case that a theory structure allows state transitions to be identical to those possibly occurring in the 
actual world. There has to be a direct relation between the Loc functions and the observables. Moreover, 
the semantic theory requires the compliance that a theory has to be empirically adequate: “If W is that 
portion of reality to which one attaches Loc functions, the image M* of W is among the models 
comprising the theory.” See van Fraassen 1980, 1989 and Suppe 1989, 1998. 
49 In the words of van Fraassen 1989, p. 366. 
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Thirdly, Giere’s account also emphasises the non-linguistic character of models, 
but it differs in construing them in slightly less abstract terms. From his point of view, 
the idealized systems described in mechanics texts, such as the simple harmonic 
oscillator, constitute a model. As such the model perfectly satisfies the equations of 
motion for the oscillator in the way that the logicians’ model satisfies the axioms of a 
theory. Models come in varying degrees of abstraction: for example, the simple 
harmonic oscillator has only a linear restoring force, while the damped oscillator 
incorporates both a restoring and a damping force. These models function as 
representations in “one of the more general senses now current in cognitive 
psychology”.50  
 Each of these approaches aims at analysing the way in which theories posit a 
relationship with the physical world, or how the theory fulfills its epistemological 
commitments: How do we face the problem of explaining the relationship between 
models and theories? With regard to this demand, three types of analysis of theory 
interpretation deserve our attention: i) a hierarchy of models, which is mainly supported 
by Patrick Suppes51 and Frederick Suppe52; ii) the isomorphistic approach, which is 
advocated by Bas van Fraassen53, Steven French and James Ladyman54 and iii) the 
similarity approach, which is promoted by Ronald Giere55 and Michael Weisberg.56 Here 
I will only point out the main advantages of each interpretation, without entering deeply 
into this debate.  
 The hierarchy of models presents an internal structure which includes axioms and 
models of theory, models of experiments, and models of data. The similarity analysis of 
theory interpretation combines both semantic and pragmatic dimensions.57 In particular, 
Giere argues that the interpretation of a theory is mediated by theoretical hypotheses 																																																								
50 Giere 1988, p. 80.  
51 Suppes 1962, pp. 252-261 [reprinted in 1969, pp. 24-35].  
52 Suppe 1977. 
53 van Fraassen, 1980 and 1989. 
54 French and Ladyman, 1997, 1999, 2003. 
55 Giere 1988; Id., 2004, pp. 742-752; and Giere, Bickle, and Mauldin 2006.   
56 Weisberg 2013.   
57 Giere 1988; Id., 2004; Id., 2010; Giere, Bickle, and Mauldin 2006; and Weisberg 2013.   
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which posit representational relations between a model and a relevant part of the 
physical system. Such a relation may be stated as follows: S, as a scientist, uses X, as a 
model-vehicle, to represent W, as a piece of the world, for a certain purpose, P. This 
approach also takes into account the cognitive role performed by the research group: 
what the scientist writes and says, the different aspects of her scientific epistemology, 
the historical developments, purely theoretical features, as well as sociological and 
cultural attributes. Finally, the isomorphistic-theoretical interpretation aims to give a 
one-to-one bi-jective mapping between two structures or sets, that is between 
observable phenomena and empirical substructures, which are themselves isomorphic 
with one or more theoretical models. 
 
Finally, the Pragmatic View outlines the idea that a scientific theory has both an internal 
and an external complex structure: mathematical components, while often present, are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for characterising the core structure of scientific 
theories. A theory also consists of a rich variety of non-formal components such as 
analogies and natural kinds. Thus, the pragmatists argue that a proper analysis of the 
grammar – or syntax – and of the meaning – or semantics – of theories must pay 
attention to the complexity of scientific theories, as well as to the various assumptions, 
purposes, values, and practices which inform them. A central question for adherents of 
this view is: Which theoretical components and which models of theorising are present 
in scientific theories, as they are found across a variety of disciplines? Following here 
the lead of Nancy Cartwright, models are held to present the appropriate level of 
investigation for philosophers who are trying to understand science. Cartwright also 
claims that the laws of nature hardly ever turn out to be true – as if they were semantic 
objects – and, moreover, that these laws are considered to be epistemically weak: “to 
explain a phenomenon is to find a model that fits it into the basic framework of the 
theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for the messy and complicated 
phenomenological laws which are true of it.”58 According to the pragmatist’s position, in 																																																								
58 Cartwright 1983, p. 152. 
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order to have a better understanding of the physical reality, we should focus on models 
rather than theories, on model practice or on the process of model building.  
 For these reasons, they consider models as mediators between the theory and the 
world:  
  
[…] [M]ediation models always stand between theory and the physical world. Their main function is 
to enable us to apply scientific theories to natural phenomena. A mediation model often involves a 
novel conception of a particular physical phenomenon that facilitates the application of some 
established physical theory to such a phenomenon.59  
 
In her Mediating Models, Margaret Morrison has identified three main stipulations of 
this mediating theory: i) the construction of models is not theory-driven; ii) the model 
does not necessitate a physical counterpart in the domain of empirical data; and iii) 
mediating models differ from other types of models because they can replace the 
physical system under consideration as the central objects of scientific enquiry.60 
 Then, over the years and especially since the 1960s onwards, an increased interest 
has been registered in models, model-building practice, and a whole series of connected 
theoretical, ontological and metaphysical issues.  
 While the purpose of this opening section was to give a brief overview of the 
different approaches applied to the structure of scientific theories, in the next section we 
will adhere to the model-building practice, focusing on models rather than theories. We 
have seen that the problem of scientific theory structure is a rich and yielding topic, 
because, although these three views seems to be in competition with one another and to 
be mutually exclusive, they indeed aim at the same broad issue: to give a plausible 
description of the world. They simply try to focus on different aspects and questions 
relating to the structure of scientific theories. In this respect, their goals can be 
considered complementary and overlapping. 
 For my purpose relating to scientific practice, it seems that only Giere and 																																																								
59 Suárez 1999, p. 169.  
60 See further Morgan and Morrison 1999 and Suárez 2016.  
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Cartwright have a clear understanding of what should be the epistemic role of models. 
Specifically, according to Giere, the axiomatic account fails to capture (let us say for 
example) the correct structure of classical mechanics. In other words, general laws of 
physics like Newton’s laws or the Schrodinger equation are not descriptions of real 
systems, but rather part of the characterisation of models, which can in turn represent 
different kinds of real systems. But a law such as F=ma does not by itself define a 
model of anything; we need in addition specific force functions, boundary conditions, 
approximations, and so on. Only when these conditions are added – by the user – can a 
model be compared with a real system.61  
 
 
1.2 Models and Model-Building Practice 
 
“Science represents the phenomena, and it does so by providing a mathematical form.”62 
Models are of central importance in theoretical science for practical purposes, in order 
to make predictions and explanations. They are – broadly speaking – abstract, idealized, 
approximated or simplified physical tools, or, as they have been otherwise defined, they 
are surrogate structures that can potentially represent the variety of real-world 
phenomena. Many different things can be employed in model building, such as 
physically constructed scale models (which can also be called heuristic and mechanical 
models), model organisms, and mathematical objects such as sets of trajectories through 
a state-space. In addition to model building, some other questions merit further 
investigation: i) Are models “autonomous agents”?63 ii) Are they complements of 
theories? iii) Should models be constructed prior to theories? iv) Are they useful to 
adopt when theories become too complex to handle? and v) Do models yield results to 
problems in which theories remain silent?64 Model building is sometimes considered an 
art and not a mechanical or mathematical procedure, insofar as in model-building, we 																																																								
61 Giere 1988.  
62 van Fraassen 2004, p. 1.  
63 For this question, cf. further Morgan and Morrison 1999, pp. 38-65. 
64 Ibid. 
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can recognise at least two different moments: firstly, on the basis of pure observation, 
one can build up by means of a bottom-up approach a model having general features; 
and secondly after this, one can integrate the model in the theory. Only upon the 
completion of this second phase does the theory produce new models with a reverse 
approach, i.e. top-down.   
 As we have seen in the previous section, in the first half of the last century, 
physical reality was interpreted mostly by giving attention to the structure of scientific 
theories. But in the last fifty years, philosophers of science have become newly devoted 
in their efforts in this new direction. Despite the abundance of questions and models 
seen in the approaches above, there is something on which scientists can unanimously 
agree, namely that the purpose of models is the same: they are new theoretical tools 
used to build knowledge on physical phenomena, and are considered to be one of the 
leading instruments of science. Some well-known examples of this purpose include the 
billiard ball model of gas, the Bohr model of atom, the Lotka-Volterra model of 
predator-prey interaction, the double helix model of DNA, and so on. Models consist of 
a compound of elements belonging to different ontological categories and deriving from 
an overlapping of different procedures.  
 In 1960 Patrick Suppes published A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of 
Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences, whose aim was to point out that the 
meaning and the use of models can be interpreted as being the same in the empirical 
sciences as it was in mathematics, and, more precisely, as it was in mathematical logic. 
It may be that it is impossible to place the several uses of the world ‘model’ under a 
single concept, as exhibited by the quotations given by Suppes in his essay. However, 
according to the author, one common pre-existing tendency is “to confuse or to 
amalgamate what logicians would call the model and the theory of the model.”65 Not 
only this, but the lack of a homogeneous interpretation of the nature and role of models 
in science also entails that it would be a challenge to argue that all occurrences of the 
term ‘model’ have exactly the same sense. Our aim, therefore, is first of all to provide a 																																																								
65 Suppes 1962, p. 3. 
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clear and thorough conceptual definition of the point mass, and thereafter to clarify to 
what extent we consider it to be a model for epistemic representation. Then, in Chapters 
2, 3 and 4, we will be able to show that the theoretical notion of the point mass 
corresponds to what we call an idealized model, i.e. idealized in the sense that it is a 
geometrical point having 0-dimension, to which we can ascribe certain physical features 
(e.g. mass and forces acting upon it), and which itself derives from a process of 
abstraction as a result of the scientific practice. Thus, by looking at the use that the 
Greeks made of the geometrical centre of gravity for heuristic purposes, and the use to 
which Renaissance mathematicians put the centre of gravity for mechanical and 
practical aims, we will discover that in both Newton’s and Euler’s rational mechanics, 
the centre of gravity fulfils the role of the point mass as a model for representing not 
only simple physical and moving bodies but also more complex physical states of 
affairs.  
 Hence, despite this heterogeneity of approaches highlighted by Suppes, the 
essential purpose of models remains unchanged: they are vehicles for learning about the 
world. Significant parts of scientific investigations are carried out through models rather 
than through reality itself, because, by studying a model, we can discover features of, 
and ascertain facts about, the system for which the model stands. In other words, models 
allow for surrogative reasoning.66 Moreover, there are neither any fixed and exact rules 
or recipes for model building, nor any singular activity of figuring out what fits together 
and how an opportunity presents itself to learn about the model. However, by following 
this commitment to the model-building practice, and by emphasising the point laid 
down by Gabriele Contessa, I will hereafter argue in favour of the idea that once the 
model is built, we no longer learn about the properties of reality in itself, but rather we 
have to use and manipulate the model in order to elicit its secrets and discover 
																																																								
66 See further Swoyer 1991, pp. 449-508. In Contessa [2007, p. 51] we find the following definition: 
“[S]urrogative reasoning is the expression introduced by Chris Swoyer (1991) to designate those cases in 
which someone uses one object, the vehicle of representation, to learn about some other object, the target 
of representation. A good example of a piece of surrogative reasoning is the case in which someone uses 
a map of the London Underground to find out how to get from one station on the London Underground 
network to another.”  
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something new about ontology67 and the realistic commitments relating to the physical 
world.68 
 Now, the several different categories of models which are currently in circulation 
are not mutually exclusive, since, for instance, some idealized models can also be 
qualified as abstract models. In recent years many authors have attempted to find a strict 
criterion by which to draw a dividing line between idealization, abstraction, 
approximation, and so on. Indeed, in what follows I will define the different kinds of 
models, and our efforts will focus not on producing a regimented set of these definitions 
on which these philosophers of science do not stand in unison, but rather on promoting 
an overview of the modelling techniques in order to support our aims of developing a 
systematic account of scientific practice. In fact, in order to show the scientific practice 
that underlies the conceptual development of the point mass model, the scheme 
presented in the next three chapters captures a significant part of the scientific practice 
of mechanics. From ancient Archimedean geometry, which is characterised by an 
heuristic and mechanical stance rather than a synthetic Euclidean approach, we will pass 
through the Renaissance equilibrium controversy, the chief aim of which was to 
regiment the foundational principles of statics by focusing on the operative principles of 
machines, to conclude with modern Newtonian mathematical physics, characterised as 
it is by the application of purely mathematical methods to problems (esp. problems of a 
kinematic and dynamic nature) in physics. In this way, the epistemological debate will 
come to the fore concerning the model-building practice together with the 
epistemological meaning we attribute to such mathematical entities as the point mass as 
a model of representation.  
 The differences in meaning among the variety of models arises from a range of 
different questions, both semantic (i.e. what is the representational function that models 
perform?), ontological (i.e. what kind of things are models?) and epistemological (i.e. 
how do we learn and gain knowledge from models?) in nature. We must also encounter 																																																								
67 The problem of the ontology of models has been widely discussed: see recently in particular Contessa 
2007 and 2010. 
68 Among other advocates of this idea, see also Giere 1988. 
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at this stage more general claims, such as the kinds of connections which stand between 
models and reality. 
 In order to reply to these challenges and show the variety of model-building 
practices, let us now turn to see the main types of models that are exhibited in the 
scientific literature.  
 
 Idealizations  
Firstly, we have idealized models, sometimes called ‘theoretical models’, which are 
built with the help of theoretical principles. Ronald Giere suggests that we take as an 
example of a theoretical model the use of the term ‘body’ introduced by Newton, when 
he asked whether this term referred to empirical objects, such as cannon balls and 
planets, or to abstract objects. Now, these objects satisfy the laws of motion, the laws of 
universal gravitation, and so on. Moreover, the generalization of the laws allows us to 
say that these objects function as general objects and are built on the basis of common 
elements in the target system of the real world. For example, Newton’s bodies are 
considered as point masses. No real objects can be point masses. Any real classical 
objects with mass must be somewhat extended. So in order to apply Newtonian models 
to real objects, one must treat their mass as being concentrated at their centre of mass, 
which is ideally a geometrical point with 0-dimension. This also supports the 
interpretation of Newton’s laws as defining idealized abstract objects, rather than as 
describing real objects.69  
 The main object of study in this approach concerns the Galilean idealizations, 
which are those that involve “deliberate distortions”. 70  Physicists build models 
consisting of point masses – as in the case of Newtonian bodies – before moving on 
frictionless planes, while economists assume that agents are omniscient, biologists study 
																																																								
69 Giere 1999, p. 50. This line of argument is indeed the one that we will follow in the rest of this 
dissertation.  
70 This deliberative operation seems to evoke Giere’s and Contessa’s attempts to define a model as the 
product of a triadic relation that involves the idealized model, a user and the modelled system. However, 
in the literature that refers to Galilean idealization, there are no traces of this cognitive or interpretational 
approach.  
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isolated populations, and so on. It was a characteristic of Galileo’s approach to science 
– as we will see extensively in Chapter 4 – to use simplifications of this sort, in the 
cases in which a real situation was too complicated to tackle it.  
 Idealization can be defined as “a real or fictitious idealizing system, distinct from 
the target system, whose properties provide an inexact description of the target 
system”.71 Idealization usually neglects pragmatic considerations which scientists judge 
to be relevant or essential for the simplicity of the description or the “intelligibility of 
the idealizing system”. According to Martin Jones, idealization requires first and 
foremost the misrepresentation of the physical system. However, since not all 
misrepresentations can properly be called idealizations, we should find a way to codify 
the use of this term by supplying some necessary conditions that can help us to 
recognise to what extent an idealization differs from an abstraction or an approximation.  
 Jones gives an example to argue in favour of a distinction between idealization and 
abstraction. Imagine that there is a certain cannon that is wheeled onto an open plain 
and fired. In the attempt to ‘predict’ where the cannonball will land, or perhaps 
alternatively to ‘explain’ why it lands where it does, we might construct a model of the 
system along the following lines. We assume that the path of the cannonball can be 
contained within a Cartesian system, which takes as its x-axis the level along the ground 
and has its y-axis pointing vertically upwards. In our assumption, we also suppose that 
the cannonball moves solely under the influence of gravity, which exerts a force 
vertically downwards with a magnitude of mg throughout the motion. By following a 
very straightforward calculation on the basis of Newton’s second law, we can calculate 
the time of flight of the cannonball and the distance from the cannon at which it will 
land. The model delineated by Jones contains several idealizations; it actually neglects 
all the forces which act on the cannonball except the earth’s gravitational effect, 
whereas in reality other massive bodies, such as the moon and the sun, exert a force on 																																																								
71 Norton 2012, p. 3. Norton specifies that this is not a definition of the process of idealization, and that 
actually very few theorists seem to be interested in this topic. However, as Norton himself says, 
idealization (as well as approximation) is considered to be something that specifies important properties 
of the target we want to model. This said, it neglects to identify, for example, how inexact a description 
may become, before we cease to admit it as an approximation of some target system.  
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the cannonball. Thus, we here spot “discrepancies between the way the model in 
question represents the model[l]ed system as being, and the way the system really is.”72 
The misrepresentation given by the idealized system is generally related to some 
features which the system has, which the model in turn represents it as not having, or 
rather some features that the system does not have, which the model represents it as 
having. For example, a point mass is in this respect an idealization, because we ascribe 
to a simple geometrical point some physical features in order to confer upon it a 
representational function. This suggests that a misrepresentation can be considered an 
approximation to the truth,73 but idealization aims to be a simplification of the modelled 
system, and from simplicity derives tractability. By tractability, we mean that the model 
has to be a misrepresentation of some of the relevant features of the reality. These 
relevant features are ones with an explanatory or predictive power. The aim of a model 
is to have a high level of applicability, with the result that the less complex the model is, 
the more applicable it will be. To explain this in greater detail, if a model has a high 
range of application, it means that it has a very general structure, which in turn allows 
the scientist to use it in order to represent or adapt it for prediction on a greater number 
of different phenomena.  
 
 Abstractions 
Abstractions – sometimes labelled approximations – are simplifying assumptions which 
aim at introducing a numerical, but not an ontological, distortion. An approximation 
does not introduce any distortions which seriously misrepresent the kind of thing the 
system is74; in this respect, it can be defined as the omission of truth. In any particular 
physical object, there are innumerable features that the abstract model omits, without 
misrepresenting or distorting the specific part of its reality we want to represent. To go 
																																																								
72 Jones 2005, p. 182. 
73 Since a model is understood as a symbolic system or a representation of a certain physical system, we 
cannot attribute to it a truth value as if it were a linguistic entity. A symbol of this kind is neither true nor 
false, since its value is determined by its usefulness; the approximate truth of a symbol embodies an idea 
such as its being “reliable within certain limits for certain purposes”. See Duhem 1977. 	
74 Teller 1979, p. 349.  
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back to the example of the cannonball, there is no mention of the material composition, 
the internal and external features of either the ball or the cannon, no information about 
the colour or temperature of the ball, or about the environment in which the experiment 
is carried out. The model is simply silent in all these respects. Or, as Jones says, “a 
model of a particular system involves an abstraction in a particular respect only when it 
omits some features of the model[l]ed system without representing the system as 
lacking that features.”75  
 Again, there are some specific necessary – but not sufficient – conditions that allow 
us to elect a model to serve as an abstraction of a certain physical system. The 
abstraction usually concerns the relationship between the model and the actual features 
of the modelled system, not the relationship between the model and the holistic features 
we take the system to have. These aspects persuade us to think that the abstraction’s 
conditions are arbitrarily defined. Thus, whether or not an abstraction approximates the 
truth is a rather trivial point, because when a model is said to contain an abstraction with 
respect to a certain set of features, it is entirely silent on its either having or lacking that 
particular set of features. Moreover, it is also worth noting that any omission of features 
related to the internal or external structure of the physical system entails a 
simplification, which thus would not help us to define a simplification as an abstraction. 
Given that these conditions are necessary but not sufficient to define a model as 
something abstract, it seems unlikely to find a way of regimenting the dividing line 
between the abstract and the other types of model-building techinques. Even by looking 
at the role of relevance, or the use of abstractions – and models in general – in scientific 
practice, as Giere would suggest, this attempt cannot be performed. Following 
McMullin and Cartwright76, it rather seems that a model will contain abstractions only 
with respect to features which we deem irrelevant for the purpose at hand; they both 
suggest that in constructing a model we can make assumptions about the presence or 
absence of a certain set of relevant features of the modelled system. In the modelled 
system of the cannonball as mentioned above, we cannot postulate the absence of air 																																																								
75 Jones 2005, pp. 184-185. 
76 McMullin 1985 and Cartwright 1983. 
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resistance, but we might be said to have constructed that model by ‘assuming’ the 
omission of air resistance, simply because air resistance is the gravitational force that 
the earth exerts on the cannonball which is taken into account in Newton’s second law, 
a law which relates mass and acceleration to the total force acting on a particular body.  
 Idealizations and abstractions are not mutually exclusive. Indeed it is sometimes the 
case that they often come together, an issue to which we shall return presently before 
moving on the next section.  
  
 Analogies 
After this, one further category of models are the analogical models. These are, for 
example, the well-known billiard ball model of a gas, or the computer model of the 
mind, and the liquid drop model of the nucleus. Historically speaking, the first thinker 
who gave an account of model as analogies was the English physicist N. R. Campbell, 
in his book Physics, the Elements (1920). His encouragement to take models and model 
building seriously was based on two main points. First, he suggests that “we require to 
be intellectually satisfied by a theory if it is to be an explanation of phenomena, and this 
satisfaction implies that the theory has an intelligible interpretation in terms of a model, 
as well as having mere mathematical intelligibility and perhaps the formal 
characteristics of simplicity and economy”.77 The second point regards the dynamic 
character of theories. A theory in its scientific context is not a static museum piece, but 
is rather always being extended and modified to account for new phenomena. Thereby, 
he concludes that: 
 
[...] [A]nalogies are not “aids” to the establishment of theories; they are an utterly essential part of 
theories, without which theories would be completely valueless and unworthy of the name. It is 
often suggested that the analogy leads to the formulation of the theory, but that once the theory is 
formulated the analogy has served its purpose and may be removed or forgotten. Such a suggestion 
is absolutely false and perniciously misleading.78  																																																								
77 This quotation is taken from Hesse 1963, p. 4. 
78 Campbell 1920, p. 129. In particular Campbell developed his approach in the attempt to deal with those 
theorists who advocated the idea that models were mere aids to theory-construction that can be easily 
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This approach, which was mainly restricted to mechanical models, was augmented from 
a theoretical viewpoint in the 1960s by Mary B. Hesse,79 who distinguished between 
different types of analogies on the basis of the kinds of similarity-relations into which 
two objects entered. One of the first types of analogy is based on the notion of shared 
properties. Yet the sameness of properties does not constitute a necessary condition for 
representing the distinction among physical bodies or objects. Secondly, an analogy 
between two objects can also be based on relevant similarities between their properties. 
For example, with regard to this second “more liberal” sense, we can say that there is an 
analogy between sound and light,80 because echoes are similar to reflections, loudness is 
similar to brightness, pitch to colour, detectability by the ear to detectability by the eye, 
and so on. Thirdly, analogies can also be based on the resemblance of relations between 
parts of two systems rather than on their monadic properties. 
 According to Hesse’s theory of building analogies, we shall find two sorts of 
common features, or ‘dyadic relations’, either between two analogies or between an 
analogy and its target system. These common features are: i) horizontal relations, or 
one-to-one relations of either identity or difference between a property of one of the 
analogues and a corresponding property of the other (i.e. or, as we would say, of the 
target system); and, ii) vertical relations, or the relations between properties of the same 
analogue which are also properties of the same object, together with causal relations 
between these properties.  
 By pointing out these types of analogies (which can themselves be differentiated 
between positive, neutral and negative types), we can establish these relations securely. 
Moreover, in virtue of the recognition of positive and neutral analogies, we can on the 																																																																																																																																																																		
thrown away when the theory has been developed. The main supporter of this idea is Duhem, who in 
1914 published his La Théorie Physique, in which he distinguished two kinds of theories in physics: i) 
systematic theories and ii) theories using familiar mechanical models. Both these models should be 
interpreted as mechanical gadgets – having a purely heuristic value – or as psychological aids in order to 
build theories. So Duhem’s main objection to models was that they are incoherent and superficial and 
tended to distract the mind from the search for logical order. In this respect, Campbell aimed at 
maintaining that without models theories cannot fulfil all the functions traditionally required of them, and 
in particular that they cannot be genuinely predictive. For more analysis, see Hesse 1963, pp. 3-5. 
79 Ibid. 
80 For a complete description of the example given by Hesse, see Hesse 1963, pp. 10-14, 59-61.  
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one hand make new predictions about the target system – or the modelled system – 
under examination, and on the other hand reach a total interpretation of a deductive 
system.81  
 Although it seems that we can give a precise definition of which model is which, 
we cannot argue in favour of an accurate regimentation of the different uses of these 
models or the different processes of model building, because while some of the features 
of the target system will be straightforwardly omitted in the model, others will be 
simplified in order to build that model. Therefore, it follows that with regard to a 
particular feature of a certain real state of affairs, a given representation can contain 
either an idealization or an abstraction, or neither, but it cannot contain both. This could 
be so, but only if the features that undergo the abstraction on the one hand are different 
from the features that undergo the idealization on the other hand, in such a way that 
some of the features are abstracted, while some other features are idealized in the final 
model obtained.  
 From this it derives that most of the models commonly used in scientific practice 
capture both part of the meaning of the idealization procedure and part of the 
abstraction, and so on. As clearly stated in the 1960s by Suppes, the theoretical notion 
and the practical use of a model are given by a cluster of model-building practices.82 
There are so many types of model that a single account probably cannot do justice to 
them all. A precise organisation of these competing types of model seems thus difficult 
to pin down.  
 
 
1.3 One Model for many purposes 
 
Scientific representation83 is a blooming field of study which has only received 
																																																								
81 Ibid., pp. 58-64. 
82 Besides Suppes 1962, see also Jones 2005, pp. 173-217.		
83 See further Suárez 2016, p. 4, who maintains: “[t]here are many different types of representations in the  
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considerable attention in the last twenty years. After a peak of interest in representation 
throughout the 1960s, attention on models and representation waned to a large extent, 
only to re-emerge at the end of the 1990s with the movement known as the ‘mediating 
models movement’. 84  The ordinary meaning of the word ‘model’ suggests that 
theoretical models are intended to be not merely exemplars to be used in the 
construction of other scientific structures such as laws and theories, but above all aim to 
be models of something. That is to say, they function on the one hand as descriptions 
and representations, and on the other hand as tools with predictive and explanatory 
power.  
 Whether or not almost all the current branches of the philosophy of science agree 
with the characterisation of science as an activity striving at representing parts of the 
physical world with the aid of scientific models, the scientific community strongly 
disagrees on two factors: i) what exactly should be the role performed by the model in 
representing phenomena?; and moreover ii) whether or not the model system is 
something that actually exists in nature as an independent spatio-temporal entity. Every 
scientist offers us a model which aims to be suitable not only for the enquiry at hand, 
but indeed to be sufficiently wide-ranging to be employed for a large variety of physical 
situations which possess in some respect a certain degree of ‘similarity’. Moreover, as 
my example of the previous section show, every model leaves out a series of 
unspecified features which have been deemed by the user to be irrelevant for the 
purpose at hand. However, this does not change the fact that these features could still be 
added back in for a later enquiry and a new purpose.  
 For this reason, we remain unsure about the possibility of undertaking a full-scale 
regimentation of the differences between the purposes that a model should fulfil. Indeed 
it is not my task to point out a suitable description of a model or model-building 																																																																																																																																																																		
sciences, in areas as diverse as engineering, mathematical physics, evolutionary biology, physical 
chemistry, economics. Modelling techniques in these areas also vary greatly as do the typical means for a 
successful application of a model. This is prima facie a thorny issue for a theory of representation, which 
must provide some account of what all these representations have in common.”  
84 This was a movement of scholars based at the London School of Economics, the Tinbergen Institute and 
the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, who developed and advanced a case for models and their role in 
scientific enquiries during the 1990s. See now Suárez 2016. 
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practice, which either perfectly predicts phenomena or perfectly explains or represents a 
certain system of reality. Even if we were to find out that models simply function as 
representations, they cannot be accounted as an epistemically faithful representation of 
phenomena. The claim of this section is to provide an overview of the “powers” that are 
fulfilled by models. Whether or not a particular idealized or abstract model performs a 
specific role in predicting or explaining a phenomenon is not the whole story; the model 
– either idealized or abstract – is only a part of the account of our explanation and 
prediction, and is not in itself a faithful representation of the system of reality. The 
model of a certain system is rather an epistemic representation of reality, insofar as it 
allows the user, by following a certain set of rules, to infer some conclusions and 
acquire some knowledge concerning that particular system of reality. This denotes 
knowledge that has to be “translated”85 before it is judged in some respect. The model is 
first built in such a way that “it is easier to study than the target-system and therefore 
allows us to derive results. Second, it is assumed to represent its target system, and 
representation is something like a licence to draw inferences. Representation allows us 
to ‘carry over’ results obtained in the model to the target-system and hence it enables us 
to learn something about that system by studying the model.”86 Every user aims at 
building a representational model which stands for a certain aspect of reality and which 
should help her in her reasoning and mathematical computations. These representations 
play such a crucial role in science because they can stand for phenomena which may be 
difficult to observe, understand and manipulate. Thereby they allow the user to draw a 
reasoned conclusion concerning the simplified model instead of the complex real state 
of affairs. In this sense, reasoning, inferences and conclusions are generally directly 
related to the model as a vehicle, instead of the phenomenon that the model represents. 
The conclusive inferences can thus be studied independently from the empirical 
investigations.  																																																								
85 In order to understand what it means to “translate” knowledge from the model, Swoyer [1991, p. 487] 
offers the following example: “for instance, to our translating facts involving lengths into their numerical 
surrogates, engaging in mathematical reasoning, then making the return trip to a conclusion about our 
original object.”  
86 Frigg 2010, p. 98. 
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The first item on this section’s agenda is to ensure clarity concerning the difference 
between description and representation on the one hand, and denotation and 
representation on the other hand. First, by following Suárez, we can say that “a critical 
difference between description and representation concerns the applicability of semantic 
notions such as truth, which are built into descriptions but seem prima facie ill-suited 
for representations.87 In focusing on the role that language plays in science, the logical 
empiricists and their successors may thus have implicitly privileged theoretical 
description.”88 Second, the meaning of ‘denotation’ in this context can be explained by 
means of a simple example: the circular red white and blue logo of the London 
underground is simply a sign that denotes every London Underground station; but the 
map represents the entire London underground network. The map is simply a model 
used to provide a representation on a different scale from that of the real network. The 
value of the model as a representation of a phenomenon in the physical world was 
emphasised respectively by van Fraassen’s89 version of the semantic view in terms of 
state-space, Ronald Giere’s theorisation90 in terms of cognitive models and most recently 
by Gabriele Contessa. All these authors maintain that models are suitable tools for 
representation rather than simply instruments of description or denotation. Historically 
speaking, the most important route to this notion of representation can be traced back to 
the tradition of the so-called ‘modelling attitude’. This represents the efforts of 
philosophers and scientists to understand the practical role of model building, or in 
other words, the role that images, metaphors and diagrams play in modelling.91	
 
In contrast, contemporary discussion on representation emerges from two distinct 
currents of thought: the semantic approach and the ‘mediating models’ movement. 																																																								
87 This point is well emphasised in Giere 1988, ch. 4. 
88 Suárez 2016, p. 2. 
89 van Fraassen 1980, ch. 3.  
90 Giere 1988, ch. 3. 
91 We have already pointed out in the previous chapter that the beginning of the tradition relating to 
models can be traced back to works of scientists such as Thomson, Maxwell, Hertz, and Boltzmann. I 
found in Hertz’s The Principles of Mechanics presented in a new form an interesting reflection on the role 
performed by images in science. I think this historical aspect on the development of the concept of model 
as representation deserves further independent scrutiny.   
	 45 
Although some supporters of the ‘mediating models’ movement reject the semantic 
view, mainly on the account of its construal of what models are, both movements agree 
on the idea that models are genuinely representational and that their predictive and 
explanatory rules are merely marginal. One of the most significant works in today’s 
scholarship is Model and Representation, written in 1997 by R. I. G. Hughes, which 
represents the result of exposure to both movements. Hughes was additionally one of 
the leading advocates of the semantic view, before going on to become a prominent 
contributor to the mediating models movement.92  
 To explain more clearly the main lines of the representational role fulfilled by 
models, let us refer to the aforementioned classical example of the billiard ball model of 
gases, which has been commonly recognised as a central analogy in the kinetic theory 
of gases since its scientific development in the second half of the nineteenth century:  
 
When we take a collection of billiard balls in random motion as a model for a gas, we are not 
asserting that billiard balls are in all respects like gas particles, for billiard balls are red or white, and 
hard and shiny, and we are not intending to suggest that gas molecules have these properties. We are 
in fact saying that gas molecules are analogous to billiard balls, and the relation of analogy means 
that there are some properties of billiard balls which are not found in molecules. Let us call those 
properties we know belong to billiard balls and not to molecules the negative analogy of the model. 
Motion and impact, on the other hand, are just the properties of billiard balls that we do want to 
ascribe to molecules in our model, and these we can call the positive analogy [...] There will 
generally be some properties of the model about which we do not yet know whether they are 
positive or negative analogies [...] Let us call this third set of properties the neutral analogy.93  
 
In the first place, let us clarify some terminology used in model-building practice: the 
system of billiard balls is defined as the source, and the system of gas molecules as the 
target. We can therefore say that billiard balls represent gas molecules if and only if the 
system of billiard balls is a representational source for the target system of gas 																																																								
92 Hughes 1997, pp. 325-336. According to Suárez, it is important to bear this dual heritage in mind since 
it goes some way towards explaining some of the inner tensions and open disagreements that one finds 
nowadays in this area. 
93 See further Brush 2003. The illustration quoted here is taken from Hesse 1963, p. 8. 
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molecules. “The extensions of ‘source’ and ‘target’ are then picked out implicitly by 
this claim, i.e. any pair of objects about which this claim is true is a <source, target> 
pair. We can then list the properties of the source object as {PS1, PS2, …, PSi, …, PSn} and 
those of the target object as {Pt1, Pt2, …, Pti, …, Ptn}.”94 The claim is thus that there is a 
relation of identity between some of these properties, namely: PS1=Pt1, PS2=Pt2, …, PSi=Pti. 
As a result, the set made up of {Pt1, Pt2, …, Pti} contains the positive analogy between the 
source and the target.  
 On the other hand, the remaining properties are properties that are omitted, if the 
model in question is an abstraction, or otherwise misrepresented, if we are talking about 
an idealized model, and so on. Thus for instance, the set {PS1+1, …, PSj} is made up of 
properties that are not identical to any of the properties of the target gas molecules {Pt1, 
Pt2, …, Pti, …Ptj, …, Ptn}. These properties of billiard balls constitute rather the negative 
analogy. Moreover, the other remaining properties, i.e. {PSj+1, …, PSn}, constitute the 
neutral analogy.95  
 Whether or not the relations of morphism – i.e. isomorphism – hold, advocates of 
this positions presuppose that there is just a single one-to-one correspondence between 
the elements of the target and the elements of the source. Thus, when the user draws 
inferences on the target, she is trying to say something about the phenomena at hand, 
and she is also claiming that this information does not require any interpretation. 
However, at this stage we would adopt Contessa’s framework, defined as the 
interpretational conception for the scientific representation of models, according to 
which: i) “scientific representations are nothing but epistemic representations that 
scientists use in the pursuit of their research”; and ii) “a vehicle (or a source) is an 
epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only if: a) the user 
takes the vehicle to stand for the target and b) the user is able to perform valid 
																																																								
94 Suárez 2016, p. 5. 
95 Suárez suggests that this is a purely epistemic criterion and we may suppose that all properties of 
billiard balls are objectively either in the positive or in the negative form of the analogy. They are either 
really shared by both balls and molecules, or they are not, regardless of how accurate our knowledge of 
these facts is. 
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surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target.”96 
 
In this dissertation we will not analyse the cognitive or imaginative (as they have been 
previously designated) processes which both users and the scientific community tend to 
adopt in order to achieve the most suitable scientific models to be used. Rather, as we 
have already stated, we will look at the practice that scientists use to achieve a new 
theoretical layer for the model under examination, namely in our case the point mass. 
 To be more accurate, the billiard ball models and the map of the London 
Underground system mentioned in the previous paragraph are considered epistemic 
representations of the gas molecules and the underground network respectively. In 
support of Contessa, we can argue that, if scientific models play a crucial role in 
science, and if scientific models relate to the world by representing aspects or portions 
of it, so then by understanding how models work in representing the world will we 
configure a thorough understanding of how science in itself functions.  
 Moreover, it is in virtue of the fact that a vehicle – in our case study, the point mass 
– can epistemically represent a body detached from some of its physical features (e.g. 
the force(s) acting on it, mass and charge) that, to borrow the terminology introduced by 
Chris Swoyer in 1991, the theoreticians – and every competent user in general – can 
perform “surrogative inferences” from the target to the source. One can also infer 
conclusions about a physical body from considerations with the help of a point mass 
model.97  
 According to Contessa, the intuitive idea behind the notion of valid surrogative 
inferences is that an inference of this kind is valid only if it is in accordance with a 
systematic set of rules, as they have been defined and followed by the scientific 																																																								
96 Contessa 2007, ch. 2, p. 48. 
97 Cf. here the words of Contessa [2007, pp. 24-25]: “The fact that a user can perform a surrogative 
inference from a certain object, the vehicle, to another, the target system, is a symptom of the fact that, for 
that user, that vehicle is an epistemic representation of that target, a symptom that allows one to 
distinguish case of epistemic representation from cases of mere denotation. So, it is important that it is not 
necessary that the conclusions the user draws about the target are true in order for the vehicle to be an 
epistemic representation of the target. In other words, if a user is able to perform inferences from a certain 
vehicle to a certain target, the vehicle is an epistemic representation of that target for that user, 
independently of whether or not the conclusions are true of the target.” 
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community. Thus, by following this idea, an inference is of a surrogative kind only if 
every user is able to translate facts about the vehicle of the point mass into presumed 
and acceptable facts about the physical body or the modelled system of reality. 
However, in this light we should pay attention to the fact that the content of the 
representational vehicle is not knowledge concerning the modelled system in itself. Or, 
as Contessa would say, the fact that a vehicle is an epistemic representation for many 
people or even for everyone does not imply that it is an epistemic representation in and 
of itself. In fact, the representational content of the epistemic representational vehicle is 
made up of a set of propositions from which it is valid to infer the vehicle in accordance 
with a given set of rules. The inferential process from a vehicle bring us, as users, 
thereby closer to understanding and knowledge about the physical world, but it cannot 
give us knowledge about the world in itself.  
 More precisely, let us take again the example given by Contessa of the map of the 
London Underground network, which is considered to be an epistemic representation of 
the real underground network. If we look at the map, and we find out that between 
Holborn and Bethnal Green there are only five centimetres on the map, this information 
cannot be translated in the form of direct knowledge to the real London Underground 
network, since there will never exist a distance of five centimetres between two stations 
in the real state of affairs. Rather, we should apply some specific set of rules standardly 
associated with that vehicle in order to draw some conclusions which will help us to 
define the real distance between Holborn and Bethnal Green, and therefore the time it 
will take us to reach our destination. In this sense, the map or vehicle gives us some 
information that users need to translate by using the scale of the map; these conclusions 
are the so-called surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target.  
 As Contessa says, “[w]henever I talk of the representational content of a map, I 
intend ‘map’ to refer to an epistemic representation not to the material object that is the 
vehicle.”98 Otherwise, in other words, the map will never be small enough to being put 
into the pocket of our coat.  																																																								
98 Contessa 2007, p. 33. 
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 To offer a preview of the research continued in further chapters of this dissertation, 
I now turn to analyse an example to understand more clearly what we mean by the 
‘representational role fulfilled by the point mass’. 
 
Suppose we have a car affected by a certain conservative force: the car is moving at 
constant velocity v along a 1 km road, until at the end of the path it will hit a wall.  
In order to perform this task, we may use a very simple model from classical 
mechanics, namely the model of the point mass. In our example, the car is represented 
by a point mass which is moving towards the end of the path on the road parallel to the 
horizon. Let us suppose that already at time t0 the car is in the position x0 with a velocity 
vc=v. Then, by following the Euler-Lagrange equation, we can determine the trajectory 
of the moving point mass by referring it to a Cartesian co-ordinate system. In this case 
the Lagrangian L will correspond only to the Kinetic energy T of the point mass, which 
is T=1/2mv2. There is no friction on the road surface, and the only forces acting on the 
point are the gravitational force (F=mg), the normal force N perpendicular to the road 
surface, and a constraint reaction which helps to keep the velocity constant. 
If we forget for a moment both the consequences of the impact and the fact that the 
car will probably bounce back upon the point of impact, let us seek to calculate the 
average velocity of the car during its route. We have the mass m=100 kg of our body, 
and we presuppose to know the Kinetic Energy T=30000 J. In order to calculate the 
velocity of the car, we can use the following formula:  
 
! = 	 2%& = 2'&  
 
From the model of the point mass, we can infer that the constant velocity of the car 
along its road will be approximately 24.5 m/s. A competent user will take this 
conclusion with a pinch of salt, because the point mass model cannot be a faithful 
epistemic representation of the car driving into the wall. One of the reasons to suspect 
	 50 
this is that some of the features that affect the velocity of the car have no counterparts in 
the model. Some other features are neglected and are thus deemed to be useless for the 
specific purpose at hand. The car, or any other differently shaped body will likewise fit 
the model presented above, but there will always be some physical properties that will 
never affect the result of our equation. Thus, it is also important, as Contessa maintains, 
that we distinguish what the user directly infers from the model from what her 
background knowledge tells her about the conclusion drawn from the model. What she 
infers – i.e. by following certain rules – will never be different from what every other 
user – who has followed the same rules – will infer from the model. Moreover, the user 
will also be aware that the model can only be approximately true, because the value of 
the velocity of the car will be close to, but not exactly the same as, that of the velocity 
of the point mass. The model can hence be put forward as the generator of a hypothesis 
about the system whose truth and falsity need to be empirically investigated. As 
Contessa writes, “[i]n the model proposed above, so as in every other model, scientists 
do not commit themselves to the model being a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of the target system. It is only through an investigative process that our 
competence in using a certain model as a faithful epistemic representation of the system 
increases. This process consists in determining to what extent the valid surrogative 
inferences from the model to the system are sound.”99  
This model is used to show that any other model cannot be used as a faithful 
epistemic representation, but is rather employable to perform inferences about a certain 
modelled system, which only at a later time is to be translated into knowledge about 
real-world phenomena.  
 
Let us now turn to the second aspect related to the role of models in science, namely 																																																								
99 In his doctoral dissertation, G. Contessa provides two examples of this: (i) the inclined plane model, and 
(ii) the Thomson and the Rutherford Models of the Atom, in order to convey the idea that in some cases, 
some of the inferences that are considered to be valid by the scientific community in the interpretation of 
the model may be found to be unsound when that aspect of the system is empirically investigated. 
However, this invalidity of reasoning could also function the other way around: inferences whose 
conclusions are known to be incorrect may be shown to be valid when inferred from the model. See 
further Contessa 2007, § 1.2.6, pp. 35-45. 
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their explanatory power. There are two conditions that make deductive arguments 
explanatory, in the sense that they are able to show the causes underlying the evolution 
of a certain phenomenon. These conditions are respectively: i) the statements in the 
explanans, i.e. the premises laid out in the argument, which include relevant scientific 
laws and some background conditions;100 and ii) the statements that fall under commonly 
used patterns of argumentation. 101  Another conventional approach argues that an 
explanation gives a true causal or counterfactual story relevant to the occurrence of the 
explanandum, i.e. the phenomenon that is (needing) to be explained.102 One thing that 
philosophers do generally agree on, however, is that statements in the explanans are 
true, whether they are about some feature either of the system or a relevant natural law, 
or they are related to a causal or counterfactual relation which performs some 
explanatory function. It seems a reasonable requirement that the statements adduced for 
the purposes of explanation should describe laws, regularities, causal relations, 
properties, structures, and so on, which obtain in the physical system exhibiting the 
explanandum.  
 However, all cases of what physicists take to consider as scientific explanations fail 
to satisfy even the basic requirements I have just articulated. Explanation in physics 
relies essentially on Galilean idealizations, or on abstractions of a certain physical 
system, within which the explanations themselves contain false statements about both 
explanatorily relevant features of the physical system and the phenomenon to be 
explained.  
 One question at this point is the following: Can idealization and abstraction be 
used only as forms of explanation? Some scientists say “yes”, whereas others argue that 
an idealization can account for an explanation only where the premises in the explanans 
are both approximately true of, and are fully corrigible with, the target system, at least 
in principle. In a certain sense this ideal model of the pendulum system can be seen as 
an epistemic representation of the real pendulum, but not as a faithful epistemic 																																																								
100 Hempel 1965. 
101 Kitcher 1989, pp. 410-505. 
102 Salmon 1984. 
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representation. 
 Historically, Galileo developed a range of idealizing techniques which were aimed 
at predicting and explaining natural phenomena. Galileo’s “idealized construct” of a 
pendulum hides the assumptions that the pendulum is not subject to air resistance, the 
wire is mass-less and inelastic, and so on. Moreover, he also hypothesized that an ideal 
– or a general – pendulum would continue to oscillate indefinitely with the same 
amplitude and period and that it would obey his pendulum law. Galileo himself says:  
 
[…] [A]s to the ratio of the times of oscillation of bodies hanging from strings of different lengths, 
those times are as the square roots of the string lengths.103  
 
Now, Galileo was aware of the fact that this failed to describe and predict accurately the 
behaviour of any of the real pendulums he used in his extended and meticulous 
experimental work. So again, this inference has to be taken with a pinch of salt, because 
the oscillations of real pendulums become smaller and smaller over time and they are 
not isochronous, as his pendulum law ideally requires. On the other hand, since Galileo 
and a whole generation of physicists after him have taken the pendulum law to be part 
of the explanation of the behaviour of physical pendulums, they were evidently not 
aware of the negative aspect related to idealization. In other words, “none of the 
standard philosophical accounts of explanation canvassed at the outset makes sense of 
this sort of explanatory practice.”104  
 With regard to this problem, one of the first authors who argued in opposition to the 
exclusive explanatory power fulfilled by the Galilean idealization was Ernan McMullin. 
His doubts towards the Galilean idealizations and their explanatory incompleteness lies 
in the fact that the idealized model approximates the target system, and, more 
importantly, that reverse techniques exist which are complementary to idealization, but 
which are nevertheless used for de-idealizing the model either by eliminating 
simplifying assumptions or by adding back physical details into the modelled system. 																																																								
103 Galilei 1989, p. 97.  
104 Wayne 2011, p. 833.	
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As Robert Batterman writes, “Galilean idealizations thus have an intrinsic “self-
correcting” feature such that they can (at least in principle) be brought in ever closer 
agreement with empirical observations in a theoretically justified, non-ad hoc way.” 105  
 Later on, Laurence Sklar and Robert Batterman made a similar distinction between 
what they call controllable and uncontrollable idealizations. An idealization denotes a 
controllable means whereby it is possible, through appeal to theory, to compensate in 
some way for the idealizations; whereas uncontrollable idealizations typically involve 
singular limits and preclude explanation.  
 These, and other scholars, have argued in favour of this position, simply by saying 
that the so-called Galilean idealizations fail to deliver an answer sufficient for giving the 
explanation of a phenomenon. But as Andrew Wayne maintains, they are taken to 
support scientific explanation, because these idealizations achieve a kind of common-
sense representational success.106   
 Furthermore, according to Eleanor Knox, almost the same reasoning fits for 
abstractions and the explanatory power commonly attributed to them. She has recently 
recognised the fundamental role played by abstraction in explaining the evolution of 
phenomena, whilst also showing awareness that phenomena cannot be explained only 
by the resources of more fundamental theory. In agreement with Batterman, she 
suggests that there is something more that gives to us the explanation of a phenomenon. 
Besides the omission or approximation of the modelled system’s features, we might 
then ask whether abstraction is really the whole story:  
 
[…] [C]an we account for the explanatory utility of the higher level explanation purely by noting 
that it is a distant abstraction of the more fundamental explanation? Should we model all 
explanations as situated along a sliding scale of abstraction, with higher level explanations deriving 
their considerable explanatory power from their ability to concisely summarize relevant information 
from some fundamental picture?107  																																																								
105 Batterman 2005, p. 235. For further details on this interpretation, see also Sklar 2000, p. 44 and Wayne 
2011, pp. 830-841. 
106 Wayne 2011, p. 834. 
107 Knox 2012, p. 22. 
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Knox argues that abstraction is not the whole story as it is, at least for the issue of 
idealization, according to McMullin, Sklar and Batterman. However, abstraction is an 
important part of the explanation: 
 
[…] [T]he abstraction that we deem appropriate is highly sensitive to changes in variables that the 
explanations given by one theory may be deemed novel with respect to another theory. When we 
properly understand the role of abstraction, we appreciate that explanatory value may be irreducible, 
even where theoretical reduction is possible.108  
 
To this extent, it seems that a model does not suffice to give a satisfactory or complete 
explanation of the dynamic aspects of physical reality. Abstraction, or even idealization, 
is a part of the explanation, but each of these, even taken together, is not the only 
components. As Margaret Morrison has put it, “the explanatory role is a function of the 
representational features of the model.” 109  That is to say, all idealizations and 
abstractions involve a series of approximations or omissions whose explanations apply 
only to the idealized and abstract models respectively, and yet are not too far off when 
applied to the modelled system of interest. Moreover, it is possible to refine the model 
systematically – i.e. by adding back in the contingent (‘real-world’) properties – in order 
to bring it closer and closer to the target system, to such a point that the statements in 
the explanation eventually become true of the physical system as well.  
 
Finally, there is one more aspect that deserves our attention: the predictive power of 
models, and more precisely that of the mechanical model, an account which is 
commonly analysed in connection with the heuristic value of a model. The contention 
here is that predictions do not refer directly to the so-called course of nature, but rather 
to our theoretical models.110 In fact, the heuristic power of a model does not guarantee a 
direct connection to a real physical system, even though it enables us to deduce some 
knowledge and conclusions concerning the latter. Thus, to test the model means to 																																																								
108 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 	
109 Morgan and Morrison 1999, p. 64. 
110 Meyer 1951, p. 113. 
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compare the conclusions deriving from the model’s features with observational 
phenomena. These processes are built on shared mathematical formulae and sets of 
rules which have been arbitrarily established by the scientific community. In other 
words, heuristic models could help us to focus our attention on the mechanical 
consequences of a modelled system in question, but they cannot predict what will 
exactly happen in the real system. As Knox and Wayne have argued in assigning 
explanatory power to models, given that models tend to simplify and organise the 
“complicated and messy” real world, we will lose this particular variety of the real 
world.  
 A well-known example of a mechanistic model is our point mass, which is found 
only in its explicit version in Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica.  Newton’s aim in the Principia was to work out the mathematical 
principles of physical science. He did so by means of geometrical representations of 
moving point masses, i.e. points in which the mass of moving bodies is deemed to be 
concentrated.  
 Certainly, before coming out with an independent and explicit theoretical model, a 
lot of work was required, both in acknowledging the existence of the phenomenon 
under scrutiny and in understanding the benefits of models and the advantages of the 
model-building practice. To make this point clear, it is important to be aware that 
physicists throughout history have imagined all sorts of mechanistic models, but far 
fewer of them have stood the test of experiential evidence.  
 In classical physics, theorists assert that models represent more or less accurately 
what is actually going on in nature.111 This is also what we read in Galileo’s Two New 
Sciences (1638), in which Galileo marked himself as one of the first advocates of the 
reliable predictive and explanatory power of idealization. His claim stood in favour of 
																																																								
111 It is likewise common to find theoreticians who argue in favour of the idea that heuristic or mechanistic 
models offer more than a merely human and imaginative way of explaining phenomena. In fact they think 
that mathematics expresses some sort of “metaphysical truth” with reference to the properties of the 
modelled system. We have seen in the beginning of this section that the scientific community itself shares 
the idea that the model does not stand for the modelled system in itself, but rather that the user interprets 
and denotes what the model stands for. 
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the idea that a model does not depart from reality too much, due to its power of self-
correction and to the practice of “adding back in the properties” that have been 
previously omitted. According to Galileo, we can “de-idealize” the model in adopting 
this technique in order to bring it closer again to the modelled system; or, in other 
words, we can make the model more specific, and adapt it to several different real states 
of affairs, by eliminating simplifying assumptions. In this way: 
 
[…] [T]he model then serves as the basis for a continuing research program. This technique will 
work only if the original model idealizes the real structure of the object. To the extent that it does, 
one would expect the technique to work. If simplifications have been made in the course of 
formulating the original model, once the operations of this model have been explored and tested 
against experimental data, the model can be improved by gradually adding back the complexities.112  
 
Galileo’s defence, when he takes e.g. the pendulum which is not subjected to friction, or 
when he uses the geometrical diagram of the inclined plane to calculate the velocity of a 
body moving down a slope or to perceive the forces acting on it, is to argue that the 
departure from truth is imperceptibly small. Moreover, Galileo also claims that the 
idealization enables, and makes more economical, a calculation that would otherwise be 
impossibly complicated. The same can be argued for the Archimedean geometrical 
representation of a vessel placed in the sea, which, in the Archimedean treatises, is 
simply shaped as a paraboloid floating in a liquid. By using this extremely 
straightforward geometrical sketch, Archimedes was representing a simplified idea of a 
real vessel and by analysing the components in the model, he was able to translate this 
“geometrical knowledge” onto a real physical object shaped like a vessel. Of course, the 
gap between the model – or, in this case, the geometrical diagram – is ample enough 
that the user needs to be careful when she translates the knowledge from the model to 
the target.  
 The gap between the source and the target additionally represents a limit for our 
faithful understanding of the world, but it is not a hindrance to the aim of representation, 																																																								
112 McMullin 1985, p. 261. 
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explanation or prediction. It is seen as an obstacle only if we want to replace our 
knowledge concerning physical reality with the knowledge on representational models 
in itself. As McMullin writes, “[e]very theoretical model idealizes, simplifies to some 
extent, the actual structure of the explanandum object(s). It leaves out of account 
features deemed not to be relevant to the explanatory task at hand. Complicated features 
of the real object(s) are deliberately simplified in order to make theoretical laws easier 
to infer, in order to get the process of explanation under way.”113 Having said that Galileo 
pretends to adopt a realistic stance about the conclusions drawn on the model, and 
thereby that knowledge concerning the model is considered knowledge concerning 
reality, no epistemological commitments need to be taken into account. This contention 
shall be in favour of the idea that Galileo and of course all preceding scientists were not 
aware either of the epistemological consequences of these epistemic concerns or of the 
ontological commitments implied by their realistic stances. 
 By contrast, we have seen that some authors, such as McMullin, became aware of 
the difficulties of this unsophisticated conception of the world, because, as we have 
emphasised at the beginning of this section, statements about predictions or conclusions 
are made on the properties of our model, not directly about the course of nature itself.114 
Let us recall the example of the car driving into the wall. There we know just by making 
some computation that its average velocity is more or less 24.5 m/s, the user will take 
this solution with a pinch of salt; she will perhaps say that this figure is the approximate 
velocity of the car moving toward the end of the road, because in the real target system, 
most of the factors that contribute to the deceleration of the car are deemed to be 
irrelevant by the user.  
 The way in which we may transfer idealized events into elements of mental 
construction is an epistemological problem of the greatest importance, but it is of too 
intricate a nature to attempt a full solution here. All the models shown in these examples 
are responsible for giving us information about the world, but perhaps they are – albeit 
deliberately and arbitrarily – too simplified to give complete information (or even 																																																								
113 Ibid., p. 258. 
114 This is also Simplicio’s idea, the Aristotelian spokesman in Galileo’s work.  
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faithful knowledge) about the dynamic nature of real-world phenomena. Their goal is 
rather only to achieve at least a partial understanding of the target system. Moreover, as 
in the case of extremely accurate idealizations or abstractions, there are always some 
features that are left out (as we have adequately said above), so that the aim of using 
these models is not “simply to escape from the intractable irregularity of the real world 
into the intelligible order of Form, but to make use of this order in an attempt to grasp 
the real-world form which the idealization [sc. or all the other types of the 
aforementioned models] takes it origins.”115  
 The main constituent of this process has to be the user of the model in question. 
Now that we have established that a certain vehicle represents a certain state of affairs, 
we can infer conclusions, make predictions or give explanations relating to it. But in 
order to translate this knowledge accurately, there are sets of rules – usually context-
dependent – that we have to follow. Thus, conclusions about the model are always 
partial.  
 Explanatory, predictive and representational powers have nothing to do with 
semantic truth. As stated by Duhem and Cartwright, models are not truth-producing or 
truth-apt pieces of equipment. We can only obtain some partial prediction, 
representation and explanation that is directly related to the model, but not a faithful 
representation about the modelled system (i.e. of a part of physical reality); scientific 
knowledge is a mental operation sui generis which is constructed by using scientific 
models. Moreover, our scientific knowledge may be restricted to the representational 
layer of physical phenomena, not to the physical reality itself. This scepticism 
concerning the ontological tractability of physical reality also seems to undermine the 
realistic stance.  
 To simplify and sum up our claim, we can make a final comparison between our 
model and a bicycle.116 The latter does not derive from Newton’s laws of motion, but 
obeys them. We as users build the bicycle because we need it to travel from one place to 
another. Only once we have the first prototype of a bicycle can we schedule a 																																																								
115 McMullin 1985, p. 248.	
116 I use this example of the bicycle by way of hommage to my Dutch inclinations! 
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performance agenda by looking at the Newton’s laws of motion: we can think how to 
improve the bicycle by making predictions on the basis of Newton’s law, or we can 
think how to improve it in order to make it easier to ride, e.g. by making it faster and 
lighter. The model in question undergoes a series of inspections over time concerning 
the certain purpose for which it is ostensibly employed; by using it for practical 
purposes, the user is able to modify the model in order to understand better the dynamic 
character of the physical reality, and to draw a model which, by the means of a 
sophisticated theoretical layer, allows us to represent epistemically, predict and explain 
the course of nature. Even if this model can effectively manage this, it nevertheless has 
only partial power, because it is a tool from which the user, by necessarily following 
certain rules, can draw some surrogative inferences, not conclusions relating to the 
reality in itself. 
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C h a p t e r  2  	
A n c i e n t  M a t h e m a t i c s  
 
 
2.1 A General Introduction to Ancient Mathematics: the methods 
and tools of Greek mathematicians 
 
The birth of Greek mathematics owes its earliest impetus to the influence of some of its 
near neighbours, especially from Egypt. During the 26th Dynasty of Egypt (ca. 685-525 
BCE), the ports of the Nile were opened to Greek traders for the first time and important 
Greek figures such as Thales and Pythagoras visited Egypt, bringing back with them 
new skills and knowledge. Ionia was also exposed to the culture and ideas of 
Mesopotamia through its neighbour, the kingdom of Lydia. Some centuries later, during 
the Hellenistic period, Greek astronomy flourished after Alexander the Great’s conquest 
of the East. The astronomical knowledge of the Babylonians and Chaldeans became 
available to the Greeks who profited by exploiting it systematically. This led to the 
advance of many Greek mathematical tools and methods. 
What the Greeks derived from Egyptian mathematics were mainly rules of thumb 
with specific applications. Egyptians knew, for example, that a triangle whose sides are 
in a 3:4:5 ratio has a right angle. The statement of the now commonly called 
‘Pythagorean Theorem’ was discovered on a Babylonian tablet (ca. 1900-1600 BCE), 
whether first by Pythagoras (ca. 560-480 BCE), or someone else from his school, who 
was the first to discover that its proof cannot be claimed with any degree of credibility.117 																																																								
117 On the basis of the extant fragments and later ancient sources, it appears that the Pythagorean 
movement was considered as a religious movement, a political party more than a philosophical school, 
and even a scientific movement with pronounced interest in mathematics. This multiplicity of projected 
images is a reflection of the different characterisations of the figure of Pythagoras himself, who is 
depicted by the later tradition as a political man, philosopher, mathematician, shaman, the head of a 
religious sect, and a figure next to divinity. Even the most recent reconstructions of Pythagoras and 
Pythagorean oscillate, paradoxically, between the characterisations proposed. A conciliatory but eclectic 
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Despite the Greeks’ attempts to systematize earlier Eastern scientific knowledge, their 
mathematics still remained limited to purely practical geometry. Only with the 
advancements made chiefly by Euclid – having been anticipated by the Pythagoreans 
Hippasus, Archytas and Hipparchus of Nicea – did geometry undergo a transformation 
from being a mere practice to becoming an exact theoretical science; thereafter 
geometrical entities were abstracted118 and began to be considered as entities independent 
from any material and physical content. In this connection, the purpose of this research 
is exactly to find the way that one of the most common idealized entities of actual 
mathematical physics, the point mass, has reached this status as a purely abstract entity. 
By following the three stages of this thesis’ methodology, which we have labelled 
“objectification of procedure”, we will analyse in this chapter the stage in which the 
geometrical notion of the centre of gravity was used, regarding it not as a precursor to 
the modern notion of the material point, but rather as an investigative geometrical tool 
for practical purposes aiming at engineering works. This stage corresponds to the 
enquiry into Archimedean equilibrium concerning the law of the lever, and in particular 
to the use he made of the centre of gravity as a crucial notion in statics (§ 2.1). 
Following this, and for the sake of completeness, we will provide an introduction to the 
Euclidean geometry dealing with points, lines and surfaces in their standard geometrical 
usage (§ 2.2). Next, we will present the main differences between the Euclidean and 
Archimedean approaches to geometry, emphasising the fact that Archimedes should be 																																																																																																																																																																		
position is bound to encounter insurmountable difficulties, or in any case, even recognising that there 
might be an ounce of truth in all of these characterisations, it is not possible to make a simple summation. 
The solution of accepting contradiction as an index of the inscrutability of Pythagoras seems to lead to the 
renunciation of clarifying the various aspects of this biographical tradition. To isolate a nucleus of 
historical truth in the face of a legend that has hardened over the centuries is an extremely difficult task, 
but it is nevertheless indispensable to try to determine which of these characterisations the historical 
Pythagoras was closest to, thus identifying the nature of that movement that is usually described, with 
inevitable margins of imprecision in terms of the school, sect, community, brotherhood, and party 
besides. Ultimately, it is important to understand what it meant in antiquity to be a“Pythagorean”; 
therefore the issue to define a criterion of classification in order to define what a Pythagorean is, is 
relatively old-fashioned, and it is not completely solved at all. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that there is a well-founded tradition of the master’s doctrines’ succession. See on this Bruno Centrone’s 
introduction to the Pythagorean, esp. pp. 3-12 and pp. 102-104 [Centrone 1996]. 
118 In the context of ancient geometry, we may use, following Enrico Giusti, the expressions ‘abstract’ and 
‘idealized’ entities synonymously, if only in order to emphasise the idea that they are not dependent upon 
any real and material objects.  
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held among the first authors to give importance to the heuristic and mechanical meaning 
of geometrical demonstrations (§ 2.3). Thereafter, in §§ 2.4-2.6 we will focus on the 
most important treatises dealing with the science of the barycentre, introducing the most 
important demonstrations and methods used to find a “method” for calculating the 
centre of gravity in the case of one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three-
dimensional figures. In all these sections we will seek to show the affinities between the 
standard definition of the centre of gravity as it is presented in Greek mathematics and 
the modern idealized notion of the material point.  
 
Let us begin with an overview of the role and status fulfilled by the notion of the 
geometrical point in Euclid’s Elements, before turning to an analysis of the two methods 
of enquiry typically used in ancient geometry, namely the analytical and the synthetical 
method respectively.  
 
Following the Pythagoreans’ discovery of incommensurable lines, which dates back to 
ca. 500 BCE, we witness the so-called process of annihilation of the point. 
Incommensurable lines, such as the diagonal line of a square, are defined as such 
because the ratio between the side and the diagonal of a square cannot be expressed by a 
rational number R. Conversely, lines are defined as commensurable when they can be 
measured and the ratio between them can be expressed by a rational number. The 
discovery of these magnitudes led to the abstract conception of geometrical entities, in 
which a point is held to be an entity without any dimension, a line is held to be a one-
dimensional magnitude without breadth, and a surface is held to be a two-dimensional 
magnitude without height. 
Lines in pre-Hellenistic geometry were considered to be material entities made up 
of thousands upon thousands of infinitely small grains (or points) and possessing of 
dimension. However, this definition of lines, combined with the discovery of 
incommensurable lines, had paradoxical consequences, since, assuming the physical 
existence of infinitely small grains, the ratio between two different sizes, even if they 
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were incommensurable, may always be reduced to a common size, namely a grain, 
which is common to both the side and the diagonal of the square.  
The only way to overcome this paradox is to annihilate the point. While previous 
geometry was anchored to matter, we now see the advent of a new abstract geometry, in 
which points are considered to be entities without length, breadth and height. New 
theoretical components are introduced; the idealized entities are now the new objects of 
study of geometry. In this way, the infinite enters the previously earthly scope of 
geometry. Since the point has no dimensions, every segment of a line is conceived as 
being composed of many infinitely small points. A line becomes seen as a continuous 
magnitude because between any two arbitrary points one may always find a third one. 
Every line is infinitely greater in size when compared to a point that is infinitely smaller 
than the line.119  
Another significant aspect of pre-Euclidean mathematics is the method of enquiry. 
Traditionally before then, natural philosophers had proceeded by means of the 
analytical method, which consisted of the analysis of complex hypotheses through 
common and empirically verifiable intuitions, proceeding gradually towards simpler 
propositions from which the given complex statements might be inferred as logical 
consequences. Only at a later stage did the synthetic method mature into a method 
which uses postulates and axioms to deduce more complex propositions and 
demonstrate theorems.  
The most valuable preservation of the use of the synthetical method is Euclid’s 
Elements. In Book XIII one finds the terms ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ defined in the 
following way:  
 
Analysis is an assumption of that which is sought as if it were admitted through its consequences to 
something admitted (to be) true […] whereas synthesis is an assumption of that which is admitted 
through its consequences to the finishing or attainment of what is sought.120 
 																																																								
119 See further Acerbi 2010, pp. 183-195 and Frajese 1964, pp. 26-37. I return to this point in the next 
section (2.2), with regard to Euclid’s approach to mathematical entities.  
120 Translations are taken from Heath 1908. 
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The analytical method can be seen as a supplementary enquiry, or, as Pappus 
maintained,121 a special body of doctrine to be studied by those who, after finishing the 
Elements, desired to acquire the knowhow of solving problems which may be set before 
them involving the construction of lines, since it is useful for this alone. On the one 
hand, we assume in analysis that which is sought as if it had already been sought, and 
we enquire what it is from what is its result, and again what is the antecedent cause of 
the latter result, and so on, until, by retracing our steps, we come upon something which 
is already known or which belongs to the class of first principles. On the other hand, 
synthesis consists of the inverse process, insofar as we take as already sought that which 
was last arrived at in the analysis, and, by arranging in their natural order as 
consequences what were previously antecedents, and connecting them successively with 
one another, we arrive finally at the construction of what was sought.122  
The methods of synthesis, together with the abstract and idealized conception of 
mathematical objects, are two of the main features of standard Euclidean geometry, in 
the sense that this geometry still prevails today. Having offered an introduction to the 
dawn of geometry as a discipline, let us now turn to Euclid’s own context and 
intellectual background for the composition of his Elements.  
 
 
 
 																																																								
121 Pappus 1876-78, Vol. 2, VII, pp. 635-636 and Jones 1986, p. 83. 
122 Heath 1908, Vol. 1, pp. 137-140. One should also note that analysis itself divides up in two directions: 
i) the theoretical kind, which is directed at searching for the truth; and ii) the problem-oriented kind, 
which is directed at finding what we are told to find. In the first kind, we assume that what is sought is 
also existent and true, after which we advance through its successive consequences, as if they too were 
true and established by virtue of our hypothesis, to something which is admitted. In which case a), if that 
something admitted is true, that which is sought will also be true and the proof will correspond in the 
reverse order to the analysis; but also b), if we come upon something that is admittedly false, then that 
which is sought will also be false. In the second kind, we assume that which is propounded is also 
knowable, after which we advance through its successive consequences, as if they too were true, up to the 
point that something is admitted. If then a) what is admitted is possible and obtainable, that is, what 
mathematicians call “given”, what was originally proposed will also be possible, and the proof will again 
correspond in a reverse order to the analysis, but b) if we come upon something admittedly impossible, 
the problem will also be impossible to solve.  
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2.2 The standard Euclidean geometry 
 
Very little can be said with certainty about the biography of Euclid himself.123 Most of 
what we know about him is contained in a passage of Proclus’ commentary.124 However, 
we can infer from Proclus’ and Stobaeus’ works that Euclid lived in the time of the first 
Ptolemy, and thus flourished in ca. 300 BCE. It is highly likely that Euclid received his 
mathematical training in Athens from the pupils of Plato, and that he not only taught at 
Alexandria, but also founded a school there. 
Although Euclid’s Elements125 were not the first work of algebraic method, they 
seem to have quickly become a point of reference for later writers, with innumerable 
commentaries, editions and translations being produced over the centuries. For a long 
time they were an active source of new mathematical theorems; in due course they 
became canonised, upheld by some as a fine tool for mathematical education126, and 
today they represent, thanks to their highly theoretical nature, a typical elementary 
treatise that is widely used for training students, mainly because they avoid any 
reference to practical and heuristic procedure. The purely geometrical constructions 
employed in the Elements are restricted to those which can be achieved using a straight-
rule and a compass; empirical proofs by means of measurement are strictly forbidden. 
Most of the theorems appearing in the Elements were not discovered by Euclid himself 
but were the work of earlier Greek mathematicians such as Pythagoras (and his school), 
Hippocrates of Chios, Theaetetus of Athens and Eudoxus of Cnidos. However, Euclid is 
generally credited with arranging these theorems logically and systematically, so as to 
demonstrate that they necessarily follow from the first five simple axioms (i.e. the well-																																																								
123 Euclid the geometrician is sometimes confused with the philosopher Euclid of Megara, who lived ca. 
400 BCE. 
124 That is, using the editions Proclus 1970 and 1978. 
125 Although the Elements are the most famous treatise deriving from ancient Greek mathematics, Euclid 
was also the author of other works, such as the Pseudaria, Data, Divisions of Figures, Porisms, Surface-
loci, Conics, Phaenomena and the Optics. Among the commentators there are additionally traces of two 
treatises on the Elements of Music. Some of these works have been lost during the centuries, while others 
are contained in and have been transmitted through other scientists of antiquity such as Pappus, Heron, 
Phorphyry, Simplicius and the well-known Proclus. A detailed study of the Euclidean treatises and 
commentators can be found in Heath 1908, Vol. 1, pp. 20-45. 
126 Grattan-Guinnes 1996, p. 1. 
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known five postulates of Euclid).127  
The treatise consists of thirteen books and consists of i) axioms or postulates, ii) 
common notions, iii) definitions, iv) propositions and v) theorems. By their own 
definition, postulates do not require proofs or demonstrations, since they are self-
evident. However, over the centuries, some scholars came to believe that axioms and 
postulates were provable and derivable only from definitions.128 The axioms and 
postulates that are derived from these definitions are the statements which are properly 
employed in the proofs, and which therefore affect the deductive structure of the 
Elements. Below I present a summary of the main contents of each book. 
 
Book 1 outlines the fundamental propositions of plane geometry, including the three 
cases in which triangles are congruent, various theorems involving parallel lines, the 
theorem regarding the sum of the angles of a triangle, and the Pythagorean theorem. 
Book 2 is commonly said to deal with ‘geometrical algebra’, since most of the theorems 
contained within it have simple algebraic interpretations. Book 3 investigates circles 
and their properties, and includes theorems on tangents and inscribed angles. Book 4 is 
concerned with regular polygons inscribed in, and circumscribed around, circles. Book 
5 develops the arithmetical theory of proportion. Book 6 applies this theory of 
proportion to plane geometry, and contains theorems on similar figures. Book 7 deals 
with elementary number theory (e.g. prime numbers, greatest common denominators, 
etc.). Book 8 is concerned with the geometric series. Book 9 contains various 
applications of results in the preceding two books, and includes theorems on the infinite 																																																								
127 These five postulates are: 
1: to draw a straight line from any point to any point;  
2: to produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line;  
3: to describe a circle with any centre and distance;  
4: that all right angles are equal to one another; and 
5: that, if a straight line falling between two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side 
less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, will meet on the side on which 
the angles are smaller than the two right angles.  
128 See e.g. the Renaissance commentary by Clavius, who gave demonstrations for all mathematical 
principles with the exception of definitions. It consequently became a point of controversy whether or not 
it was useful to prove the axioms at all; many French authors during the seventeenth century claimed that 
Clavius’s exercise had been completely futile. See further de Risi 2016, p. 11. 
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nature of prime numbers as well as the sum of a geometric series. Book 10 attempts to 
classify incommensurable (i.e. irrational) magnitudes using the so-called method or 
‘principle of exhaustion’.129 Book 11 deals with the fundamental propositions of three-
dimensional geometry. Book 12 calculates the relative volumes of cones, pyramids, 
cylinders and spheres using the method of exhaustion. Book 13 lastly deals with the five 
so-called Platonic solids (since they refer back to Platonic mathematical theory 
expounded in the Timaeus). 
  
For centuries the Elements of Euclid embodied the very model of scientific and 
deductive reasoning, and its diffuse influence throughout Europe was matched only by 
the Bible and by a few other writings of the Church Fathers. They were translated, 
edited and commented upon hundreds of times, and these editions and commentaries 
shaped the scientific tools, methodological standards and mathematical language of 
many centuries.130 Euclid’s theorems were used to build further and more audacious 
mathematical theories, and applied in the physical sciences, while the deductive 
structure of the proofs was studied by mathematicians, logicians and epistemologists as 
the ideal of reason itself. A special historical role was additionally played by the 
principles, which were employed as the foundational elements of the entire 
construction.  
Euclid’s Elements drew together materials from an older mathematical tradition, 
and had presumably already undergone several changes and modifications during the 
Hellenistic Age. Around the turn of the fourth century CE, the mathematician Theon of 
Alexandria prepared an edition of the Elements that had great importance in the 
subsequent textual tradition. But the oldest existing copies of the Elements are 
Byzantine manuscripts dating back to the beginning of the ninth century; later Greek 
manuscripts were in scholarly circulation during the Renaissance and in fact provided 
the Greek text for the first editions of Euclid in the Western world. One further 																																																								
129 Further details on the meaning of this heuristic procedure will be given in the sections concerning 
Archimedes of Syracuse below, from § 2.3 onwards. 
130 Some of the main Medieval and Renaissance translations and adaptations will be analysed in the next 
chapter, see § 3.1. 
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important manuscript was only discovered at the beginning of the nineteenth century by 
François Peyrard, and it apparently contained a version of the Elements older than any 
other, possibly even predating Theon’s edition. It seems that its author had access to 
both Theonine and non-Theonine manuscripts. This edition is still considered the best 
that we possess for the original form of Euclid’s work, and has also been employed by 
the Danish philologist Johan Ludvig Heiberg131 to prepare the only critical edition of the 
Elements (1883-1916), which is still currently used for research purposes.  
These Greek manuscripts show many definitions prefacing several books of the 
Elements, and a set of fourteen or fifteen other principles (depending on the 
manuscripts) at the beginning of Book 1. The latter principles were usually considered 
by modern scholars to be the only statements on which the mathematical construction of 
Euclid was to be based, and are divided into a first list of ‘postulates’ (αἴτηματα) and a 
second list of ‘common notions’ (κοιναι	ἔννοιαι)	or, as they were later called, axioms. 
The rationale behind this division of the principles into ‘postulates’ on the one hand and 
‘common notions’ on the other was already a subject of debate and controversy in 
antiquity, and several philosophers and mathematicians advanced their own opinions on 
the epistemological status of this distinction. Some principles among the fourteen or 
fifteen contained in the oldest manuscripts, however, came to be considered spurious 
already in late antiquity, and Proclus (6th century CE, and the author of a crucial 
commentary on the Elements’ first book) informs us that a number of them were in fact 
later interpolations. Modern philology inclines to accept Proclus’ opinion and attempts 
to prove that some of the principles must have been added in the ancient transmission of 
the text. A largely (albeit not unanimously) endorsed opinion among scholars is that 
Euclid originally had only ten principles (five postulates and five common notions), 
while the other axioms are Hellenistic additions. Some doubts are usually raised about 																																																								
131 Heiberg’s edition constitutes the most valuable and thorough work ever published on the history of the 
text. Fortunately it is also available in English translation [Heath 1908]. In particular the introduction 
ranges widely from simple notions related to Euclid’s life to probing analysis of earlier treatises on 
elementary mathematics and geometry, as well as all the later commentaries and reworkings across 
Europe, even accounting for circulation in the Arabic-speaking world. See Heiberg and Menghe 1883-
1895 and Heath 1908, Vol 1, pp. 14-151. 
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two further common notions that some scholars wish to regard as interpolations as well: 
if this latter view holds true, then Euclid originally had only eight principles. We know 
in any case that several ancient mathematicians discussed the Euclidean system of 
principles, and began to add, change or remove a number of axioms and postulates; this 
seems to have been so, for instance, of Apollonius, Geminus, Ptolemy and Pappus. In 
particular, Heron of Alexandria (1st century CE) wrote a commentary on the Elements in 
which he addressed certain gaps in the Euclidean proofs and tried to fill them by 
introducing new assumptions (which he may, however, have regarded as provable). 
Even though Heron’s commentary is now lost, it was still known in the Islamic Middle 
Ages.132 A few fragments of it were included in Proclus’ commentary to the Elements, 
whose text enjoyed only a very limited circulation in the Middle Ages, but was 
rediscovered in the Renaissance. Similarly, Simplicius’ commentary of the Elements, 
which dates back to the 6th century, was extensively read in the Arabic-speaking world, 
but was later lost. A few of the axioms added in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
in fact derive from these Greek commentaries, and from Heron in particular, since the 
philosophers Proclus and Simplicius did not dare add their own principles to the “most 
perfect” work of Euclid.  
More can certainly be said on the circulation and the transmission of one of the 
most important and well-known geometrical treatises ever published, but only in the 
next chapter will we advance to a more detailed exposition of its dissemination during 
the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance Italian courts. In spite of all the adaptations and 
translations from antiquity, it is impossibly difficult to find how the original Euclidean 
edition of the Elements was structured. However, nowadays every scholar who refers to 
this classic treatise uses Heiberg’s edition, which originates on the one hand from a long 
tradition of redrafting, adding and making alterations to the original order with the aim 
of improving its clarity, and on the other hand from changes in some demonstrations 
which seek to remove some demonstrative procedure, such as the reductio ad 
absurdum.   																																																								
132 See further Brentjes 1997-1998, pp. 55-117, and the introductory essay in Acerbi and Vitrac 2014. 
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From the analysis of Euclidean thought, we can maintain that the objects of 
classical Greek mathematics were always particular objects given by an axiomatized 
construction procedure. Euclid’s axioms allow the existence of straight lines and circles, 
and an implicit procedure (cutting a given cone with a given plane) admits, for instance, 
the existence of Apollonius’ conic sections. Thus the main goal of ancient geometry 
was to study these objects and determine their properties. This approach is considerably 
different from that which is pioneered in the modern post-Cartesian era. From the 
development of modern geometry onwards, an ellipse is the locus of the zeros of a 
particular quadratic equation, or the locus of the points, such that the sum of the 
distances from two fixed points is constant. As Napolitani and Saito explain, “the 
property precedes the object, which, a priori, might not even exist. For the Greeks the 
ellipse was the object determined by a plane cutting a cone, meeting all its generatrices; 
this curve therefore existed, but all its properties were unknown, and needed to be 
investigated. It is not by chance that the foci of the ellipse and the hyperbola are 
introduced by Apollonius only at the end of the third book of Conics. The object 
precedes its properties.” 133  The immediate consequence of this conception of 
mathematical objects, which highlights the limitations of classical Greek geometry, is 
that a general object could not exist. Nothing like our curves existed in classical 
geometry. Various curved lines existed, but no single conceptual operational category 
under which a series of different curves could be included. Each curve has its own 
special procedure that defines it. Consequently if a general object did not exist, then a 
general method could not exist either. The method for the determination of areas and 
volumes were always presented on an ad hoc basis, in connection with the practical 
problem to be solved; for example, the quadrature of the parabola is dealt with in a 
radically different way from the squaring of the circle, and the methods developed for 
the study of spirals were altogether different from those devised for conoids and 
spheroids.134  
																																																								
133 Napolitani and Saito 2004, pp. 68-69. 
134 Ibid., pp. 69-70.  
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In general, the Greeks did not use definitions as foundations for their 
demonstrations, but rather as a means of clarifying the nature of the objects under 
analysis. As a result, their objects of study do not derive from a process of idealization 
or abstraction with respect to concrete objects shaped in a certain way: the circle does 
not derive from the act of abstracting a spherical concrete object, but rather from 
practical purposes and surveying operations. Stakes, for example, stand for a point, and 
an outstretched rope used to connect the two stakes represents a geometrical line. 
Whether geometrical definitions in the Elements stand for definitions of features 
belonging to practical operation or not, axioms and postulates stand for a translation of 
empirical and mechanical procedures. From the abstraction of this practical procedure is 
derived what we now call abstract mathematical and geometrical entities. 
Regardless of whether this approach could not be clearly and explicitly seen in 
Euclid’s treatise, the contrary holds for the mechanical and heuristic approach adopted 
by Archimedes in his geometrical and mathematical methods. In fact, it is not the aim of 
this dissertation to embark upon a deep and exhaustive analysis of the Elements: we 
present only the main features in order to supply the theoretical background and 
mathematical environment in which Archimedes, the first main character of this 
reconstruction, grew up and worked. Accordingly, we suggest that it is also important to 
present the debate concerning the notion of the geometrical point and the use that Euclid 
made of it. In fact, although the purpose is to outline the theoretical development of the 
notion of material point, we believe that the first item on the agenda is necessarily to 
present the simple geometrical notion of the point. In ordinary geometry the point is 
usually defined in the following way: a point is that which has no parts.135  
We are aware that behind this definition lies a deeply protracted and paradoxical 
debate, which has been the subject of hundreds of different interpretations, in the first 
place stemming from linguistic confusion. In ancient Greek there are two different 
terms with which to express our modern idea of ‘point’. The first, used by Euclid, is 
																																																								
135 Heath 1908, Vol. 1, p. 155.  
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σηµειο3, which literally means ‘sign’ and which alludes to the unperceivable existence 
of the point. In other words a point can be interpreted as a geometrical construct.  
It is not the same for pre-Euclidean philosophy of nature, because in the fragments 
of earlier treatises we find the term στιγµη to refer to the point produced by a sharpened 
object, lit. a ‘puncture’. In the Pythagorean fragments136, a point is defined as a monad 
having position or with position added; this is by far the first definition we hear of 
among the pre-Euclidean philosophers. The same meaning is given by Aristotle in 
Metaph. 7016b 24, where he says that what is indivisible in respect of magnitude and 
qua magnitude, but has no position, is a monad, while something similar that is 
indivisible but has position is a point. Thus, according to this pre-Euclidean theory, a 
point could be defined as that which is indivisible and has position.  
Along the same line of argument, Plato seems to be in disagreement with the 
Aristotelian and Pythagorean definitions, disapproving – as Aristotle himself mentioned 
in Metaph. 992a 20 – “to this genus [viz. that of a point indivisible and with position] as 
being a geometrical fiction, and called a point the beginning of a line, while again 
frequently spoke of indivisible lines”. However Aristotle replies again that even these 
indivisible lines must have extremities, for example two end-points, so that the same 
argument which proves the existence of lines also proves the existence of points.  
In several Aristotelian treatises one can find the objection against the unscientific 
Platonic definition of point as extremes of the line. 137  According to Heiberg’s 
interpretation, this debate leads to the replacement of the previous notion of point as στιγµη with the current Euclidean and post-Euclidean meaning expressed by the term 																																																								
136 Proclus 1788, p. 95 and Id. 1978, p. 94 
137 Aristotle’s conception of a point as that which is indivisible and has position is further illustrated by his 
observation that a point is not a body [De Caelo II.13, 296a 17] and has no weight [Ibid. III.1, 299a 30]. 
Also in the Physics he makes no distinction between a point and the place where it is [Physics IV.1 209a 
11]. He finds the usual difficulty in accounting for the transition from the indivisible to the finite or 
divisible magnitude. If a point is indivisible, no accumulation of point, however far it may be carried, can 
give us anything divisible, whereas of course a line is a divisible magnitude. Hence, Aristotle holds that 
points cannot make up anything continuous like a line. A point is like the now in time: now is indivisible 
and is not a part of time, it is only the beginning or end, or a division, of time. And similarly a point may 
be an extremity, a beginning or division of a line, but it is not part of it or of magnitude. It is only by 
motion that a point can generate a line and thus be the origin of magnitude. For further details, see Heath 
1908, Vol. 1, p. 156, and see also Heiberg 1904 and Mugler 1958.  
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σηµειον. Thus, it was due to Plato’s influence that there occurred a shift from the 
earlier notion of a puncture or sting towards the regular term used by Euclid and 
Archimedes later on, the latter term probably being considered more suitable than the 
former to claim greater reality for a point.  
In contrast with Heiberg’s interpretation, Vita138 in the 1980s promoted a new 
conjecture claiming that after Aristotle’s death we assisted a process of furthr 
specialization of different fields of knowledge in such a way that each discipline 
assumed its own specific range of application and range of problems. Philosophy lost its 
inclination towards the interpretation of natural phenomena, while scientific research 
acquired its own autonomy and emancipation from philosophy. In this cultural milieu 
the term σηµειον was chosen. In 1999, on the basis of the evidence that ancient Greek 
is characterised by an absence of nuances and that the ancient Greek lexicon is 
constituted of words clearly marked off from each other and not of a continuous 
spectrum of words shading into each other, Netz – also following Vita – theorised that 
the Greek lexicon operates on the principle ‘one-concept/one-word’, due to which 
Greek practitioners tended to formulate an economical system based on simplicity. 
Therefore in this context the word σηµειον was chosen instead of στιγµη.139 
Furthermore, the Euclidean definition is perfectly compatible with the earlier 
geometrical developments of Parmenides and Zeno of Elea (both 5th century BCE), 
whose concepts still occupy a place in modern geometry, according to which points are 
merely unextended objects of study and thus differ from any tangible object. In 
Euclidean doctrine the point is not the only thing without parts, since Euclid also 
mentioned the factors of now in time140 and the unit in number.141 The only voice to 
disagree with this statement is Proclus, who declares that the point is the only thing in 
																																																								
138 Vita 1982. 
139 Vita 1982 and Netz 1999, pp. 108-114. 
140 According to Aristotle, time contains something indivisible, and this is what we call the now. See 
Physics VI, 234 a, 23. 
141 A unit is that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called one. Heath 1908, Vol. 2, Book 
VII, definition 1, p. 277. 
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the field of geometry that is indivisible.142 Simplicius says that a point is the beginning of 
magnitude and that from which it grows, and also that it is the only thing which, having 
position, is not divisible. Like Aristotle, Simplicius adds that it is by its motion that a 
point can generate a greater magnitude, such as a line (i.e. Simplicius has a dynamic 
conception of a line).  
In the third definition of Book 1, Euclid says that the extremities of a line are 
points. However, in some other definitions that Euclid used, such as the infinite straight 
line, the circle or the ellipse, lines do not possess extremities. These definitions conceal 
a question that more than any other had given rise to a fierce controversy, which 
continued across all further centuries between mathematics and physics. The ‘point’ 
controversy is clearly analogous to the controversy between atomism and continuism, as 
well as the debate surrounding Zeno’s paradoxes. The spectacular intervention of Zeno 
of Elea in the evolution of mathematical thought seems to have been largely caused by 
the embarrassment into which the human intellect had been thrown by the mathematical 
continuum; it constituted perhaps the most powerful trigger of the famous crisis of 
principles, which disturbed the incremental progress of mathematics around the turn of 
the fourth century BCE.  
Are lines made up of a finite number of points, and are there thus indivisible parts 
in geometrical extensions, as atomists argue? Or are rather those lines infinitely 
divisible, that is having the property of being divisible into parts that can themselves be 
further divided, so that the process never terminates in indivisibles? These, and not only 
these, are the questions arising from the centuries-old debate between atomists and 
continuists.  
According to the main tenets of atomism, the Greek adjective atomos literally 
means ‘uncuttable’; in this light the history of atomism is not only the history of a 
theory relating to ancient philosophy but involves over time physics, mathematics and 
metaphysics right up until the contemporary turn. In fact, a wide variety of ontological 
questions concerning the nature of space, time and matter originate therefrom, involving 																																																								
142 Proclus 1788, pp. 92-96 and Id. 1978, pp. 87-98. 
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the notion that there are indivisible parts in any kind of magnitudes, geometrical 
extension, time, and so on. This debate originates in response to paradoxes such as 
those of Zeno of Elea about the infinite divisibility of magnitudes. According to 
Aristotle (On Generation and Corruption 1.8), it is likely that the first postulation of 
indivisible bodies is given as a response to a metaphysical puzzle about the possibility 
of change and multiplicity. Parmenides had argued that any differentiation or change in 
Being implies that “what is not either is or comes to be”. Furthermore, by means of 
indivisible bodies, the atomists were also thought to answer Zeno’s paradoxes about the 
impossibility of motion.143 Zeno had argued that, if magnitudes can be divided an infinite 																																																								
143 Traditionally the problem of divisibility has reached us through different, but closely related, paradoxes. 
On the one hand stand the group of paradoxes on plurality which argue in favour of monism; on the other 
hand the second group relate to the paradoxes of motion.  
Throughout the argument for denseness, Zeno attempts to show that there could not be more than 
one thing, on pain of contradiction. Assume then that there are many things; he argues that they are both 
‘limited’ and ‘unlimited’, which is a contradiction. Firstly, he says that any collection must contain some 
definite number of things; but if you have a definite number of things, you must have a finite (limited) 
number of them. But second, imagine any collection of ‘many’ things arranged in space. Between any 
two of them, he claims, there is a third thing; and in-between these three elements another two; and 
another four between these five; and so on, endlessly. Thus the ‘limited’ collection is also ‘unlimited’, 
which is a contradiction. But, why are there ‘always others between the things that are’? As I have 
already said above (§ 2.1), we can argue in favour of the existence of an infinite number of physical 
grains, that are physically separated between each other, even if this is just so by air, contained in an 
unlimited size; or rather one might hold that any body has parts that can be densely ordered. Of course 
material and physical point-parts (or grains) are not densely ordered. However, according to modern 
geometry, familiar geometric points are densely ordered in a finite line because there are no common 
idealized entities without any dimension.  
A step forward for this line of thought is the argument for finite size. Zeno argues that if those point-
parts are imagined without dimensions at all, since they are so indefinitely small, with a series of 
additions of a point-particle to another one it would not make it any bigger. Moreover, if, when it is 
subtracted, the other thing is no smaller, or if it does not increase when something is added, clearly the 
thing being added or subtracted is nothing. 
The second group of paradoxes argue in favour of the non-existence of motion. The most famous 
paradoxes are The Dichotomy and Achilles and the Tortoise (the others are The Arrow and The Stadium). 
Since both of these two paradoxes resemble each other I will briefly analyse only the first one. Even if all 
those arguments were developed for claiming the non-existence of motion, our humble point is closely 
related to those kinematic problems which raise a number of physical and methaphysical issues about the 
divisibility of space and time. Imagine a runner needs to run for the train. Before she reaches the station 
she must run half-way. Suppose she is running with constant speed, so she takes a half of the time to run 
half-way there and a half of the time to run the rest of the way. Now she must also run half-way to the 
half-way point—i.e. a quarter of the total distance—before she reaches the half-way point, but again she 
is left with a finite number of finite lengths to run, and plenty of time to do it. And before she reaches a 
quarter of the way she must reach a half of a quarter = a 1/8 of the way; and before that a 1/16; and so on. 
There is no problem at any finite point in this series, but what if the halving is carried out infinitely many 
times? The resulting series contains, for any possible first distance, a half-way distance. Thus, the series 
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number of times, it would be impossible for motion to occur. The problem seems to be 
that a moving body would have to traverse an infinite number of spaces in a finite time. 
By supposing that the atoms form the lowest denominator for division, the atomists 
escape from this dilemma: a total space traversed has only a finite number of parts. 
Since it is unclear whether the earliest atomists understood the atoms to be physically or 
theoretically indivisible (or divisible), one wonders whether they may not have made 
this distinction. The dilemma concerning (in)divisibility, added to the paradoxes posed 
by Zeno, seems to lead to one rational solution: in order to overcome all these 
paradoxes we must deny the actual infinite and accept the potential infinite. 
Traditionally both theories are attributed to Aristotle in his Physics, Books 3 and 6 
respectively.144 The potential parts doctrine argues that the parts into which a body can be 
metaphysically145 divided are not distinctly existent entities prior to their being actualized 
by some operation of division. Prior to the act of division that actualizes or creates the 
parts, the whole is best described as containing possible or potential parts. Those 
potential parts represent the way in which the whole could be broken down, and 
consequently any talk of potential parts is really just talk about the modal properties of 
the whole original. Moreover, these parts are not created ex nihilo. The whole matter 
from which they are made existed beforehand, and thus the whole is not a composite or 																																																																																																																																																																		
of distances that the runner is required to run is: … 1/16 of the way, then 1/8 of the way, then 1/4 of the 
way, and finally 1/2 of the way. There is clearly a problem, for this description of her run has her 
travelling an infinite number of finite distances, which, Zeno would have us conclude, must take an 
infinite time, which is another way of saying that it is never completed. Consequently, Zeno’s conclusion 
is in favour of the non-existence of motion at all.  
However, Euclid’s postulate 1 (“to draw a straight line from any point to any point”), postulate 2 
(“to produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line”) and postulate 3 (“to describe a circle 
with any centre and distance”) could be considered a valuable reply to Zeno’s refutation of motion and 
divisibility, because in drawing lines and circles, a sort of motion is required. I think that this suggestion 
requires further and independent scrutiny. 
144 Aristotle (ed.) 1973. 
145 Throughout the history of ancient Greek philosophy, four different kinds of divisibility were 
recognised: i) matter is physically divisible (p-divisible) if and only if (iff) it can be broken apart by 
natural processes; ii) matter is said to be metaphysically divisible (m-divisible) iff it is logically possible 
that its spatially distinct parts could exist separately from one another; iii) matter is said to be formally 
divisible iff it has parts that can be distinguished by their spatial properties (i.e. because of the relation 
with their adjacent parts); and finally iv) matter is intellectually divisible iff a mind could represent it in 
thought as conteining different parts, regardless of whether these parts are p-divisible or m-divisible and 
regardless if the parts are spatially distinct (f-divisible). For further remarks, see Holden 2004, pp. 9-16. 
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aggregate structure, a construction from so many distinct actual parts. Nor then is the 
whole an ontologically derivative entity, depending for its existence on the 
ontologically prior existence of component parts. In fact it is a metaphysical thesis 
about the ontological status of the parts of material bodies, not a thesis about their 
internal physical structure.146  
On the other hand, the actual parts doctrine states that the parts of bodies are each 
fully-fledged distinct entities. As Holden writes, “[t]his implies that the whole gross 
extended body is a compound or composite, a structured aggregate of these pre-existing, 
independently existing parts. Since each actual part is a distinct entity, the whole must 
be conceptualised as a composite structure, a compound aggregated from ontologically 
prior concrete elements.”147  
All those paradoxical arguments were only definitively solved in the nineteenth 
century. However it is not the aim of this section to explain how this was achieved or to 
offer an exhaustive analysis of the debate arising from the geometrical notion of point. 
While the latter had given rise to such a debate, the same cannot be said for the notion 
of the point mass. Despite its complicated aspects, mathematics and physics were not 
intimidated by this centaur-like problem148, which has been treated – be it implicitly or 
explicitly, as we shall see in the subsequent chapters – somewhat casually over the 
centuries.  
Throughout this section we have aimed, first to locate the context in which 
Archimedes, who clearly gave importantce to the notion of centre of gravity, lived, 
grew and developed his research. Secondly, between Euclid and Archimedes, we have 
sought to locate a turn in the approach adopted towards geometry, insofar as the 
synthetic method and the claim of looking for foundational principles was substituted 
for a heuristic and mechanical approach aiming at purely practical purposes. With 
																																																								
146 Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
147 Ibid., p. 88. 
148 The reason we define the material point as centaur derives from the metaphor used by George Israel: 
the material point is like a centaur, in that in it coexist two heterogeneous notions. On the one hand we 
have the notion of matter-mass that come from physics, and refers to extension; on the other hand we 
have the mathematical notion of point, which refers to a body that has no parts. Israel 2007. 
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respect to this second point we shall examine the development of the first stage of the 
objectification of procedure, when the procedure of weighing is adopted in a purely 
engineering context, in particular within the context of marine engineering and in 
building fortifications and weapons for defending the city of Syracuse.  
The first kernel of abstraction and idealization hidden behind the modern notion of 
the material point can be traced back to Archimedes, because he used the centre of 
gravity of planes and solid figures, even though he did not question the epistemological 
menaning of this procedure. In fact, we have to wait the end of the Renaissance period 
for such a turn, in order that the whole figure is represented in itself. Archimedes 
imagined that an entire triangle for example could have been reduced to its centre of 
gravity and be shifted along the arms of the balance or of the lever. Let us proceed by 
presenting an overview of the Archimedean context of research.  
 
 
2.3 Towards a Heuristic tradition 
 
Archimedes is considered one of the high-water marks of the mathematical culture of 
Greek antiquity. As in the case of Euclid, so for Archimedes our knowledge is very 
scanty regarding his life and personality.149 The year of his birth cannot be stated with 
certainty: it is usually dated to 287 BCE, on the evidence of the Byzantine polyhistor 
Tzetzes, who reported that Archimedes was 75 when he was killed in 212 BCE during 
the Roman conquest of Syracuse. Archimedes was also a leading figure in the defence 
of Syracuse against the Romans in one of the defining moments of the Second Punic 
War.150 It is probably this special role as a scientist, at such a pivotal moment of history, 
which gave Archimedes fame during his lifetime.151 As a leading mathematician in 																																																								
149 In antiquity there existed a biography of Archimedes written by Heraclides. The latter was also 
mentioned once by Eutocius in his commentary on the Measurement of a Circle [Opera III, 228] and 
once by Archimedes himself in the introduction of the treatise On Spirals [Opera II, 2], yet there are no 
certain references a man called Heraclides. Most of the essential information on Archimedes’ personal 
and social life can be found in Dijksterhuis 1987. 
150 I.e. the Great World War of the classical Mediterranean. 
151 Netz 2004, p. 10. 
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Syracuse he evidently made a deep impression on the classical world, in particular due 
to his engineering talent; he built152 several technical and mechanical devices such as the 
choclias, the planetarium and the hydraulic organ, acquiring fame through his devotion 
to the engines of war.  
According to Cicero and Silus Italicus it is likely that he was born into a poor and 
humble family, although Plutarch153 reports intimate connections between his family and 
King Hieron II of Syracuse. He was the son of the astronomer Pheidias, whom 
Archimedes refers to in a passage of The Sand-Reckoner or Arenarius. What can be 
dated with greater precision is the fact that Archimedes spent some time in Egypt, above 
all because he is mentioned by Diodorus of Agyrium, who declares that Archimedes 
made his hydraulic machine in Egypt, and, in the second place, because in Archimedes’ 
prefaces to his treatises appear many references to a friendship with various scholars 
from Alexandria.154  
Even the attribution of Archimedes’ works is a difficult subject. The corpus 
surviving in Greek – which, following Reviel Netz, includes Eutocius’ commentaries as 
well – includes the following works: 
 SC I:  On the Sphere and the Cylinder (Book 1) 
SC II:  On the Sphere and the Cylinder (Book 2) 
 SL:  Spiral Lines 
 CS: Conoids and Spheroids 
 DC:  Measurement of the Circle (Dimensio Circuli)   
																																																								
152 Several writers of the classical world (among others, Cicero, Aratus of Soli, Sextus Empiricus and 
Cassiodorus) report the technical achievements of Archimedes, but from those writings it may be inferred 
that he was credited with the construction of such an instrument, not that he was held to be its inventor.  
153 In the Tusculanae Disputationes Cicero calls Archimedes humilem homunculum; Silus Italicus in his 
epic Punica mentions Archimedes’ share in the defense of Syracuse and calls him nudus opum; Plutarch 
in his Viae Marceli XVI calls him Ἰέρωνι τῷ Βασιλεῖ συγγενὴς καὶ φίλος. Dijksterhuis 1987, p. 10, fn. 
1-3. 
154 For more information, see Favaro 1923 and Dijksterhuis 1987, pp. 8-14.  
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 Aren.:  The Sand Reckoner (Arenarius)  
 PE I, II:  Planes in Equilibrium 
 QP: Quadrature of the Parabola 
 Meth.: The Method 
 CF I:  On Floating Bodies (de Corporibus Fluitantibus) (Book 1) 
 CF II:  On Floating Bodies (de Corporibus Fluitantibus) (Book 2)  
 Bov.:  The Cattle Problem (Problema Bovinum)  
 Stom.:  Stomachion 
Some works may be ascribed to Archimedes because they start with a letter by 
Archimedes himself, introducing and contextualizing the work in question: assuming 
that these are not forgeries (and their sober style suggests authenticity), they are the best 
evidence for ascription. Even more useful to us are the prefatory letters, which often 
connect the introduced works with other previous works by Archimedes.155 In the third 
century BCE, knowledge of the works of Archimedes would entail an exposure to a 
complex web of correspondence between Mediterranean intellectuals. As for all the 
other ancient treatises (not just those of Archimedes), no one in this time seems to have 
known the works in the same arrangement as that of any of the surviving manuscripts. 
Books from late antiquity very rarely survive, and we can only guess that, during the 
fifth and sixth centuries (i.e. in Byzantium’s first period of glory) several such 
collections containing works by Archimedes were made. In particular, it appears that an 
important collection was made by no less than Isidore of Miletus, the architect of Hagia 
Sophia. In late antiquity most of the books were transformed from papyrus rolls into 
parchment codices.156 Most of the evidence concerning these ancient scholars only 																																																								
155 Further remarks on the autenticity of Archimedes’ treatises can be found in Netz 2004, pp. 10-13. 
156 A codex by definition holds a collection of treatises. 
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emerged in the late ninth century CE: Byzantine culture initiated a process of 
renaissance by producing a substantial number of copies of ancient works. At least three 
codices157, namely codex A, codex B and codex C containing all of Archimedes’ works, 
were produced during the ninth and tenth centuries. Codices A, founded in 1884, and B, 
which is no longer extant today, both had an important role to play in the history of 
Western science, for it was in Western Europe that they performed their historical 
service, having being removed there following Western Europe’s first colonizing push. 
The culmination of this push was reached in 1204, when Constantinople itself was 
sacked by Venice and its allies, its old territories were parceled out to Western knights, 
and many of its intellectual treasures were looted. Codices A and B, among such looted 
works, soon made their way to Europe, and by 1269 were in the papal library in 
Viterbo, where William of Moerbeke used them for his own choice of collected works 
by Archimedes translated into Latin. Moerbeke’s translation was not altogether 
unknown at the time, but it was the mathematical Renaissance of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries that delivered to Archimedes greater intellectual prominence.158  
Currently, as we have already said for Euclid, even if many translations and 
restorations are available, the most widely used is Heiberg’s reconstruction. Heiberg 
had studied the manuscript tradition of Archimedes for over 35 years, starting with his 
doctoral dissertation, Quaestiones Archimedeae (1879), his First Edition (1880-81) and, 																																																								
157 The three codices are divided and labelled as follows. i) Heiberg’s codex A contains the works in the 
following sequence: SC I, II, DC, CS, SL, PE I, II, Aren., QP; Eutoc. In SC I, II, In DC, In PE I, II, and a 
work by Hero. This codex was prepared by Isidore of Miletus in Constantinople in the sixth century CE, 
and then was copied either by Leo the geometer or his associates, once again in Constantinople, in the 
ninth century CE. Later on it was lost, and then rediscovered again by Heiberg in Jerusalem at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. In turn the palimpsest disappeared again until in 1998 it was sold at a 
public auction at Christie’s. The anonymous buyer granted the exhibit to William Noel, the director of the 
Walters Art Museum in Baltimore and the curator of the palimpsest. Dr. Reviel Netz of Stanford 
University, Nigel Wilson and Dr. Abigail Quandt constituted a team appointed to produce a transcription 
of the text, filling in gaps in Heiberg’s account with the figures founded in codex A. ii) Around 975 CE 
another such codex was made, to be named by Heiberg codex B. It was probably a copy of a late ancient 
book. This codex B seems to have contained the following works: PE (I?), II, CF I, II, Meth., SL, SC, DC, 
Stom. Finally, iii) codex C (the classification given by Heiberg again) is a third Byzantine collection 
including works on mechanics and optics. In particular this was made up of the following works: PE I, II, 
CF I, II, QP.  
158 For further information, see Rose 1974, in particular ch. 10. I return to this topic in chapter 3.  
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after numerous articles detailing new discoveries and observations, proceeding to the 
Second Edition (1910-15). He considerably refined his views throughout this process, 
and the final position reached in 1915 seems to be proven solidly. Still, his final choice 
of letters reflects the circuitous path which got him there and is somewhat confusing.159 
Since Heiberg’s Archimedes in its original version is in Latin, the main sources for 
comprehending demonstrations of the proposition that will be presented below are taken 
from Dijksterhuis’ 1956 edition160, which is considered to be one of the most thorough-
going sources for studying and approaching Archimedean thought.  
It is not the aim of this study to analyse in their totality all the contents of the 
numerous treatises published during all over the centuries. For our purposes we will 
focus the attention on several proofs and demonstrations concerning only the centre of 
gravity. 
 
 
2.4 Archimedes and the Centres of Gravity  
 
Archimedes’ reflection on the centres of gravity can be understood by analysing his 
most important work on this topic, the Planes in Equilibrium (hereafter PE). Whereas in 
all other mathematical treatises Archimedes builds upon foundations established long 
ago by other scholars, in this work he deals with an investigation relating to the very 
foundations of physics, leaving the domain of pure mathematics to consider natural 
science from a mathematical viewpoint. As Dijksterhuis says, “he sets forth certain 
postulates in which he bases a chapter from the theory of equilibrium, and he is thus the 
first to establish the close interrelation between mathematics and mechanics, which was 
to become of such far-reaching significance for physics as well for mathematics”.161 The 
text is divided into two books. The first is organised in fifteen propositions with seven 																																																								
159 There is a long traditon explaining the use of symbols and sigla in Heiberg; he even used symbols of 
different kinds A, B and C, for codices that are similar in nature, in order to distinguish independent 
Byzantine manuscripts from the ninth to tenth centuries. Netz 2004, pp. 17-18. 
160 The Dutch original edition dates back to 1956, rather than the English translation which dates to 1987.  
161 Dijksterhuis 1987, p. 286. 
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postulates, and deals with the so-called static geometrical phenomena; from the 
postulates of the scale with equal arms, the law of the lever is stated. Later, the centres 
of gravity of the parallelogram, the triangle and the trapezoid are calculated. In 
particular, Archimedes demonstrates in the fifteen propositions of the first book that the 
centre of gravity of a triangle lies on the median line. The culmination of arguments 
about statics and the core of Archimedes’ argumentation is represented by proposition 
13, followed by the corollary proposition 14. In both of these, which will be analysed 
below, the centre of gravity is intuitively understood as the point in which the weight of 
the body is fully concentrated.  
The second book, made up of ten propositions, starts with a demonstration of the 
law of the lever applied to a particular case, namely the situation in which two portions 
of segments are hung at the extremities of a balance. The book continues with the 
statement of the centre of gravity of the segment of the parabola (orthotome) and the 
truncated parabola. The most important proposition in the second book is the fourth 
one, which clearly deals with the demonstration of the centre of gravity of a segment of 
a parabola which lies on the diameter. The method used to attain this proposition is a 
combined application of the principles of the barycentric theory and the theory of the 
quadrature of the orthotome (which has been earlier dealt in Book 1); it is further based 
on the properties of this curve.  
Although the text deals with the study of barycentres, it is particularly interesting 
that in both books there is no definition of the term ‘barycentre’, literally ‘centre of 
weight’. The term appears for the first time only in the fourth postulate162 of the treatise 
at hand, but without providing any definition. Since I have no intention to enter into the 																																																								
162 The reasons that Archimedes refers to the centre of gravity without giving any precise definition can be 
traced to the following two explanations. First, it is possible that Archimedes, when writing the treatise on 
the equilibrium of planes, could assume the theory of the centre of gravity to be familiar to a certain 
extent, because this theory had already been developed either by earlier students of mechanics or by 
himself in a treatise now lost. Second, it is possible that the work on the equilibrium of planes is an 
entirely autonomous treatise, and that the definition of the concept of the centre of gravity is to be 
conceived of as being implied in the postulates on which this work is built. Dijksterhuis maintains that 
both these points of view are valid; Vailati 1996-97 upholds the palusibility of the first hypothesis. 
Toeplitz and Stein advoctes the second hypothesis, for which see Stein 1930. For further detailed study 
on the notion of centre of gravity, see Dijksterhuis 1987, pp. 289-304.  
	 84 
debate on the reasons for this absence, let us say simply that the notion of centre of 
gravity has a connection with the concept of the centre of suspension or point of 
suspension. The centre (or point) of suspension is the point in which, given two 
weights, we must suspend the rod of a balance in order to maintain its equilibrium. 
Archimedes himself in PE I, propositions 6 and 7, analyses the concept of equilibrium163 
in terms of the centre of suspension, and provides the following account: 
“Commensurable magnitudes are in equilibrium at a distance reciprocally proportional 
to the weights.”164 We can assume, therefore, that the concept of centre of gravity also 
derives from the use of the balance and has been refined geometrically and physically165 
over time, starting from Archimedes’ works themselves.166  
In PE I, 6-7, for example, in order to prove that the centre of gravity of a figure 
which possesses a diameter or axis falls on the diameter or axis, it is sufficient to have 
the approximants167 with their centre of gravity on the axis.168 In the case of the parabola, 
its relation with the triangle seems immediate, since the latter may be inscribed into the 
segment of the parabola, in order to reach such an approximation that the surface 																																																								
163 Pappus has given the following definition: “the centre of gravity of any body is a point situated within 
which, and such that, if the body is imagined to be suspended from it, the weight will be at rest as it hangs 
and will keep its original position.” [Pappus 1876-78, VIII, prop 1, p. 1031] Heron of Alexandria instead 
wrote that “the centre of gravity or inclination is a point which is such that the weight, if it is suspended 
in it, will be divided into equal parts.” [Heron, Mechanics, 1, 24] Again in contrast, Eutokios of Ascalona 
defines it as “the centre of inclination of a plane figure the point from which it is to be suspended to stay 
parallel to the horizon, and by the centre of inclination or gravity of two more planes the one in which the 
balance is hung to be parallel to the horizon” [Cf. Archimedis opera omnia cum commentariis Eutocii, ed. 
J. L. Heiberg, 3 vols, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig 1880-1881]. Among other works on the law of the lever it is 
necessary to remember the Liber Euclidis de ponderoso et levi, attributed to Euclid, in which we find a 
geometrical proof of the law of the lever which is completely independent of Aristotelian dynamics. This 
proof also refers to the thesis according to which the effect of a weight W on the end of an arm of the 
lever (with length L) is given by the product W*L. See further Drachmann 1963 and Migliorato 2013, p. 
86.  
164  Dijksterhius 1987, p. 289. Again in proposition 7 he says: “Even if the magniturde are 
incommensurable, they will be in equilibrium at distances reciprocally proportional to the magnitudes”. 
See also Ibid. p. 305. 
165 Migliorato 2013, pp. 84-90. 
166 At the same time other scientists were working on the same topic, such as for example Pappus of 
Alexandria.  
167 Approximating figures are figures that can be inscribed and circumscribed to the figure whose centre of 
gravity one wishes to find out. Following this technique, the difference between the inscribed and the 
circumscribed figures may be made arbitrarily small. We will specify in the next section how to use the 
approximating figures when will we deal with the method of exhaustion. 
168 Napolitani 2001, p. 45.  
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difference between the major and the minor shape grows smaller until they almost 
touch.  
For the sake of clarification let us observe the proof of the two above-mentioned 
propositions 13 and 4 of Books 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
Proposition PE I-13: In any triangle the centre of gravity lies on the straight line which 
joins any vertex to the middle point of the base.  
 
    
 
Figure 2.1 
 
In Figure 2.1, with reference to the previous proposition, let ∆ be the middle point of the 
base 9: of triangle AB:. Suppose that the centre of gravity ;	of the triangle <=:	does 
not lie on A∆. We know from the postulate VII169 only that the centre of gravity lies 
within the triangle AB:. Draw the straight line through ; parallel to 9: until the parts 
thus obtained (each equal to >?) are fewer than ;@; through the points of division draw 
straight lines parallel to <∆, and divide the triangle in the manner indicated in the figure 
into parallelograms (AB, CD etc.) and triangles (EFA, GH:, etc.). In proposition 9170 
the centre of gravity of the parallelograms all lie on A∆, and consequently the centre of 
gravity P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). 
ravity P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). 
avity P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). 
vity P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). 
ity P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). Join 
ty P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). Join 
y P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). Join 
 P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). Join P 
P of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). Join P 
 of the figure IJ,	consisting of all the parallelograms, also lies on A∆ (prop. 6). Join P 
																																																								
169 In any figure whose p rimeter is concave in the same direction, the centre of gravity must be within the
figure. 
170 Proposition 9 states that the centre of gravity of any parallelogram lies on the straight line joining the 
middle points of opposite sides of the parallelogram. Dijksterhuis 1987, p. 307.  
	 86 
straight line meet the straight line ?K in L and the straight line drawn through : 
parallel to A∆ in M. L lies between P and ;, and M lies outside the triangle.  
 
Then it must be ascertained how the centre of gravity of the figure I∆,	consisting of all 
the shaded triangles, must be situated with respect to the points P, ;	and M.  
For this we first compare the area of the triangle AB: with the sum of the areas of 
the shaded triangles. By similarity we have: 
 A∆Γ, ΛΣΜ = T ΑΓ , T ΑΜ , etc. 
 
Whence: 
 A∆Γ, ΛΣΜ +⋯+ ΖΨΓ = T ΑΓ , T ΑΜ +⋯+ T ΖΓ = = T ΑΓ , O ΑΜ, ΑΓ = ΑΓ , T ΑΜ  
 
Likewise: 
 A∆Γ, ΛΣΛ +⋯+ ΕΟΒ = ΑΒ, ΑΛ = (ΑΓ, ΑΜ) 
 
Therefore: 
 A∆Γ, Χ∆ = ΑΓ, ΑΜ = ΔΓ, ΔΩ = ΡΦ, ΡΠ > (ΡΦ, ΡΘ) 
 
And thence: 
  (Χi, Χ∆) > (ΘΦ, ΘΡ) 
 
Now determine a point X on the straight line jM such that: 
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(Χi, Χ∆) = ΘΧ, ΘΡ  
 
then ;I > ;M, therefore X lies on jM produced. 
In proposition 8171, X is now the centre of gravity of the figure Χ∆, consisting of the 
shaded triangles, which is impossible because all these triangles are on the opposite side 
of the straight line drawn through : parallel to <∆ from X. The latter conclusion is not 
based on postulate VII, for the perimeter of the figure I∆	is not concave in the same 
direction. It should rather be imagined that it is made in view of the consideration that, 
if the centre of gravity is found of a figure whose component parts all lie on the same 
side of the straight line, after having combined with the aid of prop. 6 two parts, i.e. by 
combining their combination with a third part, etc., the centre of gravity of the whole 
figure must lie on the same side of the straight line on which all the parts also lie.172       
 
Let us turn now to the Proposition PE II-4: the centre of gravity of any segment 
comprehended by a straight line and an orthotome lies on the diameter of the segment.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 
																																																								
171 Proposition 8 states that if another magnitude be taken away from a magnitude which does not have the 
same centre as the whole, when the straight line joining the centres of gravity of the whole magnitude and 
the magnitude that is taken away is produced towards the side where the centre of the whole magnitude is 
situated, and when from the produced part of the line joining the said centres, a segment is cut off in such 
a way that it has to the segment between the centres, the same ratio as the weight of the magnitude which 
is taken away has to the remaining magnitude, and the extremity of the segment cut off will be the centre 
of gravity of the remaining magnitude. Dijksterhuis 1987, p. 306. 
172 Dijksterhuis 1987, pp. 310-311. 
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Suppose that the centre of gravity E of the segment F	(k9:) does not lie on the 
diameter 9> and the straight line through E parallel to the diameter meets the chord k: 
in Z. Inscribe in the segment k9: the triangle k9:, and now take a magnitude K such 
that:  
 ΓZ, ΔZ = (triangle	ΑΒΓ, K) 
 
Now inscribe in the segment F	in the recognised manner the figure ?,	such that the sum 
of the remaining segment F − ?	is less than K. Let ;t be met in E by the straight line 
through : parallel to the diameter of the segment. Since ? > k9: − uvwxyz{| and F −? < ~, we have: 
 Ω, Σ − Ω > ΑΒΓ − triangle	, Κ = ΓZ, ΔZ = (ΔΕ, ΕΘ) 
 
The centre of gravity M of F − ? is now found from the centre of gravity E of F and ; 
of ? by means of the relation (Book 1, prop. 8): 
 ΜΕ, ΘΕ = (Ω, Σ − Ω) 
 
Thence: 
 ΜΕ, ΘΕ > (ΛE, ΘΕ) so that ΜΕ > ΛE 
 
M is therefore on the opposite side of :E to E, which is impossible because the whole 
segment lies on the same side of :E with E.173  
 
Those two proofs can be considered equivalent in their methodology, firstly because 
both are based on the well-known technique of reductio ad absurdum, and secondly 																																																								
173 This reconstruction is taken from Dijksterhuis 1987, pp. 348-349. 
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because the mechanical demonstrative procedure is based on the following common 
idea, namely that “to demonstrate that the centre of gravity of a figure having a diameter 
(or an axis) lies on the diameter, it is sufficient to construct approximating figures 
whose centres of gravity are on the diameter.”174 To show where is the centre of gravity 
of a certain figure, Archimedes uses the basic idea that we have called ‘the expulsion of 
the centre of gravity’ of the remaining figure, which in turn is given by the difference 
between the circumscribed and the inscribed figure. By ‘expulsion’ we mean that the 
figure we want to measure (or weigh175) is first of all considered as if it were represented 
by its own centre of gravity – as a point with a volume and other neglected physical 
features – and secondly the centre of gravity is imagined to be shifted along the arm of a 
virtual balance represented (as in the proposition presented above) by the segment	;K, 
where ; is the centre of gravity of both the parabolid and the triangle, and M is the 
centre of gravity of the figure inscribed in the paraboloid and circumscribed to the 
triangle.  
The method of expulsion and the weighing technique will become clearer in the 
next section, where we will analyse in detail a proposition from the most famous treatise 
attributed to Archimedes, The Method, in which the mechanical procedure of the virtual 
balance is used in a particularly confident way.  
Finally, the procedure used for drawing the circumscribed and inscribed 
approximating figures was already stated by Archimedes in some of the propositions 
demonstrated in Conoids and Spheroids. 
																																																								
174 Napolitani and Saito 2004, p. 77.  
175 Let me clarify why we use the term ‘weight’ instead of ‘mass’, at least when we refer to Ancient and 
Renaissance mathematics. In antiquity the term ‘weight’ was used as a qualitative feature, just like colour 
and temperature, and it was used in reference to these properties related to single bodies. Directly related 
to it is the concept of lightness – a complementary qualitative feature of bodies. According to the 
Peripatetic school – and before them, Aristotle – weight is an intensive magnitude, so it cannot be related 
to the concept of quantitas materiae (quantity of matter) which in turn constitutes a quantitative attribute 
of rigid bodies. In fact, in nature there also exist some elements, such as fire and its derivative, which are 
naturally light. Only in Platonic thought will we facilitate a metaphysical identification between matter 
and space, therefore at this time we have the formulation of the first kernel of the theoretical quantitative 
determination of matter in the defining of the volume and (quantity of) space occupied by the body.  
For the formulation of the modern Newtonian notion of mass, we must wait until the second half of 
the seventeenth century. For further information on this last issue see chapter 4. 
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2.5 The Method of Mechanical Theorems 
 
As sketched above (fn. 157), the Method has travelled all around Europe and the Middle 
East for centuries. For our purposes, the most important refining of the concept of the 
centre of weight appears only in Archimedes’ The Method of Mechanical Theorems or 
(in its briefer title) The Method. According to the latest historiographical research, the 
Method can be dated back to the last years of Archimedes’ scientific activity. This 
treatise is thus a mature work, in which Archimedes sums up his mathematical activity, 
declaring to the addressee of the work Eratosthenes of Chios his intention to illustrate in 
detail his mechanical procedure, which he had already used in other essays and was 
useful for his illustrative purposes. It is clear that Archimedes’ intention was to give a 
mechanical interpretation to those propositions which were purely geometrical. 
Furthermore, the mechanical nature of his work highlights the heuristic dimension of 
his arguments. For example, in the letter to Eratosthenes, Archimedes writes:  
 
Since, as I said, I know that you are diligent, an excellent teacher in philosophy, and greatly 
interested in any mathematical investigations that may come your way, I thought it might be 
appropriate to write down and set forth for you in this same book certain special methods, by means 
of which you will be enable recognize certain mathematical questions with the aid of mechanics. I 
am convinced this is no less useful for finding the proofs of these same theorems. For some things, 
which first became clear to me by the mechanical method, were afterwards proved geometrically, 
because their investigation by the said method does not furnish an actual demonstration. For it is 
easier to supply the proof when we have previously acquired, by the method, some knowledge of the 
questions than it is to find it without any previous knowledge.176 
 
Euclidean mathematics is characterised by a special case of the form of mathematical 
argument, i.e. a kind of exaggeration of the synthetic structure requiring an irrefutably 
persuasive sequence of logical conditions. In contrast, Archimedes, already in the 
prefatory letter to Eratosthenes, states that “before he knew how to prove his theorems, 																																																								
176 English trans. taken from Dijksterhuis 1987, p. 314. 
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one needs to become convinced of their empirical truth.” The Method is an elementary 
essay written in order to train an audience unprepared on the topic; Eratosthenes is the 
pupil needing of education. Compared with PE I and II, the Method represents the chef 
d’oeuvre of the barycentre’s science of solid figures, the acme of Archimedes’ 
theoretical works. At the base of this exposition there are three mathematical 
techniques: the idealized lever or virtual balance, the process through infinitesimal 
sections and the principle or method of exhaustion. An extensive discussion of these 
procedures exceeds the boundaries of this dissertation, but we wish to show, through the 
analysis of some Archimedean demonstrations, that the notion of centre of gravity and 
the material point share some essential features. For our purposes, therefore, it is 
enough to outline the mechanical and heuristic values attributed to the centre of gravity 
as a material point, paying attention to the combined application of these techniques. 
 
Let us analyse briefly these procedures by looking at the construction and the 
measurement of the volume of the so-called cylinder hoof,177 as shown in Figure 2.3 
below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 
 																																																								
177 The four propositions (12-15) that deal with the construction of the cylinder hoof cannot be found in 
Archimedes’ original treatise. Rather they represent a modern reconstrution made after the rediscovery of 
the palimpsest. The reason I have decided to introduce this demonstration in order to present the three 
mathematical techniques is that in its modern reconstruction it appears clearly how these techniques are 
used independently from one another, and what the basic assumptions are on which they rely. Moreover, 
proposition 15 does not make use of the notion of barycentre, hence it is not indispensable in my 
reconstruction in aiming to show the affinities between the geometrical notion of centre of gravity and the 
mathematical object of the point mass.  
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When we read Archimedes’ postulates or propositions with an unbiased mind, we often 
have the striking impression that the author is thinking of a lever, or balance, in its 
fulcrum (the lever being idealized as a straightforward straight line) on which thin plates 
(idealized as planimetric figures, which clearly represent idealized physical weights) are 
attached in their centres of gravity. In other words, this virtual machinery is assembled 
in the following way: first of all, we build a geometrical figure whose axis of symmetry 
is linked to the arm of the balance and its fulcrum is placed in the middle point of this 
axis. On its ends are shifted sections of figures that need to be weighed (or measured). 
Secondly, we consider the ratios of the different sections, in order to establish the 
equilibrium between them. Basing ourselves on this proportion and the fundamental law 
of the lever (previously demonstrated by Archimedes) we can state that geometrical 
objects are in equilibrium at inversely proportional distances to their volumetric 
extensions,178 even when these mechanical operations are calculated with the virtual 
balance. Once we have completed these steps, we put the figures back together around 
their own respective barycentre, extending the possibility of the application of the law 
of equilibrium to the reconstructed figures: if the single sections are in equilibrium, 
even the original figures (made up of these single sections) are supposed to be in 
equilibrium.  
Let us now turn to proposition 12 which reads as follows: If in a right prism with 
square bases a cylinder be inscribed which has its bases in the squares facing each 
other and the surface of which touches the four other faces, and a plane be drawn 
through the centre of the circle which is the base of the cylinder and a side of the 
opposite square, it is recognised by this method that the solid cut off by the plane thus 
drawn is one-sixth of the whole prism.179 
Now by looking at the Figure 2.4 A and B below, it may appear clearer what the 
constituents of the virtual geometrical balance are. The arm of the balance is the 
segment DL, having the point D and L as ends; the fulcrum is the point ;;	and the two 
weights hanging at the ends are the right prism and the half-cylinder respectively. 																																																								
178 Acerbi, Fontanari and Guardini 2013, p. 65. 
179 Dijksterhuis 1987, p. 331. 
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Figure 2.4 A and B 
 
The process through infinitesimal sections is firstly stated in the preface cited after the 
prefatory letter to Eratosthenes. This paragraph asserts as follows: 
 
If in two series of magnitudes those of the first series are, in order, proportional to those of the 
second series and further the magnitudes of the first series, either all or some of them, are in any 
ratio whatever to those of a third series, and if the magnitudes of the second series are in the same 
ratio to the corresponding magnitudes of a fourth series, then the sum of the magnitudes of the first 
series has to the sum of the selected magnitudes of the third series the same ratio which the sum of 
the magnitudes of the second series has to the sum of the correspondingly selected magnitudes of 
the fourth series.180 
 
This technique connects portions of figures which shows the iterated proportionality 
between them. This proportionality also exists among the reconstructed figures. Once 
again this technique is used in proposition 15, which displays the procedure used to 
build the cylinder hoof. The modus operandi is the following: consider a prism with 
square base in which is inscribed a cylinder. Now cut the prism by a plane passing 																																																								
180 Trans. taken from Heath 1912, p. 15. The same statement is also asserted in Heath 1912, proposition 11, 
pp. 163-166; and On Conoids and Spheroids, lemma and proposition 1, pp. 105-106, for which see also 
Heath 1897. 
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through the centre of the circle of one of the cylinder’s bases and through one of the 
sides of the square on the opposite face of the prism. In the figure below, the shaded 
triangle represents the section that will be iterated in order to measure the magnitude of 
the cylinder hoof.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 
 
Finally, there is the principle of exhaustion, also called indirect passage to the limit by 
Dijksterhuis. Although the first formulation of this can be traced back to Eudoxus of 
Cnidus, one of the first examples of its application is only presented in Elements XII, 2181 
and in the Method. According to the modern reconstruction, the principle of exhaustion 
consists of the approximation of a figure by a sequence of figures inside it; this allows 
us to determine the volumetric expansion of a two-dimensional or three-dimensional 
figure. The important point of this principle is that the sequence of approximations can 
be made, such that the difference between the original figure and the inscribed figure 
decreases by at least half at each step of the sequence. In other words, at the very core of 
this procedure, there is the so-called axiom of Archimedes, sometimes also termed the 
postulate of Eudoxus – which was already used in Euclid V – which states: 
“[m]agnitudes are said to have a ratio to one another which can, when multiplied, 
																																																								
181 In this specific case (Elements, XII, 2) it is used to prove that “circles are to one another as the squares 
on their diameters” (see the demonstration of proposition 4). 
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exceed one another.”182 Thanks to this axiom it is possible to express the process called 
the ‘indefinite approach’. Here again we provide two figures in order to understand 
better how the procedure works geometrically; having built a figure bigger than the 
portion of hoof – having the shape of a parabola in its two-dimensional drawing – we 
want to measure another figure smaller than the hoof; then these two are the 
approximations of the figure in question, and their difference gives us the magnitude of 
the cylinder hoof. 
 
      
   
 
Figure 2.6 A and B 
 																																																								
182 Cf. the online source: http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/java/elements/bookV/defV5.html; also 
http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/java/elements/bookX/bookX.html. 
This axiom can be found in Euclid, Book X, proposition 1 as follows: “Two unequal magnitudes 
being set out, if from the greater there is subtracted a magnitude greater than its half, and from that which 
is left a magnitude greater than its half, and if this process is repeated continually, then there will be left 
some magnitude less than the lesser magnitude set out. And the theorem can similarly be proven even if 
the parts subtracted are halves.” This proposition is considered as the foundation of the method of 
exhaustion of Book XII. It is not used in the rest of Book X and would perhaps be better placed at the 
beginning of Book XII. This method is used in the propositions concerning areas of circles and volumes 
of solids. At the same time it is also used in Archimedes, On the Sphere and Cylinder in the following 
guise: “With regard to two unequal magnitudes a and b (a<b) it is assumed that there exist a number n 
having the property that n*a>b.” In this last case it can be considered interpretation of the already-
mentioned definition 4 of Euclid V. 
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Turning now our attention to Archimedes’ demonstration, let us now analyse the way in 
which Archimedes combined the three mathematical techniques, focusing attention on 
proposition number 4 of the treatise at hand, a proposition of central importance due to 
its clarity in showing the essence of Archimedes’ heuristic ‘method’. We shall 
reconstruct some passages of Archimedes’ presentation that are useful to understand the 
development of the notion of the material point. First we will offer the original 
geometrical version of proposition number 4, and second we will show its algebraic 
reconstruction. 
 
Proposition 4: Any segment of a right-angled conoid (i.e. a paraboloid of revolution) cut 
off by a plane at right angles to the axis is 1ÇÉ times the cone which has the same base 
and the same axis as the segment.  
 
 
 
       Figure 2.7 
 
Let a paraboloid of revolution be cut by a plane through the axis in the parabola 9kÑ; 
and let it also be cut by another plane at right angles to the axis and intersecting the 
former plane 9Ñ. Produce Ök, the axis of the segment, to H, making HA equal to AD. 
Imagine that HD is the arm of a balance, A being its middle point – i.e. the fulcrum. The 
base of the segment being the circle on BC as diameter and in a plane perpendicular to 
AD, imagine i) a cone drawn with the latter circle as base and A as vertex, and ii) a 
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cylinder with the same circle as base and AD as axis. In the parallelogram EC let any 
straight line MN be drawn parallel to BC; and through MN let a plane be drawn at right 
angles to AD; this plane will cut the cylinder in a circle with diameter MN and the 
paraboloid in a circle with diameter OP. Now, BAC being a parabola and BD, OS 
ordinates: 
 Ö<: <á = =Öà: âáà 
 
or: 
 ä<: <á = Káà: áâà 
 
Therefore: 
 ä<: <á =(circle, rad. MS) : (circle, rad. OS) = 
= (circle in cylinder) : (circle in paraboloid) 
 
Now we can establish the equilibrium between the sections. As already said, for the 
fundamental law of the lever, geometrical objects are in equilibrium at distances 
inversely proportional to their extension. We can deduce that the diameter circle MN 
(which constitutes a section of the cylinder), just in the place where it is, is in a state of 
equilibrium with respect to the point A (fulcrum), with the diameter circle OP (section 
of the parable) translated in ä (which is also its centre of gravity).183 
Finally, the figures are reassembled, starting from their circular sections: the 
cylinder comes to coincide with the original one, and the segment of the parabola is not 
rebuilt around the centre of gravity ä, but is shifted and set to be disjointed with respect 
to the other geometrical component of the figure, which stands for the virtual balance. 
The circles that compose the parabola are superimposed upon one another, so that the 																																																								
183 This mathematical reconstruction is taken from Heath 1912, pp. 24-25. 
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centre of gravity of their aggregate coincides with the centre of gravity of a single 
circular section which is located in ä.	Since the individual sections are in equilibrium, 
so too are the original figures. 
The core of this procedure is represented by the geometrical argument of 
proportionality. For each figure a proportion is established between its sections and the 
sections of an adequate auxiliary figure, as well as between two straight lines which 
coincide with the arms of the balance.184 This technique is used in all propositions of the 
Method with the cases’ variations, which are more or less complex depending on the 
figures involved in the demonstration. In fact, sometimes the topic gets more complex 
when a third auxiliary figure is introduced. This figure is divided in an infinite number 
of sections and used as a match to the original one (in most cases it is a cone). The 
richness of Archimedes’ Method has no equal in the history of ancient mathematical 
thinking, and he shows a justly famous ability when applying these heuristic and 
mechanical arguments of proportionality in the already-mentioned case of the cylindric 
hoof (propositions 12-15).  
To clarify Archimedes’ method, let us explain proposition number 4 in a more 
familiar mathematical vocabulary.185 
 
          
 
      Figure 2.8 
Paraboloid of revolution is divided into infinitely many concentric circular-sections and circumscribed by 
a cylinder with equal height. In order to determine the volume of the paraboloid, imagine that all the 																																																								
184 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
185 Both the figure and the reconstruction are taken from Napolitani 2001 pp. 49-53.  
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circular sections are gathered together around the point A of one of the arms of the balance.  
 
Let us take the paraboloid P, with axis measuring a and the circumscribed cylinder C, 
with a height of a and whose radius measures b. We proceed by cutting the solid with a 
plane in a generic point x of its axis: the circular-section Px of the paraboloid has radius 
y, while the circular-section Cx of the cylinder has radius b. The circles are related to 
each other as the squares of the radii; that is: 
 
Px : Cx = y2 : b2 
 
Here y and b are the ordinates corresponding to the abscissaes x and a respectively. In 
the parabola the squares of the ordinates are proportional to the abscissas, that is: 
 
y2 : b2 = x : a 
 
By the rule of transitivity we will have: 
  
Px : Cx = x : a 
 
Therefore: a generic circular-section of the parabola is to the circular-section of the 
cylinder as the abscissa of the point section is to the axis of the parabola. So far, 
Archimedes has applied some well-known theorems, combined with the principle of 
proportionality, that were also already used in PE I and II. Now we are going to see how 
his mechanical techniques are applied in order to find the volumes of the figures 
involved. We are also going to study the application of the method of the virtual balance 
in the case in which the arm of the balance has length 2a (twice as much the axis of the 
parabola) with A and B as ends. Let us imagine that around the end A of the balance are 
concentrated all the circular sections of the parabola. Each of them stands in equilibrium 
with a single circular section of the cylinder. For this reason all the circular sections are 
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supposed to be in equilibrium with the entire cylinder. They will be in equilibrium with 
the entire cylinder if and only if we imagine that its weight is fully concentrated around 
its centre of gravity (where the centre of gravity of a cylinder is located in the middle of 
its axis). Here we have two quantities hung at the two ends of the balance: at the point A 
we have the mass of the circular sections of the parabola, which is located at a distance 
from the fulcrum. At the point C we have the cylinder (assuming that its weight is 
concentrated in the centre of gravity), which is located at a distance a/2 from the 
fulcrum. Given the equilibrium of the system and according to the law of the lever, the 
two quantities stand in inverse proportion to the distances at which they are located with 
reference to the fulcrum.186 
Thanks to this analysis it is possible to explain the connection between the concept 
of the centre of weight and the concept of the point mass. It is moreover vital to bear in 
mind that in modern physics and mechanics, a point mass is a point-shaped body in 
which we can neglect the geometrical dimensions with reference to its movements and 
its possible rotations.187 The identification of the barycentre is important to treat a series 
of theoretical problems of the equilibrium for two-dimensional and three-dimensional 
figures. Moreover, although this notion is related to geometrical problems, it is 
calculated by a mechanical procedure; triangles, parabola, cylinders, cones and cubes 
are seen as three-dimensional bodies whose weight (as volumes) are supposed to be 
concentrated in a single point, which takes the name of the centre of weight. This 
mechanical technique is considered to be a preparatory step towards an ultimately 
geometric proof; Archimedes himself at the end of proposition 1 of The Method trains 
Eratosthenes in encountering a technique which is only heuristic in nature and will be 
useful later on, in the search for the geometric demonstration. Archimedes’ argument 
means that the aforementioned conclusion has not therefore been proved by the above 
demonstration, but a certain impression has been created that the conclusion is true. 
Since we thus see that the conclusion has not yet been proved, but we suppose that it is 
true, we shall mention the previously published geometrical proof, which we ourselves 																																																								
186 Napolitani 2001, pp. 50-51. 
187 Nolan 1996. 
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have found for it, in its appointed place.  
Since the Method ends with proposition 15, we do not know if Archimedes ever 
sent to Eratosthenes supplementary sections with the geometric illustrations. The 
nucleus of Archimedes’ technique is the shift from the study of an individual section of 
two three-dimensional objects being compared to the analysis of a set of sections, which 
are supposed to gather around a centre of gravity. Archimedes’ intuition is to consider 
the parabola as a body divided properly in endless concentric sections. This intuition 
stood contrary to classical Greek geometry: expressions such as ‘division in infinite 
sections’ may be considered problematic because they resemble the problem of the 
geometric continuum. 
The mechanical abstraction used to calculate the volume of the three-dimensional 
objects, which stands in a certain ratio to one another, and which are weighed as if they 
were material bodies, is an absolute innovation. This technique allows mathematics to 
consider only the quantitative relations between the bodies, without considering some of 
their physical properties. The three-dimensional objects are imagined to be represented 
only by their own centre of weight, or rather by means of a geometrical point devoid of 
any physical content. Although the model-building practice is still yet to develop 
properly, and in Archimedes’ time there is no awareness of the meaning and practice of 
idealization and abstraction, it seems reasonable to examine this mechanical procedure 
as if any rigid body is treated like the so-called material point, that is to say like abstract 
bodies that can be freely shifted along the arms of a balance and weighed. This 
idealized lever – as we have already stated before – is realized with two-dimensional 
geometric elements. In this way, the centre of gravity becomes a useful abstract 
instrument to represent geometrical bodies in a simplified way. In fact, in the final step 
of the weighing procedure, we do not find any longer the two three-dimensional figures 
of the beginning, but instead we have the volume of the circular sections of the parabola 
in point A and the cylinder in point C, with its weight supposed to be concentrated in the 
centre of gravity. 
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Before moving on to the next section I wish to consider the arguments in favour of the 
idea that behind Archimedes’ Methods lies hidden an early method of indivisibles. The 
belief that the heuristic method used by Archimedes could be seen as a precursor of the 
procedure attributed to Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647) is widely discussed in 
Heiberg, Heath, Dijksterhuis and Netz, and the aim of this paragraph is to show how 
anachronistic this idea is if we carefully read Archimedes’ demonstrations without 
properly contextualizing them. According to these authors, traces of the method of 
indivisibles are related to the well-known exhaustion method which consists – as 
already said and shown in the previous demonstrations of the fourth proposition of The 
Method – in weighing infinitesimal elements of X (with or without the addition of the 
corresponding elements of another figure C) against the corresponding elements of a 
figure B, B and C being such figures that their areas or volumes, and the position of the 
centres of gravity of B, are known beforehand. For this purpose the figures are first 
placed in such a position that they have, as a common diameter or axis, one and the 
same straight line; if then the infinitesimal elements are sections of the figures made by 
parallel planes perpendicular (in general) to the axis and cutting the figures, the centres 
of gravity of all the elements lie at one point or another on the common diameter or 
axis. The diameter or axis is produced and is imagined to be the arm of a balance. It is 
sufficient to take the simple case where the elements of X alone are weighed against the 
elements of another figure B. The elements which correspond to one another are the 
sections of X and B respectively by any one plane perpendicular to the diameter or axis, 
and which cut both figures; the elements are spoken of as straight lines in the case of 
planes and as plane areas in the case of solid figures. But are those planes or solid 
figures really made up of infinitesimal elements, as we have said above? Did 
Archimedes ever even mention the word ‘infinitesimal’? Was he aware of this ‘modern’ 
procedure widely used after Bonaventura Cavalieri? Although Archimedes calls the 
elements straight lines and plane areas respectively, we cannot argue that they are of 
course (as Heiberg and Heath did in their translations of the treatise), in the first case, 
indefinitely narrow strips (areas) and, in the second case, indefinitely thin plane laminae 
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(solids). I am aware that from the modern visual reconstruction which we provide 
above, it appears that the number of the elements in each figure is infinite, but 
Archimedes has no need to say this; he merely says that figures such as X and B are 
made up of all the elements in them respectively, i.e. of the straight lines in the case of 
areas and of the plane areas in the case of solids. The target of Archimedes was thus to 
arrange the balancing of the elements in such a way that the elements of X are all 
considered at one point of the lever, while the elements of B are placed at different 
points, namely where they actually are in the first instance. The reason that The Method 
is so relevant is because Archimedes contrives therefore to move the elements (or the 
circle sections of the figures) of X away from their first position and concentrate them at 
one point on the lever, while the elements of B are left where they are, and so act at their 
respective centres of gravity. This mechanical method is not to be seen as integration, 
which would naturally be used to find the area or volume required directly. Archimedes 
deals with moments about the point of suspension of the lever, i.e. the products of the 
elements of area or volume with the distances between the point of suspension of the 
lever and the centres of gravity of the elements respectively. Archimedes was bound to 
experience a great deal of doubt and uncertainty with regard to the application of the 
method of indivisibles, for here he touches upon a question which in the preceding 
centuries had given rise to keen controversy more than most other questions in Greek 
mathematics. It was the profound question of atomism or continuity on which, though 
originating from physics, opinions were also divided in mathematics, and which finds 
its clearest expression in the aporia that worried Democritus: if the circular sections that 
can be made in a cone parallel to the base are congruent, how can the cone differ from a 
cylinder; and if they grow smaller towards the vertex, is not then the curved surface, 
which should be smooth, and scalariform?188 
 
 
 																																																								
188 For the details on this debate, see Dijksterhuis 1987, pp. 318-21. 
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2.6 Floating Centres of Gravity 
 
The treatise titled On Floating Bodies (hereafter FB) is devoted to hydraulics, 
hydrodynamics and hydrostatics. It is composed of two books: the first (consisting of 9 
propositions) is purely geometrical in nature and contains an examination of the 
principles which underlie the flotation of bodies, whereas the second (10 propositions) 
deals with the application of the theorems previously stated, and so Book 2 is entirely 
dedicated to hydrostatics regarding the construction of vessels. In fact, the main purpose 
of Archimedes’ study was exactly marine engineering, and once again the ambition was 
to emphasise the heuristic and mechanical approach relating to his work. 
The Greek text has only been known since 1899. Before this time scholars always 
had to make do with William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation. It is in this treatise that 
one can finally find the definition of the centre of weight, or, to put this more exactly, 
this definition becomes clear as soon as we have apprehended the meaning and results 
of the proofs of some essential propositions, in particular those in which Archimedes 
examines the different behaviour of bodies with different (specific)189 weights with 
respect to the liquid on which they are floating.  
The entire treatise relies on postulate 1,190 which states the following: Let it be 
supposed that a fluid is of such a character that, its parts lying evenly and being 
continuous, that part which is thrust the less is driven along by that which is thrust the 
more; and that each of its parts is thrust if the fluid be sunk in anything and compressed 
by anything else. Thus, two adjacent sections of fluid cannot stand in equilibrium if they 
are pressurized differently. Let us now turn to the outcomes deriving from the 
application of this postulate. 
The first case, as we can see in Figure 2.9 below, envisages a material body and a 
medium with the same (specific) weight. The body will sink down in the fluid until the 																																																								
189 The specific weight, also known as the unit weight, is the weight per unit volume of a meterial. The 
reason ‘specific’ is included in brackets is that Archimedes never used that term, although it is clear in 
contemporary physics that in problems concerning hydrostatics we refer to it in order to explain the 
reason for the equilibrium of bodies immersed in fluids.  
190 We will say more on this postulate below, but for now let us take it for granted. 
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surfaces no longer project above that of the fluid, and they will not be driven down any 
further (proposition 3).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 
 
In the second case (Figure 2.10) the solid has a (specific) weight that is lighter than the 
medium, so that when the body is thrown into the fluid it will not be completely 
submerged, but a portion of it will project above the surface of the fluid. From here 
Archimedes derives that a solid that is lighter than the fluid, when thrown into the fluid, 
will sink until a volume of the fluid equal to the volume of the immersed portion has the 
same weight as the whole solid. Further, when solids lighter than the fluid are forcibly 
immersed in the fluid, they are thrust upwards by a force equal to the weight by which a 
volume of the fluid equal to the solid exceeds that solid (propositions 4, 5 and 6).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 
 
The third case (Figure 2.11) asserts that when a solid has a (specific) weight that is 
greater than the medium and is thrown into the fluid, it will be driven down as far as it 
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can sink, and it will be lighter in the fluid by the weight of a portion of the fluid having 
the same volume as the solid (proposition 7). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 
 
It is now time to raise the question of the real meaning of Archimedes’ hydrostatic 
arguments. Two items in particular deserved to be emphasised: i) the definition of the 
barycentre and ii) the main outcomes represented by the so-called ‘principle of 
Archimedes’, which is not properly a principle but rather a theorem because it is 
demonstrated from postulate 1 of Book 1, and only at a later time is a proper principle 
derived from it.   
Regarding point (i), the propositions mentioned above allow one to derive postulate 
2 which reads as follows: Let it be granted that bodies which are forced upwards in a 
fluid are forced upwards along the perpendicular [to the surface] which passes through 
their centre of gravity.191 Therefore, Archimedes is saying here that the body is forced to 
move upwards (but the same is also true if the body is forced to move downwards) by a 
force which exerts its intensity along the perpendicular, and passes through the centre of 
gravity of the body, rising or sinking in the fluid. However, the force is exerting its 
intensity uniformly on the whole surface of the body sinking in the fluid. By following 
postulate 2, we can maintain that it is only a matter of simplification and representation 
that a body is imagined, first of all, as devoid of its volume, and it is represented 
through its centre of gravity, and secondly, on this simplified point, that the force exerts 
its own intensity.  																																																								
191 Heath 1897, p. 261. 
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According to a modern point of view, the point at which all the parallel verticals 
along which the heavy bodies tend upwards (or downwards) is one in which a unique 
force is fully concentrated, i.e. as a force resulting from the sum of all the upward (or 
downward) forces acting on a body, towards which that body will rise (or sink). In other 
words this leads to the definition of the centre of pressure, or rather a point where the 
total sum of a parallel pressure field acts on a body, causing a force to act through that 
point.  
With respect to point (ii), the well-known principle of Archimedes, which is 
demonstrable by considering only postulate 1 at the very beginning of the treatise, can, 
as has been already mentioned above, be derived proposition 1: If a surface be cut by a 
plane always passing through a certain point, and if the section be always a 
circumference [of a circle] whose centre is the aforesaid point, the surface is that of a 
sphere. 192  This often overlooked demonstration 193  gives us a notable geometrical 
demonstration of the roundness of the Earth as if it were a fluid spheroid.  
The extraordinary beauty of Archimedes’ demonstrative procedure and the 
outcomes reached also derive from his ability to adopt the methodology of the virtual 
balance in the analysis of hydrostatic problems, merely by thinking of the portions of 
fluids as if they were sections of material bodies moving along the arms of an idealized 
hydrostatic balance. Later on, those fluid bodies move up or downwards because of a 
resultant strength acting along the parallels passing through their centres of gravity.  
 
In general, Archimedean issues ought to be a matter for statics, but in the treatises 
analysed above, and as I have tried to show, he clearly deals with the kinematic and 
dynamic behaviour of geometric figures, physical bodies and fluids. Archimedes moves 
these objects along the arms of his idealized balance. For this reason it can be argued 
that Archimedes’ subject of study is definable as a science of quasi-statical dynamics: 
the framework in which all these proofs take place conceive conditions of equilibrium 
between all the forces acting on a body, such that Archimedes’ bodies are considered in 																																																								
192 Ibid., p. 262. 
193 One of the main discussions on this demonstration can be found in Russo 2013.  
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the case in which the kinetic energy is negligible with respect to the potential energy.  
Archimedes’ procedure should be considered a truly important insight, but it must 
not be seen as an anticipation of a modern method. As declared at the beginning of the 
argument on Archimedes’ methodological approach, our purpose is not to identify 
precursors, but rather to explain when and during which demonstrations those ideas 
appeared, which led to the discovery of the corresponding mathematical objects 
(sometimes thanks to the works of other scientists, who have been attracted by the 
efficacy of the new method). My claim is that such developments occurred during the 
Renaissance era of mathematical humanism, a period marked by the rediscovery of 
Archimedes’ works and in which the abstractions of the concept of the point mass 
received a new upsurge in attention. In fact, during the Italian Renaissance, the work of 
translating, editing, reviewing and extending the intellectual limits of ancient scientific 
writings, in particular those of Archimedes, was very important. It is not possible here 
to give a complete analysis of the mechanical works of authors such as Leonardo da 
Vinci (1452-1519), Francesco Maurolico (1494-1575), Federico Commandino (1509-
1575), Guidobaldo del Monte (1545-1607), Luca Valerio (1552-1618) and Galileo 
Galilei (1564-1642), but in the next chapter we will take a closer look at Guidobaldo del 
Monte’s Mechanicorum Liber, which is usually considered the most influential treatise 
of the Renaissance period, as well as Galileo’s hints on the idealization technique which 
gave rise to a prolonged debate about the epistemological meaning on model-building 
practice.  
In this direction, I will now turn to argue in favour of a direct connection between 
the Renaissance reception of Archimedes and the development of the material point. 
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C h a p t e r  3  	
The  Rena i s sance  T urns  
 
 
The Renaissance was a period of immense cultural transformation within Europe, not 
the least of which involved a major shift in the European educational system. During 
this period, a new way of thinking came to the fore which proposed a different form of 
pedagogical training, one which would provide students with the skills for life besides 
those which were required by their occupation. This view was championed by 
humanists194 who established schools and institutions in order to implement their ideas. 
However, with regard to mathematical education, it is impossible to separate the work 
and diligence of the humanists from the approach of the mathematicians. In effect they 
collaborated to reach the same goal – the recovery of ancient Greek mathematics – and 
stood jointly at the forefront in the translation of treatises from Greek into Latin. While, 
on the one hand, the technical and theoretical competence of several mathematicians 
was protected by the Courts, on the other hand, the interest of humanists in preserving 
earlier cultural heritage was seen as a continuation and derivation from ancient times. 
Hence, throughout this refurbishment of ancient culture, they also oversaw the renewal 
of the Renaissance educational system. 
There are several closely related, and perhaps not altogether distinguishable, keys 
for understanding the significance of the Renaissance from the point of view of 
mathematics. These include: 
i) the need for a renovation of mathematical science: a restoration, repair, 
restitution, revival, instauration, or renaissance of mathematics (as they 
variously called it); in connection with this, the humanistic obsession for 
																																																								
194 A humanist is simply any kind Renaissance who pursued and disseminated the study and understanding 
of the ancient Greek and Roman cultures, placing an emphasising on secular (versus inherited religious-
traditional) and critical thought.  
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significant educational reform; 
ii) directly connected to this demand, there existed a keen request for the 
renewed study of Medieval Arabic sources: through the invention of the 
printing press (1455), accurate dissemination and translation of the original 
texts became possible, something which seemed previously inconceivable in 
an age where manuscripts represented the sole means of circulating the 
written word; and 
iii) the decrease in interest for a purely speculative Aristotelian philosophia 
naturalis, counterbalanced by an increase in interest for the Archimedean 
heuristic and mechanical tradition.195 This general shift in perspective led to 
the heightened appreciation of mathematics as a purely speculative and self-
reliant discipline, as is witnessed above all by the School of Urbino. 
 
Certainly, other more minor factors – as we will see – are directly related to the three 
key factors just mentioned, so the whole review which is delineated in this chapter 
orbits around them. The Renaissance world would be unimaginable without the 
emergence of novelty and the proliferation of new knowledge, which reflected the 
dynamics of the early modern economy and shattered the foundations of the traditional 
feudal system; this was a fragmented world in which urban centres and feudal courts 
were competing directly with one another. In this environment, classical antiquity 
served as an alternative model for shaping individual lives and collective culture in a 
way that mastered the challenges of society and nature. Hence, the desire to match the 
stable achievements of antiquity with the purpose of keeping up with the times in which 
a rapid expansion of economy, technology and knowledge flourished196, progressed at the 
same pace. This was the period in which the evolution of both the economy and society 
was also strongly influenced by three much-needed technological discoveries: the 
circumnavigability of the earth, gunpowder, and printing. Each of these aspects 																																																								
195 During the sixteenth century, first Guidobaldo del Monte and later Bernardino Baldi tried to unify the 
Aristotelian mathematical approach with the Archimedean physical tradition. A detailed analysis of this 
will be presented in §§ 3.7 and 3.7.1 below. 
196 Renn and Damerow 2010, p. 8.  
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developed independently, but at the same time each of them contributed to the 
development of the other fields, as well as to the improvement of the system of 
knowledge holistically. The emergence of the engineer as an intellectual technician 
educated in sciences is furthermore a peculiarity of these centuries. Indeed this is the 
main feature of science, where the reduced creativity of ‘pure speculative scientists’ was 
counterbalanced by the great creativity of ‘applied scientists.197  
It was exactly in this varied and intercultural environment that, I suggest, the 
second stage of the process of objectification of procedure for the material point 
developed, providing the chance for the geometrical notion of the centre of gravity to 
reach a full theoretical status. This second stage shows that scientific practice is related 
directly to the development of mechanics as an independent field of study, which is 
itself accompanied by both a practical and a speculative component. Following further 
analysis of the three main items stated above, the historical, cultural and social 
framework of the Renaissance will firstly be delineated, before a thorough investigation 
of the theoretical refinement of mechanics, thanks to some of the most important 
mathematicians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In particular, I will examine the 
life and work of the mathematicians who were active at the court of Urbino, such as 
Federico Commandino, Guidobaldo del Monte, and a few other scholars operating in a 
more isolated cultural context, such as Francesco Maurolico and Luca Valerio. 
This chapter will follow the proceeding structure. § 3.1 will attempt to give a 
general introduction to the restoration phase of the ancient Greek mathematical tradition 
and the legacy of Euclid between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance period, in order 
to highlight the different reactions of Renaissance scholars towards the two main 
authors of ancient Greece, Euclid and Archimedes. § 3.2 is dedicated to the School of 
Urbino, and in particular to the rediscovery of the ancient Archimedean treatises: a wide 
introduction to the ducal milieu will be presented, giving importance to those scholars 																																																								
197 To offer but an outline of the numerous names involved in this process, we can mention the works of 
Mariano di Jacopo, called Taccola (1381-1458), Leon Battista Alberti, Francesco di Giorgio Martini 
(1439-1501), Leonardo da Vinci, Vannoccio Vincenzio Austino Luca Biringuccio (also known as 
Vannuccio Biringuccio, 1480-1539), Francesco de’ Marchi (1504-1576), Giovanni Battista Bellucci 
(1506-1554) and Daniele Barbaro (1513-1570). 
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who advanced the recovery of Greek mathematical knowledge, and in order to show the 
different approach of the Renaissance towards mechanics, and the use that scholars 
made of the notion of the centre of gravity. In this section I will put side-by-side the 
elements characterising the two Hellenistic mechanical traditions – the Aristotelian and 
the Archimedean – with the new mechanical approach which began from the 
Renaissance onwards. Thus from § 3.3, our focus will lie with the practical and 
theoretical contributions that Renaissance scientific humanism gave: i) in consolidating 
the new way of doing and conceiving mechanics, and ii) in the second stage of the 
objectification of procedure, namely that, as is seen in several treatises published 
between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by the mathematicians of the Urbino 
School – such as Federico Commandino (§ 3.4) and Guidobaldo del Monte (§ 3.7) – it 
was possible to switch the attention onto the practical use we can make of geometrical 
elements, such as the centre of gravity. This notion became fundamental in various 
practical contexts linked to the scienza de ponderibus (science of equilibrium, § 3.6), 
the aim of which is to solve and formalize static problems concerning heavy bodies with 
particular reference to those hanging from a balance. Moreover, the concept of the 
centre of gravity is also useful to solve the so-called ‘Equilibrium Controversy’, which 
addresses the question whether or not a deflected balance will return to its horizontal 
position. This is a controversy which, though it had already has its birth during the 
Medieval era, was only during the Renaissance, and following the rediscovery of all the 
Archimedean corpus on statics and hydrostatics, applied to the science of machines and 
to other purely practical contexts. However, we have to wait until the end of the 
sixteenth century, and in particular the research into indifferent equilibrium advocated 
by Guidobaldo del Monte in his Mechanicorum Liber (1577), to see the controversy 
solved, mainly thanks to the conjunction of the Aristotelian mechanical conception with 
regard to cosmology (based on the notion of the centre of the world) with the 
Archimedean barycentric theory. Thus, the second part of the chapter will be focused on 
the Equilibrium Controversy, its origins, its claims and the scientific protagonists 
involved. At the same time, great attention is dedicated to del Monte’s attempt to treat 
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the idea of finding a wide theoretical application of the centre of gravity as a 
geometrical point devoid of purely physical content. 
 
 
3.1 The ‘Restoration’ 
 
At the end of the Middle Ages, mathematics was essentially taught at universities and at 
Abacus Schools, as part of the quadrivium (the four subjects consisting of arithmetic, 
geometry, astronomy and music) of the Faculty of Arts that, while maintaining their 
autonomy, were instrumental to the training of future Renaissance physicists and 
technicians.198 All the leading Italian mathematicians of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries were obsessed with the need for a renovation of the mathematical sciences, 
and, at the same time, humanists were obsessed with the need for significant educational 
reform.  
One of the founders of the new education in the Renaissance was Vittorino da 
Feltre (1373/78-1446), whose purpose it was that each student should both leave school 
with a basic understanding of all the available subjects, and also have received the time 
and support to study those subjects at which they excelled in greater depth. However, 
only a selected number of students were encouraged to focus their efforts on the field of 
mathematics, the practice of which was not promoted by many other educators. The 
study of mathematics was treated in low regard by many educationalists because of its 
strong association with trade and commerce.199 Up until this time merchants and master 
craftsmen living in many areas in Europe were not accorded the same level of respect or 
deference as they were in Germany. This meant that sons of the merchant class were 
taught only in those subjects which would aid them in their efforts to become statesmen 
and politicians. What little mathematics was taught in the merchant schools became 
therefore highly theoretical and divorced from practical application in the real world.  																																																								
198 For the role of European universities in the fifteenth century see de Ridder-Symoens 2003 and Ruegg 
2004. For the development of the Italian universities, see The Annals of the History of Italian 
Universities, Bologna, CLUEB.	
199 See for example Tartaglia 1556-1560. 
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In order to achieve the goal of renewing the educational system, the so-called 
Scuola d’Abaco200 was founded in Florence and was attended by those who wanted to 
improve their skills in commercial areas. It hence offered courses in arithmetic, algebra, 
astronomy, book-keeping, and practical geometry, which grew in importance due to 
recent advances in navigation.201 Technical advancements were being made in other 
sciences and technologies, in particular thanks to the invention of the printing press, 
with the result that a profound transformation of education was taking place. This 
allowed for a rapid dissemination of scientific knowledge, and besides the translation of 
important texts such as Euclid’s Elements into German, French and Italian, an increased 
demand for astronomical charts and commercial tables was recorded. A series of 
didactic textbooks202 spread across Europe, which were mainly dedicated to common 
men seeking to improve their understanding of such subjects as the Hindu-Arabic 																																																								
200 The Schools of Abacus were born in the thirteenth century with the spread of Liber Abaci by Leonardo 
Pisano, better known as Fibonacci (1170-1250). Some of these schools were subsidized by the 
municipalities, others by private organisations. The practical mathematics that emerged from the abacus 
treatises had so many characteristics that it can be considered quite clearly different from traditional 
Euclidean axiomatic-deductive mathematics. The main features of the abacus treatises were the use of the 
vernacular, mercantile writing, a great number of examples, and the presence of important drawings for 
illustrative purposes. The treatises on the abacus had different levels of quality, which reflected the skills 
of teachers who had drawn them up: some were very simple and neglected those parts of mathematics 
that were not immediately applicable in the art of the merchant (e.g. algebra, practical geometry, and 
speculative arithmetic). For further on this, see Pisano and Bussotti 2013; Pisano and Bussotti 2015 and 
Ulivi 2002, pp. 121-159.  
201 See fn. 195.  
202 In England, Robert Recorde wrote what is thought to be the first series of textbooks in English: The 
Grounde of Artes was first printed in 1540, but was reprinted over fifty times in nearly a hundred and 
sixty years. Recorde's three other major works – The Pathwaie to Knowledge, The Castle of Knowledge 
and The Whetstone of Witte – were not so popular. This is most likely due to their less practical and more 
advanced contents. Recorde’s texts were very close to the teaching style used during the Medieval Ages, 
which was obviously beginning to be recognised as inadequate by the author himself. Later on, around 
the middle of the sixteenth century in France, the humanist Petrus Ramus proposed that the arts courses 
taught at universities should return to the seven classical liberal arts, with the syllabus based to a greater 
degree on applied topics. In keeping with this approach, Ramus wrote a series of textbooks on logic and 
rhetoric, grammar, mathematics, astronomy and optics. John Dee, one of the editors for The Grounde 
after graduating from Cambridge with both a BA and an MA and after later lecturing at the University of 
Paris on sections from Euclid’s books, emphasised the need to improve the status of mathematics in 
education. He argued that mathematics should be studied not only for its practical use but also for its 
ability to “lift the heart to the heavens”, a phrase which is reminiscent of Pythagorean beliefs. He 
proposed translating currently available mathematical texts into English, in order to aid the spread of 
knowledge to those who do not study Latin at school and University and who found studying the texts in 
the original language difficult. Dee himself helped to translate Euclid’s Elements into English, and this 
was then published in 1570.  
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numeral system, conversions between weights and coins, and computations with 
prototypical counters which would aid their work in trade and commerce.  
Noticeable precedents for the Renaissance of mathematics may be found in the 
great cultural awakening of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The two major schools 
of translation in the twelfth century were the Spanish school, which concentrated on 
translations from Arabic versions of ancient mathematics, and the Sicilian school, which 
was involved solely in translations directly from ancient Greek. The head of the Spanish 
school was Gerard of Cremona (1114-1187), who is usually heralded for his translation 
of the Almagest (1175). On the other hand, the main translators of the Sicilian school 
were the Admiral Eugenius (1130-1203) and Henry Aristippus of Calabria (1105-1162). 
At a later time, the major translator of the thirteenth century was William of Moerbeke 
(1215-1285/86), the pupil of Albertus Magnus (1206-1280) in Cologne. After a series of 
philosophical translations of Aristotle, Proclus and Galen, Moerbeke tackled a group of 
mathematical translations, perhaps as a result of his friendship with the mathematicians 
Campanus of Novara (1220-1269) and Erazmus Ciolek Witelo (1230-1280/1314), both 
of whom were attached to the papal court. Despite Moerbeke’s translations being 
extremely literal and rough, he played an important role among the other translators of 
his time, firstly because he managed to recover directly from the ancient Greek texts, 
and secondly because his complete translation of Archimedes was among the first ever 
done.203 
Moerbeke and his contemporaries played an important role in the later revival of 
mathematics for two reasons: first because they ensured continuity with the scientific 
heritage of ancient Greece, and second because in dealing with these translations they 
also took into account the neglected technical development of mathematics made by the 
works and inventions of Leonardo Pisano (1175-1235) – better known as Fibonacci – 
and Jordanus Nemorarius (thirteenth century), both of whom enjoyed a second life from 
the fourteenth century onwards. As Rose writes, “[t]he combined activity of translators 
and mathematicians in the Middle Ages enables us to speak of a medieval renaissance 																																																								
203 Rose 1975, pp. 76-89. 
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of mathematics. Yet one should be careful of assuming that one renaissance led without 
interruption into another. In fact, after 1300 the Medieval renaissance waned, eclipsed 
by the popularity of Scholastic [Aristotelian] physics.”204 From a mathematical viewpoint 
the Scholastic physics has been seen as a continuation of the Medieval renaissance 
movement, due to the fact that the former attempted to appropriate some features from 
the latter, for instance the Arabo-Latin Euclid, the Ptolemaic astronomy, the theory of 
proportions or Oresme’s work on infinity and incommensurability. However from a 
general point of view the two movements had quite different aims and purposes.  
 
Following the line of argument presented in the section 2.2 dedicated to the legacy of 
Euclid in the Latin and Arabic world, and before moving on the next step of the 
objectification of procedure related to the head of the Urbino’s School, in the rest of this 
section we will offer a survey of the continuation of this legacy between the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance. We have already said that it was due to the invention of the 
printing press that the translated texts were spread among the wider public, and that the 
most renowned treatise was Euclid’s Elements, whose success was matched only by the 
Bible. The first printed edition of the Elements can be dated to 1482 and was drafted on 
the recensio of the Elements made by Campanus of Novara between 1255 and 1261. 
Campanus used the Elements of Robert of Chester (1110-1160), which itself dates back 
to the twelfth century, and which was joined with several Arabic and Latin texts, among 
which was Johannes de Tineume’s (eleventh and twelfth century) edition. Campanus’ 
work was not restricted to a literal translation, but also included new mathematical and 
geometrical outcomes using Jordanus Nemorarius’ Arithmetica and Anaritus Nazirius’ 
Elements (865-922). The humanists were highly critical of Campanus’ edition, in 
particular because it was heavily influenced by the medieval tradition, and because he 
did not improve the translation from either philological or linguistic points of view. On 
the contrary, he sought to bring out the philosophical interest of the Elements by 
elucidating its axiomatic structure. Moreover, in order to adapt Euclid further to the 																																																								
204 Ibid., p. 76. 
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didactic needs of the school, Campanus moved away from geometrical proofs to an 
emphasis on arithmetical proofs instead.205 
In 1505 in Venice Bartolomeo Zamberti (1473-1539) published the entire 
Euclidean corpus, including the Phaenomena, Optica, Catoptrica and Data. His main 
purpose was to restore Campanus’ edition using the original Greek version of the 
treatises. Campanus’ recensio and Zamberti’s edition represent two different, but 
complementary, ways of translating an ancient text. While Campanus’ main task was to 
give mathematical coherence to the Elements, Zamberti’s purpose was to restore the text 
from both philological and linguistic points of view. 
Between these two translators one can place the figure of Luca Pacioli (1445-1517), 
a mathematician who was also the author of two different editions of Euclid’s Elements. 
The first was a scholarly edition directly translated from Greek to Latin, while the 
second was rather addressed to an untrained audience. Meanwhile at the same time, one 
finds traces of both official and unofficial vernacular translations. Almost all the official 
translations were based on both Campanus’ and Zamberti’s Elements. Campano’s 
publication and its axiomatic system were even used several times in the following 
century. For example, Niccolò Tartaglia (1499-1557)206 inaugurated the translations of 
Euclid into modern languages (altering a few axioms in the process) and was followed 
by Guilielmus Xylander’s (1532-1575) publication into German (1562), Pierre 
Forcadel’s (fourteenth century) into French (1564), Sir Henry Billingsley’s into English 
(1570), Zamorano’s into Spanish (1576) and Dou’s into Dutch (1606).  
Beyond the Alps, the German astronomer Regiomontanus207 (1436-1476) deserves a 
special mention as the first European mathematician to undertake a complete restoration 																																																								
205 Qui constat multos Euclidis locus tum praeteriisse, tum non commode interpretatum et sua non satis 
examinate subdidisse, in multis tamen fatemus acute interpretatum, sed errorum nunc non bene dictorum 
nobis esse cura debet [De expetendis et fugiendis rebus opus, Lib. XI, Ch. 3 by Giorgio Valla, 1501 
postumo]. Bartolomeo Zamberti, another translator of the Euclidean corpus, defined Campanus as an 
“interpres barbarissimus”.  
206 Euclide megarense philosopho: solo introduttore delle scientie mathematice: diligentemente reassettato 
et alla integrita ridotto per il degno orifessore di tal scientie Nicolo Tartarea Brisciano, Venezia 1543.	
Nicolò Tartaglia received no formal education, except for a period of fifteen days in a “scuola per 
scrivere”, in which he learned to read Latin but wrote in a not very elegant Italian. 	
207 This is the pseudonym of Johannes Müller from Königsberg. 
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of the ancient treatises on mathematics and astronomy, whose translations were 
disseminated more widely thanks both to his friendship with Cardinal Basilios 
Bessarion (1403-1472) and his connection with other Italian humanists. Owing to the 
patronage of Bessarion, he renovated the Almagest, clarified and solved several 
problems relating to the Ptolemaic system, and on his watch astronomy became the 
pearl of mathematics because of its connection with geometry and arithmetic.208 
Mathematics and mathematicians enjoyed a special role during the Renaissance because 
– as Regiomontanus says – at that time it seems that humanities, or liberal arts, were 
floundering in uncertainty, a state of affairs usually attributed to philosophers. So in 
order to reform this state of uncertainty, one must begin with those arts which are 
constructed upon the most certain principles, i.e. those which cannot be distorted either 
by the passage of time or by the clever arguments of an eloquent professor. In the 
mathematical sciences, and especially in astronomy, truth is certain, immutable and 
eternal. If any errors creep in, they may be ascribed to the ignorant mistakes of 
translators and copyists, or to the wilfulness of a commentator. To repair the damage, 
Regiomontanus has made a large number of astronomical observations and compared 
them with the figures given in the works of classical authors.209 
An edition that truly stands out for its originality and its mathematical autonomy is 
that edited by Francesco Maurolico (1494-1575) from Messina and published in 1530. 
His text differs from the previous ones because, thanks to his mathematical and 
geometrical skills, Maurolico was able to suggest many solutions to geometrical 
problems.  
After the proliferation of so many translations, we must wait until the second half 
of the sixteenth century for a complete reception and a reliably restored version of the 
Elements. Then in 1572 Federico Commandino (1509-1575) published his Latin (and 
Italian) version, which was based on a variety of Greek manuscripts and was in many 
respects more correct than all of its predecessors. Whilst Commandino had clear 																																																								
208 For further details on the Euclidean tradition, see De Risi 2016; Gavagna 2009, pp. 97-124 and Rose 
1975. 
209 Regiomontanus 1514, pp. 211-214. 
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philological aims, he was also an outstanding mathematician and endorsed several 
changes in the axiomatic system, and added for the first time certain axioms in Books V 
and X of the Elements. The remarkable outcome of this is an edition which was trusted 
thereafter for its philological accuracy, and on which almost all subsequent editions of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would be based.  
Only two years later in 1574, the Jesuit mathematician Christoph Clavius (1538-
1612) published another influential edition of Euclid in Latin. Clavius’ edition was by 
far the longest and most complete edition of the Elements ever produced, and was 
accompanied by a lengthy commentary that collected almost everything that had been 
published on the Euclidean text in previous centuries. For this reason it quickly became 
the reference point for all later discussion of the foundations of geometry in the 
proceeding two hundred years. Clavius believed that the original Greek text was 
important and had to be preserved, but that mathematical clarity was a higher aim. 
Clavius himself envisaged a few new axioms which he thought would be useful to 
strengthen the mathematical proofs of the Elements; given the enormous success of this 
edition (and the fact that it immediately became an example for all the further Jesuit 
editions of Euclid), these new Clavian axioms were successively endorsed by almost the 
whole community of mathematicians.  
Nonetheless, who were the mathematicians during these centuries? In the 
Quattrocento and Cinquecento, the term ‘scientist’ did not exist at all, having only 
become used in its current meaning from the second half of the nineteenth century. A 
mathematician during the Renaissance, on the other hand, was an intellectual, with 
competence in (among other subjects) astronomy, astrology and medicine. The medical 
faculties of the early Renaissance were usually those in which mathematics had a 
central role. In fact, mathematics was connected to the study of astrology, which 
required the students to have rudimentary knowledge of Ptolemaic astronomy and early 
cosmology210 together with elements of geometry and arithmetic. Therefore, the place 																																																								
210 See further Kusukawa 2012. At the University of Padua, for example, the study of astronomy and 
cosmology was considered a preliminary and preparatory stage for those who wanted to study 
mathematics; the introduction of mathematics to the undergraduate curriculum preceded that of 
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occupied by mathematics was still marginal, and, with the exception of some 
outstanding teachers, the level of mathematical knowledge was limited to what was 
indispensable for the practice of astrology. In fact, mathematics did not cover the study 
of many Greek sources which were already available at the time in Latin, and which 
derived from twelfth-century Arabic translations.211 It is likely that the figure of the 
mathematician had the same academic status as a philosopher, theologian or jurist. But 
within the technical and practical environment, it was only with the Renaissance 
rediscovery of ancient mathematics and geometry that the mathematician began to enjoy 
greater treatment and respect. In fact, we know from the Renaissance treatises that 
mathematics was applied to the construction industry and agricultural engineering: the 
task of an architect, for example, was not restricted to construction engineering, since he 
was also expected to make both specific contributions during military attacks and more 
trivial arrangements in organizing banquets or celebrations. The increase in value of this 
technical and mechanical tradition and its relationship to the theoretical aspects of 
mathematics allowed the dismissal of the idea that mathematics had some magical-
symbolic associations. The discipline was finally raised to the level of scientific 
knowledge. For this cultural promotion a special mention is merited by Tartaglia’s 
General Trattato di Numeri et Misure (1556-60), a mathematical yet practically minded 
encyclopedia on how to use the theory of numbers in merchant arts or the field of 
commerce. In the Prolegomena to the reader Tartaglia conveys the needs of the time: 
while until the end of the fifteenth century mathematics was related only to the practical 
disciplines, mathematics since the Renaissance has been taught for its speculative and 
theoretical aspects: 
 
The ancient wise men […] used to divide knowledge into two parts, the first of which [was] named 
by Ptolemy [as] speculatione [speculation], and the other of which was named operatione 
[operation]. These two parts are still commonly called theoria, or speculation, and practica, or 
active, or operative (knowledge) respectively. Between these two parts (in the way that Ptolemy 																																																																																																																																																																		
astronomy and astrology related to medicine. Padua is also the city in which Federico Commandino 
graduated in medicine.  
211 Gamba 2001, pp. 75-110.  
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says) there is a considerable difference due to the fact that they have different purposes. The aim of 
the science of speculation is (as Aristotle says in his second book of Metaphysics) nothing but the 
truth, and that of operation is the completed action […] and even though speculation (insofar as it 
aims to investigate through the proximate cause, and to argue through science) is far nobler than 
practice […], since the latter aims only at accomplishing what has already been discovered through 
speculation.  
Out of these deliberations I have decided to compose a general treatise on numbers and 
measurements, on mathematics, according to the natural definition, and not only on practical 
arithmetic, and on geometry, proportions and proportionality, both irrational and commensurate. But 
also to investigate the ‘arte magna’, which in Arabic is called algebra, and the Almucabala, or the 
“rule of the thing”.212  
 
Tartaglia’s encyclopedia is divided into six parts, which are dedicated to the three 
subfields of arithmetic, geometry and algebra. The first part deals with mercantile 
arithmetic, while the second part is more speculative and experimental and includes the 
paraphrase of Euclid’s Elements II-X. The main purpose of the other parts is to present 																																																								
212 Gli antichi sapienti, […] dividerno la sapientia in due parti, la prima delle quali dal (detto) Ptolomeo è 
detta speculazione, e l’altra è chiamta operatione, le quali due parti communamente anchora l’una è 
detta theorica, over speculatione, e l’altra pratica, over attiva, over operativa, tra le quali due parti 
(come afferma esso Ptolomeo) non vi è poca differentia, la causa è che tendono a diverso fine, perché il 
fine della scientia speculativa (come dice Aristotile nel secondo della metafisica) non è altro che la 
verità, e della operazione […] l’opera compiuta, e abenche la speculazione (per esser invesigatrice delle 
propiunque cause, et argumentatrice della scientia) sia molto più nobile della operatione, […], la quale 
solamente attenda a saper con diligenza essequire […] tutte le cose già speculativamente ritrovate […]. 
Deliberai altresì nella mente mia di comporre a comun beneficio (per l’arte speculativa-teorica e per 
quella pratica d’operazione) un General Trattato di Numeri e Misure, si secondo la considerazion 
naturale, come Mathematica, e non solamente nella pratica Arithmetica, e di Geometria, e delle 
Proportioni, e proporzionalità, si irrazionali come razionali. Ma andar nella pratica speculativa dell’arte 
Magna detta in arabo Algebra, e Almucabala, over regola della cosa [...]. Tartaglia 1556-60, pp. 3-4. 
The English trans. is my own because no official translation is available. 
Furthermore, let us not forget the most important and prominent pupil of Tartaglia, Giovan Battista 
Benedetti (1530-1590). As a court mathematician to the dukes of Savoy from 1567 to his death in 1590, 
Benedetti procured for himself the title of ducal philosopher. In his De Philosophia Mathematica, 
Benedetti regarded mathematics as philosophy, summoning Aristotle’s epistemology in his defence. 
Moreover, like Aristotle, he makes mathematics the most honoured discipline of philosophy. Benedetti’s 
actual mathematical method – which he called speculatio mathematica – is however more original than 
the method declared by Tartaglia in his Nova Scientia, especially because Benedetti takes for granted the 
recovery of ancient geometrical techniques, averring that there is no need to quote chapter and verse of 
Euclid, or any need to order mathematical propositions formally and sequentially. Instead of being part of 
a rigorous system, the propositions become intuitive speculationes. With this method of philosophia or 
speculatio mathematica, Benedetti achieved resounding success in purging science from the baneful 
influence of the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanica. See further Benedetti 1585, p. 168, and Rose 1975, pp. 
151-158.   
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a renewal to technical disciplines, with the addressees of the treatise being ostensibly 
geometricians, architects, engineers and machinery builders. In this respect, the Trattato 
represents the perfect synthesis of empirical investigation and speculative thought. In 
fact, Tartaglia’s interests both in the speculative aspects of mathematics and in its 
practical and mechanical application can be noticed just by looking again at the 
quotation above and at the structure of the treatise. Tartaglia is among the first 
mathematicians to emphasise the importance of placing side-by-side empirical research 
and theoretical investigation, in order to find shorter expedients to those problems 
which are usually solved with a ruler and a compass, and eventually to reach theoretical 
solutions which can have a wide applicability. It seems, already in Tartaglia’s time, that 
mathematics is the only means that can help to reach the goal of generality. 
From the elements stated above, we can conclude that it is inconceivable to 
separate the classical basis of the mathematical Renaissance from a general classical 
revival undertaken by the Italian humanists.213 Not only did the humanists collaborate 
with the mathematicians in the recovery of Greek mathematical manuscripts, but they 
also took an active role in the translation of the texts into Latin, and in particular, as we 
will see below, they played an exceptional role in the case of the works of Archimedes, 
which represent an authority in nearly all the practical disciplines. All these elements 
allowed for the elevation of mathematics to the status of an independent and self-reliant 
field of research and the appearance of a new way of doing and considering mechanics. 
Moreover, the arrival of Guidobaldo del Monte (1545-1607) sanctioned a new 
breakthrough: the second half of the sixteenth century was the context in which 
occurred discussion on how some sciences could use rigorous mathematical 
demonstrations to arrive at conclusions about physical objects. These theoretical 
considerations, which were themselves based on heuristic and empirical mechanical 																																																								
213 Besides the emergence of the culture of the middle class, which played an important part in accounting, 
geography, economics and finance, one should emphasise that the emergence of the humanist movement 
should be attributed to the role performed by the new social and economic conditions, offering new 
perspectives on the world, which on the one hand allowed the members of the middle class to be able to 
devote time to study, and on the other hand allowed the courts to play a more or less disinterested activity 
of patronage. The fifteenth century records a growth in the development of science and the publication of 
scientific papers. For a more general overview, see Kristeller 1956; Id. 1965 and Id. 1990.	
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procedures, gave rise to ontological and epistemological reflections on the nature of the 
centre of gravity, both as a purely geometrical entity and as a physical notion. We will 
return to this point in due course, but let us now continue with the account of the 
Renaissance rediscovery of the heritage of ancient books. 
The fascination of rediscovering classical antiquity led to another phenomenon: the 
rapid formation and growth of the great humanist libraries of the fifteenth century. 
These Renaissance libraries differed greatly from their Medieval forebears with regard 
to both their size and their contents.  
Florence was the focal point of the Greek revival, firstly because chairs of Greek 
were established in ca. 1396 at the University, and secondly because there sprung up a 
brilliant group of Grecisti214 that included Palla Strozzi (1372-1462), Niccolò Nicoli 
(1365-1437), Fra Ambrogio Traversari (1386-1439), Ser Filippo di Ser Ugolino (XV 
century) and Antonio Corbinelli (1373-1425). The unanimous efforts of these scholars 
led to the composition of several great humanist collections that were assembled in the 
first half of the fifteenth century, collections that became public libraries after their 
acquisition by Cosimo de’ Medici (1389-1464).  
Two great libraries were inaugurated in Florence under Medici patronage. The first, 
known as the Libreria Medicea Publica, was opened to the public in 1444 and housed at 
the Dominican monastery of San Marco. The second, the Libreria Medicea Privata, was 
kept in the private household of the Medici and was usually accessible only to a group 
of scholars associated with the family. These family collections flourished particularly 
under Lorenzo de’ Medici (1449-1492) and, since they were housed later in the cloister 
of San Lorenzo, became known as the Laurenziana. At present, most of the San Marco 
manuscripts are divided between the Laurentiana and the Biblioteca Nazionale in 
Florence.215   
Many of the Greek codices were brought from Byzantium in the 1420s by the 
humanists Giovanni Aurispa (1376-1459) and Francesco Filelfo (1398-1481). During 
one of his journeys to the East in 1420-1423, Aurispa obtained an estimated 238 																																																								
214 A Grecista was a term denoting a scholar of the language, literature and culture of Ancient Greece. 
215 Rose 1975, p. 33. 
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codices. Humanist sponsorship ensured the copying, translation and circulation of these 
texts besides their preservation. Their main interest was focused on mathematics thanks 
to the circulation of the Latin texts and translations of Ptolemy’s Almagest, the Liber 
Abaci, Pratica Geometriae Aritmeticus and a Prospectiva Generalis of Leonardo 
Fibonacci. In addition, great interest was shown for the Greek codex of Ptolemy’s 
Geographia, after it was brought to Florence by Emanuel Chrysoloras (1350-1415).  
The intertwining of this humanist environment with the rediscovered scientific 
tradition led to a confluence of knowledge that allowed a huge improvement in 
conceptualising and using mathematics, geometry and scientific knowledge in general. 
In 1425, upon returning to Florence from the University of Padua, Paolo dal Pozzo 
Toscanelli (1397-1482) introduced the great architect Filippo Brunelleschi (1377-1446) 
to Euclid and geometry; thus it was due to this renewed discipline that Brunelleschi was 
acclaimed as the “second Archimedes”. Doubtless this is a humanist exaggeration216, but 
one which indicates the impression made upon contemporaries by the architect’s 
discoveries in applied mathematics. Mathematical discoveries in perspective and 
engineering on the one side, and the restoration of classical techniques on the other, 
suggest immediate links between Renaissance engineering, as achieved by (among 
others) Brunelleschi and his friend Mariano Taccola (1381-1453), and Renaissance 
mathematics.217 Moreover, because of his acquaintance with Leon Battista Alberti (1404-
1472), Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464) and Regiomontanus, the mathematician and 
astronomer Toscanelli stands at the nexus of several important strands of the early 
mathematical renaissance. Among these figures the interest in Archimedean engineering 
had gradually increased, and it was thanks to these authors that the Renaissance 
tradition of arts and architecture spread all over the country and through Europe in the 
later centuries.  
However, compared with Rome and Venice, Florence in the middle of the fifteenth 
century still had serious gaps in its possession of the texts of Greek mathematical 
authors. Only with the founding of the private library of Medici did most of the Greek 																																																								
216 Ibid., p. 29. 
217 Ibid. 
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manuscripts of Apollonius, Proclus, Diophantus and Archimedes appear in the 
Florentine catalogue.  
In Rome, the Renaissance began with Nicholas V (1397-1455), who was acclaimed 
by Vespasiano as the ornament and light of letters and learned men. The symbol of the 
Roman Renaissance was the Biblioteca Vaticana, which can be essentially considered 
as the creation of popes, preeminently the papacies of Nicholas V and Sixtus IV (1414-
1484). By 1484 the Vatican had excellent copies of the works of Apollonius, 
Diophantus and Euclid. In the next century, the Greek texts of Hero and Pappus were to 
be added. Nicholas’ patronage, following the Medici’s tradition, induced a great number 
of scholars to come to Rome in order to make free use of the Vatican assets and through 
the commissioning of translations from Greek to Latin. The most important translations 
made in this period were those made by Jacobus Cremonensis (1413-1453/54) of most 
of the works of Archimedes.  
The translation of Archimedes commissioned by Nicholas V undoubtedly 
represents a significant layer in Renaissance mathematics, even though the Medieval 
Era Moerbeke version was ultimately to prove more important in the long run. In the 
early years of the fifteenth century, Jacobus’ translations circulated among some of the 
central figures in that movement. Bessarion made a copy of it, and Regiomontanus 
corrected a copy for publication, which was also included in the editio princeps of 
Archimedes, having been published in Basel in 1544.218  
Bessarion, the Greek monk who later became a Latin cardinal, attempted to join the 
two worlds of Byzantine and Renaissance Italian culture. The cardinal remained in Italy 
for most of the rest of his life, establishing himself in Rome as one of the dominant 
figures of this century. His house functioned as a humanist academy, being frequented 
by Poggio (1380-1459), Filelfo (1398-1481), Trapezuntius (1395-1472/73), 
Argyropulus (1416-1486), Cusanus and Regiomontanus. Bessarion’s collection can be 
considered the richest and most helpful for the transmission of classical Greek culture 
into Europe from the fifteenth century onwards. According to the inventory of 1468, the 																																																								
218 Jacobus’ version was superseded by Federico Commandino’s edition in 1558.  
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collection numbered 182 Greek manuscripts and another 264 Latin texts. Between 1468 
and 1472 several hundred more were added, thus making the library the largest 
collection in Europe before the time of Sixtus IV. After Bessarion’s death the collection 
was bequeathed to the Venetian Republic, where the books were assembled to form the 
Biblioteca Marciana. From the inventory we can see that Bessarion’s interests ranged 
widely, yet his main interest focused on Platonic philosophy, geometry and 
mathematics. The mathematical and astronomical sections alone run to 43 Greek and 11 
Latin manuscripts. 
At the end of the fifteenth century in Venice, there was besides Bessarion’s 
collection another humanist collection, namely the library of the prominent humanist 
Giorgio Valla of Piacenza (1447-1500). Unfortunately, the detailed and precise 
catalogue of Valla’s library has been lost, but a part of the books found their way to the 
Biblioteca Estense at Modena around the sixteenth century.  
Valla’s mathematical manuscripts became rather celebrated among the humanists 
of the late fifteenth century and attracted important visitors to his house in Venice, some 
of whom sought to procure copies of Archimedes’ Codex A. Valla’s interest in 
mathematics and the humanities is an example of the close relationship between the two 
fields of study in Renaissance Italy, a relationship shown directly by his De 
Expetendis219, that is a great encyclopaedia which marks the state of humanist studies in 
Venice around 1500. Moreover, Valla used his position as public professor of 
humanities at Venice to further the cause of mathematics, by lecturing on astronomy, 
geometry and natural philosophy. 
At that time in Venice there were three active mathematicians. The first was the 
Neapolitan Luca Gaurico (1475-1558), who published the Tetragonismus id est de 
Circuli Quadratura, comprehending the first printed Latin texts of Archimedes. The 
second, the Venetian Bartolomeo Zamberti, was far more deeply rooted in Valla’s 
tradition than Gaurico. Zamberti was active as a lawyer and humanist and counted 																																																								
219 Tartaglia’s Encyclopaedia is made up of 49 books, and in it mathematics holds pride of place, for it 
enables one to move from natural philosophy to the higher realms of theology and methaphysics; Rose 
1975, pp. 44-54. 
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among the first scholars who had a particular interest in Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
whose logical works were translated between 1511 and 1524. The third active in Venice 
in the early sixteenth century was Giovanni Battista Memmo (1466-1536), a patrician 
who held several government offices. His main work was the Latin translation of the 
Greek text of Apollonius, Apollonii Perigei, philosophi, matematicique excellentissimi 
Opera (Venice, 1537).  
 
This extensive introduction allows us to state firstly the nature and extent of the 
influence that humanism had on the mathematical Renaissance. Certainly it was thanks 
to the determination and perseverance shown by Italian humanist manuscript-collectors 
of the Quattrocento that the assembly of an almost complete corpus of the Greek 
mathematical treatises was possible. In addition, all the humanists, mathematicians and 
other collectors presented above were directly involved in actively promoting the 
revival of ancient science, making the libraries the cultural centres of the mathematical 
Renaissance. Thanks to these scholars, the Greek heritage survived across the centuries 
and was restored from the vague and erratic Medieval style of translating. Finally, 
mathematics became a newly self-reliant discipline, which was not only useful for 
technical and engineering purposes, but which was also starting to be considered a 
theoretical discipline that needed to be axiomatized. 
This goal was reached progressively in the following century to the detriment of 
Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy. Until then, there had been a neglect of 
Archimedean mechanical works because almost none of the relevant treatises wrote by 
Archimedes were available in Arabo-Latin translation, with a lot of Euclidean and 
Aristotelian works instead being accessible in different languages. The right cultural 
environment for Archimedes’ revival, and for explaining the meaning of the partition of 
Greek mechanics into the Aristotelian and Archimedean tradition, was provided by the 
development of Renaissance Scientific Humanism, whose main contribution derived 
from the School of Urbino.  
However, before moving on to the next section, the purpose of which will be to 
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display a detailed framework of the Urbino milieu, one more remark deserves our 
attention. At the beginning of the sixteenth century in Italy, a broad debate began to be 
had on two key issues: i) the role of mathematics among the natural sciences as a result 
of the increasing use of mathematics in applications, and as Tartaglia was trying to 
emphasise in his General Trattato; and ii) the fact that mathematicians were beginning 
to bestow a distinct status on those natural and technical disciplines. While almost no-
one denied the fundamental role of mathematics in itself, not everyone agreed on the 
status of knowledge it might provide with regard to the physical world. The importance 
of the role of mathematics was certainly advocated by supporters of Platonist ideas, 
which, in addition to their diffusion through humanist circles, found their support from 
a professional mathematician, Luca Pacioli, whose Summa was read and appreciated by 
all the major mathematicians of the early sixteenth century, such as Tartaglia, Gerolamo 
Cardano (1501-1576), Giovan Battista Benedetti (1530-1590) and Commandino. 
Therefore, only in the second half of the sixteenth century can one truly see the 
dissemination of Archimedean mathematical and mechanical works, which deeply 
modified the approach to mechanics. Although Archimedes’ work was influential 
everywhere, its stimulus was different in different regions. In the Northern school, 
which consisted of Benedetti, Tartaglia and Cardano, Archimedes’ texts received less 
attention than those of Jordanus de Nemore or the Problemata Mechanica. The contrary 
held for the Centre school, which consisted of Commandino, del Monte, Bernardino 
Baldi (1553-1617) and the Southern school, who was made up of Maurolico, Nicola 
Antonio Stigliola (1546-1623) and Luca Valerio (1553-1618).220  
Let us now turn to examine the role played by the Scientific Humanism in Urbino 
in the development of the new way of thinking about mathematics and the new way of 
considering mechanics as an independent and advanced field of study. 
 
 
 																																																								
220 Pisano and Capecchi 2016, pp. 163-164. 
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3.2 The rediscovery of Archimedes in the ‘School of Urbino’  
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the mathematical Renaissance is to be found in the 
writings of the Urbino School. The library of the Duke Federico da Montefeltro of 
Urbino (1422-1482) was considered by Vespasiano to be the most impressive humanist 
collection in Europe. Duke Federico was remembered as a “skilled geometer and 
arithmetician, and, with the great German philosopher and astrologer Master Paul of 
Middelburg (1446-1534), [he] before his death read books on mathematics, discoursing 
thereon like one learned in them.”221  
As for the other libraries described in the last section, the Urbino library was set up 
for humanist purposes, but came to be of the greatest use for the restorers of 
mathematics. The Duchy of Urbino assembled a significant circle of scholars, including 
the painter Piero della Francesca (1416/17-1492) and the mathematicians Luca Pacioli, 
Federico Commandino, Guidobaldo del Monte, Bernaldino Baldi and Muzio Oddi 
(1569-1639). Also the already well-known Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), a close 
friend of Pacioli, showed interest in both the assets of the Urbino library and in 
particular in the Archimedean codices preserved there. 
As far as the cultural and scientific background of the Duchy’s mathematicians is 
concerned, existing scholarly literature tends to place an exclusive emphasis on the 
importance of the lectures held by Commandino for the subsequent establishment of the 
Urbino School. These lessons were indeed surely influential for the education of 
Commandino’s disciples, but unfortunately other important aspects of the technical and 
scientific environment have been sidelined in the scholarship as a result. Above all, the 																																																								
221 Vespasiano 1859, p. 213. Federico da Montefeltro was a military and civil leader as well as an 
intellectual humanist, and may be considered one of the most enlightened figures of the Italian 
Renaissance. He was the one to impose justice and stability on his state through the principles of his 
humanist education; he engaged the best copyists and editors in his private scriptorium to produce the 
most comprehensive library outside the Vatican; and he supported the development of fine artists, 
including the early training of the young painter Raphael. Finally, as mentioned above, he commissioned 
the constitution of one of the most complete and great libraries of the Renaissance. His humanistic court 
was built around the Ducal Palace of Urbino designed by Francesco di Giorgio Martini and Luciano 
Laurana. One of the most remarkable rooms of the Ducal Palace is the studiolo, commissioned by 
Federico and combining his personal vanity and interest in scientific knowledge. 
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cultural milieu which developed around the court of Urbino was particularly significant 
because of the rediscovery of Archimedes’ scientific works. To single out but one 
figure, Commandino, who was notably influenced by Francesco Maria II della Rovere, 
published – among other works – Euclid’s Elements in 1572 and Pappus’ Collectiones 
Mathematicae in 1588. Furthermore, it was the Duke himself who entrusted both 
Commandino and his pupil Guidobaldo to supervise a series of construction and 
renovation projects in Urbino, Pesaro and the surrounding suburbs.222 This exchange of 
knowledge and ideas, joined with the intense collaboration between the court and 
humanists, offered fruitful stimuli for these mathematicians. Indeed, as Martin Frank 
writes, “the cultural milieu at court was characterised by a profound interest in 
philosophical questions, with particular attention paid to the philosophy of Aristotle. 
Thus, in keeping with Guidobaldo, Baldi and Oddi’s close ties to the court, some of 
their most important interlocutors were philosophers: Jacopo Mazzoni (1548-1598), 
Federico Bonaventura (1555-1602) and Cesare Benedetti. And in fact, certain 
arguments addressed in their writings seem to reflect discussions on natural philosophy 
they had had with them or appear to be developments of such exchanges of ideas.”223  
Aside from this general cultural trend, there were also specific concrete reasons that 
urged the Dukes of Urbino to stimulate the study of mathematics. The Dukes were 
traditionally military captains serving the Venetian Republic, the Pontifical State and 
the Spanish King. The activities that this role entailed were often fraught with 
mechanical challenges, such as the movement of heavy loads, the construction of walls, 
or the calculation of the trajectory of projectiles. These historical preoccupations 
remained prominent in the courtly milieu of the little duchy, even though the political 
situation in Italy increasingly calmed down over the course of the sixteenth century. It 
was in this context that the Prince Francesco Maria and Guidobaldo del Monte grew up 
together. Both of them were prepared for a life in the military. Guidobaldo was the 
Prince’s page from the age of seven, and had the privilege of enjoying the same 																																																								
222 Those works were also supervised with the help of other mathematicians, architects, technicians and 
craftsmen, such as Muzio Oddi, the Count Giulio da Tiene, Girolamo Arduini, Francesco Paciotti and 
Simone Barocci.  
223 Frank 2013, p. 308. 
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education as Francesco Maria II della Rovere, which included the study of mechanics, 
and obviously a general background in mathematics. After all, preoccupations in war 
and certain mathematical disciplines were not the only traits that characterised the 
Urbino’s environment: between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the duchy was an 
important cultural centre. Indeed, famous artists, architects and men of letters such as 
Raffaelo Sanzio (1483-1520), Piero della Francesca, Leon Battista Alberti, Luca 
Pacioli, Francesco di Giorgio Martini (1439-1501), the poets Pietro Aretino (1492-
1556) and Torquato Tasso (1544-1595), were connected with the court. 
In this scenario one also observes a decline in scholarly interest in Aristotle’s 
natural philosophy counterbalanced by an increased attention in Archimedes. In fact, 
throughout the sixteenth century, all the scholars mentioned above became positively 
enthusiastic about Archimedes; in the field of Discipline Mathematiche a meeting of 
geometry and mechanics was expected. Renaissance scholars thought that Archimedes’ 
work filled a gap that Aristotle was unable to fill because of a direct connection between 
Archimedes’ and Euclid’s studies. In particular Euclid’s work represents the 
emblematic classical synthetic approach, proceeding from primitive propositions to 
deduce theorems and solve problems. On the other hand, although Archimedes kept the 
method of synthesis, he never rejected the laws of measures and the concrete 
application of mathematics. Archimedes’ mathematics could be defined as a tool used to 
shape physical reality; according to him, building machines and the study of mechanical 
or hydrostatic phenomena were both jointly mathematical operations. He represents the 
perfect synthesis of the theoretical and practical qualities of the mathematician, in being 
able to combine theory and practice, knowledge and action.224 
In order to understand the role played by Archimedes and to clarify how and why 
the idealized notion of the material point has its origins in the work of Reinassance 
mathematicians, craftsmans and machine-builders, we need to understand better the 
origins of mechanics itself. The theoretical physical notion of the point mass and the 
geometrical concept of the centre of gravity share some properties, since the description 																																																								
224 Gamba and Montebelli 1988, p. 69. In the section below on the science of weight (§ 3.6) I will supply 
more details on Greek problems relating to the conception of equilibrium.  
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and definition of the latter underwent a countless series of reshuffles over the centuries. 
Moreover, having mentioned at the beginning of the chapter the reasons that drive us to 
analyse the purposes of Renaissance mathematics and physics, we will show that it is 
exactly in this framework that the notion of the centre of gravity experienced a 
transformation, from being a simple geometrical and physical tool to becoming a 
theoretical and mathematical model used to perform both the idealization and the 
representation of physical reality. The idea is that pure mathematical objects have arisen 
on the basis of the idealization of quantitative properties from physical bodies, as the 
result of a theoretical operation that consisted in considering these properties as if they 
were not a part of sensible matter. 
 
Before moving on to explaining the way in which this new branch of mechanics came to 
the fore, I will first discuss the ancient heritage of classical mechanics, which splits into 
two strands: the neglected Archimedean mechanics and the influential Aristotelian one. 	
 
In ancient Greece, mechanics was the science that dealt above all with the study of 
equipment or machines, transport, lifting, and weights, and that was employed as a 
response to other technological problems. The search for equilibrium was not of 
practical interest225 – excluding the case of weighing by means of a balance – and 
mechanics, at least at the beginning, did not care for it. Rather, mechanics was above all 
preoccupied by problems of everyday life, being connected to manual work, and as such 
was considered insignificant by the intellectual aristocracy.  
It is likely that mechanics began with Aristotle (384-322 BCE) or with the 
unknown author of the treatise called Problems of Mechanics.226 This is a textbook of 																																																								
225 This lies in striking contrast with the Renaissance tendency; in fact during the Renaissance, as we will 
see in this chapter, mechanics was associated with statics and thus with the science of equilibrium. 
226 During my research I have found that different opinions have been voiced concerning the author of this 
treatise. Some attribute it to Aristotle (e.g. Capecchi 2012, Duhem 1905 and Rose 1975), others (e.g. 
Dugas 1988) to an unknown author. Without entering into the debate pertaining to this issue, it is better to 
refer to it without authorship as the Problems of Mechanics. In short, the main purpose of this work 
concerns the mechanical problems relating to the shifting of heavy bodies. Nowhere in this text does 
either the concept or a word for equilibrium occur. The functioning of machines or devices such as the 
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practical mechanics devoted to the study of simple machines. According to its author, 
the power of the agency that sets a body in motion is defined as the product of the 
weight (or mass227) of the body and the velocity of the motion which the body acquires. 
By means of this law it is possible to formulate the condition of “equilibrium” of a 
straight lever with two unequal arms carrying unequal weights at their ends. Since 
nowhere in the Problems of Mechanics does the author use the word or refer to the 
concept of equilibrium, equilibrium can be seen at most in the dynamic key as the result 
of the cancellation of effects of opposing forces: when the lever rotates, the velocities of 
the weights will be proportional to the lengths of their supporting arms. So the author 
regards the efficacy of the lever as a consequence of a magical power of circular 
motion. This statement reduces all study of all simple machines to the same principles, 
or rather, the properties of the balance are related to those of the circle and the 
properties of the lever to those of the balance.228  
In opposition to this magical interpretation of motion there is Aristotle, who 
thought that mechanics should be considered a mixed science defined as follows:  
 
These are not altogether identical with physical problems, nor are they entirely separate from them, 
but they have a share in both mathematical and physical speculations, for the method is 
demonstrated by mathematics, but the practical applications belong to physics.229   
 
In both his treatises On the Heavens and the Physics the notion of movement includes 
both changes of position and changes of kind, of either a physical or chemical state; the 
Greek word dunamis denotes the force producing the movement. Its application to 
statics may be regarded as the origin of the “principle of virtual velocities” which will 
be encountered much later. Elsewhere Aristotle makes a distinction between natural 																																																																																																																																																																		
wedge, pulley and winch is reduced to the lever. However, all authors agree in thinking that the validity 
of the law of the lever is suggested and may be the first in the history of mechanics. See further Capecchi 
2012, pp. 19-32. 
227 The Greeks always confused these two concepts. In the next chapter (Ch. 4, especially § 4.2.2) we will 
see that the modern definition of the term ‘mass’ was given by Isaac Newton during the seventeenth 
century. 
228 Capecchi 2012 and Dugas 1988, pp. 19-31. 
229 Aristotle 1955, p. 331.  
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motions230 and violent motions.231 The fall of heavy bodies, for example, is a natural 
motion, while the motion of a projectile is a violent one. In particular, he writes: “to 
each thing corresponds a natural place. In this place its substantial form achieves 
perfection – it is disposed in such a way that it is subject as completely as possible to 
influences which are favourable, and so that it avoids those which are inimical. If 
something is moved from its natural place,232 it tends to return there, for everything tends 
to perfection. If it already occupies its natural place it remains there at rest and can only 
be torn away by violence.”233  
In accordance with the idea that mechanics is a mixed science, one does not find 
any difference in the Aristotelian treatises between the two branches of dynamics and 
kinematics: all mechanical problems were held to accord with the same laws, and, as we 
will see below, it is only after the Renaissance period that things will change.   
Instead, it is likely that Archimedes – as we have seen in the previous chapter – did 
not share the Aristotelian opinion and considered mechanics as a branch of pure 																																																								
230 On the subject of the natural motion of falling bodies, Aristotle maintained in his treatise On the 
Heavens Book 1 that the “relation which weights have to each other is reproduced inversely in their 
durations of fall. If a weight falls from a certain height in so much time, a weight which is twice as great 
will fall from the same height in half the time.” In Physics Book 5, he discusses the acceleration of falling 
heavy bodies: a body is attracted towards its natural place by means of its heaviness. The closer the body 
comes to the ground, the more that property increases. Additionally, if the natural place of heavy bodies is 
the centre of the world, the natural place of light bodies is the region contiguous with the sphere of the 
Moon. Inversely, heavenly bodies are not subjected to the same law as that which the terrestrial bodies 
are. 
231 All violent motion is essentially impermanent. Once a projectile is thrown, the motivating agency which 
ensures the continuity of the motion resides in the air which has been set in motion. Aristotle assumes 
that, in contrast to solid bodies, air spontaneously preserves the impulsion which it receives when the 
projectile is thrown, and that it can in consequence act as the motivating agency during the projectile’s 
flight. This second Aristotelian thesis on motion, which is clearly stated in his Physics, concerns the 
motion against nature (commonly known as the “violent motion”) of a heavy body: it occurs along a 
straight line, and the space covered in a given time is directly proportional to the ‘force’ applied to the 
body and inversely proportional to its weight. Over the centuries, the notions of force and work have 
always been superimposed and used synonymously, yet the precise differentiation between force and 
work will occur only in the eigtheenth century, and as late as the nineteenth century ‘force’ will 
ambiguously be used to mean both force and work. Directly connected with the causes and meaning of 
the “motion against nature of a heavy body”, there is the problem of “resistance to a body’s motion”, but 
the causes of resistance are sometimes attributed to weight and sometimes attributed to the medium in 
which the body is embedded. See further Aristotle, Physics (trans. R. P. Hardie, R. K. Gaye). This trans. 
is available online: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.html. 
232 The natural place of the earth to which moving bodies tend is the concave surface, which defines the 
bottom of the sea, joined in part to the lower surface of the atmosphere, the natural place of air. 
233 Dugas 1988, p. 20. 
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mathematics. While Aristotelian mechanics is integrated into a theory of physics234 
which goes so far as to incorporate a system of the world, Archimedes made out of 
statics an autonomous theoretical science, which was based on postulates of 
experimental origin and supported by mathematical rigorous demonstrations. He 
focused mainly on the foundations of mechanics as a rational science, emphasising in 
particular the demonstration of the law of the lever. The lack of rigour and his 
indifference towards equilibrium were not central problems for the Aristotelian 
applications of mechanics; instead “it became a central theoretical problem for 
Archimedes (and of course for the Reinassance tradition that undertook a full-scale 
reevaluation of his science). He realized that once the problem of equilibrium was 
solved, the problem of lifting a weight was also solved. Indeed if a weight p equilibrates 
a weight q in a lever, a weight only slightly heavier than p will lift q. But there is an 
advantage of this shifting of the theory from transport to equilibrium, because 
equilibrium is much easier to study in a rigorous way.”235  
Archimedes based his mechanical theory on a few suppositiones (both 
‘suppositions’ and ‘principles’), which were partly empirical in nature, and which 
certainly appear more convincing than the Aristotelian ones. His goal was to address the 
equilibrium of extended bodies, as we see in the examples in his treatise on 
hydrostatics: the equilibrium of a body, or set of bodies, was reduced to the 
determination of its centre of gravity and the ensurance that it was held in a stable 
position. Archimedes was certainly the first scientist to set rigorous deductive criteria 
for determining centres of gravity, and his theory was the first known physical theory 
formalised on a purely mathematical basis.  																																																								
234 Physics according to Aristotle – considered as a subalternate science – can demonstrate that things are 
so (demonstrationes quia); while mathematics – the subalternating science – demonstrates why (propter 
quid) things are so. As a rule, the respective subject matter of the subalternating and subalternate science 
is not the same; if they were, one would have a single science and not two separate sciences. Apart from 
astronomy, the subalternate sciences which attracted the greater attention of mathematicians were 
geometrical optics and mechanics. They were structured on the basis of the Euclidean model, being based 
on definitions, suppositions (principles) and propositions (theorems). The main difference with respect to 
the Euclidean model was that some of the principles, rather than being purely geometric, are related to the 
physical world. See further De Pace 2009 and Kesten 1945. 
235 Capecchi 2012, p. 45.   
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So it was, and still is, an axiom of historiography that, since its origins, mechanics 
has followed two main routes, which are classified as Aristotelian and Archimedean, as 
we have shown above; it seems moreover that the two approaches differ only in the 
manner of their proofs. But studies from the second half of the nineteenth century236 have 
proved that Archimedean mechanics represents simply the more formalized approach 
adopted by the mature work of Aristotle, avoiding, in the proofs, physical concepts such 
as e.g. force, whose meaning was difficult to grasp with certainty. The Greek concept of 
mechanics was thus revived in the Renaissance. It seems also that the Renaissance had a 
clear preference for Archimedean mechanics rather than its Aristotelian variant. In fact 
during this period, mechanics was considered a “new theoretical science” and it was 
mathematically well founded, although its object had a physical nature and it had social 
utility. However, for a full synthesis of the Archimedean and Aristotelian routes, we 
have to wait until Guidobaldo del Monte’s and Bernardino Baldi’s studies in the second 
half of the sixteenth century.237  
What, then, exactly happened during the Middle Ages? How should this shift from 
one tradition to the other best be explained?  
Texts in the Arabic Middle Ages usually divide mechanics into two parts. In 
particular Abu Nasr al-Farabi (870-950) established the epistemological status of 
mechanics by differentiating between the science of weights and the science of devices, 
both of which were considered parts of mathematics. Mathematics in turn was divided 
into seven disciplines: arithmetics, geometry, perspective, music, the science of weights 
and the science of devices.238 The science of devices referred to the practical use and 
construction of machines. The science of weights, probably because of the fact that it 
centered on the balance, was a science not of motion but of equilibrium, as was 
Aristotelian mechanics. Arabic scholars had access to both Aristotelian and 
Archimedean works, as well as to Pappus, Hero of Alexandria and of course Euclid. 
However, among all the Archimedean treatises which are known today and 																																																								
236 See e.g. those by Jaouiche 1976 and Knorr 1982. 
237 We will return to this issue in § 3.7 and § 3.7.1 below. 
238 Abattouy 2006.   
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rediscovered only after the fifteenth century, Arabic scholars had access only to the 
treatise on floating bodies.  
In the Latin milieu we have witnessed a process similar to that registered in the 
Arabic environment. A science of weight was founded and labelled scientia de 
ponderibus.239 In addition, there was a branch of learning called mechanics, which was 
sometimes considered an activity of craftsmen, sometimes one of engineers (scientia de 
ingeniis).240 What then was the legacy of those two traditions within the context of the 
School of Urbino? It was exactly in this milieu, due to Urbino’s dynamic research and 
scholars, that what later became known as the “Equilibrium Controversy” took place, 
having become unfurled since the fourteenth century.241 This dispute seeks to answer the 
question of whether a balance with equal arms, deflected from its horizontal equilibrium 
position, is able to return to its original position, or if it tilts to the vertical. Within the 
consideration of this problem, we find traces of the process of consolidation of the 
idealized concept of the material point, traces of idealization of a model nowadays 
widely used in mathematical physics. In fact, after geometrical analysis of the centre of 
gravity, the concept of the centre of gravity will achieve more and more autonomy and 
validity in the area of static equilibrium problems and in the demonstration of the 
equilibrium of the balance, above all for practical rather than theoretical problems. 
In the above paragraph we have described briefly the duality of ancient mechanics in 
order to understand better its improvement and rejuvenation in the context of sixteenth 
century science. The next section (§ 3.3) is dedicated to the Renaissance of ancient 
science, above all to the chiefs of the Urbino School, in order to highlight the leap taken 
forwards both by mathematical physics towards a new theoretical level and by the new 																																																								
239 As Danilo Capecchi shows, the expression scientia de ponderibus comes from the translation completed 
by Dominicus Gundissalinus of al-Farabi’s works into Latin (whereas ‘science of devices’ was instead 
translated as scientia de ingenii). For more details, see Abattouy 2006, p. 17 and Capecchi 2012, p. 65.  
240 For more information on the Greek, Arabic and Latin history of mechanics, see the following 
bibliography: Abattouy 2001; Id. 2002; Id. 2006 and Id. 2008; Capecchi 2012; Dugas 1988; Duhem 1905; 
Id. 1905-1906 and Id. 1911; Clagett 1959.  
241 We have discussed the legacy of the different Aristotelian and Archimedean viewpoints on mechanics 
during the Middle Ages, but in addition we should say that only in the late Renaissance does Aristotelic 
dynamics – based on the concept of gravitas secundum situm – meet with Archimedean statics. See 
further Nenci 2001 and section 3.7.1 below. 
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stage of idealization of the material point within the phenomenon of the objectification 
of procedure. 
 
 
3.3 Mathematical Humanism in the Renaissance  
 
The Renaissance was the period in which mathematics became related to matter, and in 
which mathematics and natural philosophy reached an extraordinarily high level of 
maturity, both of which were factors which, in combination, ended up opening the doors 
to rational mechanics. From a methodological point of view, demonstrations became 
more and more geometrically based, whereas from a subject-oriented point of view, we 
witness the development of the so-called scientia de ponderibus, the study of which 
involves both problems of statics and the notion of the centre of gravity.242 The latter was 
totally unknown among those authors who had an Aristotelian education, because the 
Medieval philosophical tradition did not yet know Archimedes’ treatises on statics and 
equilibrium. Some of these works, in particular the Planes in Equilibrium (Book 1), 
were translated for the first time into Latin around 1269 by William of Moerbeke. The 
Archimedean approach to mechanics was non-causal and non-dynamic, inasmuch as 
force and speed were not taken into account, but instead a rigorously mathematical 
method was applied to the study of equilibrium, with the aid of such physical postulates 
as the centre of gravity. This approach differed fundamentally from that of the Problems 
of Mechanics (attributed to Aristotle), which embodied vague dynamic ideas, above all 
that of the relationship between power and speed. When taken independently, as seen in 
the previous section, both traditions could be fruitful: Archimedes pioneered 
mathematical and rigorous proofs in mechanics, while Aristotle adumbrated the concept 
of virtual velocities. But in order to produce modern mechanics, it was essential to 
combine these two traditions in a complementary way. This step forward was 
unquestionably and authoritatively taken by Galileo, as we will see in the next chapter, 																																																								
242 For further study, see Pisano 2006. 
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but vaguely sketched by Guidobaldo del Monte and Bernardino Baldi from the School 
of Urbino, both of whom thought that the Mechanica merely represented a primitive 
and physico-causal account of mechanics.243 Baldi’s viewpoint flowered in sixteenth-
century Italy, when the Aristotelian tradition was promoted by Niccolò Leonico Tomeo 
(1456-1531) and Alessandro Piccolomini (1508-1579), nor was it ignored by Tartaglia, 
Benedetti or Guidobaldo, all of whom attended Pietro Catena’s (1501-1577) lectures in 
Padua. However, according to Baldi, the limitation of the pseudo-Aristelian Problems of 
Mechanics was the natural explanation of the lever and other machines. Baldi’s 
Mechanica Aristotelis Problemata Excercitationes, printed albeit posthumously in 
Mainz in 1621, attempted to expose the “statistical obsolence of the Mechanica while 
retaining the Peripatetic doctrines of dynamics surrounding the tradition.”244  
Since the main goal of this study is to focus on the contribution of the Reniassance 
mathematicians to show the way in which a theoretical notion such as the point mass 
emerges, thanks to a process of idealization through analysing and observing the 
scientific practice which stands behind the activity of weighing, it is appropriate to 
analyse the rediscovery of Archimedean mathematics and the development of the 
Equilibrium Controversy by means of an analysis of the most prominent characters 
involved in this process. In the subsequent subchapters, I first analyse the way in which 
Federico Commandino reintroduced the Archimedean treatises to the Italian cultural 
milieu by circulating new translations of them, in order finally to clean them up from 
their earlier Medieval vagueness. Second I will scrutinise the work by Guidobaldo del 
Monte, who is first and foremost remembered for his most important Renaissance 
treatise on mechanics, but who is also estimated to be the first scientist ever to have 
tried to conjoin the two conflicting mechanical traditions. 
 
																																																								
243 This led to the appreciation of the important work of other Renaissance mathematicians based in Italy, 
especially that of Tartaglia, who had tried to receive the medieval statics of Jordanus as an alternative 
critique of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems of Mechanics. However, Jordanus’ statics was in many ways 
dynamic in character and so impressed the Urbino School as being nothing more than a regression to an 
imprecise Aristotelian system long since superseded by Archimedes. See further Rose 1975, p. 249. 
244 Rose 1975, p. 249. 
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3.4 Federico Commandino, Head of the Urbino School245  
 
During the sixteenth century, among the first thinkers to discuss the concept of 
Archimedes’ centre of weight was Leonardo da Vinci, who used the centre of weight in 
his work on mechanical devices, as well as later in his studies on the equilibrium of the 
deflected balance.246 But it is only in the Renaissance courts of Venice and Urbino, 
within a strongly humanistic background (which was at the same time interested in the 
practical application of mathematics and strongly connected with engineers and 
technicians), that we can observe the most important rediscovery of Archimedean 
science.  
In Venice in 1503 Luca Gaurico edited a Latin edition of two Archimedean 
treatises, De Mensura Circuli and De Quadratura Parabolae.247 Then in 1543, Tartaglia 
edited Gaurico’s version (printed only posthumusly in 1565), adding the Planes in 
Equilibrium and The Floating Bodies.248 In Basel in 1544 the first editio princeps of the 
Archimedean corpus was printed, including the Greek text and the Latin translation by 
Thomas Geschauff, better known by his Latin name Veratorius.249 
At the court of the Duke of Urbino, the scholar who was considered the initiator of 
the Renaissance Mathematical Humanism, and who best represents the tradition of the 																																																								
245 Despite the fact that, for my research purposes, the most important achievements towards the process of 
idealization and the objectification of the model of material point are reached by Guidobaldo dal Monte, 
his pupil Galileo Galilei, and Luca Valerio, I consider it to be significant at least to give a brief but 
expansive introduction on the “fathers” of this modern rational mathematical physics. Thus it seems 
impossible for me to outline such a process without taking into account the rule of Commandino and 
Bernardino Baldi as the foremost figures of the “Urbino School”. 
246 Renn and Damerow 2012, p. 58.  
247 Tetragonismus id est circuli quadratura, per Campanum, Archimedem Syracusanum atque Boetium 
mathematicae perspicacissimos adinventa, Venezia, 1503.  
248 Opera Archimedis Syracusani philosophi et mathematici ingeniosissimi, per Nico-laum Tartaleam 
Brixianum (mathematicarum scientiarum cultorem) multis erroribus emendata, expurgata ac in luce 
posita multisque necessariis additis... Appositisque manu propria guris quae graeco exemplari 
deformatae ac depravatae erant, Venezia, 1543. In 1551 the same edtion was translated in vernacular and 
printed in 1565 with the title: Ragionamenti sopra la sua Travagliata inventione, nelli quali se dechiara 
volgarmente quel libro di Archimede Siracusano intitolato De insidentibus aquae, Venezia, 1551. 
249 Archimedis Syracusani philosophi ac geometrae excellentissimi Opera, quae quidem extant, omnia 
multis iam seculis desiderata atque a quam paucissimis hactenus visa, nuncque primum et graece et 
latine in lucem edita. Adiecta quoque sunt Eutocii Ascalonitae in eosdem Archimedis libros 
Commentaria, item graece et latine, nunquam antea excusa, Basel, 1544.  
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ancient mathematics, is Federico Commandino. This is certainly confirmed by his 
contemporaries and by Guidobaldo’s praise, articulated in 1577:  
Yet in the midst of that darkness (though there were also some other famous names) Federico 
Commandino shone like the sun. He by his many learned studies not only restored the lost heritage 
of mathematics, but actually increased and enhanced it. For that great man was so well-endowed 
with mathematical talent that in him there seem to have lived again Archytas, Eudoxus, Hero, 
Euclid, Theon, Aristarchus, Diophantus, Theodosius, Ptolemy, Apollonius, Serenus, Pappus and 
even Archimedes himself, for his commentaries on Archimedes smell of the mathematician’s own 
lamp. And so! Just as he had been suddenly thrust from the darkness and prison of the body (as we 
believe) into the light and liberty of mathematics, so at the most opportune time he left mathematics 
bereft of its fine and noble father and left us so prostrate that we scarcely seem able even by a long 
discourse to console ourseves for his loss.250  
 
Commandino is defined as a humanist with a strong interest for the mathematical 
discipline, and, by the same token, as a mathematician with a strong competence in 
philology. In fact, between 1558251 and 1575 he edited ten of the main ancient Greek 
treatises. But let us take one thing at a time.  
Federico Commandino was born into a noble Urbinate family in 1509.252 His 
grandfather had served the Duke Federico da Montefeltro, after whom the 
mathematician was named. His father was Battista Commandino and as a diligent 
student of architecture had supervised the fortification of Urbino’s walls. Since 																																																								
250 Emicuit tamen inter istas tenebras (quamiis alij, quoquè nonnulli fuerint praedarissimi) Solis instar 
Federicus Commandinus, qui multis doctissimis elucubrationibus amissum mathematicarum patrimonium 
non modò restauravit, verùm etiam auctiùs, e kocupletiùs effecit erat enim summus iste vir omnibus adeò 
facultatibus mathematicus ornatus, ut in eo Architas, Eudoxus, Heron, Euclides, Theon, Aristarcus, 
Diophantus, Theodosius, Ptolemaeus, Apollonius, Serenus, Pappus, quin e ipsemet Archimedes (si 
quidem ipsius in Archimedem scripta Archimedis ilent lucernam) revixisse viderentur e ecce repentè è 
tenebris (ut confidimus) ac vinculis corporiis in lucem, liberatatemquè productus mathematicas 
alienissimo tempore optimo, e praestantissimo patre orbatas, nos veò ita conservatos reliquit, ut eius 
desideruum vix longo sermone mitigare posse dideamur. Ille tamen perpetuò in aliarum mathematicarum 
explicationem varsans, mechanicam facultatem, aut penitus praeter misit, aut modicè attigit. del Monte 
1577, Prefatio. 
The English trans. is quoted in Renn and Damerow 2010, p. 57.  
251 Yet in 1558 Commandino was already 49 years old. What took him so long to get started? 
252 In this section, in order to recount the life and research carried out by Commandino, I have consulted 
the following works: Dennistoun 1851, III, p. 97; Grossi 1819, pp. 53-57; Mamiani 1828, pp. 4-42; 
Ugolino 1859, II, 271, 273f. 
	 142 
Commandino’s father met figures as Jacob of Spira and Paul of Middelburg, his training 
and formative environment were both humanistic; in fact during his life and studies, 
Commandino remained in close contact with the Farnese’s circle at Rome, which 
included Fulvio Orsini (1529-1600), Marcello Cervini (1501-1555) and the poet 
Torquato Tasso, who studied with Commandino and acquired enough mathematics to 
lecture at the University of Ferrara.253  
Commandino’s teachers were Giacomo Torelli of Fano, his tutor in liberal arts, 
Latin and Greek, and Giam-Pietro de’ Grassi (both sixteenth century), who was skilled 
in both the humanities and mathematics. Thanks to both these teachers, when 
Commandino returned to Rome he entered the service of Cardinal Niccolò Ridolfi as a 
mathematics tutor. Ridolfi was a philologist and amassed over 600 Greek manuscripts. 
In this collection there was also a copy of the Codex A of Archimedes. It was surely 
thanks to his friendship with Ridolfi that Commandino resided in Rome in the 1530s 
and had unlimited access to Ridolfi’s great collection. Moreover, owing to this 
acquaintance Commandino secured an introduction to Pope Clement VII, who 
appointed him as cameriere secreto and with whom he discussed mathematics and the 
scientific discipline in general.  
After his years in Rome, he moved to the University of Padua where he attended 
medicine and philosophy under Marc’Antonio de’ Passeri and Giovanni Battista 
Montano for ten years. Later he went to Ferrara where he completed his medical studies 
under the patronage of Antonio Brasavola. Meanwhile in 1537, he also met Tommaso 
Leonardi of Fano, an algebraist skilled in mathematics and astronomy, and it was likely 
that he was the major formative influence on Commandino.  
In 1556 Commandino returned to Urbino, where he married Girolama 
Buonaventuri and had two daughters and a son. Given that both his wife and his son 
died prematurely, and since he also lost his father around the same time, Commandino 
harboured a sense of disillusionment towards medicine, labelling it as an uncertain 
branch of knowledge. It was in this context that Commandino abandoned the practice of 																																																								
253 For further details, see Guasti 1952.  
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medicine for the certainty and undeniability offered by mathematics.  
In Urbino, Commandino was called to the service of Duke Guidobaldo della 
Rovere, under whose patronage Commandino met Ranuccio Farnese and the librarian 
Fulvio Orsini mentioned above. In the assets amassed by Orsini, Commandino had the 
chance to consult the entire Greek tradition including Aratus, Aristarchus’ astronomical 
and musical works, and fragments of Archimedes’ On Floating Bodies. Indeed owing to 
Farnese’s network of acquaintances, Commandino met several scholars such as the 
Spanish humanist and mathematician Diego Huardo de Mendoza, who took lessons 
directly from Tartaglia in Venice.  
Extremely important was also the friendship with the Cardinal Marcello Cervini, 
another collector of manuscripts and bibliophile who amassed among 440 codices now 
deposited in the Biblioteca Vaticana. This collection includes Leonardo Fibonacci’s 
Pratica Geometriae, Pappus’ Problemata Geometrica, Ptolemy’s Almagest and 
Geographia, Hero’s De Geometria and Pneumatica, and others. Through his friendship 
with Cardinal Cervini, Commandino acquired the Moerbeke translation of Archimedes’ 
On Floating Bodies. Only after Marcello Cervini’s death did Commandino return to 
Urbino definitively, where he accomplished the mathematical works which were 
published in 1556.   
In the Prolegomena found at the beginning of the Archimedean edition, 
Commandino expresses the idea254 that although all sciences have some elements of truth 
in common, it is only with the discipline of mathematics that uncertainty is dispelled. 
“The obscurity in nature and philosophy is exemplified in the disagreement between 
Plato and Aristotle. But Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and Galen all attest to the nobility 
and importance of mathematics”, he says.255 Commandino also remarks, according to the 
																																																								
254 This idea is also reintroduced in the Prolegomena at the beginning of the edition of the Elements 
published in Pesaro in 1575.  
255 Rose 1975, p. 195. As said above, Commandino in the Prolegomena begins by dividing philosophy into 
divine, natural and mathematical categories, of which the last provides the greatest epistemic certainty. 
After this, mathematics is distinguished from physics, because the former does not rely upon sense-
phenomena and depends upon the intellect alone. At the same time mathematics is not merely an abstract 
discipline, for it has real connections with the physical world. This is obvious in relation to the mixed 
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current trend, how far mathematics was essential for military science and civil 
engineering works. The 1558 edition of Archimedes’ works was not a complete corpus, 
but included only De mensura Circuli, De Lineis Spiralibus, De Quadratura Parabolae, 
De Conoidibus et Spheroidibus and the Arenarius. Despite the fact that he had also 
promised the publication of the Aequeponderantibus256, Commandino never reached this 
goal, and the publication of this treatise was left to his pupil Guidobaldo in 1588. 
Hence, the climax of the restoration of the Archimedean corpus was reached with his 
publication of On Floating Bodies (Bologna 1565), whose delay was caused by the 
corruption of the ancient text. The excellence of Commandino’s edition of On Floating 
Bodies may be observed in his elegant reconstruction of two lost proofs of Archimedes. 
In contrast to the Latin and vernacular editions by Tartaglia (published in Venice 
respectively in 1543 and 1565), Commandino supplied the missing proofs of 
Proposition 8 of Book 1 and Proposition 2 of Book 2. The difference between Tartaglia 
and Commandino can be found in the fact that these two proofs required a 
foreknowledge of the determination of the centre of gravity of a paraboloid segment 
(i.e. the centre of gravity of solid figures). On the one hand, Tartaglia never even tried 
to rework those proofs, and on the other hand, neither in any of the extant Archimedean 
works (the Archimedean Method was being rediscovered by Hilberg in 1906), nor in 
any other known Greek works, is this method described. Thus, Commandino merits to 
be called the first to achieve the task of reconstruction and restoration of the ancient 
Greek treatise On Floating Bodies.257 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																		
sciences such as mechanics, astronomy, optics, music and geodesy. In addition to being a liberal art, 
mathematics is also utilitarian, as can also be seen from its application in medicine and military science.  
256 Planes in Equilibrium. 
257 Rose 1975, p. 201. 
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3.4.1 The new Centre of Gravity 
 
Commandino’s research on solids is embodied in his Liber de Centro Gravitatis 
Solidorum258, published in 1565 and considered the apogee of his scientific production. 
This manuscript was principally written to clarify one of the most important 
propositions of the Archimedean On Floating Bodies, previously translated by 
Moerbeke into unclear and problematic Latin. Commandino was able not only to 
translate the Floating Bodies properly, but also, thanks to the additional work just 
mentioned above, to fill in the demonstrative and conceptual gaps about the law of the 
lever. Pier Napolitani writes: “As the only determinations of the centre of gravity that 
we have from antiquity only refer to two-dimensional figures, Commandino decided to 
provide scholars with an essay on centres of gravity of three-dimensional figures such 
as prisms, pyramids and cones, and also the parabola.” 259  From Archimedes 
Commandino acquired not only the method for calculating the centre of gravity of each 
figure, but also the method of approximation. This method is useful for demonstrating 
that the centre of gravity of a figure lies on its axis or diameter (the segment that links 
the vertex with the centre of gravity of the base). 260  Starting from this point, 
Commandino was able to prove how to circumscribe (or inscribe) the studied figures 
with figures of increasing dimensions, in order to make the difference between the two 
of them arbitrarily small. 
The definition of the centrum gravitates, which can be found in Commandino’s 
treatise, arises from Pappus’ Mathematicae Collectiones (third/fourth century BCE). 
Although in the previous chapter we have already given Pappus’ definition, for the sake 
of convenience I reproduce it below: 
 																																																								
258 The latest edition is recently published in 2015 and is edited and translated into Italian by E. Gamba and 
V. Montebelli: Liber de Centro Gravitatis Solidorum, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2015. 
259 Napolitani 2001. During the Renaissance only the first book of the treatise Planes in Equilibrium was 
already known besides the treatise On Floating Bodies. 260	The property that underlies the approximating figure technique – which was studied by Luca Valerio 
in 1604 – is the ‘monotonicity’ of the figure in question, that is the fact that the sections constantly 
decrease from the base to the vertex.  
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The centre of gravity of any body is a point situated within, and such that, if the body is imagined to 
be suspended from it, the weight will be at rest as it hangs and will keep its original position.261 
 
The idea is that a point is the centre of gravity of a body if and only if once we are 
hanging that body by its centre of gravity, it remains in that position, or in the 
equilibrium position, and it will never rotate around that point.  
Given that definition and by combining it with Pappus’ propositions, Commandino 
provides a new description, trying to be as accurate as he can, and additionally 
grounding his formulation on Archimedes’ fragments. The result as he states it is the 
following:  
 
The centre of gravity of any solid shape is that point within it around which are disposed on all sides 
parts of equal moments [aequalium momentorum], so that if a plane be passed through this point 
cutting the said shape, it will always be divided into parts of equal weight.262  
 
This definition contains two different statements: i) there exists in any solid a point in 
respect of which the two different parts making up the solid have equal moments; and ii) 
the two parts obtained from the operation by which we cut the whole solid will always 
be equal in weight.   
This is absolutely the first work ever published which is completely dedicated to 
this topic, even though contemporaneously other mathematicians were working on the 
same subject, such as the Sicilian Francesco Maurolico, whose treatises were only 
published posthumously.263  
It is not the aim of this section to compare or criticize the outcomes obtained by the 
Urbinate Commandino. Instead I wish to point out the importance of the introduction of 																																																								
261 Pappi Alexandrini Mathematicae Collectiones a Federico Commandino urbinate in latinum conversae 
et commentariis illustratae, Pesaro 1588, f. 306v.  
262 Centrum gravitatis uniuscuiusque solidae figurae est punctum illud intra positum, circa quod undique 
partes aequalium momentorum consistunt. Si enim per tale centrum ducatur planum figuram 
quomodocumque secans semper in partes aequeponderantes semper dividet. Commandino 1565, pp. 1-2, 
with the English trans. taken from Frank, 2013.  
263 In the dedication of his book to Alessandro Ranuccio, Commandino explicitly states that in the previous 
years he was waiting for the publication of Maurolico’s treatise, in order to be able to compare his own 
studies with Maurolico’s outcomes. 
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the definition of centre of gravity or weight, to which both the newly introduced notion 
of moment and the meaning of the expression equal in weight are directly related. 
The centrum gravitatis is a geometrical point equipped with specific static 
properties. Gravitas is not the force acting on a body, but the gravezza or weight of a 
body which is imagined to be concentrated in just one point. The centre of gravity is 
defined as the fulcrum of the virtual balance which is in turn made up of the elements of 
the solid figure; it is the point of equilibrium of all solids’ inclinations and moments. 
Thus the moment represents the tendency to go downwards or upwards, and depends on 
the weight of the solid in itself and on its distance from the fulcrum. In this precise 
context the moment indicates the variable of the weight.  
The meaning given to ‘moment’ by Commandino is not related to the concept of 
the moment of inertia264, but rather is only a qualitative definition which tries to state the 
difference in the efficacy of weight in the balance and the lever. It will be Galileo who, 
between 1595 and 1597, will define the moment of a body – or of a particle – as the 
product of its mass multiplied by its velocity.265 
Commandino’s definition of the centre of gravity leads the general reader to 
misunderstand the term ‘moment’ and its relation to the expression ‘equal in weight’. 
From the description given above it appears in fact that by cutting the solid figure in 
two parts, with a plane passing through the centre of gravity, the two parts must 
necessarily have the same weight in order to achieve the equilibrium position. But this 
cannot be the case, because, as we already know from Archimedes’ law of the lever, 
once we hang two bodies at the end of the arm of a balance, that balance will be in 
equilibrium if and only if the bodies (hanging in their centre of gravity) lie at a distance 
which is indirectly proportional to the weight of the bodies. Thus, this does not endorse 																																																								
264 The moment of inertia, also known as the angular mass or rotational inertia, of a rigid body is a tensor 
that determines the torque needed for a desired angular acceleration about a rotational axis. In its modern 
physical conception, the moment of inertia I is defined as the ratio of the angular momentum L of a 
system to its angular velocity ω around a principal axis. 
265 For more on the development of the conception of ‘moment’, see Galluzzi 1979, pp. 41-62, which 
examines the occurrences of the word ‘moment’ in Commandino’s De Centro, and which states that, 
besides the use made in the definition of the centre of gravity, in no other of his other works does it occur 
again.  
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the idea that the two parts of the same body must have the same weight. Only 
Guidobaldo in his Mechanicorum Liber will remedy this linguistic misunderstanding.  
Now, let me introduce some examples to provide a basic overview of the evolution 
of the debate surrounding the notion of centre of gravity and its difference from the 
notion of moment. Francesco Guerrini, Guidobaldo’s disciple, just few months after the 
death of his teacher, sent a letter to Clavius in which he reported a commentary given by 
Guidobaldo himself on the Archimedean propositions of the Plane in Equilibrium: 
 
After the death of the most Illustrious Guido del Monte, may God rest his soul, several gentlemen of 
Pesaro asked me to show them the practice of the Mechanicorum Liber of the aforesaid Sir, as I am 
doing. We already finished the first chapter Della Libra and at the beginning there has been a great 
controversy about the definition of the centre of gravity, about these words: “In fact, if a plane is 
drawn through this centre, intersecting the figure in an arbitrary way, so it always divides it into 
equiponderating parts.” And if one wanted to insist on the wording “intersecting in an arbitrary 
way”, it would seem that the two parts, after the section, would weigh equally, but in reality the 
contrary can be proven. [...] I beg You to tell me Your opinion which would be of great use for me 
[...].266  
 
First of all, the term ‘equiponderating’ is a neologism used in translating the Latin word 
aequeponderare. Both the translations ‘equal’ and ‘of equal moment’ would distort the 
sense of the sentence.267 Thus, Guerrini’s letter (together with the discussions among the 
“gentlemen of Pesaro”) concerns exactly the same problem already raised by 
Commandino, and which had only for a second time been reintroduced by Guidobaldo 
in the first book of the Paraphrasis. Formulated in terms of modern physics, the issue 
(in the case of three-dimensional geometry) is equivalent to the following question: 
does the intersection of a body by a plane passing through its barycentre create two 
separate parts of equal weight, or rather two separate parts of equal moment? 
In the light of Commandino’s activity later as a teacher to young engineers, the 																																																								
266 Frank 2013, p. 322. 
267 For further in this regard, see the doctoral dissertation by M. Frank, Guidobaldo Del Monte Mechanics 
in Context. Research on the Connections between his mechanical work and his life and environment, 
2011/2012, pp. 348-349. 
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double occurrence of this problem does not seem coincidental. Since the distinction 
between weight and a kind of (proto-)moment (aequeponderare) is one of the basic 
problems of Archimedes’ barycentre theory, it is likely that Guidobaldo encountered the 
same quandary while he was teaching the Mechanicorum Liber’s content (and thus the 
very foundations of the Archimedean theory).268 The remedy to this dilemma is later 
found thanks to the combination of the Archimedean tradition with its Aristotelian 
counterpart. Guidobaldo, and Baldi too, both give importance to machinery, for both the 
physical content and the physical outcomes of their research, while Commandino on his 
own was above all worried about the mathematical rigour of his reconstruction.  
In fact also Guidobaldo himself, while praising Commandino as the greatest 
restorer of ancient mathematics, voiced that his teacher had failed to achieve a 
systematic treatment of mechanics:  
 
In his [sc. Commandino’s] endless concern with the elucidation of other parts of mathematics, 
Commandino either left mechanics completely untreated or touched on it just casually. Therefore I 
began to devote myself more eagerly to this study, and in making my way through every branch of 
mathematics I never lost sight of my course to find whatever could be appropriated and derived 
from each of these branches, so that I might be better equipped to perfect and embellish mechanics.269  																																																								
268 In 1598 Guidobaldo wrote to the Jesuit Christoph Clavius, claiming that the Mechanicorum’s second 
supposition (i.e. that the centre of gravity of a body is always in the same location with respect to its 
body), asserts that when Archimedes, in the De aequeponderantibus, refers to centres of gravity, and to 
weights suspended in their centre of gravity, he intends that the weights must remain in any position 
whatever, and that in this sense they “have the same weight, or, are equally heavy [Lat: 
aequeponderent]”. To this Guidobaldo also adds that Archimedes can only be interpreted in this way, 
since otherwise his conclusions would not be true. Thus, while Guidobaldo may or may not be right about 
his reading of Archimedes, it is clear that, by attributing to the nature of the centre of gravity the meaning 
of “having the same weight in all directions [that is, aequeponderare per tutti i versi]”, he is de facto 
interpreting Archimedes according to Pappus’ definition, and Pappus’ definition in terms of moments, 
along the lines of Commandino’s description. The main misinterpretation is, however, given by the fact 
that neither Commandino nor Guidobaldo have ever specified how the ‘moment’ is to be defined. Indeed 
Commandino throughout the De Centro never makes use of his own definition; rather following in 
Archimedes’ footsteps, he proceeds by demonstrations that start from postulates. Moreover, neither 
Archimedes nor Pappus ever furnished criteria which are to be used for directly finding centres of gravity. 
In other words, from the descriptions and demonstrations given by those authors, we can only accrue 
knowledge about centres of gravity starting from postulates that describe simple configurations of 
weights, and only thereby progress to theorems about more complex configurations of weights. For 
further details, see Palmieri 2008, pp. 315-16. 
269 Ille tamen perpetuò in aliarum mathematicarum ecplicationem versans, mechanicam facultatem, aut 
penitus praeter misit, aut modicè attigit. Qua propter in hoc studium ardentiùs ego incumbere caepi, nec 
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Thus, Commandino’s lack of theoretical knowledge did not allow him to enter actively 
into the equilibrium controversy, although numerous studies had been dedicated to the 
balance in practically all times and cultures, in particular in the Arabic and Latin Middle 
Ages, as well as in the early modern period. Specialist understanding of the question 
whether or not an equilibrated balance would return to its horizontal position or remain 
in whatever position it is brought was the paradigmatic topic of mechanical knowledge, 
the core of a science of weight. For centuries, it was a topic strictly related to physical 
concepts, from the law of the lever to the principle of conservation of energy. Therefore, 
what happened in this context and what was the gap that these scholars were able to fill 
in, by collaborating with each other and by allowing the overlap of different theoretical, 
empirical, geometrical and mathematical knowledge that they were in possession of?  
Perhaps a more sophisticated knowledge was required to answer this apparently 
straightforward question. Physics was not enough. Although a series of sophisticated 
empirical experiments give us certain results, without a theoretical background we are 
not able to reply to the question in a proper way. In fact, the empirical context will yield 
nothing more than an accumulation of data based on single-case observations. The 
profound gap between these partial results and the theoretical framework used widely 
and confidently nowadays lies upon the lack of generalization or, better, on the absence 
of a systematic treatment of an ample series of cases, each of which may be included in 
a general law or in a general framework. Therefore, this dilemma was decided only 
before the turn to the early modern age, when – as stated by Guidobaldo himself – he 
was dealing with a systematic treatment of the equilibrium controversy.  
Although Commandino did not make any particular contribution to the 
development of the notion of centre of gravity, or to its transformation from a purely 
geometrical notion relating to plane and solid figures into a theoretical entity used to 
represent all bodies detached from their physical features, a transformation which we 																																																																																																																																																																		
me unquam per omne mathematum genus vagantem ea solicitudo deservit; ecquid ex uno quoque decerpi, 
ac delibrari possit; quo ad mechanicam expoliendam, & exornandam accomodatior esse possem. del 
Monte 1577, Preface.  
The English trans. is taken from Drake and Drabkin 1969, pp. 239 ff, especially p. 245.  
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have already seen above, at least he had the merits to recover Archimedean studies in 
their entirety by giving back to them a measure of coherence. 
Before switching to the core of the debate over the equilibrium of the balance, we 
will dedicate a section to the one of the most influential contemporaries of the Urbinate 
Commandino. Unfortunately, the indispensable role of Francesco Maurolico was only 
recognised later in the century, because during his lifetime he postponed the publication 
and circulation of the outcomes of his endeavors. According to today’s scholarship, we 
do not find significant evidence of his influence on the theoretical development of the 
notion of the point mass; however, Maurolico deserves to be considered one of the main 
protagonists in the systematisation of the Archimedean mathematical corpus. 
 
 
3.5 Francesco Maurolico 
 
While Commandino is remembered for the philological accuracy of his translations, and 
for having illuminated for the first time the work of one of the greatest scientists of 
antiquity, his contemporary, the self-educated Francesco Maurolico from Messina,270 
also enters in a list of the greatest ancient “renovators” of the sixteenth century. He was 
the son of Antonio Maurolì, a Greek physician who had fled the sack of Constantinople 
to settle in Sicily, where he become master of the mint at Messina. Maurolico’s father 
was attracted to mathematics and astronomy, acting as personal tutor to his son 
Francesco, who had other two teachers to train him in poetry, philology and history. As 
Rose says, “Maurolico’s immersion in Greek culture – both through parentage and 
education – also gave him the technical skills in language necessary for his attempt to 
restore to life the mathematics of the Greeks.”271 Nothing is known of Maurolico’s career 
until 1521. His first works on mathematics were completed between 1521 and 1523, 
and they represent a new departure in the history of optics. Then in 1528 he published 																																																								
270 The best source for Maurolico’s biography can be found in the Vita dell’Abate del Parto D. Francesco 
Maurolico, Messina, 1613, written by his nephew Baron della Foresta.  
271 Rose 1975, p. 159. 
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the Grammaticorum Rudimentorum Libelli Sex. In this work it was his principal thesis 
that all five areas of natural philosophy (the trivium, metaphysics, physics, the 
quadrivium and ethics) were subject to epistemic doubt, while only mathematics 
contained certain demonstrations which keep it from falling into scepticism. Thus, he 
was directly involved in the renewal of the educational system, despite the fact that he 
was geographically isolated.272  
Moreover, by 1534 he had finished a translation of a portion of Euclid’s Elements 
based on Campanus’ edition, and in the same year he turned his attention to Hero’s 
Pneumatica and Archimedes. Maurolico’s main attempt was now to restore and clean 
up the translated works of the previous authors thanks to his skills both in ancient Greek 
and in classical mathematics and geometry. Maurolico told his friend Pietro Bembo 
(1470-1547) that Euclid’s original version of the Elements was so falsified by 
translators that he had become altogether altered, mutilated and full of new trifles. 
Despite this, his main interest was directed upon Archimedes. During his lifetime he 
enjoyed marginal success and his studies on Archimedes were published only 
posthumously. Fortunately, his intellectual heritage remained alive thanks to his Jesuit 
friend Christoph Clavius. Maurolico adopted his own editorial technique: while his 
predecessors, such as Commandino (as we have seen above) were only interested in the 
accuracy of their translations and adhered in this exercise to strict philological rules, 
Maurolico reworked the treatises entirely that he already had in his hands. He edited the 
books of Apollonius, Euclid and Archimedes, adding lemmas, demonstrating things 
which were omitted by the original authors, and treating their mathematical subjects 
with enormous expertise. 
Maurolico’s greatest work, and the most extraordinary example of his innovations, 
is the De Momentis Aequalibus (Admirandi Archimedis Syracusani monumenta omnia 
mathematica), an extensive rewriting of Archimedes’ Planes in Equilibrium which was 
only published in 1685. This work is composed of four books, the first of which deals 																																																								
272 As we read in Rose [1975 pp. 167-169], Maurolico during his lifetime received several offers from his 
contemporaries to stay in Rome, or to travel to other cities for research purposes or teaching. However, he 
always refused these offers, arguably because of his attachment to his Sicilian patron, Giovanni 
Ventimiglia.  
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with general statements relating to centres of gravity and equilibrium. The following 
three books concern the determination of barycentres in plane figures and solids 
(paraboloids and spheres, pyramids, prism and conoids). The De Momentis provides a 
new demonstration of the determination of the rotating parabola’s centre of gravity. 
This demonstration is independent of the one given by Commandino (which he does not 
seem to be aware of at this time), and is based on the notion of moment. Maurolico’s De 
Momentis cannot be considered either a simple edition of Archimedes’ Planes in 
Equilibrium or an extension of this treatise. Rather, it is the result of deep reflection on 
Greek statics and Archimedean thought. It broke into the vanguard of Renaissance 
mathematical scholarship by presenting a new interpretation of i) the scientia de 
ponderibus, ii) the centre of gravity and iii) the relationship between the physical and 
mathematical interpretations of the equilibrium of balance.273 Moreover, there is a 
conceptual transition from a qualitative notion of moment – whereby one is able to 
express the different efficacies of the weight in the scale and the lever – to a geometrical 
and quantitative notion of moment. Maurolico used his mathematical skills to integrate 
and redefine Archimedes’ works, avoiding demonstrative gaps in his manuscripts. 
At first glance, in comparing Commandino’s and Maurolico’s re-elaborated 
versions, it seems that their approach is basically the same, namely to elucidate the 
sequential development of the Archimedean proofs and to give alternative or additional 
demonstrations when required. Regarding this methodological consensus, there is a 
surviving amount of correspondence between them, which reports the following: 
 
All the mathematicians of our time ought to be grateful for the abundance of books written by you 
[Commandino is here referring to Maurolico]. With these you have opened the way to explaining 
and making intelligible those things which have lain, obstructed by many difficulties, in the greatest 
darkness for uncountable centuries [...]. I wish to see all your works printed as soon as possible, 
particularly the two unpublished books of Archimedes – De operimetris Figuris and De Speculis 
Comburentibus – and your books of De Aequalibus Momentis, Photismi and Diaphana.274 																																																								
273 Napolitani 2001, p. 19. 
274 The surviving correspondence between Maurolico and Commandino can be found in the Biblioteca 
Universitaria, Urbino, MS, Busta Comune 120, fols. 185-188v, and may be dated to ca. 1557.  
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Although from the passage above Commandino and Maurolico’s approaches appear to 
resemble each other, it is worthwhile highlighting the main difference between them. 
From the examination of Maurolico’s texts we can assert that he seeks to establish the 
ancestry of algebra, mathematics and geometry by using the available Archimedean 
fragments, surpassing the translations made by Arabic and Latin amanuenses that were 
normally full of both grammatical and content-related errors and miscalculations. Out of 
scepticism towards these sources, he opts to change his expository method, and in fact 
was able to identify the fil rouge of the ancient mathematical-geometrical approach in 
order to make use of the common general features, and in so doing to yield a unitary 
method of enquiry and bring about the most consistent demonstrations. In this way the 
treatments of mechanical problems are now envisaged from two different perspectives: 
i) a purely physical analysis relating to the empirical experiments; and ii) a more 
general treatment involving the use of a systematic model to represent the events by 
means of this theoretical and idealized model. Thus in this respect, Maurolico’s corpus 
denoted not only an inquiry into the science of mechanics with practical implications, 
but also a step towards the consolidation of a new general methodology and a new 
means of doing and conceiving mechanics. For example, in one of his works, the 
Arithmetica of Diophantus275, the most striking aspect lies in the use of letters in place of 
numbers. The aim of this procedure is to try to convert the handling of numerical data to 
the same generality and abstraction as the letter-based handling of geometry.276  
We have mentioned the steps forward taken by Commandino and Maurolico in the 
restoration of the main Archimedean treatises. Both authors provide two different 
approaches which were indispensable both for initiating the debate that led to the 
development of modern mechanics and, in particular, for kick-starting an 
epistemological debate about the nature of idealized geometrical entities. The process 
which the geometrical notion of the centre of gravity underwent by being transformed 																																																								
275 Scinà, Bottazzini and Nastasi 1808, pp. 38-45; See further Fontana 1808, pp. 275-296 and Martines 
1865, pp. 65-89. 	
276 Some of the details used in this reconstruction are taken from Rose 1975, pp. 159-184.  
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into a mathematical notion, assuming that the physical meaning related to the definition 
of point mass, has its hints in the mechanical practice of weighing. However, the 
epistemological significance of idealizing and abstracting physical properties from its 
practical application or from real bodies are no more than outlined in Guidobaldo’s 
research. So before entering into a detailed analysis of del Monte’s mechanics, let us 
first consider the epistemological and historical meaning of the sixteenth century’s 
Equilibrium Controversy.  
 
 
3.6 The Scientia de Ponderibus  
 
By understanding the epistemological and historical significance of the Equilibrium 
Controversy, we will better appreciate the difference between Guidobaldo del Monte, 
“the new Archimedes”, and his contemporary Federico Commandino. Moreover, 
comprehension of this centuries-old debate will help us both to grasp the development 
of the theoretical field of modern mechanics, and to understand the essence of the 
process we have called “the second stage of objectification of procedure”. Here it will 
be shown that, by looking at the practice of weighing and the behaviour of the balance, 
and by stating its mechanical principles, Guidobaldo and his contemporaries were able 
to abstract from a practical context an idealized concept such as the notion which we 
now call the point mass. Thus, in the context of the Equilibrium Controversy, the centre 
of gravity behaves as a geometrical point devoid of any physical content, i.e. any 
volume. This admittedly schematic representation is used mainly to simplify 
computations and to attempt to find a general mechanical law governing the behaviour 
of the balance. By means of these two items, the purely geometrical notion of the centre 
of gravity will approach – under a conceptual revision – the status of a (quasi-)idealized 
mathematical object. As we will see, even a simple problem such as that of the 
equilibrium of balance can in this light become a challenging issue. In this respect, the 
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main aspect to be emphasised is the role played by historical contingencies277 in 
conceptual development at the heart of mechanics. There is, first of all (as we have seen 
in the previous Chapter), the contingency of those aspects related to the centre of 
gravity, which had a physical, heuristic and mechanical meaning in aiming at pure 
geometrical and mathematical enquiry. Secondly, there is the contingency of the social 
and cultural conditions whereby knowledge is recorded, transmitted, and appropriated 
in the case of the Renaissance; this thorough re-examination of ancient sources occurred 
in order to determine the real nature of concepts in mechanics. Since science is by its 
nature a humanly guided enterprise, it is the purpose of this subchapter to display the 
key role played by mathematical humanism. 
   
Furthermore, the analysis of the Equilibrium Controversy offers the chance to scrutinise 
the interaction of various components of mechanical knowledge and to investigate the 
consequences of the incomplete transmission of ancient scientific knowledge through 
the Arabic and Latin Middle Ages and into the early modern period. Scientific 
controversies have an unrestricted meaning, and can in general be defined as persistent 
antagonistic disagreements concerning a substantial scientific issue that cannot be 
resolved by standard means available to science in the given period.278 In such a 
situation, the mathematicians of the time were trying to answer the question of the 
deflected balance by showing that their understanding agreed with widely accepted 
contemporary explanations. In this research they adapted their own interpretations to 
novel situations which had never been analysed before, hence widening the empirical 
range of their approach. They also attempted to show the inappropriateness and 
deficiencies of the opponents’ accounts.  
However, in this very context of methodological debate for the solving of unusual 
equilibrium problems, it appears that, in order to solve such a controversy, a demand for 
mature concepts and their generalization is required. Thus the attempt to find a 																																																								
277 With contingency we mean the circumstances in which the rediscovery of the ancient geometry took 
place, and the development of the related debate over the equilibrium. 
278 Freudental 2000, pp. 125-142; and Id. 2002, pp. 573-637. 
	 157 
universal “key”, as it were, by which the effectiveness of a weight under varying 
mechanical circumstances, could be described, which could be applicable to all 
mechanical circumstances.  
The need for generalization invades scientific controversies often triggered by what 
has recently been called “challenging objects”.279 As Renn and Damerow write, “these 
[sc. objects] are artefacts or other parts of the material culture that confront existing 
theoretical frameworks with explanatory tasks that cannot be accomplished with the 
available conceptual means, thus triggering their further development and ultimately 
their transformation. They typically embody other forms of knowledge, for instance, the 
practical knowledge of artisans to invent, produce, or make use of such objects. The 
development of the theoretical knowledge of mechanics in the early modern period can 
to a large extent be accounted for by the increasing attention scholars and engineer-
scientists of the period paid to new objects of study which they investigated by means 
of the extant conceptual frameworks.”280  
A scientific controversy typically comes to an end through the development of a 
new conceptual framework, in which the original question either changes or loses its 
meaning. In this specific case, we witness the inception of a new theoretical object that 
will be extensively useful in a scientific context as a model or representational tool.  
Scientia de ponderibus is the name given by Medieval scholars to the discipline that 
treats the equilibrium of heavy bodies, with particular reference to those hanging from a 
balance. This field was distinct from Greek mechanics both in scope – Greek mechanics 
aimed to interpret the transportation of weights, instead of their equilibrium – and in 
methodology – the science of weight was interested only in the theoretical foundations 
of equilibrium and not in its application.281  																																																								
279 The notion of ‘challenging objects’ was first proposed by Renn in 2001. It became widely used in 
Bertoloni Meli 2006; Büttner, Damerow and Renn 2004; Büttner 2008 and Id. 2009, and Valleriani 2010. 
However, in this context, we only borrow the concept of ‘challenging objects’ without relating it 
explicitly to Renn’s approach to the history of science.  
280 Renn and Damerow 2012, p. 13.  
281 As we will see in the next section, Guidobaldo del Monte, from Momabaroccio, represents an exception 
to this general rule among his contemporaries; he will be the first to instigate the reconciliation of 
mechanics as a scientific praxis and its theoretical aspects.	
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In the early third millennium BCE, balances with equal arms were introduced in 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China, and they became more widespread across the 
Mediterranean. From the extant papyri fragments, which report vignettes of the so-
called ‘judgment scenes’, historians agree in maintaining that the balance had ritualistic 
origins, because in those scenes the main event consisted in the weighing of the heart of 
the deceased against the Father of Ma’at, a symbol of truth and rectitude. There are 
additional traces of ritual origins among the Incas of Peru and others of the pre-
Columbian period. But any entertainment concerning the single or multiple origins of 
this device in the Old and New Worlds, or its original source, is not a matter for this 
reconstruction. However, the employment of these devices is well documented in 
literature, e.g. in Homer’s Iliad and Aeschylus’ fragmentary Psychostasia: in votive 
rituals, the balancing is seen as a special way of finding an equivalent to a sacrificed 
object, thus functioning as a prototype for the practical and physical use of the balance.282 
Gradually, these symbolic problems became associated with the practice of measuring 
with seeds, above all to solve mercantile disputes. Over time these arbitrary and 
geographically isolated methods underwent a process of standardization. 283  Their 
introduction to Europe was associated with the emergence of a quantitative concept of 
weight and a greater uniformity of weight measures. Despite its practical purposes, from 
the archaic era onwards, a theoretical field of knowledge can be reconstructed in which 
the balance and the law of the lever were central. This is further documented by texts in 
which the equilibrium of a balance is studied under various circumstances and 
fundamental statements about the balance and other mechanical devices are derived 
within a deductive structure from certain presuppositions.284  																																																								
282 Seidenberg and Casey 1980, pp. 208-209. 
283 For further details, see Seidenberg and Casey 1980, pp. 179-226. 
284 Brentjes and Renn 2013. The authors establish that each of the extant ancient texts belongs to a different 
literary and intellectual tradition, thus for example the Problems of Mechanics – traditionally ascribed to 
Aristotle – explains the force-saving effect of a variety of mechanical devices with the help of a “balance-
lever model”, and makes use of the idea that differences of weight can be compensated by differences of 
length. This idea in turn is based on the practical experience of balances with unequal arms, a 
phenomenon which had been discovered in the late fifth century BCE. In this context, the sequel to 
Aristotelian natural philosophy deals with the challenge provided by mechanical devices to the 
correspondence between causes and effects fundamental to natural philosophy. The question concerned 
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However, the scientia de ponderibus in its original formulation saw its birth in the 
Arab world, with its status of a distinct scientia appearing in the Book of Enumeration 
of the Sciences by Al Farabi, who first definitively distinguished between a science of 
weights and a science of devices (or machines).285 In the Arabic world, the new science 
of weights was characterised by a strong deductive system. The most common historical 
point of view is that the (Arabic) science of weights originated from the interplay of 
Aristotelian physics and physical-geometrical approaches to the equilibrium of bodies 
by Archimedes and (probably) Euclid. From a methodological viewpoint, the majority 
of treatises in the science of weights followed what is often called a dynamic (or more 
exactly a kinematic) approach, in which the equilibrium is seen as a balance of opposing 
forces, and movement – either virtual or real – plays an important role.286 In addition, 
according to historians, the Arabic tradition was not merely a translation or 
reappropriation of the Greek science of weights, but constituted rather the emergence of 
a new science as a specific branch of mechanics, embodied in a large scientific and 
technical corpus.287 The very expression scientia de ponderibus is only registered in the 
Latin context after the translation of al-Farabi into Latin, thanks both to Gerardo da 
Cremona and Dominicus Gundissalinus in the thirteen century. The latter reproduced al-
Farabi’s characterisation of the sciences of weights and devices, labelling them 
respectively scientia de ponderibus and sciencia de ingeniis.288 So in the Middle Ages it 																																																																																																																																																																		
was: how can a small force overcome a large weight? In his work Planes in Equilibrium Archimedes 
demonstrates the law of the lever with the help of the concept of the centre of gravity, and the observation 
that a redistribution of weights on a balance maintains its equilibrium, thus attaching it to a tradition of 
mathematical writing. Hero’s Mechanics represents a later technical treatise belonging to the context of 
the Museion of Alexandria. And finally the Liber de canonio attributed to Euclid belongs to a tradition of 
deductive treatises in the style of Euclid’s Elements.  
285 Some scholars, such as Ibn Sina (980-1037), divide the science of weights further into the science of 
balances and the science of weight-lifting. In contrast, other scholars, especially Al-Isfiza ̄r ̄ı (1048-
1116) and al-Kha ̄zin ̄ı (1115-1130), distinguished the theory of centres of gravity from the science of 
weights. 
286 Capecchi 2012, pp. 115-116. The main sources consulted by these Arabic mathematians were 
Aristotle’s Physics and On the Heavens, which had been available since the eleventh century; Pappus’ 
and Heron’s Mechanics were only available in Greek. With regard to Archimedes, only the treatises on 
hydrostatics were available at this time, but were seemingly not taken into account at all. See further 
Abattouy 2006, pp. 1-25.  
287 Capecchi 2012, p. 116.  
288 The main treatises of these two traditions are listed in Pisano and Capecchi 2016, pp. 120-121. 
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was possible to identify two distinct traditions of mechanics in Europe: i) the science of 
weights, in particular that pioneered by Jordanus Nemorarius; and ii) the philosophy of 
motion. Alongside these theoretical traditions there was the task of practical mechanics 
somehow continuing the tradition of the Roman period.  
These two approaches both lack rigour and suffer from a structural weakness of the 
handling of a priori principles which lie at the very core of the scientia de ponderibus: 
that is, the principle of gravitas secundum situm, or, roughly speaking, the change in a 
body’s gravity according to its position [situs], when the body moves along the 
circumference of a circle.289 More precisely, this principle states that the positional 
gravity of a (punctiform) weight fixed at the end of one arm of a balance changes as the 
balance rotates around the fulcrum. The origin of this line of argument is given by two 
works, both attributed to Jordanus Nemorarius, but published only in the sixteenth 
century: the first, which appeared in 1533, is a short treatise entitled Liber Iordani 
Nemorarii viri clarissimi De ponderibus propositiones XIII, and the second, published 
in 1565 and titled Iordani opusculum de ponderositate, was printed in Venice on the 
basis of manuscript materials which had been collected and edited by Niccolò 
Tartaglia.290 
It stemmed exactly from the practical question of whether or not a deflected 
balance will return to its horizontal position that initiated the Equilibrium Controversy. 
This in fact involves a set of causes and problems, and requires a set of concepts – such 
as centre of gravity, torque or moment, friction and bent levers – to be solved. In this 
context our twofold claim requires a clarification: the procedure of idealization and 
modelling which is required to represent physical bodies by means of punctiform 
mathematical objects also involves the balance, which in fact becomes an idealized 
model useful in order to build a theoretical set of mechanical principles. This model can 
																																																								
289 A further definition can also be provided: the heaviness of a body according to its location along the 
circumference described by the end of one of the arms of a balance rotating around the fulcrum.  
290 In this connection, E. Moody and M. Clagett have published a treatise by Jordanus Nemorarius, entitled 
De ratione ponderis, which is mostly reconstructed on the basis of a collation of medieval manuscripts, 
and whose contents overlaps only in part with the 1565 Tartaglia edition. See further Palmieri 2008, p. 
309. 
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be used to interpret a whole series of single empirical cases, including a great variety of 
different experimental case-studies. Only by reaching this new theoretical layer could 
mechanics represent, through a broad and general model, a series of single cases. 
  
From the beginning, the aim of mechanics was to explain the similarities between a 
set of mechanical devices and the ways it became possible to achieve a large effect with 
a small force.291 The dispute over the deflected balance diminished only after the 
appearance of Guidobaldo del Monte’s Mechanicorum Liber. Guidobaldo is considered 
by historians to have been the most influential writer on mechanics in the sixteenth 
century. He took a remarkable step forward towards the new classical mechanics. 
Despite the work of Maurolico, it was Guidobaldo del Monte, Commandino’s pupil, 
who published in 1577 the most important text on mechanics. Guidobaldo was a soldier, 
an engineer and a scientist; his manuscript is treated as a continuation of the Greek 
tradition and represented the first work on mechanics to gain a prominent role in the 
equilibrium debate.  
Up until Guidobaldo’s time, the theorists of scientia de ponderibus had believed 
that an inclined balance does not remain in equilibrium but rather returns to the 
horizontal position. Only Guidobaldo ascertained experimentally that an inclined 
balance does in fact remain in equilibrium in the inclined position.292 However, he argued 
that an inclined balance, far from remaining in equilibrium, and far from returning to 
the horizontal position, should rotate until it becomes perfectly vertical, with the 
initially lowest weight descending and the highest one ascending. This realisation must 
have been disconcerting to Guidobaldo, since it actually undermined the very 
foundation of his mechanics, which, as we shall see in the next two sections (§ 3.7 and § 
3.7.1), rested mainly on Pappus’ definition of centre of gravity. The theoretical step 
taken towards a new way of doing and conceiving mechanics amounted to showing the 
incoherence of Guidobaldo’s interpretation of Pappus’ definition of the centre of 
gravity, and ultimately called into question the physical existence of such a point in real 																																																								
291 Renn and Damerow 2012, p. 17. 
292 This is what is called indifferent equilibrium. A detailed analysis will be given in § 3.7.1 below. 
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bodies. Notwithstanding his vehement attack on Jordanus and his followers, 
Guidobaldo’s discovery stems from his wholeheartedly embracing the a priori 
principles of scientia de ponderibus.293   
 
 
3.7 Guidobaldo del Monte: the new Archimedes?  
 
Guidobaldo del Monte was born in Pesaro on January 11th 1545. His father was Ranieri 
del Monte, created a marchese in 1543 by the Duke Guidobaldo II of Urbino. In 1564 
Guidobaldo moved to Padua to attend lectures on the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems of 
Mechanics by Pietro Catena. However, as we already know, his main teacher was 
Federico Commandino. During his lifetime he remained close to the noble family and in 
particular to Prince Francesco Maria, whose half-sister married Guidobaldo. In 1587 he 
inherited the title of marchese and spent the rest of his life in Mombaroccio until his 
death on January 9th 1607.  
Just as in the case of Commandino’s education, Guidobaldo’s education also 
involved intellectual exchange between literary men and mathematicians at the court of 
Urbino, which provided the perfect environment for him to grow both personally and 
professionally. For instance, Torquato Tasso and Jacopo Mazzoni (1548-1598) were 
both common friends of Commandino and Guidobaldo. One of the most prominent 
figures conversant with this milieu was the already-mentioned man of letters, 
Bernardino Baldi, who was also a skilled mathematician and historian of mathematics.  
By analysing the correspondence between Guidobaldo and his contemporaries it 
emerges that almost all of Urbino’s mathematicians were strongly connected with the 
engineers and technicians of the Duchy.294 It is known that the Duchy of Urbino was an 																																																								
293 Palmieri 2008, p. 302. 
294 This includes Francesco Maria della Rovere, Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Gerolamo Genga, Giovanni 
Battista Belluzzi, Francesco Paciotti, Giulio da Thiene, Muzio Oddi and Guidobaldo himself. On the 
figure of Guidobalso as manufacturer and inventor, see further the work of Muzio Oddi, another 
mathematician of Urbino (1569-1639), who was also Guidobaldo’s pupil. Cf. e.g. Degli orologi solari, 
Milano, 1614, p. 19; Fabrica et Uso del Compasso Polimetro, Milano, 1633, “Proemio”. The best 
modern literature on this topic is Rose 1968, pp. 53-69, together with corrections by E. Rosen 1968, pp. 
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important centre of military architecture. However, a particularly important technical 
branch was the fabrication of precision instruments, since both the distribution and 
renown of these devices was national, if not even international. The Venetian Giacomo 
Contarini in his Problemata Astronomicorum speaks of a geared and sophisticated 
instrument which could divide circular arcs into degrees, minutes, seconds, thirds and so 
on. Other instruments included a device for drawing ellipses and conic sections used to 
depict the planisphere, mechanical clocks and compasses (both reductional and 
proportional). Guidobaldo’s attitude to mathematical instruments paralleled his attitude 
towards machines and mechanics. Through these mechanical devices he felt that 
abstract mathematical truths could be made entirely visible.295 Mechanics had thus a 
special way of investigating the causes of things and demonstrating its propositions, 
which must be grasped before one can truly understand any of its claims. As Maarten 
van Dyck shows, “[i]n Paraphrasis (1588), Guidobaldo accordingly shows that the 
validity of the law of the lever is indeed grounded in a special method of demonstration 
– in the argumentandi modus huius scentiae maximè proprius – implying that whoever 
does not grasp this method of demonstration actually ignores the proper foundations for 
the mechanical science.”296 Thus, Guidobaldo’s strategy consisted in observing the 
mechanical effects and their link to their being character praeter naturam297 (‘beyond 
nature’), in showcasing that mechanical science had both mathematical and physical 
characteristics. Furthermore, his skills in engineering were particularly evident due to 
the uninterrupted consultations with him and the confidence that Prince Francesco 
Maria displayed towards him.298 As Frank says, “[t]he resulting engagement with 																																																																																																																																																																		
377-400. In particular, for a detailed reconstruction on the mathematical and technical disciplines at the 
Urbino court, see Frank 2013; Laird 2013, pp. 35-52; Renn and Omodeo 2013, pp. 53-94.  
295 Rose 1975, p. 224. 
296 van Dyck 2013, p. 17. 
297 The same issue will be considered again in the next section (3.7.1). By way of indication here, in both 
Physics Book 2 and the Problems of Mechanics, Aristotle considers three ways in which art can operate: 
i) by imitating nature, ii) by completing what nature could not achieve and iii) by operating praeter 
naturam such as it does in mechanics. Guidobaldo inherits from Aristotle his own view on mechanics, 
allowing the rise of a science of mechanics that operates between mathematics and physics. See further 
van Dyck 2013, pp. 9-34. 
298 After consulting the correspondence that Guidobaldo kept in 1583, it appears that the ducal engineers 
worked with him to improve the water supply of Villa Mirafiore in Pesaro. However, after several months 
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questions of a practical nature and interaction with technical collaborators stimulated his 
scientific work. This is easily evidenced by an analysis of his manuscript 
Meditatiunculae.299 Apart from using the manuscript to further his studies of perspective, 
astronomy and gnomonics, Guidobaldo also addressed practical topics: how to target 
with a cannon, the advantages and disadvantages of certain kinds of mechanical 
machines, the maximal and minimal inclination of roofs, and the water intake of a mill. 
In view of what is known about his practical activities, these reflections appear aimed at 
an elaboration of Guidobaldo’s everyday observations and discoveries as a civil and 
military engineer and inventor of scientific instruments.”300 
With regard to his role among the translators of ancient Greek treatises, he 
translated the works of Pappus, Apollonius and Euclid and several other codices that 
were obtained from Contarini and Francesco Barozzi. His writings ranged widely across 
mathematics, mechanics, optics and astronomy over a 30-year period. In 1579 in 
Pesaro, Guidobaldo published an astronomical work entitled Planisphaeriorum 
Universalium Theoretica, which deals with the projection of the sphere onto a plane. It 
also contains theorems and transformations of figures, as well as sketches for building 
the compass to be used for drawing the projections of ellipses and conic sections. His 
interest in projection culminates in the work Perspectivae Libri Sex (Pesaro, 1600), in 
which he generalised and systematised the rules of perspective discovered in the 
previous 150 years. Until then, perspective was a theoretical instrument used by 
painters, but Guidobaldo was the first scholar to confer upon it a rigorous mathematical 
structure, with the treatise even containing a treatment of scenography. On the other 
hand, his interest in astronomy culminates in writings related to observational 
astronomy. Besides Guidobaldo’s works published posthumously, there are different 																																																																																																																																																																		
of vain endeavours to resolve the problem, Guidobaldo was summoned to perform an expert’s inspection. 
The correspondence focuses on the discussion that Guidobaldo had with his collaborators, and in 
particular concerns the construction of the water reservoir and the water conduits. By these letters it also 
emerged that Guidobaldo oversaw the fabrication of clocks by craftsmen in the Duke’s service. See 
further Frank 2013, pp. 315-319.  299	Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Paris), ms. Latin 10246; for a transcription and analysis of the 
Meditatiunculae, see the doctoral dissertation by R. Tassora, Le Meditatiunculae de rebus mathematicis 
di Guidobaldo del Monte, 2001.  
300 Frank 2013, p. 323.	
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lost opuscoli mentioned by Orazio del Monte, namely In Quintum Euclidis 
Elementorum Commentarius and De Proportione Composita, which contained many 
comments related to the generalization of proofs.301  
However, it is a cliché to consider the Mechanicorum Liber the apogee of 
Renaissance statics, and the culmination of the Equilibrium Controversy and mechanics. 
By analysing its rigorous mathematical proofs, we can maintain that the structure and 
content of the Liber trace back to the first personality of this contribution: Archimedes. 
After all, Guidobaldo himself was altogether aware of the contribution he gave to the 
restoration of the ancient tradition, as well as the Archimedean revival, as we see in his 
opening Dedication: 
 
After Archimedes, there were among the mechanicians Hero, Ctesibius and Pappus […]. Although 
they did not reach the pinnacle of mechanics, as Archimedes did, still they had a remarkable 
understanding of mechanics and were excellent men. This is especially true of Pappus, so that no 
one could, I believe, blame me for following him as my leader. I have the more readily done so 
because Pappus does not depart even a nail’s breadth from the principles of Archimedes. For I have 
always wished in this branch of science to follow in the footsteps of Archimedes. His thoughts, 
sought for some years now by many scholars, are to be found in his excellent book On the 
Equilibrium of Planes; in this, I believe, all the theories of mechanics are gathered as in an abundant 
store. Were the mathematicians of our present time to be better acquainted with this work, they 
would see repudiated many of the ideas they hold valid and correct. Let them see for themselves. 
Pappus, deeply devoted to a richer application of mathematics and so increasing the profits of the 
study, carried out a thorough and brilliant investigation of the five simple machines – the lever, 
pulley, wheel and axle, wedge and screw. […] I wish that the ravages of time had not caused any 
loss in the writings of so great a man, for that earth would not have been covered almost entirely by 
such a thick mist of ignorance, nor would there be such ignorance of mechanics that men are 
esteemed leading mathematicians who by their inept distinctions remove some difficulties, but not 
those that are very arduous or obscure.302  																																																								
301 These opuscoli are now held in the Biblioteca Oliveriana in Pesaro, nos. MSS 630-631 respectively. 
302 Mechanici praeterea fuerunt Heron, Ctesibius & Pappus, qui licet ad mechanicae apicem, perinde atq; 
Archimedes, evecti fortasse minimè sint; mechanicam tamen facultatem egregiè percaluerunt; talesq; 
fuerunt, & praesertim Pappus, ut eum me ducem sequentem nemo (ut opinor) culpaverint. Quod & 
propterea libentinus feci, quòd nè latum quidem unguem ab Archimedeis principijs Pappus recedat. Ego 
enim in hac praesertim facultate Archimedis vertigijs haerere semper volui: & licet eius lucubrationes ad 
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In addition, one more element proves his contribution and overtaking of the ancient 
works; by scrutinising Guidobaldo’s relationships with expert craftsmen, we notice that 
this friendship had an impact on more than just his invention of new scientific 
instruments. In fact, in 1580 Guidobaldo exchanged several letters with Giacomo 
Contarini and Filippo Pigafetta, including a letter303 addressed to the former, in which he 
explained the following:  
 
You should know that, before writing anything about the Mechanicorum Liber, I never wanted (so 
as not to make errors) to consider anything, irrelevant as it may have been, if first I had not seen that 
the experiment (esperienza) agreed exactly with the proof; and of very little thing I have made the 
experiment. [...] In any case, it is most sure that practice and theory always agree and do not differ 
from each other. And I tell you even this: the proofs have taught me much about how to make the 
experiments, regarding which many things have to be considered: firstly, the instruments should be 
small rather than big; as for example the pulleys with their wheels: if possible they should be made 
out of brass with very thin, iron axes; and the wheels should be well turned so that they do not 
waggle round the axes; but if possible, it would be very good if they turned around with just a blow 
of air. In fact, the big pulleys which are able to lift heavy weights, are not that adept at telling apart 
details, as the balances clearly show: in order to distinguish every little detail, one has to use those 
small ones for weighing coins, and not those big ones, with which large objects are weighed like 
meat or similar things, even if they are precise.  
In this passage we first see the close relation between Guidobaldo’s theoretical studies 
																																																																																																																																																																		
mechanicá pertinentes multi sab hinc annis passim soleant doctis desiderari: eruditissimus tamen libellus 
de aequeponderantibus prae minibus hominú adhuc versatur, in quò tanquam in copiosissima poenu 
Omnia ferè mechanica dogmata reposita mihi videntur; quem sane labellum, si aetatis nostrae 
mathematici sibi magis familiarem adhibuissent; reperissent sanè sentétias multas, quos modò ipsi 
firmas,& ratasesse docent;subtilissimè, atque verissimè conuulsas, & labefactatas. Fed hoc viderint ipsi. 
Ego enim ad Pappus redeo, qui ad usum mathematicarum vberiorem, emulumentorumqué accessiones 
amplificandas penitus conversus, de quinque principibus machinis, Vecte nempè, Trochlea, Axe in 
peritrochio, Cuneo, & Cochlea, multa egregiè philosphatus est; demonstravitquè quicquid in machinis, 
aut cogitari peritè, aut acute definiri, aut certò statui potest, id omne quinquè illis infinita vi praeditis 
machinis referendum esse. Atquè utinam iniuria temporis nihil è tanti viri scriptis abrasisset: nec enim 
tam densa inscitiae caligo universum prope terrarium irbem obtexisset, neque tanta mechanicae 
facultatis esset ignoratio consecuta, ut mathematicarum proceres existimarentur illi, qui modo 
ineptissima quadam distinction, difficultates nonnullas, nec illastamen satis arduas, & obscuras è medio 
tollunt. del Monte 1577, Prefatio (Guidobaldo’s dedication to the Duke Francesco Maria).  
The English trans. comes from Rose 1975, p. 231.  
303 Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia, It. IV 63 (=Ven. 259); October 9th 1580; published in Favaro 
1899-1900, pp. 307-310. The English transl. is taken from Frank 2013. 
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and the ‘experiences’ with his devices. Second, the instruments considered by 
Guidobaldo were not the everyday devices used in the marketplace (balances) or at 
building sites (pulleys): rather, he is referring to precision instruments, of small 
dimensions and made out of brass with very thin iron axes to keep friction to a 
minimum, so that a blow would suffice to make them turn around. Third, the role that 
Guidobaldo played in the late Renaissance was truly analogous to the methodological 
and theoretical function performed by Archimedes.304 The main body of Guidobaldo’s 
treatise is concerned with the theoretical discussion of machines. This was achievable 
only by following the Archimedean model: his work started with definition and 
postulates on the centre of gravity, derived from both Pappus’ and Commandino’s 
previous works.  
“The centre of gravity of any body is a certain point within it, from which, if it is 
imagined to be suspended and carried, it remains stable and maintains the position 
which it had at the beginning, and is not set to rotating by that motion”. This definition 
of the centre of gravity is taught by Pappus of Alexandria in the eighth book of his 
Collections. But, again, Guidobaldo’s teacher Commandino, in his On Centres of 
Gravity of Solid Bodies, explains the centre as follows: “the centre of gravity of any 
solid shape is that point within it around which is disposed on all sides of parts of equal 
moments, so that if a plane be passed through this point cutting the said shape, it will 
always be divided into parts of equal weight.”305  
Since we have already discussed Commandino’s interpretation, it will be sufficient 
to add just a few more reflections which lead us directly onto the epistemological 
meaning of the scientific practice lying behind the second – ambiguous – step of the 
objectification of procedure. First of all, according to Guidobaldo, the uses that both 
Pappus and Commandino made of the notion of the centre of gravity should be regarded 
as “descriptions” rather than as definitions.306 After this, Guidobaldo states that, on the 
one hand, bodies are taken individually and are subjected to gravity converging toward 																																																								
304 For further information on Guidobaldo’s discoveries and handicraft, see Gamba 2001.  
305 Drake and Drabkin 1969.  
306 del Monte 1577, p. 9 and Palmieri 2008, pp. 301-346. 
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the centre of the world; and, on the other hand, gravity – the weight – is thought to be 
concentrated in the centre of gravity of the whole body, which is determined by the 
Archimedean rules.307 Moreover, Pappus’ description – as Guidobaldo would say – is 
purely experimental in nature, and as such leaves its mathematical determination 
completely open. To give such a precise determination is exactly the task of the first 
eight propositions of Archimedes’ treatise. Guidobaldo’s commentaries accordingly 
focus on precisely this problem: How does this purely physical characterisation allow 
for precise mathematical determination?308 The issue can also be detailed as follows: as a 
point situated in a body, the centre of gravity is linked with some of the body’s physical 
properties (i.e. tendency toward motion and equilibrium, dimensions and mass) but it 
can also be – as indeed it is – treated as a mathematical point. The question now 
becomes: How is it possible to determine the mathematical features from this point, 
only by arguing from its physical nature and behaviour? 
By following the demonstrations Guidobaldo gives in the first few propositions of 
the Mechanicorum Liber, I argue that the context in which he developed his new way of 
doing and conceiving mechanics represents the perfect, albeit tantalizing, framework in 
which the centre of gravity, as an idealized model of the representation of physical 
reality, takes a new step forward in its process of objectification. More precisely, the 
operation by which the macroscopic bodies are considered abstract and idealized 
geometrical points (through which it is possible to study their motion and other physical 
features), will became more and more connected with geometrical investigation as it 
was applied to mechanics. In this light, let us examine first of all some of the 
fundamental propositions of the Mechanicorum Liber in order to upgrade and nuance 
our working hypothesis.  
The propositions that support it are propositions 2, 3 and 4. The last of these – as 																																																								
307 It should be noted that del Monte, along with many other mathematicians of his time, would 
unquestionably conclude that, from a practical point of view, to consider the lines of action of gravity 
parallel to each other or to consider them converging to the centre of the world did not matter much. 
Nevertheless Guidobaldo also believed that, to establish the ‘reality’ of things, one could not accept this 
approximation. See further Capecchi 2012, p. 109. For more clarification on this, see also my next section 
(§ 3.7.1). 
308 van Dyck 2013, pp. 12-15. 
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we shall see in the next section in more detail (§ 3.7.1) – also includes the attempt to 
combine the Archimedean and Aristotelian mechanical traditions. In particular, 
Guidobaldo saw himself as pursuing a mechanical approach that could be traced 
directly to Archimedes; however, at the same time he was also following the 
Aristotelian tradition, giving great importance to the concept of the centre of the world. 
Guidobaldo is thus seen by both his contemporaries and historians as the reconciler of 
two divergent and parallel traditions in deriving the mechanical properties of his 
machines from the mutual relation of three centres: the fulcrum, the centres of gravity 
and the centre of the world. Now, with regard to this last item, we will examine in the 
next section the lively polemical debate concerning indifferent equilibrium, which turns 
out to be one more piece of evidence in favour of our methodological approach – the 
objectification of procedure. 
With this idea in mind, let us now turn to the first two propositions mentioned 
above. In Proposition 2 we can observe (below, Figure 3.1) a balance whose point of 
suspension C is placed above the centre of gravity D of the system of weights. If the 
balance is deflected from its horizontal equilibrium position, it will return to its original 
position because the barycentre, raised from the position D to the position G, will tend 
to occupy the lowest position, and then return to D. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
 
Proposition 2 states: A balance parallel to the horizon, with its centre above and having 
equal weights at its extremities which are equidistant from the perpendicular CD, when 
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moved from this position and released, will return and rest in it. 
 
Given the balance AB which is placed parallel to the horizon, and whose centre of suspension C is 
placed above the scale, the line CD is perpendicular to AB and DA is equal to DB. The two weights, 
A and B, located at the ends of the bars, are equal to each other. From this position of stable 
equilibrium the scale is moving from AB to the position EF, and it is left. From here the balance 
returns to the original position AB. But how is that possible? Since the point C is stationary during 
the counterclockwise movement, the point D describes the CD circle diameter. And since CD is 
always perpendicular to the arm AB of the scale, whether the balance is in the position EF or not, the 
line CD is located in CG. In D there is the centre of gravity of the system of weights AB, while G is 
the centre of gravity of the AB system of weights when the balance is in EF position. Since then CG 
is not perpendicular to the horizon, EF does not remain in this site, but returns to the original 
position AB.309 
 
This demonstration discusses the stable equilibrium of the balance by means of a 
deductive procedure. Later on, in Proposition 3, Guidobaldo discusses the unstable 
equilibrium of the balance, in the case in which the fulcrum is under the barycentre of 
the system of weights AB (see below, Figure 3.2). 
 
																																																								
309Libra horizionti aequidistans, cuius centrum sit supra libram, aequalia in extremitatibus, aequaliterq; à 
perpendiculo distantia habens pondera, si ab eiusmodi moveatur situ, in eundem rursus relicta, redibit, 
ibìq; manebit. 
Sit libra AB recta lineahorizonti aequidistans, cuius centrum C sit supral ibram; sitq CD 
perpendiculù, quod horizonti perpendiculare erit: atq; distantia AD sit distantia DB aequalis; sitq; in AB 
pondera aequalia euorù gravitatis centra sint in AB libra ab hoc situ, putà in EF, deinde relinquatur. 
Dico libram EF in AB horizonti aequidistantem redire, ibìq; manere. Quoniam autem punctum C est 
immobile, dum libra movetur, punctum D circuli circumferentiam describet, cuiud semidiameter erit CD. 
Quare centro C, spatio verò CD, circulus describatur DGH. Quoniam enim CD ipsi libra semper est 
perpendicularis, dum libra erit in EF, linea CD erit in CG, ita ut CG siti psi EF perpendicularis. Cùm 
autem AB bisariam à puncto D dividatur, et pondera in AB sint aequalia; erit magnitudinis ex utrisq; EF 
compositae centrum gravitatis in medio, hoc est in D et quando libra unà cum ponderibus erit in EF; erit 
magnitudinis ex utrisq; EF compositae centrum gravitatis G et quoniam CG horizonti non est 
perpendicularis; magnitudo ex ponderibus EF composita in hoc situ minimé persistet, sed deorsum 
secundum eius centrum gravitatis G per circumferentiam GD movebitur; donce CG horizonti fiat 
perpendicularis, scilicet donec CG in CD redeat. Quando autem CG erit in CD, linea EF, cùm ipsi CG 
semper ad rectos sit angulos, erit in AB; in quo situ quoq; manebit libra ergo EF in AB horizonti 
aequidistantem redibit, ibìq; manebit. Quod demonstrare oportebat. del Monte 1577, pp. 4-4r. 
The English trans. is my own. 
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Figure 3.2 
  
Proposition 3 states: A balance parallel to the horizon, with its centre below and having 
equal weights at its extremities which are equidistant from the perpendicular CD, will 
be at rest; but if moved and left tilted, it will move towards the lower side.  
 
Given the balance AB placed parallel to the horizon, whose centre of suspension is placed under the 
balance itself, the line CD is perpendicular to the horizon and to the arm AB. The distance AD is 
equal to DB. The two weights placed at the ends A and B are equal to each other. At the beginning, 
the balance is at rest in this site AB, and the arms AB is divided in half by the point D. D is therefore 
the centre of gravity of the system of weights AB. Let us move the balance AB to EF and then leave 
it. The system of weights EF will move downwards, i.e. towards the weight F. But how is that 
possible? Since the line CD is perpendicular to the horizon, when the balance reaches the position 
EF, CD is in CG. Since then CG is not perpendicular to the horizon, EF will descend towards F.310 
 
In order to solve the unstable equilibrium problem, Guidobaldo argued that, if a balance 
is deflected from its horizontal position, whether the centre of suspension remains fixed 
in C or not, the centre of gravity of the system of weight EF does not remain fixed. 																																																								
310Libra horizonti aequidistans, aequalia extremitatibus, aequaliterq; à perpendiculo distantia habens 
pondera, centro infernè, collocato, in hoc situ manebit. Si verò inde moveatur deorsum relicta, secundùm 
partem decliviorem movebitur.  
Sit libra AB recta linea horizonti aequidistans cuius centrum C sit infra libram; perpendiculumq; sit 
in CD, quod horizonti perpendiculare erit; et distantia AD sit distantiae DB aequalis; sintq; in AB 
pondera aequalia, quorum gravitatis centra sint in punctis AB. Dico primum libram AB in hoc situ 
manere. Quoniam enim AB bisariam dividitur à puncto D, et pondera in AB sunt aequalia; erit punctum 
D centrum gravitatis magnitudinis ex utrisq; AB ponderibus compositae. Et CD libram sustinens 
horizonti est perpendicularis, libra ergo AB in hoc situ manebit moveatur autem libra AB ab hoc situ, 
putà in EF, deinde relinquatur. Dico libram EF parte F moveri. Quoniam igitur CD ipsi librae semper 
est perpendicularis, dum libra erit in EF, erit CD in CG ipsi EF perpendicularis. Et puncto G 
magnitudinis ex EF compositae centrum gravitatis erit; quod dum movetur, circuli circimferentiam 
describet DGH, cuius semidiameter CD, et centrum C. Quoniam autem CG horizonti no est 
perpendicularis, magnitudo ex EF ponderibus composita in hoc situ minimè manebit; sed secundum eius 
gravitatis centrum G deorsum per circunferentiam GH movebitur. Libvra ergo EF ex parte F deorum 
movebitur, quod demonstrare oportebat. del Monte 1577, pp. 4r-5. 
The English trans. is my own. 
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Thus additionally, the whole system of weights will not remain in its original place and 
will move downwards towards F.311  
In order to solve the problem of the unstable equilibrium, Guidobaldo needed to 
imagine the balance as a punctiform system, having position in the centre of weight of 
the system EF. In this respect, we can maintain that he used, in a most confident way, a 
theoretical model to solve a practical problem, and that he thereby counts among the 
scholars who prepared the correct context for developing the idealized concept of the 
point mass. The idea is that at the base of the Mechanicorum Liber there is the 
following theoretical approach at play: the bodies placed in equilibrium at the 
extremities of the balance’s arm are considered as bodies devoid of size and mass and 
other physical features, as if they were just punctiform objects subject to any possible 
movement. The endorsement of this interpretation can be traced back to the 
demonstrations that we have just seen, and precisely in these words: “the system (of 
weights) made up of the EF weights, will not stay in its place, but, according to its 
centre of gravity, it will descend along the circumference GH”. Guidobaldo postulates 
this idealization, which is very akin to the modern concept of the material point. He 
imagines that the macroscopic balance no longer exists, but that there is instead its 
centre of gravity. In other words, he thinks that, in order to understand the unstable 
equilibrium, the whole system of weight – i.e. the balance in itself – could be 
substituted with a geometrical point to which we can ascribe certain physical properties. 
Such an operation frees the material bodies of any dimensional properties, and they can 
finally be considered as if they were moving material points.  
Guidobaldo’s understanding of the stability of the balance, which took an 
additional step forward in Proposition 4 of the treatise at hand, allows a wider 
conception of the three-fold organisation of his mechanics to emerge, one which is 
based not only on the notion of centre of gravity but also on the Aristotelian centre of 
the world – which has appeared in the thinking of almost all previous scholars – and the 
fulcrum – which had hitherto appeared as a only weak element in the development of 																																																								
311 Gamba and Montebelli 1988, p. 231.  
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the Equilibrium Controversy. In fact Guidobaldo’s conceptualization of mechanical 
phenomena involves, on the one hand, what he found in Aristotle and his followers, 
and, on the other hand, what he learned from Archimedes. Its basic conceptual feature, 
the barycentre, is of Archimedean origin, but the methodological approach and the way 
it functions is co-determined by an Aristotelian cosmological framework and a 
particularly Aristotelian understanding of the balance.  
This new framework leads us to endorse the idea that it was exactly by means of 
Guidobaldo’s mechanics that a theoretical and idealized notion of centre of gravity took 
a new step towards its process of the objectification of procedure. Guidobaldo’s 
mechanics is characterised by a series of mathematical considerations. In fact he 
exploited mechanical and practical procedures in order to formalize mathematically the 
natural properties observed in nature. Following in Archimedes’ footsteps, mechanical 
science has a special heuristic way of demonstrating its propositions, which must be 
grasped before one can truly understand any of its theoretical claims. From the next 
section, it will emerge that the concept of the centre of gravity grounds this new 
approach to the science of mechanics in two ways: i) by providing the artificial effects 
with a well-defined ontological place in the Aristotelian cosmos; and ii) by allowing the 
epistemological grounding of the law of the lever. With regard to i), the concept of the 
centre of gravity can be adduced as a further proof that Guidobaldo considered 
important to situate his mathematical science of mechanics within a properly 
Aristotelian framework. In fact, he had a sophisticated understanding of abstraction as a 
mental operation (e.g. as is evident in his solution to Proposition 3, on which see 
above). The main idea advocated by del Monte – following Aristotle – was that pure 
mathematics arose on the basis of the abstraction of quantitative properties as if they 
were not a part of sensible matter, which in reality they are. For a second time the 
analysis of these abstractions stimulated renewed attention to problems regarding the 
ontological status of the objects of Archimedes’ science. Furthermore, with regard to ii), 
given that a purely empirical approach would not suffice to lay the mathematical 
foundations of the law of the lever, it is important to bring out the essential properties of 
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a body’s centre of gravity, including the very fact of its existence ontologically. It is 
exactly in the scenario arising from the polemical discussion on indifferent equilibrium 
– which is the subject of § 3.7.1 – that it becomes possible to recognise the indifferent 
equilibrium in itself as the essential property for the proof of the law of the lever.312  		
3.7.1 Guidobaldo the Natural Philosopher  
 
In the fourth proposition Guidobaldo goes on to demonstrate that a balance – defined as 
a weightless beam with two extended weights fixed to the beam’s ends in their centres 
of gravity – will always remain in the position where it is initially placed, be it 
horizontal or inclined, contrary to the belief of all the previous theories of scientia de 
ponderibus.313 Guidobaldo’s demonstration of the indifferent equilibrium constitutes a 
direct application to the balance of Pappus’ definition of the centre of gravity. In what 
follows, I will argue that, not only by solving the stable and unstable equilibrium, but 
also by defining and explaining the problem of indifferent equilibrium, Guidobaldo 
gave rise to a twofold theoretical discovery. First, by discussing the conjunction of the 
two divergent Hellenistic mechanical traditions, he legitimates the idea that 
mathematics makes free use of theoretical entities, such as the punctiform entity 
corresponding to the geometrical and physical centre of gravity of rigid bodies. Second, 
he significantly does not neglect the fundamentals of the heuristic and mechanical 
procedures – as Archimedes did – in discovering the mathematical foundations of any 
other science.  
To this end, we will in this section mainly be interested in stressing two 
considerations: i) the main difference between Guidobaldo’s mechanics with respect to 
that of his contemporaries, and ii) his pronounced interest in natural – or Aristotelian – 
philosophy. Laird summarizes the first of these issues as follows: “first, it [sc. 																																																								
312 See further Laird 1986, pp. 43-68 and van Dyck 2013, pp. 28-32. 
313 I have sketched a brief review of the scientia de ponderibus in § 3.6. For further analysis, see Palmieri 
2008 and van Dyck 2006, pp. 373-407. 
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mechanics] was a theoretical science rather than a manual art; second, it was 
mathematical, although its subject was natural; third, it concerned motion and effects 
outside of or even against nature; and fourth, it produced them for human ends.”314 As 
pointed out above, the arc of sixteenth-century views on the status of mechanics as a 
scientific discipline derived from the rediscovery of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems 
of Mechanics. Due to the presuppositions set down in this treatise, mechanics was seen 
as a subalternate science315, above all because both Tartaglia and Baldi, following the 
Aristotelian preface, claim that the ‘How?’ of mechanical problems is known through 
mathematics, and the ‘About What?’ through physics. Maurolico noted that mechanics 
represented a scientia media between the mathematical and the natural (physics). 
However, as maintained by Van Dyck, “a potential complication arises when we try to 
see how this can be squared with the third aspect singled out by Laird: that mechanics 
treats effects praeter naturam.”316 It is well known that Aristotle more than once singled 
out the difference between “what is according to nature” and “what is beyond nature”, 
promoting the distinction between the natural and the artificial. Thus, the claim that art 
imitates nature means that the former does not simply overrule nature, but that it profits 
from the natural constitution of things to bring about these effects by imitating nature. 
																																																								
314 Laird 1986, pp. 45-46. 
315 In his Posterior Analytics Aristotle alludes to some sciences which are “under” other sciences; on this 
basis, commentators on the Stagirite elaborated and analysed the category of the subalternate sciences. 
The context in which Aristotle had introduced the germs of this concept stemmed from his discussion of 
how some sciences could use mathematical demonstrations to arrive at conclusions about physical things, 
apparently by violating the essential Aristotelian requirement of homogeneity, which states that all terms 
in valid scientific demonstrations must belong to the same genus. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, 
sciences such as astronomy or optics can use mathematical principles because they are related to 
mathematics as “one [sc. science] under the other”. Furthermore in the Physics, Aristotle also called 
astronomy, optics and harmonics as the “more physical of the mathematical sciences”. While in geometry 
one treats physical lines as mathematical rather than physical, in optics one treats mathematical lines as 
physical rather than mathematical. Finally, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the seemingly contrary 
claim that optics treats visual rays (i.e. physical lines) but only as mathematical lines. Debate concerning 
the use of purely mathematical and abstract entities in understanding how the world functioned naturally 
was already around in earlier philosophy, but the scientific community only became fully aware of its 
capacity close to the end of the Renaissance, when the conjunction of the Aristotelian-mathematical and 
Archimedean-mechanical traditions eventually took place. 
316 van Dyck, 2013. 
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In this regard Guidobaldo, first in the Mechanicorum Liber,317 expressed the idea that 
mathematics was not sufficient to describe mechanics. Thus, mechanics would need to 
include elements of natural philosophy alongside mathematics, for instance in the 
context of the “true motion” of weights:  
 
[…] [I]n fact, there are some keen mathematicians of our time who assert that mechanics can only 
be considered either mathematically or physically; as if mechanics could sometimes be considered 
either without geometrical demonstrations or without the true motion.318 
 
Later, Guidobaldo opens his Paraphrasis with a broad discussion of art’s imitation of 
nature. There he asserts that art is able to bring about effects which are praeter naturam 
because it imitates nature. Accordingly mechanical demonstrations are not wholly 
mathematical, and, at least on an Aristotelian view, nature certainly does not operate 
according to mathematical principles. Del Monte seeks the interrelation of aspects 
relating to mathematics and natural philosophy in the discipline of mechanics, but 
without referring to the idea of subalternate or mixed science.319 To be precise, he 
describes mechanics in his 1577 treatise as the Aristotelian natural field, and as a 
discipline which refers to phenomena apparent in nature, whilst at the same time 
holding that mechanics possesses intrinsically a mathematical tendency, insofar as it 
makes recourse to notions such as distance or ratio which belong to mathematics and 
are represented by the Archimedean conception. Guidobaldo’s view of the relation 
between Archimedes and Aristotle goes further, attributing to them an equally 
influential status, as Frank states: “[h]e [sc. Guidobaldo] presents a kind of concordism, 																																																								
317 Guidobaldo too opened his Mechanicorum Liber with a discussion of mechanics operating against 
nature, in which he claimed that mechanics comes from the union of geometry and physics. 
318  Reperiuntur enim aliqui nostraque aetate emunctae naris mathematici, qui mechanicam tum 
mathematice seorsum, tum phisice considerari posse affirmant; ac si aliquando vel sine 
demonstrationibus geometricis, vel sine vero motu res mechanicae considerari possint. del Monte 1577, 
Prefatio, p. 8.   
A further reference to the ‘need’ for a connection between mathematics and natural philosophy can 
be found in Cochlea (Venice, 1615), where Guidobaldo claims that mathematics and mechanics both shed 
light on those phenomena which at first glance seem to be in contradiction with common sense, such as 
the fact that heavy loads can be moved by exiguous forces.  
319 Ibid., p. 16. 
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claiming that in his axioms Archimedes followed what Aristotle had shown and that 
they agree also in their perception of mechanics as subdivided in the two fields. 
Consequently, although Guidobaldo was undoubtedly a follower of Archimedes’ 
mechanical theory, he did not consider Aristotle’s approach as inferior:  
 
At the beginning of the Quaestiones Mechanicae, Aristotle gave many extraordinary clues for 
discerning the causes of mechanical phenomena. In his writings, Archimedes followed him and 
brought to light the principles of mechanics more clearly, making them even more intelligible. But 
Aristotle is not diminished in stature for this reason: in fact, he masterfully explained the causes 
behind the problems that he had presented and discussed. [...] [F]or example, Aristotle asks why we 
move heavy weights with a lever. And he replies that the cause is the greater length of the law on 
the side of the force: and he is indeed right.320  
 
It seems that Guidobaldo interpreted Aristotle’s approach as an explanation of the 
causes of the mechanical phenomena which – in Aristotelian terminology – corresponds 
to the teleological task of philosophy in its search of the causes. Archimedes in turn 
dealt with the mathematical description of these phenomena, and reached a more 
complete formalisation in this regard.” 321  Guidobaldo focused on the rational 
understanding of mechanical phenomena and vice versa. The exercise in which 
Archimedes seems to have been engaged was not so much a mathematization of 
physics, but rather a physicization of mechanics.  
Therefore, the examination of the demonstration of indifferent equilibrium 
addressed in the fourth proposition of the Mechanicorum Liber can help us to 
understand the following two points: i) how Guidobaldo interpreted and recovered the 
writings of his predecessors, trying to make them cohere and complement each other; 
and ii) why this new conceptual and theoretical approach also has to be seen as an 																																																								
320 Aristoteles enim in principio Quaestionum Mechanicarum multa, eaque praecipua ad causas rei 
mechanicae dignoscendas aperuit. Quem secutus Archimedes in his libris mechanica principia 
explicatius patefecit eaque planiora reddidit. Nec propterea Aristoteles diminutus exstitit: etenim eorum 
quae ab ipso proposita et explicata fuere, problematum causas egregie patefecit. [...] Aristoteles enim 
(gratia exempli) quaerens cur vecte magna movemus pondera. Causam esse ait longitudinem vectis 
maiorem ad partem potentiae: et recte quidem. del Monte, Paraphrasis, p. 4. 
321 Frank 2013, pp. 326-327. 	
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influential example which Galileo – and earlier, Luca Valerio – at some point tried to 
emulate in their own endeavours in the field of mechanics.  
Guidobaldo opens his treatise with both Pappus’ and Commandino’s definitions of 
centre of gravity followed by a few obvious axioms about weight as a magnitude, 
together with three suppositions, which read as follows:  
1. Every body has but a single centre of gravity.  
2. The centre of gravity of any body is always in the same place with respect to that body.  
3. A heavy body descends according to its centre of gravity.322 
After the proof of the stable and unstable equilibrium in Propositions 2 and 3 
respectively, Guidobaldo in Proposition 4 deals with the indifferent equilibrium 
demonstrated as follows:  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 
 
Proposition 4 states: A balance parallel to the horizon, having its centre within the 
balance and with equal weights at its extremities, equally distant from the centre of the 
balance, will remain stable in any position to which it is moved.  
 
Let the balance be the straight line AB, parallel to the horizon, with its centre C in the line AB and 
the distance CA equal to the distance CB; and let the weights A and B be equal, and have their 																																																								
322 I reproduce the Latin text here:  
1. Unius corporis unum tantùm est centrum gravitates. 
2. Unius corporis centrum gravitatis semper in eodem est situ respect sui corporis. 
3. Secundùm gravitatis centrum pondera deorsum feruntur.  
del Monte, 1577, p. 1r.  
The English trans. is taken from Drake and Drabkin 1969, p. 256. 
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centres of gravity in the points A and B. Let the balance be moved to DE and left there. I say, first, 
that the balance DE will not move and will remain in that position. Now, since the weights A and B 
are equal, the centre of gravity of the combination of the two weights A and B will be at C. Hence 
the same point C will be the centre of gravity of the balance and of the whole weight. And since the 
centre of gravity of the balance C remains motionless while the balance AB, together with the 
weights, moves to DE, the centre of gravity is not moved. Therefore the balance DE, being hung on 
this, will not move, by the definition of the centre of gravity. The same likewise happens with the 
balance AB parallel to the horizon or in any other position. Hence the balance will remain where it is 
left; which was to be demonstrated.323 
 
Both in propositions 4, and, in particular, in the propositions (2-3) studied in the 
previous section, Guidobaldo maintains that the centre of gravity of the system of 
weight – which coincides with the point of suspension of the balance – is raised if the 
balance is deflected from its horizontal position. In the case of indifferent equilibrium 
(Figure 3.3), if one moves the balance from the stationary horizontal position, the centre 
of gravity of the system of weight will remain stationary while the arm of the balance 
keeps on moving.  
At first glance, it may appear to the reader that the aim of the proposition is rather 
ambiguous, because del Monte is disagreeing with the idea upheld by Jordanus and 
Tartaglia which had argued against indifferent equilibrium and in favour of the idea of 
building a science of mechanics that was completely dependent on the notion of 
positional gravity.   
According to these authors, a balance would never be in a state of indifferent 
equilibrium, since the weight on a depressed arm is always “positionally lighter” (as 
they said) than the weight on the other arm. Hence, a balance with equal weights, 
suspended in its centre, always returns to its horizontal position. At the very beginning 																																																								
323 Libra horizionti aequidistans aequalia in extremitatibus, aequaliterq; à centro in ipsa libra collocato, 
distantia habens pondera; sive inde moveatur, sive minus, ubicunq; relicta manebit.  
Sit libra recta linea AB horizonti aequidistand, cuius centrum C in eadem sit linea AB; distantia 
verò CA sit distantiae CB aequalis: sintq; pondera in AB aequalia, quorum centra gravitatis sint in puntis 
AB. Moveatur libra ut in DE, ibiquè relinquatur. Dico primùm libram DE non moveri, in eoquè situ 
manere. Quoniam enim pondera AB sunt aequalia; erit magnitudinis ex utroq; pondere, videlicet A, & B 
compositae centrum gravitatisC. Quare idem punctum C, & centrum librae, & centrù gravitatis totius 
ponderis erit. Quoniam autem centrum librae BC, dum libra AB unà cum ponderibus in DE movetur, 
immobile remanet,centrum quoq; gravitatis, quod est idem C,non mevebitur. Nec igitur libra DE 
movebitur, per definitionem centri gravitatis, cum in ipso suspendatur. Idipsum quoq; contingit libra 
ABhorizonti aequidistante, vel in quocunq; alio situ existente. Manebit ergo libra, ebi relinquetur. Quod 
demonstrare oportebat. del Monte 1577, pp. 5-5r.  
The English trans. is taken from Drake and Drabkin 1969, p. 261. 
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of his discussion, Guidobaldo simply reiterates his proof of Proposition 4 without 
supplying a direct proof of the existence of indifferent equilibrium, but employs a 
reductio ad absurdum argument to refute the claim that an equal arm balance sustained 
in its centre would have stable equilibrium, by showing that this would imply that the 
centre of gravity of a given body would not be unique, contrary to the first postulate.  
In this refutation Guidobaldo aimed at undermining the arguments of Tartaglia and 
Jordanus through two main ideas: i) by showing a mathematical error in their argument 
concerning the supposedly smallest ratio of angles; and ii) by criticizing the argument of 
the parallel nature of the descending lines from the weights at both ends of the balance, 
by introducing the convergence of the line of descent towards the centre of the world.324 
The main point of the first argument consists in showing that, despite the fact that 
the weight on the elevated arm is positionally heavier than the weight on the depressed 
arm, the difference in heaviness is always infinitesimally small and consequently cannot 
be offset by adding a small weight to the positionally lighter weight. The relevance of 
this argument for Guidobaldo’s point lay in the fact that it could be used to argue that 
although the one weight would be positionally heavier than the other, the centre of 
gravity of both weights would not change and as a result it would still be unique.  
Guidobaldo’s second aim is to show that Tartaglia was also wrong in maintaining 
that the lines of descent of the weights at both ends of the balance are parallel. To this 
end, he first re-introduced the convergence of the lines of descent towards the centre of 
the world into the argument. Therefrom he deduced that, as a consequence of this 
convergence, the weight on the depressed arm should always be positionally heavier, 
and that even stable equilibrium is inconsistent with the theory of positional gravity. 
(See Figure 3.4)  
 
																																																								
324 As we shall see in a moment, the argument of the parallel nature of the descending lines is used not only 
to criticize Tartaglia, but also to maintain the possibility of indifferent equilibrium. Although this seems 
to be contradictory, or a self-contradiction for Guidobaldo’s argument in itself, I explain the meaning of 
its choice below.  
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Figure 3.4 
 
Since the lines of descent of the bodies at D and E converge in S, the centre of the world, the body at the 
lower position E will always have to be positionally heavier, according to the views of Tartaglia and 
Jordanus, because the angle SEG is smaller than SDG. It follows that even stable equilibrium would be 
impossible on these authors’ own assumptions. (Mechanicorum Liber, 8r.) 
 
In the second part of his polemical debate in favour of indifferent equilibrium, 
Guidobaldo first refers back the parallel nature of the lines of descent of the weights 
suspended on the opposing arms of a balance. Secondly, he stresses that the different 
types of stability (stable, unstable and indifferent) are governed by the duality between 
centre of suspension and centre of gravity. Immediately after having criticized Jordanus 
and Tartaglia for having neglected the effect of the conjunction of weights moving on 
the opposite arms of a balance in assessing stability, Guidobaldo aims to show that as a 
further effect of this conjunction the lines of descent will become parallel.325 Why does 
Guidobaldo return here to parallel lines? If he did not do this, he would be confronted 
with the same problem as he had uncovered for the proponents of positional gravity, i.e. 
Tartaglia and Baldi. In fact he says:  																																																								
325 van Dyck 2006. 
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But if the weights E and D are joined together and we consider them with respect to their 
conjunction, the natural inclination of the weight placed at E will be along the line MEK, because 
the weighing down of the other weight at D has the effect that the weight placed at E must weigh 
down not along the line ES, but along the line EK.326  
 
The line ES is the line connecting the weight E with the centre of the world S, whereas 
the line EK is a line through E but parallel with the line connecting the centre of gravity 
of E and D with the centre of world. Now, van Dyck maintains that the lines of descent 
are posited not just to be parallel to each other, but also to be parallel to the line 
connecting their centre of gravity with the centre of the world. This is immediately 
relevant, because if Guidobaldo has a means to justify this, he also has resources which 
are unavailable to the proponents of a theory based on the notion of positional gravity. 
Hence, he could at the same time criticize them for neglecting the convergence of the 
lines of descent and retain the parallel lines in his own conception. Moreover, if we 
remember Guidobaldo’s understanding of the notion of the centre of gravity as it was 
evinced in his comments in the Planes in Equilibrium, it becomes clear that he is not 
just positing an arbitrary stipulation. In fact, one of the main properties of the centre of 
gravity is that it is connected with the cosmological structure of the Aristotelian cosmos. 
We saw that it is the centre of gravity which truly wants to unite itself with the centre of 
the universe (a fact which is also expressed in the third supposition of the 
Mechanicorum Liber, quoted above).327 Once again, following Pappus, Guidobaldo links 
the existence of such a point – as the centre of gravity – within any body which 
possesses the natural propensity that all bodies have to move towards the centre of the 
world.328 The present argument for the parallel nature of the lines of descent can be 
understood as a straightforward extension of this reasoning. The balance is also shown 																																																								
326 Ac propterea non est inconveniens idem pondus modò in E, modò in D, gravius esse in E, quàm in D. Si 
verò pondera in ED sibi inuicem connexa, quatenusq; sunt connexa consideraverimusù; erit ponderis in e 
naturalis propensio per lineam MEK: gravitas enim alterius ponderis in D efficit, nè pondus in e per 
lineam ES gravitet, sed per EK. del Monte 1577, 20 r. 
The English trans. is taken from Drake and Drabkin 1969, p. 282. 
327 van Dyck 2006, pp. 390-391. 
328 van Dyck 2013, p. 20. 
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with its centre of gravity in the centre of the world, its arms parallel to the original 
position. If we now draw lines from the weights in their original position to the same 
weights in this latter position, we have their paths of descent as their centre of gravity 
descending towards the centre of the world: lines which are parallel with each other, and 
with the line of descent of the centre of gravity.329  
From the extensive passage that follows Proposition 4 – more or less fifty pages of 
polemical reasoning against Tartaglia and Jordanus! – it emerges that Guidobaldo is 
interested not so much in attributing a theory of barycentric physics to Aristotle, but 
rather in taking over an Aristotelian focus on the physical effects of the stationary 
character of the point around which the weights move, and in integrating this within a 
barycentric theory. Guidobaldo’s conceptualization of mechanical phenomena 
essentially involves both what he had found in Aristotle and his followers, and what he 
had learned from Archimedes. Its essential conceptual element, the centre of gravity, is 
of Archimedean origin, but the way it functions is co-determined by an Aristotelian 
cosmological framework and the particular Aristotelian understanding of the balance. 
This straightforward connection between the possibility of indifferent equilibrium and 
the existence and uniqueness of the centre of gravity brings to light what is really at 
stake for Guidobaldo in his polemic against the proponents of the notion of positional 
gravity. In his view, by denying indifferent stability, they take away the well-
foundedness of the whole concept of centre of gravity (hence also Guidobaldo’s 
confidence in claiming that Archimedes seems to have been of the same opinion as 
himself concerning the stability of balances, a topic never explicitly discussed by 
Archimedes). 
The very basic assumption of the demonstration makes recourse to the Aristotelian 
cosmos, namely that a heavy body is at rest in the centre of the world. Consequently, all 
the world’s parts must have equal moments with respect to the point that coincides with 																																																								
329 What happens if a body is hypothetically placed at the centre of the world? It will be absolutely at rest, 
and there must additionally be a point in the body around which all parts of the body have an equal 
moment (or equal weight). This clearly resembles Archimedes’ hydrostatic arguments, in particular 
Propositions 2-7 of On Floating Bodies which are used to prove the sphericity of the Earth, and which 
have been discussed in the previous chapter (§ 2.5). 
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the centre of the world; otherwise, one part would outbalance the other and produce 
movement, thus contradicting the hypothesis of the body’s rest at the centre of the 
world. But according to the definition given above, this point is also the centre of 
gravity itself. Therefore, to say that a body moves to the centre of the world naturali 
propensione – or by its own positional gravity – is to say that it is the centre of gravity 
which truly wants to unite itself with the centre of the universe. Since it is the gravity, 
or the weight, of the body itself which generates the natural propensity of a body 
towards the centre of the world, and since both the centre of the world and the centre of 
gravity coincide, we can assert, using Guidobaldo’s own words, the following 
conclusion:  
 
Although we have considered in the foregoing only the weights of the bodies which are at the ends 
of the balance, without that of the balance itself, nevertheless since the arms of the balance are 
equal, the balance will behave the same whether we consider its weight together with those of the 
bodies or without them, for the same centre of gravity without weights will be that of the balance 
alone. Likewise if the weights are attached to the ends of the balance, in the usual manner, it will be 
the same, provided that the lines drawn from where the weights are attached toward the centre of 
heavy things (the balance being moved in any manner) go to meet in the centre of the world, since, 
when the weights are attached in this manner, they bear down as if they had their centres of gravity 
in those same points. Whence we may consider the results in just the same way. But with regard to 
this last conclusion, many things are said by men who believe otherwise. Hence it will be well to 
dwell further on this; and according to my ability I shall endeavour to defend not only my own 
opinion but Archimedes too, who seems to have been of the same opinion.330  
 																																																								
330 Cum vero in iis, quae dictasunt, gravitatis tantùm magnitudinum, quae in extremitatibus librae prositae 
sunt aequales, absq; librae gravitate consideraverimus; quoniam tamen adhuc librae brachia sunt 
aequalia, idcirco idem librae, eius gravitate considerata, unà cum ponderibus, vel fine ponderibus 
eveniet. Idem enim centrum gravitatis fine ponderibus librae tantùm gravitatis centrum erit. Similiter si 
pondera in librae etrmitatibus appendantur, ut fieri solet, idem eveniet; dummodo ex suspensiorum 
punctis ad centra gravitatum ponderum ductae lineae (quocunq; modo moveatur libra) si protrahantur, 
in centrum mundi concurrant. Ubi enim pondera hoc modo sunt appensa, ibi gravescunt, acsi in iisdem 
punctis centra gravitatum haberent. Praeterea, quae sequuntur, eodem prorsus modo considerare 
poterimus. Quoniam autem huic determination ultimate multa à nonnullis aliter sentientibus dicta 
officere videntur; idcirco n hac parte aliquantulum immrari oportebit; et pro viribus, non solum 
propriam sententiam, sed Archmedem ipsum, qui in hac eadem esse sentential videtur, defencere 
conabor. del Monte 1577, p. 5r. 
The English trans. is taken from Drake and Drabkin 1969, p. 262.  
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Thus, all bodies behave as if they possess weight exclusively in their centre of gravity. 
Does this mean that the weight of a body, or what is nowadays simply called mass, is 
fully concentrated in the body’s centre of gravity? Could it be the case that this idea 
conceals some insights related to the process of idealization that will only become an 
ordinary process in the following centuries? The common centre of two equal bodies is 
located in the middle of the line connecting their centres of gravity. It is absolutely 
crucial that since this is one magnitude – given by the union of the weights posed at the 
extremities of the balance’s arm – it also has one unique centre of gravity, and this must 
be completely independent from the shape of the composing magnitude. On the same 
subject, Guidobaldo had already argued (in Propositions 2 and 3) that the definition of a 
body’s centre of gravity is given by stating that it is exactly in this point that the 
tendency towards the motion of the body is concentrated. We can thus validly assume 
that the equilibrium which subsists between two bodies will not be disturbed if we 
replace one of these bodies with two equal bodies, both of which are half its weight, 
and, placed in such a way that their centres of gravity are equally far from its centre of 
gravity, which follows from the fourth proposition (quoted above) together with the 
definition of centre of gravity, that both situations are completely equivalent with 
respect to the physical causes determining the system’s equilibrium.331  
By investigating the physical behaviour of the centre of gravity, we can 
conceptualize mechanical phenomena and give them a mathematical meaning. It is by 
means of an odd wordplay – somehow already adopted by Commandino – that 
Guidobaldo expressed the relation between the physical and the mathematical 
approaches, when he speaks about the fact that two bodies, which are suspended at their 
common centre of gravity, are aequipollent. This term expresses first that the bodies 
have equal power, and second it constitutes a term with “a well-engrained technical 
meaning within medieval logic, where it expresses something like truth-valued 
equivalence because of the syntactic features of language.”332  
Whilst being careful not to make too much out of Guidobaldo’s reasoning, we can 																																																								
331 van Dyck 2013, pp. 25-26. 
332 Ibid., p. 31. 
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say that his insights show favour towards a new emerging tradition, a new mechanics or 
new mathematical science of nature, which would become more developed from 
Galileo onwards. This new mechanics can be seen as an attempt to systematise the 
practice of introducing abstract concepts to denote physical objects. “These can be 
transformed into each other without altering the effect, rather allowing the construction 
of a logic that is supposed to do justice to the syntax of the world.”333  
Despite the fact that there are no traces of indifferent equilibrium in either Aristotle 
or Archimedes, Guidobaldo makes recourse to the Aristotelian conception of the 
cosmos in order to justify his integration of the Pappian and Archimedean definitions of 
the centre of gravity into his own mechanical theory. Since the basic assumption of his 
reasoning is that a heavy body is at rest in the centre of the world, thus both parts of the 
body must have equal moments with respect to the point that coincides with the centre 
of the world. This case, in which the centre of the system of weight is in the balance 
itself – so coinciding with the fulcrum – is exactly the most crucial example that is 
missing in the Greek treatises. What is interesting is that Guidobaldo takes over an 
Aristotelian focus on the physical effects of the stationary character of the point around 
which the weights move, and integrates this within a barycentric theory. In this manner, 
to simplify the case, we can just imagine that instead of considering the equilibrium of 
the whole balance, thus imagining the physical effects of the stationary character of the 
mechanical and material device, we can replace the balance itself with the point around 
which the weights are suspended.  
Due to this interplay between theoretical and empirical considerations, i.e. between 
Aristotelian and Archimedean mechanics, Guidobaldo opens the doors to modern 
mechanics and to a more strongly theoretical input. The core of the whole argument lies 
in the idea that the complete weight of each body can be replaced by its centre of 
gravity, when considered as a point without any physical content. This replacement is 
justified, on the one hand, by the definition of centre of gravity, which, on the basis of 
Pappus’ and Commandino’s viewpoints, clearly imply that a body suspended in its own 																																																								
333 Ibid. 
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centre of gravity will always be in what has been called indifferent equilibrium – that is 
roughly, the idea according to which no matter what the orientation with respect to that 
point, the body will remain in equilibrium. On the other hand, the replacement of the 
physical body with the barycentre is endorsed by the procedure through which 
Guidobaldo raises his worry whether two bodies merely connected by a line can be 
considered to be natural constituents of the physical universe. In other words, as he 
writes in this passage: “the balance will behave the same whether we consider its weight 
together with those of the bodies or without them, for the same centre of gravity without 
weights will be that of the balance alone.” It turns out that we can ascribe a centre of 
gravity to any combination of physical bodies; we can consider them to be unified in 
just one point, or we can also neglect their magnitude altogether. Guidobaldo 
conceptualises mechanical phenomena in a new way. In his Mechanicorum Liber he 
says that to have control over physical things does not come about by the application of 
geometrical arguments to physical matter, but by employing those physical properties in 
a cunning and opportunistic way.  
Following the same line of argument, we will now pursue the theoretical forward 
step subsequently taken by Luca Valerio.		
 
3.8 Luca Valerio: the turn towards the mathematical analysis of 
physical states of affairs 
 
The mathematician Luca Valerio334 was a pupil to Christoph Clavius in Rome and was 
																																																								
334 Luca Valerio was born in Naples in 1553, the son of Giovanni Valeri from Ferrara (a chef) and 
Vincenza Rodomano from Corfù, Greece. Unfortunately we know very little about the family’s origins 
and Valerio’s childhood. We know that he lived in Corfù, where he received a training in liberal arts. His 
humble origins forced him to pursue a religious career in order to continue his study. In 1570 he became a 
Jesuit, and his tutor Christoph Clavius helped him to familiarize himself with various scientific 
disciplines, mathematics in particular; in the following years he also established contact with F. 
Maurolico and his works. From 1580s he abandoned the Jesuit order and from 1580 to 1600 we have no 
more than fragmentary testimonies and information about his life and interests. However, it was in these 
years that his first mathematical treatises can be safely dated. The first two works – which are now lost – 
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probably influenced by the work of Francesco Maurolico, because of their mutual 
friendship with Clavius the Jesuit. Valerio represents an exception in the Renaissance 
era, because he was able to build a huge corpus of theorems which was useful for 
finding the centre of gravity of any figure, and which worked efficiently for a large 
group of figures. This corpus was divided into two categories: circa axim (‘around the 
axis’) and circa diametrum (‘around the diameter’). This division allowed him to 
distance himself from the ad hoc335 system which was already used by Commandino as 
part of the Archimedean legacy. Already an entire set of theorems was developed with 
Maurolico which was useful to calculate the centres of gravity for each class of figures, 
but only following Valerio’s De Centro Gravitatis Solidorum Libri Tres (1604) did it 
become possible to achieve a general demonstrative technique336 and thereby bring into 																																																																																																																																																																		
are the Phylogeometricus Tetragonismus and the Subtilium Indagationum Liber, both of which were 
dedicated to mechanics. 
In the last twenty years of the sixteenth century, he gave private lessons to Cardinal Ippolito 
Aldobrandini and simultaneously worked in the Biblioteca Vaticana as teacher of Greek, while his 
governor was Cardinal Marco Antonio Colonna. In the same time, he met G. Galilei in Pisa and the Ducal 
family of Zagarolo.  
Finally, it was only in 1600 that he held his first classes at the Sapienza University in Rome, one in 
ancient Greek and the other in mathematics. During the teaching activities he had time to carry out further 
research, reshuffling the problems related to the centres of gravity. In 1604 he published the De Centro 
Gravitatis Solidorum Libri Tres, and almost all his life and career from this point was dedicated to the 
refinement of the methodology introduced in the De Centro. His outcomes are also mentioned by Galileo 
in the appendix of the Two New Sciences, where Galileo says loudly that Valerio has to be considered the 
Archimedes of the seventeenth century, who gave a large contribution to the birth of modern mechanics. 
For more detailed biographical information, see Baldini and Napolitani 1991.  
335 The objects of classic geometry were always particular (i.e. ad hoc) objects given by a more or less 
axiomatized construction procedure. If no general object exists, then a general method could not exist 
either. Therefore, the classic method was always to deal with particular objects on a case-by-case basis, 
introducing an ad hoc technique for each plane or solid figure under scrutiny.  
But Luca Valerio, in his De Centro Gravitatis Solidorum, followed a different method. He 
constructed an enormous edifice of theorems valid for a whole class of figures, namely circa axim and 
circa diametrum. Roughly speaking, the former denotes the solid figure generated by rotation around an 
axis, while the latter denotes the plane figure with an axis of symmetry. Thanks to his methodological 
innovations, the way was opened to the development of modern rational geometry. Napolitani and Saito 
2004, pp. 67-124.  
336 As Napolitani and Saito state in their paper, and as we see in the previous footnote, the objects of 
classical Greek geometry were particular objects and if no general object exists, then a general method 
could not exist either. For us, an ellipse is the locus of the zeros of a particular quadratic equation, or in 
more elementary terms, the locus of the points, such that the sum of the distances from two fixed points is 
constant. The property precedes the object, which, a priori, might not even exist. For the Greeks, the 
ellipse was the object determined by a plane which cuts a cone, and which meets all of its generatrices; 
this curve therefore existed, but all its properties were unknown and needed to be investigated. Now, it 
was arguably thanks to Valerio that the transition from the classical to the modern perspective was 
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production a corpus of general theorems on centres of gravity applicable to a variety of 
different figures. 
Although the De Centro represents an unicum in the overview of the history of 
science, the most important and fascinating results regarding debate around the notion 
of the centre of gravity are not found in its demonstrations, but in a treatise apparently 
less important and influential, the Quadratura Parabolae per Simplex Falsum. This 
work, published in Rome in 1606 and dedicated to Marzio Colonna, Duke of Zagarolo, 
can be considered a manifesto or public declaration of the methodology which was 
more widely and explicitly used in the De Centro, and which aimed at explaining the 
geometrical outcomes presented in it. Not only that, this work also aimed at answering a 
single much-discussed epistemological question of the time. This question can be 
restated in the following form: are we committed to considering plane and solid figures 
such as they are, i.e. just as mathematical abstractions without any physical or material 
properties (e.g. mass, dimension, extension and volume)? Or, are we committed to 
attributing weight – as a physical property – to purely geometrical entities? 
The cultural environment in which Guidobaldo and Valerio worked was 
characterised by the clear attempt of attributing methodological certainty and certainty 
relating to the outcomes obtained in mathematics to other associated fields of study. In 
particular, while Guidobaldo was attempting to understand the ambit of machines and 
technical constructions, Valerio’s aim was to broaden the results of mathematics to 
physics and thereby discover the epistemological meaning of this revolutionary 
overlapping of disciplines.  
Let us now turn to the most interesting proposition of the treatise at hand, the 
statement of the first theorem, which proceeds as follows: Si qualibet figura plana 
gravitatem acciperet, tanta esset, quanta si nullam gravitatem accepisset. In other 
words, if we add weight to a geometrical object, its extension (i.e. area or volume) will 
not change. Thus, the core of the proposition is the following: 																																																																																																																																																																		
possible. Valerio thus took a significant step forward in departing from classical mathematics, in that he 
found a general method and theorems to discover the centres of gravity of the two classes of figures he 
dealt with. His new and general method of demonstration, as we further note above (fn. 260), is based on 
the property of ‘monotonicity’.  
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Proposition I: If to any plane figure we add a certain weight, this figure will continue to have the 
same dimension as (its dimension) before we have added some weight. 
 
Let us take a square of two feet (bipedale) and denote it as A. Now, if we confer gravity (weight) 
upon that square A, it will be the same square as before, or rather (it will be) a surface surrounded 
between four straight lines and four angles, each of 90° degrees.  
The heavy square A will be the same with respect to the square without that attributed weight, 
namely of two feet (bipedale). 
In the same way, if any man would become white and that man is also an animal, he will be an 
animal in the same way as he was before acquiring his whiteness. 
Another proposition is evident in itself: the assumption that A, from not being white, will become 
white is evident for itself. Whether A has already become white or is becoming white, it is still the 
same A as (it was at) the beginning. This is true because of a[n Aristotelian] definition that a thing 
can be either true or false but it cannot be both at the same time337.   
If Caesar would be declared orator – for the same Aristotelian definition expressed in his Physics – 
he would remain to be alike, because something that persists is something that is for itself and it 
cannot be lost. In the same way, if a square figure acquires some weight, its geometrical extension 
would not be greater than before, and indeed it would be the same as before acquiring the weight. 
This is not subject to demonstration, but it is materiam falsitatis that we are not using for our 
purpose. When we say that the squared figure A has acquired a certain weight can be true or false, it 
will be the same as saying that the squared bipedale A is heavy. Having stated that, the 
demonstration is easy to do.338  																																																								
337 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, VIII, 263b, 10-25: “Let us suppose a time ABG and a thing D, D being white in 
the time A and not-white in the time B. Then D is at the moment G white and not-white: for if we are right 
in saying that it is white during the whole time A, it is true to call it white at any moment of A and not-
white in B, and G is in both A and B. We must not allow, therefore, that it is white in the whole of A, but 
must say that it is so in all of it except the last moment G. G belongs already to the later period, and if in 
the whole of A not-white was in process of becoming and white in the process of perishing, at G the 
process is complete. And so G is the first moment at which it is true to call the thing white or not-white 
respectively. Otherwise a thing may be non-existent at the moment when it has become, and existent at 
the moment when it has perished: or else it must be possible for a thing at the same time to be white and 
not-white, and in fact to be existent and not-existent.” 
338 Sumamus hic exempli gratia quadratum bipedale, quod voco A. Quonim igitur si quadratu hoc A, 
pondus acciperet; idem esset quadtratum, quod nunc est: at nunc quadratum A, nihil est aliud quam 
superficies plana, quatuor restis lineis ad rectos inter se angulos comprehesa certae mensurae; grave 
igitur quadratum A, tantundem esset, quantum nunc est omnis ponderis expers, nimirum bipedale. 
Quemadmodum si quis homo animo albesceret, is pereque esset animal, atque ante fuisset, cum animo 
non esset albus homo enim non aliud est, quam animal rationis particeps. Altera etiam propositio est per 
se nota: si enim verum ilud consequitur; A iam factum album, vel albescens idem esse A, quod ante erat 
manifestum hoc autem ex generali definitione eius quod est certam quampiam rem fieri, vel factam esse 
aliquid: velut si Caesar fiat, vel factus sit orator: illa enim definitiom quam Aristoteles in physicic optimè 
ecpressit, significat permanere id, quod sit aliquid, non autem interire. Quoòd autem, si figura quadrata 
gravis fierer, ea corpus esser non amplius superficies, nec ergo tanta quanta fuisset antequam gravis 
fierit: genere enim differentium magnitudinum, genere differentes sunt mensurae: hoc non facessit 
negotium demonstrationi, sed material arguit falsitatis, qua non utimur, nulla siquidem his verbis. Si 
quadratum A sit ponderosum, veritas affirmatur, aut negatur: quemadmodum neque his. Sit quadratum A 
grave, dicimus, sed facimus quadratum A esse grave. His iactis fundamentis facilis est demonstratio istius 
alterius dicti. Valerio 1606, pp. 8-9. 
The English trans. is my own because no official translation is available. 
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The example suggested by Valerio takes into account a square measuring two feet 
(quadratum bipedale) which possesses certain geometrical properties. If we add weight 
(pondus) to it, its extension (i.e. area or volume) will remain unchanged because the 
addition of weight – as a physical feature – refers to a different category of size or 
magnitude. However, he also says: Let us imagine that we can confer gravity upon that 
plane figure, in which case its geometrical properties will not change. The theoretical 
concept and properties related to this geometrical figure (i.e. it has square sides and four 
right angles) does not change; in fact its substance or category, understood in an 
Aristotelian sense, does not change, whether we talk about plane or solid figures. 
The outstanding crux to the issue is this: Can a geometrical size have a physical 
meaning? The addition of weight to a geometrical plane figure does not change its own 
geometrical nature, and we can freely and arbitrarily attribute physical content to 
geometrical simple objects, such as point, lines, planes and solids, or else add weight to 
geometrical entities without changing their extension. To this end, it is legitimate to 
suppose that a simple unextended point has some idealized physical features, such as 
weight or mass, if it is understood in its modern Newtonian sense; or otherwise velocity, 
charge, and so on.  
However, I think that the contrary also holds, or rather that given an extended body 
– no matter how it is shaped – we can abstract, omit or neglect its physical content and 
make free use of our imagination in order to associate that body with a geometrical 
entity. In this respect, these kinds of mathematical entities can be used to represent any 
physical contingencies. 
Therefore, the quantity of mass should be considered a mere attribute, or a simple 
feature which is tied to the idealized notion that we want to express. Valerio thereby 
imagines theoretical and explicative situations which have a particular connection with 
empirical data.  
Valerio’s main aim thus seems to account for an investigation into a theoretical 
procedure which has a pre-eminently epistemic function, namely the investigation of a 
process of attributing physical properties (e.g. weight/pondus) to geometrical figures 
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(planes and solids). Up until this time, the theorisation stressed by Luca Valerio had 
aimed at conferring weight upon simple plane figures, and at explaining the movement 
of these bodies by the action of an external force (vis) which brings the bodies to their 
natural place (i.e. the centre of the world). Moreover, it was common in Valerio’s day to 
use the terms ‘pondus’, ‘gravity’ and weight’ in a virtually synonymous fashion. In 
Valerio’s proposition as seen above, we can recognise a difference in both the meaning 
and the use of these words, since when Valerio uses the term ‘gravity’, he is referring to 
the natural ‘propension’ that a body possesses to move towards its natural place (i.e. the 
centre of the world), whereas when he uses the term pondus, he is referring to the 
physical property of extended bodies such as their weight. These terms were used in the 
same way by Galileo, all of which conveyed the same idea of burden, or heaviness as 
measured by weighing, describing a mechanical procedure whose principles can be 
understood through purely mathematical analysis, by representing the physical bodies as 
a geometrical entity.   
Perhaps the most interesting way of interpreting Valerio’s argument, which follows 
not only in Guidobaldo’s footsteps but also a general trend widespread during this time, 
is to suggest that he is attempting an investigation into the physical meaning that one 
should attribute to purely mathematical principles. His work can thus be considered as 
an epistemological analysis of the conditions under which mathematical principles can 
be considered to be true of physical things.  
Valerio’s breakthrough seems to suggest that a purely empirical approach does not 
suffice to understand the way in which the physical world behaves or how physical 
contents are related to each other. This is perfectly understandable, since the 
mathematical principles state precise relations which can only be approximated in 
reality. Even though a purely heuristic approach will not suffice to lay the foundations 
of a mathematical science, it is still important to stress that these foundations do 
crucially involve an empirical input.  
In Chapter 2 we have seen that in antiquity, above all in the case of the 
Archimedean law of the lever, the empirical approach allowed the essential properties 
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of a body’s centre of gravity to be emphasised. Thereafter, from Guidobaldo’s proofs of 
indifferent equilibrium, there arose the idea that the centre of gravity should be 
considered as a point of ‘indifferent equilibrium’, because otherwise the form of a body 
would matter, and the crucial transformations could not be affected in the proof. The 
polemical discussion that followed Guidobaldo’s fourth proposition constituted not only 
a way to discredit the followers of Jordanus, but also the perfect framework in which to 
introduce the ill-fated idea that the natural tendency of bodies to move downwards must 
converge at the centre of the earth. Such a centripetal convergence reflects the physical 
situation on which Guidobaldo agreed with his opponents, but he also showed in detail 
that it invalidates their explanatory scheme, whereas he can accommodate the physical 
facts. The difference marked from his opponents lies in the requirement of absolute 
mathematical rigour. However, to this rigour an empirical item needed to be added: in a 
passage included in the Italian translation of his Mechanicorum Liber, Guidobaldo 
claims to have been able to construct a balance that exhibits indifferent equilibrium. 
This proves empirically that bodies do indeed have a point situated within them that 
shows the required property, contrary to Jordanus’ misguided arguments. The rigour 
that Guidobaldo seeks is not absolute mathematical rigour, which would describe the 
empirical world in detail, but the rigour of any well-founded applied mathematical 
science. And in order to ground such a science, one has to select – and, where possible, 
support experimentally (e.g. by building a balance) – those properties of the empirical 
world that can be linked with fruitful mathematical demonstrations.339  
What was not explicitly asserted by Guidobaldo has now been added by Luca 
Valerio. Valerio seems to ask: How can we claim to offer a treatment of the equilibrium 
of plane figures, since such a predicate – the equilibrium – is completely alien to the 
nature of plane figures? Insofar as they are plane figures and do not have weight at all, 
we can still “mentally conceive” of plane figures to be equilibrating, and thus still 
showing the effects of gravity, or in other words their tendency to move downwards 
towards the centre of the earth. How could science make use of mathematical 																																																								
339 van Dyck 2013, pp. 29-31. 
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demonstrations in order to achieve conclusions about physical reality? Or rather, how 
could science make use of physical experiments in order to endorse mathematical 
demonstrations or concepts? Is one science subordinate to another? The discussion of 
this exemplary scenario brings out the essentially dual nature of a body’s centre of 
gravity. It is a notion that can be ascribed to every physical body which has a natural 
tendency for motion, but which is at the same time connected with some of the 
mathematical accidents of this body, such as its geometrical form and position (i.e. 
properties which are not mathematical). It is this double aspect that lies behind the 
revised Renaissance centre of gravity. While Archimedes considered mathematical 
things, such as distances and proportions, through geometrical demonstrations, giving 
rise to a new heuristic and mechanical approach to geometry, Guidobaldo considered 
natural things through natural considerations, such as those relating to the nature of the 
centre of gravity and upward or downward motion. Thus, the Renaissance notion of the 
centre of gravity essentially binds together both kinds of considerations, the 
mathematical joined with the physical; it connects itself with physical properties, such 
as the equilibrium effects of weight, but at the same time it is to be considered as a 
mathematical point which can be easily introduced into physical demonstrations. 
Furthermore, later at the very beginning of the seventeenth century, Valerio explicitly 
declares that pure and theoretical mathematics have arisen on the basis of the 
abstraction of quantitative properties from physical bodies, an abstraction that consisted 
in considering these properties as if they did not belong to sensible matter. This 
abstraction is nothing more than the approximation by means of which scientific theory 
represents how the physical reality appears to our eyes. Conversely, this opportunistic 
procedure allowed Valerio to apply the abstracted properties back to natural things, an 
application which was understood as the predication of a sensible condition.  
These mathematical entities, such as the material point, rely on the idea that it is 
possible to ascribe a sufficiently rich mathematical structure to empirical reality, which 
can in turn truly ground a fruitful science. But on the other hand, the contrary also 
holds, since these kinds of abstract or idealized mathematical entities allow us to 
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represent physical reality by means of simple geometrical entities devoid of their 
physical properties. The centre of gravity is thus hybrid in method, both i) in being 
geometrical in origin, due to its belonging to geometrical figures; and ii) in representing 
on the one hand that point in which a figure is cut into two halves equal in extension, 
but on the other hand a point endowed with physical properties, such as shape, weight 
and velocity.  
To this end, the centre of gravity becomes an issue of crucial importance because it 
fulfils a fundamental and irreplaceable role, due to the fact that it allowed scientists to 
explain physical and material configurations in mathematical terms. In fact, the centre 
of gravity represents a hybrid case, since it is considered – by definition – a 0-
dimensional geometrical point to which one can nevertheless attribute an idealized 
physical content. Yet on the other hand, if we have a physical body one can omit its 
physical content and represent it as a geometrical entity. In this respect, the weight 
becomes a quality, not a quantity, and as evidence of this, we can consider the fact that 
the weight is neglected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 196 
C h a p t e r  4  	
From Gal i l eo  to  the  Modern  Turns  
 
 
The reconstruction undertaken in the previous chapter showed the way in which the 
mathematics of the Renaissance had managed to create a suitable set of meaningful 
materials, techniques and methods that could be used to create a modern rational 
mathematical physics. These Renaissance scholars were able to work – with 
mathematical accuracy and methodological opportunism – towards the reinforcement of 
a particular branch of physics, namely that which consists of important theoretical 
notions. They worked towards the foundational programme of constructing an 
epistemological debate over the nature of abstract and idealized mathematical entities. 
This was the context in which a purely mathematical treatment of physical reality now 
came to the fore. The notion of the point mass interpreted as the centre of gravity still 
relates, on the one hand, to heuristic and practical issues, but now on the other hand it 
started to be used as a representational model for a great variety of physical (specifically 
dynamic, kinematic and static) phenomena. Seventeenth-century mathematical physics 
represents the framework for the completion of the third stage of the objectification of 
procedure, insofar as it was at this time that the centre of gravity became an independent 
object of study as the point mass, an idealized entity used to represent physical objects 
and to which we can ascribe natural properties such as volumetric extension, mass and 
forces. The point mass is still a representational geometrical point whose features are 
idealized, but it now assumes the role of being an independent object of research useful 
for building the axiomatic foundational principles of rational mechanics.  
Historically, Galileo Galilei dates to the last phase of the Renaissance period, when 
in the 1580s he led the renaissance of mathematics at its high tide. In fact, he is usually 
considered the author who initiated the tradition of modern mathematical physics, either 
because in his early years of research he focused on problems directly related to the 
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Hellenistic tradition340, and because, by the turn of the new century, his interest had 
shifted to different topics and purposes, or better, because his approach was driven by 
the desire to give a mathematical interpretation to natural and physical phenomena. By 
analysing some of the Galilean treatises we can isolate the reasons that he can be 
considered the author who placed himself in a half-way position between the earlier 
mechanics of the Renaissance and the prototypical conception of modern rational 
mechanics. Having completed our analysis of Galileo’s mathematical approach to 
mechanics, above all to the branch of kinematics, we will now turn to consider the 
theoretical elements which characterise the last stage of the objectification of procedure, 
the stage in which the point mass enters the scene as an intelligible entity, a primitive 
term, and a model for scientific representation. In particular, this last phase is 
characterised by the fact that the algebraic approach replaced the geometrical one, and 
allowed for the abstract theoretical reasoning of mathematical entities such as ideal 
numbers or simple equations. In order to carry out this examination, we will scrutinise 
the contributions and achievements of three more vital thinkers, Thomas Hobbes, Isaac 
Newton and Leonard Euler. In the findings of these authors we can locate the answers 
to our twofold purpose. First, we will note the way in which the geometrical centre of 
gravity assumed its status as an object of mathematical idealization, that is as a model 
used to represent any physical heavy body, not only at rest but also in motion, either 
uniformly, in acceleration or parabolically. Between the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries the point mass turned into an independent mathematical entity detached from 
any physical features, which was applicable to a series of different cases due to its 
general nature and its power to serve as a representational model. It became a sort of 
simple and malleable centaur which can be modified on the basis of the analysis of the 
cases and purposes at hand. This achievement is directly related to the second purpose 
																																																								
340 It is also often said that Galileo’s research represents the revival and continuation of the Archimedean 
tradition, while he had constantly taken a position against the influence of Aristotle. However, even if this 
is true in many areas of dispute such as in hydrostatics, it is nevertheless quite erroneous in the domain 
covered by mechanics, which is the one in which we are most interested. Indeed, almost the reverse holds 
here: Galileo operates as his mentor Guidobaldo did in dealing with an attempt to reconcile himself with 
both the Archimedean and the Aristotelian traditions. For further details, see Galileo 1960, p. 141. 
	 198 
of our study, namely to ascertain how Galileo assisted in the development of the first 
kernel of the theoretical procedure involving idealization and abstraction in 
mathematical physics. In this connection, we will see how Galileo used the practical and 
artisanal achievements of the Urbino School to win mechanics a more general level of 
applicability. Thus, the first item on the agenda of this chapter focuses on Galileo’s 
contributions (§ 4.1) to the science of mechanics. Here we shall point out how Galileo 
was able to shift the investigative methodology used in the field of mechanics to a more 
theoretical and physical perspective, by showing how the purely practical operations 
carried out through machinery were now, in Galileo’s view, able to be used to interpret 
the working principles behind the phenomena of the natural world. Within the second 
part of this chapter, § 4.2, we will first examine (§ 4.2.1) the more metaphysical 
contributions given by Thomas Hobbes, which relate to the rule of human imagination 
in building our representational model of physical phenomena and the point mass. Then 
in §§ 4.2.2-4.2.3, we will establish the way in which the model of the point mass from a 
purely mathematical point of view is used to represent, with purely algebraic language, 
a series of states of affairs which were not only made up of simple rigid bodies, but 
which were also typified by a higher level of complexity. This represents the climax of 
the procedure of objectification of our centre of gravity. Now it is no longer a 
geometrical tool shifted along the arms of a real mechanical balance, but instead a 
mathematical entity, an investigative tool or a model of intelligibility – explicitly 
introduced for the first time in Newton’s and Euler’s research – that has two main 
characteristics: i) it is the centre of mass of any rigid body, no matter how it is shaped, 
and ii) it is the point of applicability of all the forces – gravity, works, pressure, and so 
on – acting on a stationary or a moving body, be it travelling in uniform motion, in a 
state of acceleration or parabolically.  
Before entering into the details, let us examine some historical features of the 
period under consideration. The debate over the equilibrium, which was widely 
discussed in the previous chapter (esp. § 3.6), continues until the turn into the 
eighteenth century, and although Galileo took part in it – especially in the first years of 
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his career, with his research presented in the De Motu (ca. 1590) and in Le Mecaniche 
(ca. 1600) – his approach, as we shall see, was completely different by comparison with 
the one of his tutors Guidobaldo. The relationship of the Equilibrium Controversy to the 
branches of mechanics became increasingly close: while study on the equilibrium was 
previously connected to statics, or otherwise confined to the field of kinematics, now 
with Galileo’s works, dynamics and statics are considered two aspects of the same field 
of research. My interest in this section will be directed to the causes341 of the loss of 
equilibrium of bodies on a balance, thus shifting the attention towards the forces acting 
in the equation for a falling body and towards the nature of gravity of the energy 
involved in the motion of bodies. The Aristotelian dynamics, which remained prevalent 
until the late Middle Ages, erroneously believed that to keep a moving body in constant 
velocity did not require the application of an external force, and that the motion of 
bodies was rather caused by a power that possessed intrinsic self-motion. In other 
words, the conventional opinion asserted that the cause of the falling of a body was 
inherent to its heaviness and that motion was a natural property of any body in itself. 
The idea of the existence of an external and independent cause of motion was not yet 
conceptualised. The resurgent interest in the causes of motion, which found its 
application in the field of the science of equilibrium, led in turn to the science of the 
impetus. This field was probably first identified by Jean Buridan (1295-1358), who 
theorised that the application of a force to a body leads to the generation of an impetus, 
which gives the body the power to continue moving at a constant velocity. The velocity 
does not change if the body is not stopped by obstacles or if there is no resistance, i.e. 
from friction on the surface; otherwise in the case of resistance the speed will gradually 
decrease. The existence of this impetus seems to be the cause due to which the natural 
fall of bodies acquired an undefined acceleration. Buridan also applied this theory not 
only to earthly bodies but also to the celestial bodies. 
Therefore between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the combined studies of 
static and dynamic phenomena allowed above all the achievement of the most important 																																																								
341 Galileo might be considered one of the first investigators to inspire this new approach. 
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results in astronomy, in particular thanks to the work of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) 
and Isaac Newton. Moreover, there appears to be a direct connection between Buridan’s 
studies and the astronomy of Johannes Kepler. This connection involved the theoretical 
innovations into astronomy by Buridan’s pupil, Nicholas Oresme (1323-1382), 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) and Giambattista 
Benedetti (1530-1590). From the doctrine of impetus Kepler established the notion of 
‘inertia’ – which had already been theorised by Benedetti – and defined it as the 
tendency of a body to maintain its static condition or its linear motion, unless an 
external force changes its state.342  
At the same time, studies were being carried out into the nature of space. The law 
of inertia in seventeenth-century physics was a theory of absolute space, a continuum of 
utterly featureless and indistinguishable parts against which motion can be 
comprehended. Even more importantly, space was understood not as deriving from the 
relations between objects, but in and of itself as a “pseudo-substance” that is not 
dependent on anything else for its existence. 343  The chief figures of this new 
mathematical science of space presumed that motion can be understood to occur in 
relation to space itself without reference to any other bodies around it, and being 
accounted for only by appeal to the law of inertia. Thus, for example, a single isolated 
body alone in space can be said either to move or to remain stationary. The difference 
between the two states are explained by the difference of the surrounding environment. 
These two concepts – absolute space and inertia – were inseparable and together were 
absolutely crucial for the development of modern mathematical physics.344 In this 
scenario, bodies moving in the space are conceived as point masses, hence as models of 
intelligibility. This latter notion represents the tradition according to which a great 																																																								
342 For further bibliography, see Dugas 1988; Jammer 1957 and Jammer 1961.  
343 These two different definitions of space (and time) date back to the well-known substantivalist-
relationalist debate. The ontological contents related to the nature of space originate from Newton’s 
mechanics and Leibniz’s philosophy. The former, as a substantivalist, argues that space is a somewhat 
particular substance that does not depend upon the objects which are located in it, whereas the latter, as a 
relationist, s t a t e s  t h a t  space is nothing but some sort of collection of spatial relations between 
more fundamental physical objects, wh ich  thus thoroughly depends on them for its existence.  
344 For further details, see Herbert1987, pp. 709-717 and Brandt 1927.  
	 201 
variety of phenomena can be represented and investigated in a simplified way. 
Originally, Peter Machamer introduced the notion of ‘model of intelligibility’ to capture 
the multiple functions the balance plays within Galileo’s science, but I would suggest 
that it applies not only in Galilean mechanics, but across the whole dispute on the 
equilibrium. Machamer states that:  
 
Its physical concreteness, mathematical describability, and physical manipulability leading to 
experimental possibilities gave intelligibility and structure to the abstract concepts of the mechanical 
world picture.345 
 
According to this research here, the appearance of the theoretical notion of balance has 
to be considered fundamental to sketch the development of the notion we are trying to 
investigate. Already in ancient Greek mechanics, especially in Archimedean science, 
the virtual balance represented not only a novelty but also a mechanical and heuristic 
insight which could be used to simplify and represent much more complicated situations 
occurring in (among others) artisanal contexts. The virtual balance model can be 
considered as a parallel to the centre of gravity as a point mass model. In this 
connection, we can borrow the notion of the model of intelligibility in order to describe 
the role which is fulfilled by the material point in this last step of the objectification of 
procedure. Just as the virtual balance represents an investigative tool, according to van 
Dyck346 and Machamer, the material point is a mechanical and heuristic tool used in 
investigating natural principles. In this new step taken during the modern turn, the idea 
of using mechanical tools in investigating natural principles loses much of its 
paradoxical character. Rather it becomes an ordinary practice, whereby it is almost 
natural to investigate these everyday physical events exactly through manipulations. It 
is through our way of interacting with nature that nature can now truly show itself for 
the first time. This allows mathematical instruments which had been primarily practical 
																																																								
345 Machamer 1998b, p. 71. 
346 van Dyck 2006. 
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problem-solving tools to function now additionally as investigative tools and models of 
intelligibility.  
To sum up, it will be pointed out from the analysis at hand that the behaviour of 
any rigid body, be it standing at the extremities of a balance or in motion along a flat or 
inclined surface, or again in motion following a parabolic path, may be represented with 
a model of intelligibility which has the structure and features of a point mass. The 
geometrical centre of gravity will leave the stage to be replaced by the notion of the 
centre of mass. The centre of mass or centre of inertia is a point in any body, around 
which the mass or inertia347 is equally distributed in some manner according to the 
equality of the moments. This point simultaneously represents the point of application 
of the forces acting on a body, which is a force equally distributed on the entire surface 
of the body, but it is imagined to be concentrated on the centre of gravity of the body in 
question.  
It was, however, only in the eighteenth century that this notion widened in terms of 
its heuristic applicability. Before then until the end of the first half of the nineteenth 
century, there were several attempts to extend and systematise mechanics as it had been 
developed in the works of Galileo, Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695), Leibniz, Jakob 
Bernoulli (1654-1705) and Newton. What will evidently change in the approach 
suggested and adopted, first by Leonard Euler, and later by his pupil Lagrange, was the 
search for principles that allowed the study of systems more complex than those formed 
by simple point masses that had been studied in the previous century. It was a period in 
which scientists debated by publishing their research in scientific journals, a period in 
which the spread of knowledge became faster and more immediate than before. The 
eighteenth century generally traces its influences back to the presentation of the 
infinitesimal calculus – this having been achieved by both Leibniz and Newton, 																																																								
347 As Drake [1970, p. 4] recalls in his Galileo Studies, all historians agree that the chief importance of the 
concept of inertia lay in its application to projectile motion, which is usually traced back to Galileo’s 
mature work. It is likewise agreed that Galileo had to do with the treatment of the inertial concept, but not 
in connection with the treatment of the projectile motion. In fact, the origins of this latter concept lay in 
the logical refutation of Aristotle’s classification of motion in general, which was carried out at a time 
when Galileo was already satisfied with the anti-Aristotelian impetus theory of projectiles, a theory which 
he himself adapted to the explanation of acceleration in fall at that same time. 
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apparently independently of each other – that was widely used for solving complex 
problems. 
Along with the search for new principles, their foundations were examined as well 
as the nature of mechanics and its relationship with mathematics. It was a period 
dominated by empiricist philosophy, in which mechanics was seen by some of the 
greatest scientists as a purely mathematical discipline, shedding the characterisation of a 
mixed science that had accompanied its inception, first as statics in the ancient world 
and later as dynamics in the modern era. The new emphasis laid upon the causes of 
motion, instead of upon the causes and the conditions which guaranteed the 
equilibrium.348 
 
 
4.1 Galileo Galilei: a Bridge to the Modern Mathematical Physics 
 
Even though Guidobaldo del Monte’s science of mechanics was still confined to statics 
and the study of simple machines, through the use of a series of central concepts, he 
nevertheless had the meritable aim not only to give coherence to mechanics, but also to 
trigger the process of representing facts about physical phenomena through 
mathematics. Just after the publication and distribution of his Mechanicorum Liber, 
which became the most respected treatise on mechanics from the second half of the 
sixteenth century, one of his pupils, Galileo Galilei, published a treatise containing the 
most outstanding physical and mathematical results related to this issue, Discourses and 
Mathematical Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences (1638). Galileo in this 
treatise attempted to develop a mathematically grounded natural philosophy as a new 
field of knowledge; moreover, due to the values embedded in late sixteenth-century 
society, he was capable of structuring this field in a different way. However, whilst this 
masterpiece represents the highest point of Galileo’s scientific research, it marked the 
result of a long series of practical and thought experiments combined with attempted 																																																								
348 See further Dugas 1988 and Capecchi 2014.  
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theoretical treatments. 
First, let us provide some details on Galileo’s personal life and an overview of his 
oeuvre. Galileo was born in Pisa on February 15th 1564, and moved with his family to 
Florence in 1572, where he started to study for the priesthood. But this he soon left and 
signed up for a medical degree at the University of Pisa. However, he never completed 
this degree, but instead in 1583-84 came in contact with Ostilio Ricci (1540-1603), a 
mathematician of the Tuscan court and a friend of his father’s, who introduced him to 
Euclid, Archimedes and all the mathematicians of his time, including the Urbino 
School. Later, he visited the mathematician Christopher Clavius in Rome and began a 
correspondence with Guidobaldo del Monte. He applied and was turned down for a 
position in Bologna, but a few years later in 1589, with the help of Clavius and del 
Monte, he was appointed to the chair of mathematics in Pisa. In 1592 he moved to 
Padua for a position as mathematician at the University; during this time he also became 
married and from two spouses in the period 1600-1606 had two daughters and a son. In 
Padua he worked on mechanics and his telescope, and in 1610 he published The Starry 
Messenger. After this period he accepted a teaching position in Pisa, where he carried 
out observations on the moon of Jupiter, which were certified by Clavius and the 
Collegio Romano in 1610. 
In 1612 Galileo published his Discourses on Floating Bodies and in 1613 his 
Letters on the Sunspots. In 1623 he published The Assayer, an essay dealing with the 
comets which posited that they were sublunary phenomena. At the same time, he began 
work on his Dialogues concerning the Two Great World Systems, which was first 
published in Florence in 1632. This is the book that caused the trial promoted by the 
Church, with the book being immediately banned from sale, and in 1633 Galileo 
himself was condemned by the Inquisition. Upon his arrest he began work on his last 
masterpiece, the Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations concerning Two New 
Sciences.349 																																																								
349 For a brief entry on Galileo’s life and works, see P. Machamer, “Galileo Galilei”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition);  
On-line: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/galileo/.  
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The central influence of Galileo’s scientific life was Archimedean mechanics as it 
was laid down by Commandino and Guidobaldo. In each of the Galilean works can be 
recognised influences from his contemporary scholars. For example, in the Theoremata 
circa centrum gravitatis solidorum written between 1585 and 1587, but published only 
as an appendix to the Two New Sciences in 1638, Galileo’s affinity with Luca Valerio’s 
treatise is an evident trait. In the De Motu composed in the late 1580s at Pisa, the 
influence of Filippo Fantoni is discernible, who was among the first mathematicians to 
give lectures on the application of mathematics to physical problems, treating the 
subject of mathematical certainty and addressing problems of motion that were usually 
neglected in the Archimedean context but discussed in the Aristotelian domain. By the 
time of his departure from Pisa to Padua, Galileo was in possession of “an effective 
Archimedean method for the interpretation of physical subjects”.350 At the University of 
Padua, Galileo encountered an established mathematical and philosophical tradition: in 
the 1350s Giovanni de’ Dondi (1330-1388), designer of the planetarium, had lectured 
mathematics, Biagio Pelacani (1355-1416) and Vittorino da Feltre on Euclid, and in 
1463-1464 Regiomontanus gave a course of lectures on astronomy and his famous 
Oratio in Omnias Scientias Mathematicas. Moreover, sixteenth-century debate now 
centered on two main problems: i) the relationship between mathematics and physics, or 
more exactly the methodological applicability of mathematics to mechanics as the 
mixed science; and ii) the claim of the superiority of mathematics – which posits 
epistemological certainty in virtue of its reliance on theoretical abstractions – over 
Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning, in which certainty is supposed to derive from the 
intrinsic power of its proofs. Again in his youthful contributions, it appears clear that 
obvious and decisive influences derive from Greek geometers, and in fact in 1584 when 
he was a student at Pisa, Galileo encountered Euclid’s treatises for the first time, while 
in 1585 at Florence he approached Archimedes’ works. Therefore, it is likely that it was 
the study of the treatises on statics and hydrostatics that settled Galileo’s true vocation. 
In 1586, the young Galileo constructed a hydrostatic balance in order to reproduce the 																																																																																																																																																																		
For further details, see Drake 1978.  
350 Rose 1975, p. 283. 
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experiments by which Archimedes had established the density of various substances. 
But while these young contributions failed to introduce any novel concepts, they 
nevertheless make it clear that as early as 1587/1588 Galileo was already familiar with 
the essential contributions of the Greek mathematicians.351 On the same line of thought, 
the second source of inspiration was his acquaintance and correspondence with the 
Urbinate, Guidobaldo, who was in all likelihood appointed as Galileo’s mentor and 
intellectual patron, and whose own scholarship gave rise to the reunion of the two 
Hellenistic traditions, as I have argued in the previous chapter (esp. § 3.7 and 3.7.1). 
These may be considered the preparatory years that provided Galileo with the 
instruments for the transformation of the old approach and the gradual elaboration of a 
new and original method of analysis. This method represents the outcome of his 
research into the so-called ‘problem of nature’: he uncovered the way in which nature 
functions discursively as a normative instance that regulates the kind of claims that can 
be scientifically made about any individual objects under study.  
It is suggestive to consider Galileo’s achievements from two distinct points of view. 
First, we shall consider the theatres of machines and the epistemological and theoretical 
meaning which Galileo gave to the use of the virtual balance as an artisanal practice that 
however still retains its heuristic value. In this context it is worthwhile to analyse the 
youthful work Le Mecaniche, together with some passages deriving from Galileo’s last 
work, Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences. 
From this it emerges that, in order to represent natural phenomena by means of a virtual 
balance model, bodies – no matter how they are shaped or how big they are – have to be 
represented as volumeless point masses. Secondly after this, we shall see how Galileo 
took part in, and provided a significant contribution to, the ongoing dispute over the 
truth-value attributed to idealizations, and to the idealized model of the point mass – 
something that Galileo tends to label as ‘moving particle’. Here it will be pointed out 
that at the very core of the use that Galileo made of the model of balance, the inclined 
plane model and even the pendulum model, there stands the idea of bodies conceived as 																																																								
351 Clavelin 1974, p. 118.  
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simple idealized point masses. These conclusions are drawn from the dispute that is 
staged between Simplicio, Sagredo and Salviati 352  in Galileo’s last masterpiece 
concerning the nature of motion, in which he suggests a free play of human imagination 
that is only constrained by the intentions that must be put into practice. Galileo hereby 
regiments the “role played by the imagination” through his abstract analysis353, or 
through what we have called in Chapter 1, ‘Galilean idealizations’. It will appear that 
for Galileo human imagination has no limit, neither does the range of applicability that 
we can confer upon our idealized models, to which we give the label of investigative 
tools and which derive from abstracting the purely practical purposes for which we have 
built machines and the abstraction of the natural properties of our physical bodies. The 
result will be the extrapolation of a general and simple model applicable to a large 
variety of issues. According to Galileo’s regimentation of model-building practice, there 
is one limit that we cannot overcome as users of a new mathematical discursive 
practice: this is not the limit of practical feasibility or efficiency, but rather the limit of 
what we can do with machines and what is imposed on us by nature itself.  
What will therefore emerge from this section is a conclusion concerning how the 
material point will achieve a new step forward. Galileo will appear as the last 
Renaissance mathematician, but also as the one who opens a window onto the 
accomplishment of the third stage of the objectification of procedure. In other words, 
Galileo gave some clues as to how we should conceive the point mass as a mathematical 
idealization represented by an unextended geometrical point, imagined as devoid of 
weight, and as the idealized point in which all forces acting on a moving body – be it 
suspended at the extremity of a balance and moving downwards, or in motion along an 
inclined plane – are imagined as exerting their power uniformly on the centre of gravity 
of the body; this point has since taken the name ‘centre of pressure’. Galileo was the 																																																								
352 Salvaiti is Galileo’s spokesman, Sagredo is a Venetian senator and friend of Galileo, and Simplicio 
represents the spokesman of the Aristotelian tradition. Those three characters are used in the two main 
last works written by Galileo: Dialogues concerning the Two Great World Systems, Florence, 1632; and 
Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences, Leiden, 1638. 
353 Galilei, Opere II, pp. 156-157. See also Galilei 1960a-b, pp. 46 and 148. Throughout this chapter, when 
I refer to “Galilei, Opere n.”, I refer to the corresponding volume of Favaro’s National edition in the 
bibliography. 
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author who delivered the biggest contribution for reaching the level of theorisation 
shown progressively by authors such as Newton and Euler, who both also contributed to 
the legitimation of the representational relation linking mathematical structure to 
concrete physical events. 
 
It has already been mentioned that Guidobaldo was one of the earliest and most 
important patrons of Galileo: both men had the same interest in scientific matters, and 
also carried out some experiments together. Thus it may not be surprising for the 
contemporary reader to find common elements between Guidobaldo’s mechanics and 
Galileo’s mechanical-theoretical writings. Yet despite these general similarities between 
them, Galileo was consciously trying to do something else in his conceptualization of 
mechanical phenomena: he was trying to achieve a new layer of generality and 
simplicity but, above all, instead of paying attention to conditions that preserve the 
equilibrium of a balance, he was focussing on the causes behind the loss of this 
equilibrium, with his efforts being specifically oriented towards dynamics as a theory 
concerning heaviness and lightness. However, in Galileo’s science of motion the centre 
of gravity still plays an important role.  
In the early 1590s Galileo published the treatise entitled Le Mecaniche, which was 
intended as a clear and coherent account of statics, and only in its last few pages did he 
apply the results of his analysis to the revision of some crucial concepts of dynamics. 
More precisely, he underlined there the practical usefulness that can be abstracted from 
the theoretical analysis of the mechanical machine – or instruments of precision – which 
were ordinarily used by artisans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Galileo 
opened this treatise with an explanation of a mechanical phenomenon by introducing a 
proof of the long-established Archimedean law of the lever. Not only this proof, but 
indeed the entire work relies on this demonstration already given by Guidobaldo, or 
rather the explanations which made use of the interplay between the centre of gravity 
and the point of suspension on the one hand, and the relation between the centre of 
gravity and the tendency towards the centre of the world on the other hand. However, 
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there are some methodological differences between the two authors. Let us first look at 
the proof through a summary borrowed from Marteen van Dyck:  
“A uniform solid is suspended at its endpoints from a line AB which at its turn is 
suspended at the point G exactly in the middle (see Figure 4.1 below). It will be in 
equilibrium. Now divide the solid in two unequal parts, and add an extra string at the 
point of division. It remains in equilibrium, as it will also if we now hang it from two 
other strings right above the parts’ respective centres of gravity and cut the other strings. 
At this point follows a geometrical proof of the fact that the ratio of the weights of the 
two unequal parts equals the ratio between the distances from which they are 
respectively suspended. Galileo then comments as follows: And from what has been 
said it seems to me clearly understood not only how the two unequal bodies CS and SD 
weigh equally when hanging from distances inversely proportional to their weights, but 
moreover how, in the nature of things, this is the same effect as if equal weights were 
suspended at equal distances, since in a certain sense the heaviness of the weight CS 
virtually spreads out beyond the support at G, and that of the weight SD shrinks back 
from it, as any speculative mind can understand by examining closely what has been 
said about the present diagram.”354 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 
 																																																								
354 van Dyck 2006, p. 140. For the complete demonstration, see the English trans. in Galilei 1960b, p. 155, 
and the Italian verion in Galilei 2005a, pp. 150-152. 
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The uniform solid CF is suspended at its endpoints from a line AB which at its turn is suspended at the 
point G exactly in the middle. It will be in equilibrium. Now divide the solid in two unequal parts CS and 
DS, and add an extra string at the point I. It remains in equilibrium, as it also will if we now hang it from 
two other strings right above the parts’ respective centres of gravity at K and L and cut the other strings. It 
can easily be geometrically proven that the ratio between the distances MG and GN equals the ratio of the 
weights of the respective unequal parts.355  
 
Our attention is immediately drawn to Galileo’s use of the notion of moment, or 
downward impetus.356 This notion plays an important role in Galileo’s scientific writings 
and has subsequently been inherited by today’s mathematical physics: 
 
Moment is the tendency to move downward [sc. with the downward impetus] caused not so much by 
the heaviness of the moveable body as by the arrangement which different heavy bodies have among 
themselves.357 
 
From the demonstration of the law of the lever and this new definition, two aspects need 
to be underlined, respectively: i) the conclusion drawn by Galileo from the law of the 
lever, and ii) the causes that stand behind the loss of equilibrium. Galileo is offering his 
interlocutors a visual reasoning, teaching to the reader to see for himself what makes for 
an equilibrium in mechanical situations:  
 																																																								
355 Galilei, Opere IV, p. 161.  
356 In Galileo’ research there is no space for the notion of acceleration. He thinks that this is a sort of 
accident attributed to the moving bodies; however, there is the notion of impetus which represent a vis 
motiva exerting its tendency in an opposite manner to the force of gravity. More precisely, in the youthful 
treatise De Motu, Galileo established that the time taken by a body to descend along an inclined plane is 
equal to the square of the plane’s length (i tempi di discesa lungo i piani inclinati di uguale elevazione 
stanno tra loro come i quadrati delle lunghezze di tali piani). However, Galileo also observed that this 
conclusion did not comply with empirical observations. The theory makes a prediction of the velocity of a 
body moving uniformly or downwards along an inclined plane; but on the other hand, when we introduce 
this ratio to the treatment of kinematic problems, the theoretical outcomes stand in contrast with the 
empirical observations. This discrepancy is due – in Galileo’s conception – to the presence of the 
acceleration as a disturbing element, because i) it does not allow the user to grasp the “real” nature or 
behaviour of the bodies under consideration, and ii) it precludes any possibility of a purely mathematical 
explanation of the motion of heavy bodies. The purely mechanical and heuristic approach adopted in the 
youthful treatise drives Galileo to look at the acceleration as the core concept of a new kinematics, 
especially thanks to the analysis of the pendulum motion (in the Discourses), which is accelerated since it 
begins to swing, and only after a series of oscillation does its velocity decrease. Thus, it emerges that the 
acceleration plays a dominant role in the motion of bodies and it is no longer a simple accident.  
357 Galilei 1960b, p. 151.  
[…] Momento è la propensione di andare al basso, cagionata non tanto dalla gravità del mobile, quanto 
dalla disposizione che abbino tra di loro diversi corpi gravi […]. Galilei 2005a, p. 147. 
	 211 
One can see how the relative positions of the respective centres of gravity are responsible for the 
fact that the effect of the separate bodies’ weights is distributed over space in such a way that they 
are conceptually reducible to a situation where a single body is hanging from its two end points. In 
this way one can see through the apparent marvelousness of this kind of situation and perceive the 
underlying and inherently stable configuration.358  
 
As in Guidobaldo’s proof IV of the first book of the Mechanicorum Liber, Galileo used 
the idea that the centres of gravity of the two different bodies hanging at the extremities 
of the balance may be imagined as being collected only in one point – the centre of 
suspension of the balance. Moreover, in that proof Galileo moved from a consideration 
of the conditions that ensure stability to the balance to multiple considerations on the 
causes of motion, asking ‘What would happen if the two bodies A and B, situated at 
different distances on a balance, would start to move?’ During the Renaissance, 
considerations about the equilibrium of a body that has been displaced from its original 
position by means of a force – or power – applied to a machine were justified as soon as 
the equilibrium of the body was explained. Indeed, if a balance is in equilibrium with a 
force f, a force F greater than f causes the displacement. However, the question ‘By how 
much should F be greater than f?’ was left open. In reply several interpretations can be 
given: for engineers F represented the force necessary to overcome frictions, while for 
mathematicians F stood substantially for a vanishing value (i.e. such that the value is 
negligible). As Danilo Capecchi writes, “[t]he equilibrium was seen from two points of 
view that clashed for a long time in the history of mechanics. On the one hand the 
equilibrium was considered between two actions that in ‘potentiality’ would have been 
able to produce contrasting displacements; on the other hand between two actions that 
in ‘actuality’ produce opposite displacements. They are however thought as imaginary 
or virtual, resulting thus from a power only partially in act.”359 
Moreover, there are other similarities and differences between Guidobaldo’s and 
Galileo’s explanations. Besides the dynamic interplay between the three centres, 
																																																								
358 van Dyck 2006, p. 140. 
359 Capecchi 2014, p. 3. 
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Guidobaldo’s attempt to join the Archimedean tradition with the Aristotelian one was 
due on the one hand to a large humanistic project aimed at restoring the ancient science 
of mechanics, whilst on the other hand it relied on the dispute over the possibility of 
indifferent equilibrium in which he was already engaged. Thus, from the analysis above, 
it should appear clear to the reader that in Guidobaldo’s mind the centre of gravity was 
of crucial importance for a rational organisation of his mechanics. Similarly, in the first 
version of Galileo’s treatise Le Mecaniche, Guidobaldo’s statement appeared again by 
means of a corollary in the following way:  
 
But it must be remarked that so much as we make it easier on ourselves using a lever, that much 
more time will we have to take; and that so much as the force will be less than the weight, that much 
larger will be the distance over which the force travels than the distance over which the weight 
travels.360 
 
However, this passage also contains the point through which Galileo was attempting to 
take a new further step towards a discursive mechanical practice. But it was just while 
he was preparing the second version of the treatise Le Mecaniche (in the late 1590s) that 
he realized that the instrument of the virtual balance361 could have been used for a 
different purpose, namely as a general mechanical principle and an investigative 
instrument:  
 
The utility which is drawn from this instrumentis not that of which common mechanics persuade 
themselves; that is, that nature comes to be overpowered and in a sense cheated.362 
 
So, rather than thinking of a machine as an instrument whose only use is to shift the 
centre of gravity of bodies, Galileo now starts to think of it as an instrument by which to 
																																																								
360 Galilei 2002, p. 7. For critical analysis, see van Dyck 2006, pp. 143-145.  
361 As will also be noted by Galileo about all the other mechanical instruments.  
362 Galilei 1960b, p. 158. 
E qui si deve notare […] che la utilità, che si trae da tale strumento, non è quell ache i volgari meccanici 
si persuadono, ciò è che si venga a superare, ed inun certo modo ingannare, la natura […]. Galilei 
2005a, pp. 157-158.  
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understand what the causes are that move the bodies at the extremities of the balance, 
how the force exerts this power, and how the balance could be used to redistribute the 
moment. Additionally in some passages of his works, he presents an analogy between 
the mechanical model of the balance as a visual representation of a practical instrument 
and the physical situations of bodies moving downwards along a rigid inclined plane. 
Given that the definition of moment as the tendency of a body to move downward is 
caused not so much by the heaviness of the moveable body as by the arrangement which 
different bodies have among themselves, in order to understand why and how a body 
will move at the extremity of the balance, we have to investigate what that tendency is. 
This tendency in the same work is defined as that force with which the mover moves the 
mobile and with which the mobile resists this motion, which force depends not only 
upon simple weight, but also upon the velocity of motion and the various inclinations of 
the spaces in which the motion occurs.363 Therefore, the moment was conceived as the 
motive force that is exerted on the weight, and it is frequently used by Galileo to denote 
the action of a force.  
The main problem deriving from this term ‘moment’, however, is to be found in the 
fact that it was originally a static concept (as is especially the case in Giovanni Battista 
Benedetti’s interpretation, which – according to Mach – was an inspiration to Galileo on 
this occasion), which is now applied in a dynamic context. Indeed in Le Mecaniche, 
Galileo used the term as a purely dynamic concept, recalling that etymologically 
‘moment’ derives from the Latin movimentum (‘movement’). And yet in the Dialogues, 
the term momento (or momento della potenza) denotes the force in the static sense. This 
represents the turning point in the conception of force, because – as we have already 
said – Galileo shifts the attention from “why” to “how” the free falling of bodies could 
be conceived and explained, by looking for a more general principle from which the 
laws of free fall could be deduced.364 
A step forward was reached in Galileo’s mature work, the Two New Sciences, 																																																								
363 Galilei 1960b, pp. 151-52. 
364 For more thoroughgoing investigation on the evolution of the notion of momentum, see Galluzzi 1979 
and Jammer 1957.  
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which contains everything that Galileo had to say on the subject of physics. As Stillman 
Drake has written, “[i]n Galileo’s day there was no such profession as that of physicist. 
The role of the theoretical physicist was played by the philosopher. By temperament 
and tradition, the philosopher liked to generalise and was not unduly perturbed by 
apparent anomalies; indeed, he welcomed them as things to explain, or at any rate to 
explain away. The role of the experimental physicist, to the extent that it was played at 
all, fell to craftsmen, artisans, and mechanics. But philosopher and mechanics did not 
work on the same team, nor was there any apparent reason why they should. 
Consequently, there was a highly developed technology, which was generally not even 
noticed by philosophers, let alone integrated with their physics. Philosophers knew how 
physical objects ought to behave, and cared relatively little if they didn’t always seem to 
behave that way; craftsmen knew how objects behaved and cared relatively little for 
theoretical explanations. Though both were deeply concerned (each in his own way) 
with precision, neither habitually associated that with mathematics.”365 However, Galileo 
represented the exception in his time, since his disposition was almost perfectly 
balanced between the two extremes described above; in fact he liked particularly to 
carry out observation on natural phenomena and generalise about them, since he saw 
mathematics as a common ground of the two demands for precision.366 This attitude was 
certainly helpful, if not absolutely necessary, to the birth of modern physical science, 
namely that someone should formulate mathematical laws without waiting for their 
precise experimental confirmation. The last work published by Galileo in 1638, which 
contains much of his scientific results on physics over the preceding thirty years, may 
thus be considered a manifesto of this emerging mathematical tendency. The Two New 
Sciences is divided into Four “Days”, each of which addresses a different area of 
physics. In the First Day Galileo focuses on topics deriving from Aristotle’s Physics and 																																																								
365 Drake 1970, p. 68. 
366 Drake mentions that this kind of temperament was quite exceptional in that century. For example, 
Marin Mersenne represents the extreme of the critical temperament and was much more involved in 
proving that his experiments with falling bodies departed from the mathematical laws confidently 
announced by Galileo. In contrast, René Descartes privileged the route of generalization over concern for 
precise experimental observations and went in the wrong direction in formulating the general laws of 
physics, such as the laws of impact. 
	 215 
Hellenistic mechanics, and of course also provides an overview on the “two new 
sciences”. The topic of the resistance of bodies to separation leads into a wide 
discussion on infinites and the continuum, the composition of matter, atoms and the 
existence of void. The Second Day’s discussion deals with the strength of materials, and 
the cause of cohesion. Both these arguments rely on the well-known Archimedean law 
of the lever, and the mechanical instrument of the balance is used to support Galileo’s 
experimental and theoretical speculations. Almost all the discussion of the Second Day 
contains the main outcomes stated in the early treatise Le Mecaniche. After this, both 
the Third and the Fourth Days focussed on dynamics and the science of motion. In 
particular, the Third Day discusses uniform and naturally accelerated motion and is 
shaped on the basis of the early treatise De motu locali. It is also divided into three 
parts: i) De motu aequabili, ii) De motu Naturaliter accelerato and iii) De motu 
violento. The Fourth Day calls attention to the projectile motion, and the treatise entitled 
De motu violento seu de proiectis. In the first of these, uniform steady motion is defined 
as “the one in which the distances traversed by the moving particle during any equal 
intervals of time, are themselves equal”367, while the uniformly accelerated motion is 
motion in which the speed increases by the same amount in increments of time. In the 
latter day, the motion of projectiles is defined as a combination of uniform horizontal 
motion and a naturally accelerated vertical motion which produces a parabolic curve.  
This mathematically rigorous method prevails chiefly in the exposition of the last 
two days, and the whole treatise aims at defining the two new sciences, the strength of 
materials and the motion of objects. In this way mechanics is no longer only the science 
either of equilibrium or of statics, but also refers to the motion and the causes of bodies’ 
motion.  
In the first place we can now examine a demonstration which is considered an 
added fragment of the treatise at hand, but which cannot be found in any printed edition 
of it because, according to Raffaele Caverni, there are no suggestions from Galileo’s 
successors and scholars to dating it and reorganising it within the entire exposition of 																																																								
367 Galilei 1914, p. 154. 
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the Discourses. But because the methodology adopted in the demonstration sounds very 
similar to the one found in the youthful treatise Le Mecaniche, I have decided to present 
it first:  
 
Sagredo: Let a balance having unequal arms be suspended at the point C, with AC greater than CB, 
and let us look for the reason why, although we have two equal weights A and B at the ends of the 
balance, the balance will not remain in equilibrium once it is deflected from its horizontal position, 
but rather moves downwards towards the greater arm reaching the EF position (see Figure 4.2).  
The reason that is commonly attributed to this reaction is because the weight of velocity A, when it 
comes down, would be greater than the speed of weight B, because CA’s distance is greater than the 
distance CB. Given that the movable A is equal to the B in weight, it will exceeds it at the moment of 
speed, so A prevails B, and the former (A) goes down by lifting the latter (B). 
We doubt the value of that reason, which seems to have no strong conclusion: it is true that the 
moment of a weight is increasing, together with the speed of the movable, with respect to the 
moment and the velocity of another weight that is made in quiet; however, given that both of the 
weights are at rest, we are not able to see how this kind of behaviour is even possible; And I really 
feel a noticeable difficulty.  
 
Salviati: Your Lordship has very good reason to doubt; and I still am not satisfied with this kind of 
argument. I found myself silent for another very simple and expedient direction, without the support 
of anything other than the very first and common notion, that heavy things go down in all the ways 
that they are allowed. When you put two equal weights in the balance AB, if you let it go freely, it 
will fall to the centre of the heavy things, always maintaining the centre of its gravity (which is the 
middle point D) in the line that goes to the centre of the world; but if you run into a bump under the 
centre D, the motion of the balance will be stopped. So let the balance in equilibrium in its position. 
But if the obstruction gets out of centre D, as it would be in C, such an obstruction will not stop the 
balance, but will divert the centre D from the perpendicular towards which it was walking and make 
it down by the DO arc.  
In this way the balance with the two weights is one and only one heavy body, whose centre of 
gravity is the point D, and this only body will fall as far as it can, and its fall is governed by its own 
centre of gravity: the centre D falls in O, and so what goes down is the whole system of weight 
composed of the two initial weight A and B and the balance too. The answer to the question why the 
inclined balance moves downwards to the side of the heaviest body is that an entire weight comes 
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down and approaches what can be the common centre of all the graves (or centre of the world).368  
 
              
 
Figure 4.2 
 
What should be noticed from this passage is that, first of all, it resembles the arguments 
used at the beginning of Le Mecaniche, which in turn show some affinities with 
Guidobaldo’s abstraction. In particular, the passage maintaining “[…] the centre D falls 
in O, and so what goes down is the whole system of weight composed of the two initial 																																																								
368 As stated above, this fragment cannot be found in the printed version of the 1638 treatise, so there is no 
official English trans. of it. Galilei 1831, p. 154. The Italian text runs: 
Sagr. Sia sostenuta nel punto C la libra di bracci diseguali, AC maggiore, CB minor; cercasi la 
cagione onde avvenga che, posti nell’estremità due pesi eguali, A, B, la libra non resti in quiete ed 
equilibrio, ma inclini dalla parte del braccio maggiore, trasferendosi come in EF. La ragione che 
comunemente se ne assegna è perché la velocità del peso A, nello scendere, sarebbe maggiore della 
velocità del peso B, per essere la distanza CA maggiore della CB; ode il mobile A, quanto al peso, eguale 
al B, lo supera quanto al momento della velocità, e però gli prevale, e scende sollevando l’altro. Dubitasi 
circa il valore di tal ragione, la quale pare che non abbi forza di concludere: perché è ben vero che il 
momento di un grave si accresce, congiunto con velocità, sopra il momento di un grave eguale che sia 
costituito in quiete; ma che, posti amendue in quiete, cioè dove non sia pur moto, non che velocità 
maggiore di un’altra, quella maggioranza che non è, ma ancora ha da essere, possa produrre un effetto 
presente, ha qualche durezza nel potersi apprendere; ed io veramente ci sento difficultà notabile.  
Salv. V. S. ha molto ben ragione di dubitare; ed io ancora non restando ben soddisfatto di simile 
discorso, trovai di quietarmi per un altro verso molto semplice e speditivo, senza suppor niente altro che 
la prima e comunissima nozione, cioè che le cose gravi vanno all’in giù in tutte le maniere che gli viene 
permesso. Quando nella libbra AB voi ponete due pesi eguali, se voi la lascerete andare liberamente, ella 
se ne calerà al centro delle ose gravi, mantenendo sempre il centro della sua gravità (che è il punto di 
mezzo D) nella retta che da esso va al centro universale; ma se voi a cotal moto opporrete un intoppo 
sotto il centro D, il moto si fermerà, restando la libra con i suoi pesi in equilibrio; ma se l’intoppo si 
metterà fuor del centro D, come sarebbe in C, tale intoppo non fermerà la bilancia, ma devierà il centro 
D dalla perpendicolare per la quale camminava, e lo farà scendere per l’arco DO. Insomma la libbra 
con i due pesi è un corpo ed un grave solo, il cui centro della gravità è il punto D, e questo solo corpo 
grave scenderà quanto potrà, e la sua scesa è regolata dal centro di gravità suo proprio: quando voi gli 
supponete il sostegno, il centro D cala in O, e così quel che scende è tutto il corpo aggregato e composto 
della libra e i suoi pesi. La risposta, dunque, propria alla interrogazione perché inclina la libbra etc. è 
perchè, come quella che è una mole solo, scende e si avvicina quanto può al centro comune di tutti i 
gravi. 
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weight A and B and the balance too […]”369 makes an explicit use of the point mass 
model as a representation for the entire system of the balance. This argument supports 
exactly our main hypothesis, inasmuch it might be used to maintain that in this period of 
transition (between the Renaissance and the modern period) the abstraction method, 
which stands behind the notion of the material point, is a customary and explicit 
procedure. This passage represents one more proof in support of the controversy 
triggered by Luca Valerio in his Quadratura Parabolae per simplex falsum. The 
mechanical procedures commonly used by Archimedes in the Greek period and usually 
referred to in a geometrical context now bring to bear in the field of the science de 
ponderibus, with the result that the mechanical instruments are used to represent not 
only artisanal and practical evidence, but also natural phenomena that can be simplified 
by using representations which have a mechanical structure.  
At the beginning of the second day of the Discourses, after having established the 
condition of equilibrium, Galileo lets his characters deal with the following issue:  
 
Salviati: […] [I]f what preceded is clear [sc. referring to the condition of equilibrium of two weights 
suspended at a certain equal distance from the centre of suspension of the balance], you will not 
hesitate, I think, to admit that two prisms AD and DB are in equilibrium about the point C, since one 
half of the whole body AB lies on the right of the suspension C and the other half on the left; in other 
words, this arrangement is equivalent to two equal weights disposed at equal distances. I do not see 
how anyone can doubt, if the two prisms D and DB were transformed into cubes, spheres, or into 
any other figure whatever, and if G and F were retained as points of suspension, that they would 
remain in equilibrium about the point C, for it is only too evident that a change of figure does not 
produce a change of weight so long as the mass [quantity of mass] does not vary. From this we may 
derive the general conclusion that any two heavy bodies are in equilibrium at distances which are 
inversely proportional to their weights.  
This principle established, I desire, before passing to any other subject, to call your attention to 
the fact that these forces, resistance, moments, figures, etc., may be considered either in the abstract, 
dissociated from matter, or in the concrete, associated with matter. Hence the properties which 
belong to the figures that are merely geometrical and non-material must be modified when we fill 																																																								
369 “[…] il centro D cala in O, e così quel che scende è tutto il corpo aggregato e composto della libra e i 
suoi pesi […]”. 
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these figures with matter and therefore give them weight. Take, for example, the lever BA which, 
resting upon the support E, is used to lift a heavy stone D. The principle just demonstrated makes it 
clear that a force applied at the extremity B will just suffice to equilibrate the resistance offered by 
the heavy body D, provided this force [momento] bears to the force [momento] at D the same ratio as 
the distance AC bears to the distance CB; and this is true so long as we consider only the moments 
of the single force at B and the resistance at D, treating the lever as an immaterial body devoid of 
weight. But if we take into account the weight of the lever itself – an instrument which may be made 
either of wood or of iron – it is manifest that, when this weight has been added to the force at B, the 
ratio will be changed and must therefore be expressed in different terms. Hence before going further, 
let us agree to distinguish between these two points of view; when we consider an instrument in the 
abstract, i.e. apart from the weight of its own material, we shall speak of “taking it in an absolute 
sense” [prendere assolutamente]; but if we fill one of these simple and absolute figures with matter 
and thus give it weight, we shall refer to such a material figure as a “moment” or compound force! 
[momento o forza composta]  
 
Sagredo: I must break my resolution about not leading you off into a digression; for I cannot 
concentrate my attention upon what is to follow until a certain doubt is removed from my mind, 
namely, you seem to compare the force at B with the total weight of the stone D, a part of which – 
possibly the greater part – rests upon the horizontal plane: so that … – 
 
Salviati: I understand perfectly: you need to go on further. However please observe that I have not 
mentioned the total weight of the stone, and [this] varies with its shape and elevation.  
 
Sagredo: Good: but there occurs to me another question about which I am curious. For a complete 
understanding of this matter, I should like you to show me, if possible, how we can determine what 
part of the total weight is supposed by the underlying plane and what part by the end A of the lever. 
 
Salviati: The explanation will not delay request. In the accompanying figure, let us understand that 
the weight having its centre of gravity at A rests with the end B upon the horizontal plane and with 
the other end upon the lever CG. Let N be the fulcrum of a lever to which the force [potenza] is 
applied at G. Let the perpendiculars, AO and CF, fall from the centre A and the end C. Then, I say, 
the magnitude [momento] of the entire weight bears to the magnitude of the force [momento della 
potenza] at G a ratio compounded of the ratio between the two distances GN and NC and the ratio 
between FB and BO. Lay off a distance X such that its ratio to NC is the same as that of BO to FB; 
then, since the total weight A is counterbalanced by the two forces at B and at C, it follows that the 
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force at B is to that at C as the distance FO is to the distance OB. Hence [componendo] the sum of 
the force C at band C, that is, the total weight A [momento di tutto il peso A], is to the force at C as 
the line FB is to the line BO, that is, as NC is to X: but the force [momento della potenza] applied at 
C is to the force applied at G as the distance GN is to the distance NC; hence it follows [ex aequali 
in proportione perturbata370] that the entire weight A is to the force applied at G as the distance GN is 
to X. But the ratio of GN to X is compounded of the ratio of GN to NC and of NC to X, that is, of FB 
to BO; hence, the weight A bears to the equilibrating force at G a ratio compounded of that of GN to 
NC and of F to BO: which was to be proved.371  																																																								
370 Having been affected (or disrupted) in equal proportion. 
371 Galilei 1914, pp. 112-115.  
Salv. Inteso sin qui, non credo che voi porrete difficoltà in ammettere che i due prismi AD, DB 
facciano l’equilibrio dal punto C, perchè la metà di tutto ‘l solido AB è alla destra della sospensione C, e 
l’altra metà dalla sinistra, e che così si vengon a rappresentar due pesi eguali disposti e distesi in due 
distanze eguali. Che poi li due prismi AD, DB ridotti in due dadi, o in due palle, o in due qual’altre si 
siano figure (purchè si conservino le sospensioni medesime G, F), seguitino di far l’equilibrio dal punto 
C, non credo che sia alcuno che ne possa dubitare, perchè troppo manifesta cosa è che le figure non 
mutano peso, dove si ritenga la medesima quantità di materia. Dal che possiamo raccor la general 
conclusione, che due pesi, qualunque si siano, fanno l’equilibrio da distanze permutatamente respondenti 
alle lor gravità. Stabilito dunque tal principio, Avanti che passiamo più oltre devo metter in 
cosiderazione come queste forze, resistenze, momenti, figure, etc., si posson considerar in astratto e 
separate dalla materia, ed anco in concreto e congiunte con la materia; ed in questo modo quelli 
accidenti che converranno alle figure considerate come immateriali, riceveranno alcune modificazioni 
mentre li aggiugneremo la materia, ed in consequenza la gravità. Come, per esempio, se noi intenderemo 
una leva, qual sarebbe questa BA, la quale, posando su ‘l sostegno E, sia applicata per sollevare il grave 
sasso D, è manifesto, per il dimostrato principio, che la forza posta nell’estrmità B basterà per adequare 
la resistenza del grave D, se il suo momento al momento di esso D abbia la medesima proporzione che ha 
la distanza AC dalla distanza CB; e questo è vero, non mettendo in considerazione altri momenti che 
quelli della semplice forza in B e della resistenza in D, quasi che l’istessa leva fusse immateriale e senza 
gravità: ma se noi metteremmo in conto la gravità ancora dello strumento stesso della leva, la quale sarà 
talor di legno e talvolta anco di ferro, è manifesto che, alla forza in B aggiunto il peso della leva, altererà 
la proporzione, la quale converrà pronunziare sotto altri termini. E però, prima che passar più oltre, è 
necessario che noi convenghiamo in por distinzione tra queste due maniere di considerare, chiamando un 
prendere assolutamente quello quando intenderemo lo strumento preso in astratto, cioè separato dalla 
gravità della propria materia; ma congiugnendo con le figure semplici ed assolute la materia, con la 
gravità ancora, nomineremo le figure congiunte con la materia momento o forza composta. 
Sagr. È forza ch’io rompa il proposito che vevo di non dar occasione di digredire; ma non potrei 
con attenzione applicarmi al rimanente, se non mi fusse rimosso certo scrupolo che mi nasce; ed è 
questo: che mi pare che V. S. faccia comparazione della forza posta in B con la total gravità del sasso D, 
della qual gravità mi pare che una parte, e forse forse la maggiore, si appoggi sopra ‘l piano 
dell’orizonte; sì che … 
Salv. Ho inteso benissimo, V. S. non soggiunga altro ma solamente avverta che io non ho nominata 
la gravità totale del sasso, ma ho parlato del momento che egli tiene ed esercita sopra ‘l punto A, 
estremo termine della leva BA; il quale è sempre minore dell’intero peso del sasso, ed è, variabile 
secondo la figura della pietra e secondo che ella vien più o meno sollevata.  
Sagr. Resto appagato; ma mi nasce un altro desiderio, che è, che per intera cognizione mi fusse 
dimostrato il modo, se vi è, di poter investigare qual parte sia del peso totale quella che vien sostenuta 
dal soggetto piano, e quale quella che grava su ‘l vette nell’estremità A.  
	 221 
  
  
Figure 4.3 
 
This passage has, first of all, something in common with the previous one, namely that 
it deals with the new notion of moment, which refers to the action of a body on a 
mechanical system, or more precisely, to the tendency of moving downwards composed 
of heaviness, position and everything else by which this tendency may be caused. 
Apropos of this aspect, two features need to be emphasised: i) each body in the 
demonstrations is replaced with a material point detached of its natural weight or its 
volume, so that it becomes an heavy point mass – the weight is imagined to be 
concentrated in the centre of mass; and ii) on each body moving downwards a specific 
force exerts its tendency, and it is equally distributed over the entire surface of the body; 
however, the force is imagined to be directed only on the centre of gravity – or the 
centre of pressure – of the moving body. Therefore, it is clear that Galileo’s thought is 
perfectly in harmony with the entirety of sixteenth-century mechanics whose 
background already hinged on the causes of motion. However, the precise definition of 																																																																																																																																																																		
Salv. Perchè posso con poche parole dargli sodisfazzione, non voglio lasciar di servirla. Però, 
facendone un poco di figura, intenda V. S. il peso il cui centro di gravità sia A, appoggiato sopra 
l’orizonte co ‘l termine B, e nell’altro sia sostenuto col vette CG, sopra ‘l sostegno N, da una potenza 
posta in G; e dal centro A e dal termine C caschino, perpendicolari all’orizzonte, AO, CF: dico, il 
momento di tutto il peso al momento della potenza in G aver la proporzion composta della distanza GN 
alla distanza NC e della FB alla BO. Facciasi, come la linea FB alla BO, così la NC alla X: ed essendo 
tutto il peso A sostenuto dalle due potenze poste in B e C, la potenza B alla C è come la distanza FO alla 
OB; e componendo, le due potenze B, C insieme, cioè il total momento di tutto ‘l peso A, alla potenza in 
C è come la linea FB alla BO, cioè come la NC alla X: ma il momento della potenza in C al momento 
della potenza in G è come la distanza GN alla NC: adunque, per la perturbata, il total peso A al 
momento della potenza in G è come la GN alla X. Ma la poroporzione di GN ad X è composta della 
proporzione di GN ad NC e di quella di NC ad X, cioè di FB a BO; adunque il peso A alla potenza che lo 
sostiene in G ha la proporzione composta della GN ad NC e di quella di FB a BO: ch’è quello che si 
doveva dimostrare. Galilei 2005b, pp. 684-687. 
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force as a gravitational force that causes the falling of bodies cannot be attributed to 
Galileo himself. He in fact studied the kinematic aspects of motion, a motion originated 
mainly in a constant force, without delving into the nature of force in itself. 
Within this historical framework Galileo showcases some anticipation of the 
development of what we define as force and what we define as work. In fact, a 
differentiation between the two concepts had already appeared clearly in the 
introductory part of Galileo’s Le Mecaniche372, but it was with Descartes and his 
reflection on the operations of simple machines that this distinction was made fully 
explicit.373  
A second aspect that emerges from the last passage relates to the idea that machines 
are no longer characterised by the fact that they conserve an abstract quantity, or that 
they should be used practically by artisans or engineers – as it was said in the 
introduction of Le Mecaniche – but that they are built and interpreted as idealized and 
representative devices that could be used to cheat nature. In the statement: “[…] forces, 
resistance, moments, figures, etc., may be considered either in the abstract, dissociated 
from matter, or in the concrete, associated with matter. Hence the properties which 
belong to the figures that are merely geometrical and non-material must be modified 
when we fill these figures with matter and therefore give them weight”, we can find the 																																																								
372 Galilei 1890-1909b, pp. 147-190.  
373 As far as the classical concept of force is concerned, Galileo’s contribution to the development of the 
notion of force is related to the one given by Kepler. While the latter arrived at his concept as a result of 
his astronomical investigations, Galileo studied the kinematic aspects of motion originated by a constant 
force without examining properly the nature of force itself. Moreover, he rejected any conjecture about 
the true essence of force, so he avoided any purely metaphysical considerations. Rather Galileo declares 
in his Discourses (1638) that force is first and foremost a physical concept. In the Third Day of the 
Dialogue he furthermore grappled with an intuitive notion of force and sought an exact formulation: he 
gave ‘force’ by definition an “agency that caused unnatural motion and is a sort of intruder in the 
otherwise harmonious system of natural process.” In sixteenth-century mechanics forza (force) was used 
as a synonym, and in his writing we can find more than just two terms, such as forza, potenze, virtù, 
possanza, momento della potenza, etc. In his works impeto is widely used to express the instantaneous 
action of a force and is taken for what we call “impulse”; however, his favourite term is momento (a 
notion which is already analysed in the current section). From the analysis of Galileo’s whole corpus, it 
emerges that he was one of the first thinkers to compare and distinguish two different concepts: i) 
muscular force (the impelling force or the impetus) and ii) the force of gravity. “In fact, when the stone, 
thrown upwards, attains its highest position, its momentary state of rest is for Galileo an indication that 
these two forces, the ‘impressed impetus’ and the ‘weight of a body’, are in equilibrium”. In his 
Dialogues, where this twofold definition could be found, Galileo comes very near to the modern notion of 
force. For further details, see Jammer 1957, pp. 94-115.  
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kernel of model-building practice which is not limited to the model of balance, but is 
extended even to the simplest bodies in nature. It is likely that this transition, and this 
new way of observing natural phenomena, was suggested to Galileo by his 
reformulation of the treatment of mechanical phenomena by means of the concept of 
moment. 374  Writers like Guidobaldo had previously maintained that mechanical 
phenomena stood outside nature, or that technicians and craftsmen worked in 
opposition to the laws of their disciplines, even though they did not claim that they were 
able to overstep the boundaries of what was possible. Rather they merely indicated their 
awareness of the Aristotelian way of identifying objects by the origin of their principles 
of coming into existence and being organised. Yet, on the contrary, when Galileo states 
that it is impossible to achieve any effect that is “outside the constitution of nature”, he 
is trying to ascertain the boundaries between the possible and the impossible, between 
what is natural and what is not. 
The new forward step that Galileo took by following this approach consisted in the 
idea that machines – above all the classical balance – were conceived as instruments for 
building discursive practices over artisanal ones. These instruments, the model of 
balance and the point mass model are investigative tools used to confer a discursive 
structure onto the phenomenal world. This process takes the name of model-building 
practice, suggested by a free play of the imagination, and thus machines were only 
constrained by the intentions that must be put into practice. Galileo hereby regiments 
this play of the imagination through his abstract analyses; he is effectively stressing that 
certain things are “absolutely impossible to accomplish with any machine imagined or 
imaginable”.375  
In Galileo’s thought we can find two different steps of the idealization procedure. 
The first relates to single bodies, in which he has his mouthpiece Sagredo says, that the 
change of shape of the body hanging at the extremity of the balance does not have any 
																																																								
374 van Dyck 2006, p. 144. 
375 Galilei Opere II, pp. 156-157. See also Galilei 2002, p. 46.  
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influence on the loss of equilibrium.376 Thus, the representation given by the theory 
stated by Galileo does not change whether the bodies are transformed into cubes, 
spheres, or any other figures; this means that any figure can also be represented by a 
simple geometrical point made devoid of its weight intended as volume. The second 
step deserving of mention relates to the idea that the balance or lever in itself henceforth 
became an instrument devoid of natural properties, and was used to represent any other 
phenomena that resemble, for some properties, the balance in itself. To be more clear, 
we should stress this point again: whether in the second half of the sixteenth century the 
centre of gravity represents an idealized instrument that stands for the bodies hanging at 
the extremities of the balance, or whether the idealization procedure was restricted to 
rigid bodies only, at the turn of the new century, “the identity of a machine no longer 
lies in its functional organisation of material to a specific end, but in the fact that it is a 
closed system that conserves the amount of moment that is put into it. It is the unity of 
nature rather than the intention of men that constitutes their ontological character.”377  
The machines being no longer useful tools for attaining specific practical purposes, 
they enter now into the new century as investigative tools, and in a parallel 
development, the centre of gravity becomes a general and independent intelligible entity 
used for analysing and solving purposes extrinsic to their specific functioning. The way 
in which they behave becomes a general method used to represent a large variety of 
natural phenomena, and by understanding the pragmatic functioning of the balance – as 
Renaissance mechanics was perfectly able to do – we can understand a greater variety 
of phenomena that follow almost the same physical principles by the weighing practice. 
The balance in turn becomes a means for investigating the working process of nature, as 
a representational model of what is going on in the phenomenal world. In this sense, 
Galileo has to be considered the one who gave to those practical tools – indeed to 
machines in general – the role of investigative tools, rather than merely a means of 																																																								
376 Here there ought to be pointed out the difference in meaning between force and weight. As Jammer 
maintains in his book on the concept of force, in Galileo’s early writing the concept of force is nearly 
equivalent to weight. This is an inheritance from the Archimedean conception, according to which force 
and weight can be seen as a natural inclination of a body to move nearer to the centre of the world.  
377 van Dyck 2006, p. 148. 
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representation. However, as he himself says in the Fourth Day of his Discourses, they 
(i.e. machines) should be considered as tools that not only represent the physical reality, 
but even stand for it, or rather that they do not depart from the physical reality in itself, 
no matter how idealized they are. We can always add back the properties that have 
undergone idealization in order to bring those models closer to the particular 
phenomenon at hand.   
 
What happens in the concrete […] happens the same way in the abstract. It would indeed be 
surprising if computations made in abstract number did not thereafter correspond to actual gold and 
silver coins and merchandise. Did you know what does happen, Simplicio? Just as the accountant 
who wants his calculations to deal with sugar, silk and wool must subtract the boxes, bales, and 
other packings, so the mathematical physicist, when he wants to recognize in the concrete the effects 
which he has proven in the abstract, must deduct the material hindrances; and if he is able to do that, 
I assure you that matters are in no less agreement than for arithmetical computations. The sources of 
errors, then, lie not in the abstractness or concreteness, not in geometry or physics, but in a 
calculator [sc. as the user of this method] who does not know how to make a true accounting.378  
 
For Galileo the question of how much an abstract model, designed on the basis of the 
mechanistic operations of craftsmen, departs from reality does not make any sense, 
because he was completely confident in the idea that nature in itself is written in a 
mathematical language and codes.  
For these reasons, by understanding how the balance acquired representational 
power, we can also understand how the geometrical centre of gravity could be 
conceived as a point mass model that stands for natural bodies, no matter how they are 
shaped and no matter whether they are at rest or in motion. The point mass could thus 
be considered as a sort of preliminary notion compared with the balance, because, 
before entering into the analysis of complex phenomena, or a state of affairs involving a 
system of moving or accelerated rigid bodies, we should understand the behaviour of 
single simple bodies.  
The balance as a machine is, in Galileo’s time, thought of as exemplifying 																																																								
378 Galilei 1914, pp. 207-208.  
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inviolable invariance, and human intentions have become extrinsic to their ontological 
identity, so that the idea of using mechanical tools in investigating natural principles 
also loses much of its paradoxical character. While in Luca Valerio’s treatises there are 
worries about the legitimacy of the attribution of purely mathematical notions to 
geometrical entities, now with Galileo, when it is admitted that the basic principles of 
this new mechanical science express the limits of our manipulative capabilities, it 
becomes natural to investigate these exactly through manipulations. It is through our 
way of interacting with nature that nature now can truly show itself for the first time. 
This allows mathematical instruments that had been primarily practical problem-solving 
tools now also to function as investigative tools.379 Galileo thus regiments the model-
building practice, especially in the Two New Sciences, in which Simplicio, the 
spokesman for the Hellenistic and Scholastic tradition, and Salviati, Galileo’s mediator, 
debate the techniques of idealization that underlie the proposed ‘new science’ of 
mechanics. The former strongly objects to these techniques, because they tend to falsify 
the real world which is not regular, as the idealized laws would make it seem, but rather 
complicated and messy. The latter, on the contrary, claims that by choosing the right set 
of conditions we can reach the right way of representing the complexity of the empirical 
world. By choosing the invariances that underlie the phenomena taken into account, we 
can create isolated subsystems which have the role of representing the empirical 
phenomena at hand. There is, of course, a set of conditions that need to be followed: 
crucially, “one has to choose the right level of abstraction.”380 
Galileo was able to achieve a level of isolation of real properties and thereby take 
them under the same approximated closed systems (closed in the sense that the 
representational system which we are building up is constituted by a series of similar 
and stable properties behaving analogously). This is the preliminary commitment to the 
development of full-fledged mathematical theories381, and it represents the second key 
issue of his research: 																																																								
379 Bennett 1986, p. 2. 
380 van Dyck 2006, p. 153. 
381 For a detailed analysis see van Dyck 2006, chapters 6 and 7, and McMullin 1985, pp. 247-73.  
	 227 
 
This way of proceeding actually installs the specific interplay between universality and locality that 
has become so specific for modern physical sciences. If one has been able, in a very specific and 
local situation, to isolate a sufficiently closed system that shows some stable behaviour, one can 
transfer the lessons learned from this behaviour to all similar situations. And one can do this exactly 
because this stability expresses what lies outside our manipulative capabilities and hence must be 
ascribed to nature.382 [my italics] 
 
According to Galileo, the model has to represent the invariances observed in natural 
phenomena. In his works, the virtual balance plays this very role, and the same has to be 
attributed to the pendulum system or the inclined plane. We can use these models as a 
system for helping scientists to build up the laws that stand behind nature. This led 
Galileo to make abstract mathematical representations of concrete physical events.  
Irrespective of whether or not we can overcome ideally true propositions by purely 
material hindrances or by machines for Guidobaldo, for Galileo this natural limit cannot 
be violated, and machines cannot be used to violate nature. Guidobaldo is thus offering 
a picture of theoretical mathematics that is somewhat different from the one expounded 
by Galileo. The former is still too much related to practical and material considerations. 
Galileo, by contrast, introduced a frictionless fulcrum of a balance, a frictionless, 
inclined plane, or a pendulum which oscillates with the same frequency, without 
considering the fact that a real pendulum reduces its frequency of oscillations over time. 
When we move to Galileo’s thought, the conditions under which something can count 
as a deviation from true principles apparently becomes changed. I propose to interpret 
this change as follows: what for Guidobaldo was an invalid abstraction becomes an 
innocuous idealization for Galileo. Guidobaldo was still too heavily anchored to 
mechanics, because his theory relies on the purpose of giving practical scope to the 
investigation of the phenomenon of equilibrium. He belonged to the century in which 
the main interest lay in practical physics, in making suppositions in order to build real 
artisanal machines, using the outcomes of his theory in order to build instruments of 																																																								
382 van Dyck 2006, p. 154. 
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precision. Galileo, and previously Luca Valerio, albeit in a less precise and mature way, 
both represent a change in the way of approaching mechanics and looking at the 
practice, because they wanted to build a purely mathematical form of physics and 
mechanics. They want to make sure that the laws can be applied to general phenomena. 
As van Dyck sees it, “Galileo sees a continuum from a fulcrum with friction towards an 
ideal fulcrum which only alters the way in which the precise relations show up in 
empirical reality.”383 Here, Galileo shows his awareness of the difference between a 
mechanical and a geometrical approach – linked to the name of his tutor – with an 
approach that is designed to offer the foundations of future mathematical physics:  
 
Experience bore Guido out in a sense, as some power is lost in actual simple machines; [...] [y]et 
Guido was in the habit of showing side by side material machines and schematic figures of them, 
and as a mathematician he should have been able to see the idealized truth. The fact that he did not 
is strong evidence that it is simpler for us to see this than it was for Galileo, who was the first to do 
so. Nor is this surprising; it was he who made it simpler for us.384  
 
Regardless of whether Guidobaldo was able to see an idealized truth in the moving 
point along the downward motion of the balance’s arms, Galileo interpreted this truth as 
a truth impacting on bodies and nature in itself. In fact he says that the truth expressed 
by this representation does not depart from reality, and has to be interpreted as the truth 
about reality in itself. This idea derives from the fact that throughout his career, Galileo 
was aware that nature was written in the abstract language of mathematics, and that any 
practical mechanism could be used in order to understand how nature works and 
behaves. Again, whilst Guidobaldo was using the moving point mass as an abstract 
body detached from its purely physical content, and whereas he was not confident in 
using this as a vehicle for truth concerning real-world phenomena, Galileo, on the other 
																																																								
383 Ibid., p. 164. 
384 Ibid., p. 165. See further the translator’s footnote in Galilei 1960b, pp. 166-167, n. 24.  
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hand, was the advocate of the idea that idealization truly expressed the course of nature. 
Nature should hence be investigated by applying these general models; machines should 
assume a theoretical layer in order to be used as investigative tools for a general 
framework by which to study a series of phenomena through common instances. 
Although the question of the extent to which the model departed from the real 
situation has already been introduced, we should focus more on the necessary answer 
for it. This is so especially because our claim already stands in favour of the idea that 
the conclusions which we as users draw from models are not suitable for truth, but 
rather that they are surrogative inferences which need to be adapted to the observations. 
By adopting the Galilean point of view, let us now consider the following comparison. 
The most peculiar property of a pendulum is its isochrony, i.e. whatever the amplitude 
given to a swing, the time it takes to execute that swing remain unchanged. As a 
consequence, the pendulum seems to be a particularly interesting closed system, 
comparable with but at the same time interestingly different from a balance. Most 
importantly, since any swing always starts from zero speed, isochrony is only 
intelligible if we take into account that any downward motion is accelerated, and that 
this acceleration moreover obeys precise proportions which make the overall time 
always come out as equal. No matter what was the precise historical chronology 
between his empirical discovery of isochrony and his mathematical derivation of the 
law of chords, it is clear that once Galileo had realized this connection, he was 
determined to see what could be learned from it concerning the proportions 
characterising all natural accelerations.385 
The issue we attempt here to argue can be rephrased in the form of the following 
question: is the idealization something that allows us to observe the phenomenon under 
study in its ideal circumstances, where precise ratios can be discerned, or are we rather 
dealing with an illegitimate abstraction where we illicitly alter the scope of the theory 
(from natural to fictitious situations)? Why would the idealized situation teach us 																																																								
385 For more details, see van Dyck 2006, pp. 172-173; Machamer and Hepburn 2004, pp. 333-347 and 
Wisan 1974, p. 175.  
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something valuable about the real freefall of bodies, or about the real instrument of the 
pendulum, to enable us to claim that in a void they would fall with equal speeds, when 
we see arising clear differences in their speeds in all actual instances? Aren’t we just 
dealing with a different kind of phenomenon? For example, in the First Day of the 
treatise, Galileo takes as a model the situation in which all the bodies fall freely in the 
void, since in this environment all bodies exhibit the same behaviour independently 
from any other factors. Here Galileo is only constructing a theoretical model with a 
certain grade of simplicity and generality; but in fact, there will never be the case of a 
body moving in the void. The achievement reached by Galileo is the following: it has 
been shown that the proper domain to model freefall mathematically is fall within a 
void, since in this environment all bodies will exhibit the same behaviour, 
independently from any other factors. Notice that he has not yet established the exact 
relations constituting such models; this will only be done in the Third Day of the 
Discourses, where the ‘times squared’ relation will find its place in an elaborated 
deductive structure built on the supposition of uniform acceleration. That the models 
thus constructed will still be relevant for all actual occurrences of freefall is secured by 
his particular experimental procedure, which guarantees that the case of fall in a void 
is not merely the simplest case, but the most general. There can thus be no question of 
an invalid abstraction. By isolating all the proper dissimilarities between different kind 
of bodies with respect to the phenomenon of freefall, it becomes possible for Galileo to 
attribute the presence of the “pure phenomenon” to actually occurring instances of 
freefall, even if these might show considerable deviations from the theoretical models. 
The model represents the pure phenomenon by means of the target system. He 
maintains that: 
 
No firm science can be given of such events [accidenti] of heaviness, speed, and shape, which are 
variable in infinitely many ways. Hence to deal with such matters scientifically, it is necessary to 
abstract from them. We must find and demonstrate conclusions abstracted from the impediments, in 
order to make use of them in practice under those limitations that experience will teach us.386 																																																								
386 Galilei 1974, p. 225.  
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To this end he then tries to estimate the effect of air friction on different kind of bodies 
and under different conditions (again using the pendulum as an investigative tool).  
In this last work Galileo is doing something strikingly new: he is learning 
something about the ideal case (the model) in which bodies exhibit their behaviour from 
the way in which they are disturbed by the presence of a medium (an interactive 
medium, i.e. matter). In order to do “science” Galileo maintains that we need to rely 
upon our conclusions on abstraction. Although he is still not giving a scientific 
treatment of the disturbances themselves, he shows how to exploit their presence to 
epistemic ends. Thus, Galileo shows how to retract a meaningful signal from the noisy 
real-world behaviour by looking at how signal and disturbances interact with each other.  
In Galileo, we find a precursor of what in Bachelard and in van Dyck is called 
‘phenomenotechnique’; and the transition from a phenomenon to a 
phenomenotechnique is what makes possible a mathematical science of nature. His 
idealizations are instantiations of practice deriving from establishing or regimenting the 
use of imagination for building up rules for engaging with material objects. In Galileo’s 
eyes, we can start to discern stable relationships (if they are to be found – this is of 
course never guaranteed) which can be modelled mathematically as constant ratios. The 
high level of applicability and management which every model shows allow us to fit 
them to a cluster of similar states of affairs. Moreover, this is the language of 
mathematics which is seen as an abstract layer that overlaps with nature in itself. The 
material point, from our point of view, is a kind of primary model which is used in 
order to build more complex models such as the model of the balance, and so on. These 
models’ representative power relies on the fact that they can account for the 
exemplification of principles of natural philosophy and thus can be used to generate 
evidence for our physical theories. The ground for this representative power must be 
sought in the discursive function of nature, but crucially a further question arises from 
this issue: why can these concrete material objects be represented in turn on an abstract 																																																																																																																																																																		
De i quali accidenti di gravità, di velocità, ed anco di figura, come variabili in modi infiniti, non si può 
dar ferma scienza: e però, per poter scientificamente trattar cotal materia, bisogna astrar da essi, e 
ritrovate e dimostrate le conclusioni astratte da gl’impedimenti, servircene, nel praticarle, con quelle 
limitazioni che l'esperienza ci verrà insegnando. Galilei 2005b, p. 779.  
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level through mathematical structures exemplified in geometrical diagrams or figures? 
Galileo has no methodological instruments to attempt to reply to this question, since the 
purely algebraic method is still far off, at least in its modern formulations. 
 
 
4.2 The Modern Turns 
 
In the second half of the seventeenth century Italy was no longer the main centre in 
Europe for the development of mathematics and physics as independent disciplines; this 
role was left mainly to France, the Netherlands and England. It was, however, the 
century labelled as the ‘Golden Age’. The great variety of catalogues and archives 
collected during the Renaissance period were no longer of exclusive access to the Italian 
scholars; now the development of the printing press system, joined with the growth of 
the means of communication and transport, allowed for the rapid spread of knowledge, 
gaining in turn to an increased exchange of knowledge between scholars who had the 
same scientific interests. This was also a period of great and significant transformation 
in the fields of politics and religion, both of which underwent intense cultural and 
economic development.  
The Netherlands, for example, promoted the dissemination of scientific knowledge 
through the creation of new schools at a local level. Higher studies were also enhanced 
and the University of Leiden387, founded in 1575, became one of the most popular in 
Northern Europe. A special role for the development of mathematics was played by the 
surveyors, who faced complex problems for the preparation of reliable nautical and land 
charts required for the trade policies of the new state. This fervor of scientific activity 
set to root an important cultural tradition.  
In England too the seventeenth century saw a revival of the sciences in general and 
these exact sciences in particular. It was not that there had not been great British 
scientists before this time, but, excepting William Harvey (1578–1657) and William 																																																								
387 In Leiden in 1638 the first editio of the Discourses was also published, which however failed to found 
any promoter in Italy, due to Galileo’s excommunication from the Church.  
	 233 
Gilbert (1544–1603), these were sporadic cases. According to some historians, the real 
flowering of British science started around the 1640s, in particular in connection with 
the beginning of the Puritan Revolution, before the restoration of the British monarchy 
in 1658. Although there is no unanimity on this point, it is likely that a close connection 
could be attributed between the Puritan movement and scientific improvement. 
The main attempt of this century was thus directed towards the solution of all the 
problems that afflicted Galileo. The mathematics of this century saw the birth and early 
development of the infinitesimal calculus, known as Calculus as the alternative to the 
existing mathematics. The very necessity of its development was certainly determined 
by the problems posed by physics, in particular by mechanics, which could be solved 
only in part by Hellenistic geometry or unsophisticated Renaissance algebra. For 
example, many much-discussed problems were related to the kinematics of accelerated 
motion, the determination of the maximum range of a cannon, the direction of reflection 
of the light incident on non-planar surfaces, and the determination of the centroids of 
solid figures having complex forms.  
Still in the same century the foundation of the method of indivisibles was also 
generally attributed to Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598–1647), who posited a fully 
geometric method that was very fertile for calculating areas and volumes. He considered 
lines, surfaces and volumes as generated respectively by points, lines and surfaces that 
were added up together. Almost over the same years, Gilles Personne de Roberval 
(1602-1675) developed similar methods. Later on, Evangelista Torricelli (1608-1647), 
following in Cavalieri’s footsteps, arrived upon some extremely interesting and 
apparently paradoxical results, including the demonstration that if one rotates a branch 
of a hyperboloid around an axis, despite the area subtended by the hyperboloid being 
infinite, the volume of the solid of rotation stays as finite. At this time, Galileo and 
Cavalieri had had systematic scientific relations through intense correspondence, since 
the latter was trying to obtain Galileo’s approval for his method of indivisibles, but 
Galileo was always sceptical towards it. The fundamental idea in the Geometria 
indivisibilibus continuorum nova quadam ratione promota (1653) was that it is possible 
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to compare two continua by comparing their indivisibles. This method allowed one to 
measure the area or volume of a plane or solid figure respectively as a continua of lines 
– or plane – parallel with each other. While Cavalieri adopted a geometrical conception 
and was sceptical towards a description of real-world phenomena in purely 
mathematical language, for Galileo the converse was true.   
Unfortunately, the history of the developments of the method of indivisibles is too 
complex to be covered fully here, and it would also entail a dealing with both the 
history of seventeenth-century calculus and the definition of the notion of the 
infinitesimal. But given that this is not the right place to attempt such a reconstruction, 
we will instead choose in the next section (§ 4.2.1) to reconstruct Hobbes’ attempt to 
regiment the role and process of abstraction and idealization from a more philosophical 
– and metaphysical – point of view. 
 
 
4.2.1 Hobbes: Abstraction and Idealization as Acts of Mind 
 
In the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries an intense debate had 
been registered concerning the interrelationship between mathematics and philosophy. 
It involved figures such as the English philosophers John Wallis (1616-1703), Thomas 
Hobbes388, Isaac Barrow (1630-1677) and George Berkeley (1685-1753). This debate 																																																								
388 Thomas Hobbes was born on April 5th 1588 in Malmesbury, and left the city in ca. 1602-1603 in order 
to study at Magdalen Hall, Oxford. After graduating from Oxford in February 1608, Hobbes went to work 
for the Cavendish family, initially only as a tutor to William Cavendish (1590-1628); here, he would 
work for most of the rest of his life, and his work as a philosopher was strongly influenced by the 
Cavendish family’s background and acquaintance with other philosophers and scientists. Hobbes had also 
interacted with various prominent intellectual figures. On a trip around Europe in the mid-1630s, Hobbes 
met Marin Mersenne in Paris; there is here some evidence that he also met Galileo Galilei and that he 
worked as a secretary to Francis Bacon. Hobbes first made a notable impact in his philosophical writings 
in the early 1640s. These included his Elements of Law and De Cive. The Elements of Law is the first 
work in which Hobbes follows his typical systematic pattern of starting with the workings of the mind 
and language, and in turn, developing the discussion towards political matters. De Cive was meanwhile 
conceived as part of a larger work, the Elements of Philosophy, the first part of which turned out to be De 
Corpore, which deals with logic, language, method, metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. About this I 
will have more to say later on in this section. At this time Hobbes also had a series of interactions with 
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concerns the alleged merits of algebra – a blooming field of the new mathematical 
physics – and its struggle with the ranks of geometry. One main point of contention 
concerned one of the larger mathematical questions of the days: our ability to accrue 
reasoning about signs without consideration of their meaning. It was a debate that runs 
parallel to the problem of imaginary numbers, which similarly raised the question of 
reasoning about signs for which there were absolutely no corresponding ideas.  
Accordingly, three main questions surrounding this period of transition were: i) 
Does the use of symbols really shorten mathematics? ii) Is the human mind able to 
reason about symbols, or do the mathematicians need to translate them back into 
appropriate prose expressions or into the ideas for which they originally stood? and iii) 
Can the mathematician draw accurate conclusions – those that we have previously 
labelled surrogative inferences – just by grounding them in symbolic expressions, as for 
instance x2 + y2 = 9, without recalling that the curve under consideration is a circle with 
all its common geometrical properties?  
This later critical attitude was strongly advocated by Hobbes, according to whom 
the algebraic symbolism effectively wasted the mathematician’s time by forcing him to 
translate his ideas into mathematical abstract symbolism and then to translate it back 
again in the form of prose.389 Let us first clarify one point: from our perspective, Hobbes 
was not in opposition to the so-called process of abstraction or idealization, but he was 
doubtful about the idea of substituting the geometrical perspective and reasoning for 																																																																																																																																																																		
Descartes: they probably met in 1648 but apparently did not get along very well. Descartes suggested that 
Hobbes was more accomplished in moral philosophy than in other disciplines, but also that he had wicked 
views there [Descartes 1643, 3.230-1], and Hobbes equally thought that Descartes would have been better 
off sticking to geometry. Hobbes spent the next decade in exile in Paris, leaving England late in 1640, and 
not returning until 1651. His exile was related to the civil wars of the time. During his time in France, 
Hobbes continued to associate with Mersenne and his circle, including Pierre Gassendi, who seems to 
have been a particular friend of Hobbes. Before moving back to England he wrote the Leviathan, which 
was published in 1651. The De Corpore was only published in 1655 and provides Hobbes’s main 
statements on several topics, such as method and the workings of language. In his later years he took part 
in discussions with the mathematician John Wallis on the merits of geometry and algebra, and with 
Robert Boyle about the experimental physics of the Royal Society. Hobbes died on December 4th 1679 at 
Hardwick Hall.  
For further biographical information, see D. Stewart, “Thomas Hobbes”, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming;  
On-line: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/hobbes/. 
389 Pycior 1987, pp. 265-286.  
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physical reality with the algebraic interpretation. In other words, according to Hobbes, 
geometrical symbols have representational power, and they are still sensible tools, with 
the difference that they should be considered by neglecting physical properties. Due to 
the powers of our imagination, we can abstract and idealize, with a simple act of 
omission, all the natural properties of the physical phenomena.  
In fact, I suggest that the debate promoted by Hobbes now comes into direct contact 
with the one promoted by Valerio and Galileo, because the claim is now the following: 
how legitimate is it to draw conclusions about purely symbolic and theoretical 
representations, rather than about the objects they stand for? This issue took the name of 
the ‘problem of symbolic reasoning’, and it focused not only – as it had done for 
Valerio and Galileo – on the legitimacy of having symbolic representations of physical 
phenomena, but even on the epistemological meaning of the conclusions we draw about 
those symbols. Thus on some occasions, it also supplied hints that touched on the 
realistic/anti-realistic debate, and in fact in this respect Hobbes followed Galileo’s 
footsteps in supporting the idea that the abstractions we use in geometry are not mind-
dependent, so they do not depart from reality, but rather than it was only a matter of 
omission and simplification in order to make easier computations and find a form for 
representing the physical reality in itself.  
Although his main interest lay with the analysis of human behaviour and social 
aspects of our society, Hobbes’ ambition was to attempt an investigation following the 
scientific method. More precisely he aimed to apply the rigour and the foundational 
principles of geometry in his political and sociological investigations. On this basis, 
individuals were considered as inanimate objects subjected to motion, force and 
external power. For the sake of simplicity and in order to reach valid general 
conclusions on how we as human beings should behave in our society, it was in his eyes 
simpler to adduce reasoning about general statements and to build general laws on 
objects considered in their simplest form, being detached from their purely natural 
content.  
It appears clear that, from Hobbes’ perspective, bodies come in two varieties, the 
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natural and the political, in the same way that philosophy is divided into the natural and 
the political. A single methodological approach with geometrical foundations can be 
used for both kinds of investigations.  
At that time, Hobbes was also the author who went upstream with respect to the use 
of the inertia principle. In fact, whereas on the one hand he made only little use of the 
doctrine of inertia in his natural philosophy, on the other hand he had a lot to say about 
the foundations of geometry and mathematical physics, the differences between the two 
and the processes of abstraction and idealization that were flowering in that century. In 
particular, it seems that his doctrine of inertia helped him considerably in favour of the 
aim of this overall contribution.  
Taking into account his entire corpus, we can see that Hobbes was throughout still 
anchored to a geometrical representation of physical reality. After all, he was also aware 
that his speculations were of a metaphysical nature instead of a physical, mathematical 
or a strictly mechanical one, like that of Galileo or Wallis. Yet the difference between 
Hobbes and Galileo lies in the fact that whereas the Galilean theory on idealizations 
originates from a technical interest and in part from the theoretical and epistemological 
leftovers of the Equilibrium Controversy, the Hobbesian thought was mainly driven by 
the desire to gain a certain ground for his political speculations. The intellectual ferment 
of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries provided Hobbes not only with 
elements of his mathematical philosophy but also with problems and insights which 
dominated his general philosophy. Hobbes and his contemporaries were involved in 
what we can characterise as the mathematical phase of the battle of the ancients against 
the moderns; his thought, and in particular the defence of the ancient thought expressed 
in the Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima de Corpore published in 1655, made of 
him – within this framework – a maverick in geometry, insofar as he favoured geometry 
over arithmetic and synthesis over analysis. In summary, his inclination was in favour 
of a nominalistic position. 
We will argue that whereas on the one hand, the Hobbesian conception has been 
considered a materialistic one because of the rejection of pure abstract mathematical 
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reasoning, on the other hand his consideration of the line as a body whose length is 
considered without its breadth constitutes from our point of view an act of omission.  
In 1655 Thomas Hobbes published the Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima de 
Corpore, in which he sets out the principles, methods, and ends of his philosophy, 
together with his doctrines of the first part of that philosophy390, which concerns bodies. 
Once he had established that the most fundamental and primary doctrines on bodies is 
geometry, which also illuminates Hobbes’s views on metaphysics, logic, and 
philosophy of science, he stated that the foundations of science were to be found in the 
most universal treatment of the simplest bodies391, of which others are merely component 
parts. This foundation of science is represented by geometry. As he frequently 
maintains throughout the treatise, philosophia prima, i.e. mathematics and physics, may 
be gathered together under the same a priori science, namely geometry.  
To understand better the connection between our purpose and Hobbes’ thought, let us 
first summarize his conception on bodies and motion. According to Hobbes, bodies are 
imagined as “that, which, having no dependence on our thought, is coincident or 
coextended with some parts of space.”392 Whether or not bodies are mind-independent, 
space is certainly not, because the latter is an imaginary entity; it is “the phantasm of a 
thing existing without the mind simply.”393 More precisely, besides imaginary space, 
there is a complementary conception of space labelled ‘real space’, which is roughly 
considered as the magnitude of some object just as it are measured in itself.  																																																								
390 As we can see in the De Corpore, Hobbes, following his contemporaries, used the term “philosophy” in 
a broad sense. Thus in this case philosophy is, roughly speaking, the working-out of the doctrines of logic 
and metaphysics to give knowledge of a particular sort. This knowledge may be divided up according to 
the categories of body, man, and commonwealth. One of the most interesting aspects of Hobbes’ natural 
philosophy, which unfortunately cannot be analysed thoroughly in this section, is the “extension” of the 
geometrical, synthetic and deductive methods from the context of the strict scientific knowledge to the 
field of politics. Thus, Hobbes’ idea is that, since we can use the rigid and coherent geometrical and 
synthetic methods in order to interpret and represent physical reality, the same should be done in other 
realms. In other words, the model given by scientific knowledge can be transferred to the foundation of 
political science. Geometry thus became a central discipline in two quite distinct ways: i) as a 
methodological guide and example, and ii) as the most basic of all branches of knowledge, from which 
“synthesis” might deduce, step by step, the immutable laws of social justice.  
391 One question remains open: are we committed to consider these “simplest objects” as geometrical 
points detached from any of their physical content? 
392 Hobbes 1839-45, Vol. IV, part II, ch. VII, §1.  
393 Ibid., Vol. IV, part II, ch. VII, §2.  
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Thus, first we have the property that makes a body real, or rather its being mind-
independent: a body is not simply an idea or a theoretical conception, so it is still a 
sensible tool. Secondly, we have the idea that what makes space imaginary is the 
converse; it is simply a conception and as such is dependent on some thought – i.e. it is 
the conception of extension, specifically the extension394 of some body. The extension of 
a body is an abstraction and so, considered in itself, it is imaginary; since it is appraised 
as the extension of some body, it is real. Given that the extension of a body is not mind-
dependent, the notions of real and imaginary space are not two sorts of space, but they 
rather overlap as if they were the same space. In other words, the extension of a body 
can be considered in two different ways: either i) as the magnitude of a (real) body, so 
that geometrical objects are instances of magnitude; or ii) as the abstracted extension 
(not necessarily with any body), which is thus existent only in thought (and which is 
hence imaginary).395 Since space, whether it is real or imaginary, is given by the 
extension of bodies, the latter overlaps at least with a part of that space.  
Having defined bodies, Hobbes is now in a position also to define the elements of 
geometry. A point, he says, is a body considered without its magnitude. The path of a 
body through space considered without its breadth is a geometrical line. A superficies 
(surface) is the space made by the motion of a body considered as a line (i.e. a one-
dimensional body considered without its depth).396 On the one hand, the Euclidean notion 
is considered, from Hobbes’ point of view, as nothing more than meaningless symbols 
and not names. On the other hand, the Hobbesian points, lines and surfaces are 
considered as abstract entities with their own magnitude. It is simply that bodies as 
points are considered without their magnitude. They are real instances of their own 
properties; those real bodies are just now represented by means of points. Again, 																																																								
394 Ibid., Vol. IV, part II, ch. VIII, § 44, p. 105: “The extension of a body, is the same thing with the 
magnitude of it, or that which some call real space. But this magnitude does not depend upon our 
cognition, as imaginary space does; for this is an effect of our imagination, but magnitude is the cause of 
it; this is an accident of the mind that of a body existing out of the mind”.  
395 Bird 1996, p. 224. 
396 This is clearly in contrast with the well-known Euclidean definition of point and line given at the very 
beginning of the Elements. Euclid says there that “a line is a breadth-less length”, and “a surface is that 
which has length and breadth only”. For further study, see also Sacksteder 1981. 
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Euclidean notions of point and line are just empty symbols without any reference to 
physical reality; Hobbesian notions, and indeed our material point, are on the other hand 
names or models, with a direct correlation to the physical reality; thus they are instances 
of magnitude.397 A point, being a body considered without its magnitude, is imaginary in 
the sense that the omission of its natural properties derives solely from the competence 
of the user’s own imagination: 
 
Though there be no body which has not some magnitude, yet if, when any body is moved, the 
magnitude of it be not at all considered, the way it makes is called a line, or one single dimension; 
and the space, through which it passeth, is called length; and the body a point.398 
 
These mathematical objects – point, line and surface, as Hobbes argues – perform an act 
of representation, since they do not arise from observation but from a descriptive or 
representational mental act. Magnitude is omitted solely in order to find a means for 
calculating it; they can thus be considered as a meta-geometrical model. 
On this interpretation, our point mass accomplishes the rule of a model or meta-
geometrical tool which we might call an act of imaginary abstraction, since it leaves out 
of consideration any magnitude belonging to an actual and real body.  
Hobbes took part in what we have called the theoretical definition of the model-
building practice – or simply the idealization and abstraction process – and became one 
of the philosophers who tried to confer relevance and legitimacy on metaphysical 
speculations about abstract, idealized and theoretical mathematical tools or meta-
geometrical tools. He clearly explained how, from an act of the mind, we can create 
purely mathematical representational objects of physical reality:  
 
Mathematical objects do not derive from observation of a motion presented. They depend, instead, 
on our election to attend to such and such consequences resulting from causal act or from a motion 
which is proposed or undertaken by ourselves or in our imagination. Dimensions of magnitude are 
not given to the geometer. Rather they are made by his own descriptive motions or taken up 																																																								
397 See fn. 394 of this chapter above on the difference between magnitude and extension. 
398 Hobbes 1839-45, part II, ch. VIII, §12, p. 111. 
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according to his mental discriminations.399  
 
Bodies in themselves, and even their actual magnitudes, are left out in any account and 
reasoning. Geometry, and science in general for Hobbes, both make calculations from 
the geometrical representation of the physical reality. Moreover, the philosophia prima 
studies the accidents common to all bodies: 
 
Though there be no body which has not some magnitude, yet if, when any body is moved, the 
magnitude of it be not at all considered, the way it makes is called a line, or one single dimension; 
and the space, through which is passeth is called length; and the body itself, a point; in which sense 
the earth is called a point, and the way of its yearly revolution, the ecliptic line. But if a body, which 
is moved, be considered as long, and be supposed to be so moved, as that all the several parts of it 
be understood to make several lines, then the way of every part that is called breadth, and the space 
which is made is called superficies, consisting of two dimensions, one whereof to every several part 
of the other is applied whole. Again, if a body be considered as having superficies, and be 
understood to be so moved, that all several parts of it describe several lines, then the way of every 
part of that body is called thickness or depth, and the space which is made is called solid, consisting 
of three dimensions, any two whereof are applied whole to every several parts of the third.400  
 
From our point of view, the seventeenth-century philosophical and mathematical 
tradition houses the conjunction of two different lines of thought, which together led to 
the fulfillment of the theoretical notion of the point mass. The first of these two 
traditions derives from a more technical framework and is disposed to analyse the 
functioning of artisanal and mechanical practices; the second line of thought conversely 
gives rise to the abstraction and idealization procedure, or rather to the practice of 
abstracting some natural properties from any particular set of phenomena at hand in 
order to simplify computations. Thus in the seventeenth century, we envision a process 
in which any mechanical analysis was abstracted from its original context and used in a 
broader sense, in order to understand the physical world in which we are embedded. 
The basic idea is that from the observation of a practical context – such as the context of 																																																								
399 Sacksteder 1981, p. 578. 
400 Hobbes 1839-45, Vol. IV, part II, ch. VIII, §12. 
	 242 
Renaissance mechanics – a kernel of idealization emerges and leads to the 
objectification of a purely practical procedure. The process of measuring the weight of 
heavy bodies hanging at the extremity of a balance is shifted to a physical context, in 
which any heavy bodies are conceived as reduced to their centre of gravity, devoid of its 
own area or volume.  
 
 
4.2.2 Newton  
 
The reconstruction undertaken so far in §§ 4.1 and 4.2.1 to showcase the model building 
practice and the role that imagination played in conferring legitimacy upon a theoretical 
procedure used for building mathematical entities in a representational way represent an 
important part of the whole story. Whether from a philosophical and metaphysical slight 
of speculation or not, the debate over the nature of mathematical entities kept going on 
in the way that we have just delineated, and both from the side of mechanics and from a 
more technical perspective, things were also improving differently. While Hobbes, from 
his non-technical perspective, was enquiring into the foundations of geometry and 
mathematics, Newton and some of his other contemporaries were investigating the field 
of mechanics, stimulating the development of the so-called rational mechanics, and 
those branches of physics which had mathematical foundations. On the one hand, del 
Monte and his pupils pointed out the utility of mechanics, maintaining that the role of 
mechanics and the philosopher of mechanics were strictly separate, and that the latter 
was considered superior to the former. On the other hand, with Newton, the term 
‘mechanics’ acquired its modern prevalent meaning and began to be defined as “a 
theoretical discipline founded on mathematics, often referred to as the science par 
excellence”.401 We have already said that mechanics in the past was considered a branch 
of mathematics together with astronomy, music and optics, whose principles derived 
from empirical observations about nature and as such could no longer be considered as 																																																								
401 Capecchi 2014, p. 7. 
	 243 
irrefutable and unquestionable but simply highly probable. In Galileo’s conception, 
experiments still occupied a marginal role, and were not considered as a useful means of 
discarding theoretical principles or giving confirmations to them. However, on the 
advent of Newton’s Principia, a new tradition emerged, since this treatise was “for one 
half a treatise on theoretical mechanics, for the other half a treatise of applied 
mechanics. Regarding the theoretical parts, the experiments that Newton presented were 
rather simple and had a predominantly educational value. The matter on applied 
mechanics, especially celestial astronomy, is different. It was based on the law of 
universal attraction and this was not so immediate to be accepted. Here empiric 
observations were important and could not be of qualitative nature.”402  
From this perspective, Newton maintained the following:  
 
In mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with their proportions consequent upon 
any conditions supposed; then, when we enter upon physics, we compare those proportions with the 
phenomena of Nature, that we may know what conditions of those forces answer to the several kinds 
of attractive bodies.403  
 
More precisely, in the second half of the seventeenth century, mechanics had a different 
background from the background of earlier periods, and almost all scientific knowledge 
could now be framed under the following four schemes: i) the validity of the principle 
of inertia, ii) uniform acceleration for falling bodies, iii) the introduction of the 
infinitesimals in mathematics, and iv) the indifference to presence or absence of a 
vacuum.404 Besides the cause of motion and its variation – an aspect that was already 
part of the Galilean research – a new interest now came to the fore, namely that 
variation in motion was no longer associated with impetus – this sort of inner power 																																																								
402 Ibid., p. 8.  
403 Newton (1687) 1726, p. 218.  
In mathesi investigandae sunt virium quantitates et rationes illae, quae ex conditionibus quibuscunque 
positis consequentur: deinde, ubi in physicam descenditur conferendae sunt hac rationes cum 
phaenomenis; ut innotescat quaenam virium conditiones singulis corporum attractivorum generis 
competant.  
404 These four different approaches are widely analysed in Capecchi 2014. 
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which was attributed to bodies – but to something labelled force (flanked with power), 
which now took on various important connotations. As Daniel Capecchi has written: 
 
It [sc. force] might indicate the muscle force, the elastic force of a spring, the pressure, 
corresponding more or less to the modern force; the effort or the fatigue to move bodies, 
corresponding more or less to the modern work; the force of bodies in motion which modifies the 
state of rest or motion of the collided body, corresponding more or less to the modern kinetic 
energy.405  
 
These different connotations of force began to evolve from confused to more or less 
clear conceptions. Moreover, we also notice an extension of the new discoveries from 
astronomy to mechanics. Newton was also the first to introduce the notion of mass in 
mechanics, and his laws of motion represented the summit of mathematical physics 
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In these centuries, mathematics 
proceeded towards the preparatory phase of the birth of modern rational mechanics. 
This new way of conceiving mechanics dealt with the study of the movement of the 
bodies, excluding other phenomena such as thermal, chemical or electromagnetic ones.406 
In order to describe a great variety of natural bodies such as fluids, three-dimensional or 
deformable bodies, physics used conceptual abstractions and idealizations that derived 
from the strict criterion of approximation and simplification which had been mainly 
determined in the works of Galileo. The application of the notion of mass in the field of 
dynamics – as I have already said – represents a part of the process of conceptual 
abstraction, because the dynamic of three-dimensional bodies now involved the 
possibility of analysing their natural behaviour without considering their volumetric 
dimensions. The idea to reduce rigid bodies to simple point masses is already explicit in 
Newton’s research, but we need to wait until the turn of the eighteenth century and 
Euler’s writings in order to see these theoretical entities applied in a purely algebraic 
context. Moreover, the term ‘point mass’ was put forward only in Euler’s Mechanica of 
																																																								
405 Capecchi 2014, p. 228. 
406 D’Anna and Renno 1995, pp. 1-2. 
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1736.  
Let us first analyse the structure of Newton’s407 Philosophiae naturalis principia 
mathematica. This work is made up of four different parts: (i) the introduction 
containing eight definitions, the famous scholium on absolute space and time, and the 
axioms or laws of motion; and (ii) three books, the first two of which are both entitled 
The Motion of Bodies, and the third of which is entitled The System of the World. 
Together they embody a powerful and coherent research program for linking 
mathematical representations with real world structures, which has been dubbed “the 
Newtonian style” by Bernard Cohen.408 A crucial passage where Newton himself 
expresses clearly what he is up to in his Principia occurs in a scholium to section XI of 
the first book. This section concerns the motion of bodies with centripetal forces which 
mutually attract each other, and it maintains the following: 
 
These propositions naturally lead us to the analogy there is between centripetal force, and the central 
bodies to which those forces used to be directed; for it is reasonable to suppose that forces which are 
directed to bodies should depend upon the nature and quantity of those bodies, as we see they do in 
magnetical (sic) experiments. And when such cases occur, we are to compute the attractions of the 
bodies by assigning to each of their particles its proper force, and then collect the sum of them all. I 
here use the word attraction in general for any endeavour of what kind so ever, made by bodies to 
approach to each other; whether that endeavour arises from the action of the bodies themselves, as 
tending mutually to or agitating each other by spirits emitted, or whether it arises from the action of 																																																								
407 Isaac Newton was born into a Puritan family in Woolsthorpe, a small village in Lincolnshire near 
Grantham, on December 25th 1642, just after Galileo’s death. His father, a farmer, died two months before 
Isaac was born. Isaac learned to read and write from his maternal grandmother and mother, both of whom 
were literate. In 1656 he went to boarding school in Grantham, returning full time to manage the farm, 
not very successfully, in 1659. After further schooling at Grantham, he entered Trinity College, 
Cambridge in 1661. These years of Newton's youth coincided with the most turbulent in the history of 
England. The English Civil War had begun in 1642, King Charles was beheaded in 1649, Oliver 
Cromwell ruled as lord protector from 1653 until his death in 1658, to be followed by his son Richard in 
1658-1659, leading to the restoration of the monarchy under Charles II in 1660. How much the political 
turmoil of these years affected Newton and his family is unclear, but it has been noticed that the 
intellectual world of England at the time when Newton matriculated in Cambridge was thus very different 
from its previous state when he was born.  
For further information, see S. George, “Isaac Newton”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.);  
On-line: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/newton/. 
408 Cohen 1980. 
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the aether or of the air, or of any medium whatsoever whether corporeal or incorporeal, any how 
impelling bodies placed therein towards each other in the same general sense I use the word 
impulse, not defining in this treatise the species or physical qualities of force, but investigating the 
quantities and mathematical propositions of them; as I observe before in the Definitions. In 
mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with their proportions consequent upon 
any conditions supposed; then, when we enter upon physics, we compare those proportions with the 
phenomena of Nature, that we may know what conditions of those forces answer to the several kinds 
of attractive bodies. And this preparation being made, we argue more safely concerning the physical 
species, causes, and proportions of forces. Let us see then with what forces spherical bodies 
consisting of particles endued with attractive powers in the manner above spoken of must act 
mutually upon one another: and what kind of motions will follow from thence409.  
 
Here, we encounter not only the idea that natural state of affairs could be represented 
throughout a mathematical language, but, as Newton explicitly says, that spherical 
bodies only consist of particles, an issue which is deeply developed in section XII of the 
same first book. In particular, in expounding the theorem known as “the shell theorem”, 
we can find the reasons which drives Newton to posit the Calculus, or rather the idea of 
showing that in applying his Law of Universal Gravitation to spherically symmetrical 
massive bodies (such as planets, stars, and the like), one can regard these bodies as 
point masses with all of their mass concentrated at a point. The key ingredient in 
showing this is to show that for a thin mass shell, the gravitational force at a point 
outside this shell is the same as if all the mass of this shell is concentrated at its centre.  																																																								
409 Newton (1687) 1726, pp 217-218.  
His propositionibus manuducimur ad analogiam inter vires centripetas, et corpora centralia, ad quae 
vires illae dirigi solent. Rationi enim consentaneum est, ut vires, quae ad corpora diriguntu, pendeant ab 
eorundem naturâ et quantitate, ut fit in magnetics. Et quoties hujusmodi casus incidunt, aestimandae 
erunt corporum attractiones, assignando singulis eorum particulis vires proprias, et colligendo summas 
virium. Vocem attractionis hic generaliter usurpo pro corporum conato quocunque accedendi ad 
invicem: sive conatus iste fiat ab actione corporum vel se mutuo petentium, vel per spiritus emissos se 
invicem agitantium; sive is ab actione aetheris, aut aëris, mediive cujuscunque seu corporei seu 
incorporei oriatur corpora innatantia in se invicem utcunque impellentis. Eodem sensu generali usurpo 
vocem impulsus, non specie virium et qualitates physicas, sed quantitates et proportiones mathematicasin 
hoc tractatu expendens ut in definitionibus explicui. In mathesi investigandae sunt virium quantitates et 
rationes illae, quae ex conditionibus quibuscunque positis consequentur: deinde, ubi in physicam 
descenditur conferendae sunt hac rationes cum phaenomenis; ut innotescat quaenam virium conditiones 
singulis corporum attractivorum generis competant. Et tum demum de virium speciebus, causis et 
rationibus physicistutius disputare licebit. Videamus igitur quibus viribus corpora spherica, ex particulis 
modo jam exposito attractivis constantia, debeant in se mutuò agere; et quales motus inde consequantur.  
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Before looking at this theorem in detail, we should focus on the way in which the 
concept of force and mass are used, modified, and applied to this new theoretical layer 
added to mathematical physics.  
The force in this case needs to be considered and understood as a purely 
instrumental concept that could also be removed. Indeed Newton avoided giving force 
any ontological content. This idea that the force can be sometimes removed or neglected 
gave rise to some metaphysical questions on the model-building theory, something I 
already considered when we defined the material point with its theoretical modern 
definition. In order to understand how a force acts on a rigid body, let us consider 
Newton’s following definition: 
 
I have hitherto been treating of the attractions of bodies towards an immovable centre; though very 
probably there is no such thing existent in nature. For attractions are made towards bodies, and the 
actions of the bodies attracted and attracting are always reciprocal and equal, by Law III; so that if 
there are two bodies, neither the attracted nor the attracting body is truly at rest, but both (by Cor. 4, 
of the Laws of Motion), being as it were mutually attracted, revolve about a common centre of 
gravity, And if there be more bodies, which are either attracted by one single one which is attracted 
by them again, or which all of them, attract each other mutually, these bodies will be so moved 
among themselves, as that their common centre of gravity will either be at rest, or move uniformly 
forward in a right line. I shall therefore at present go on to treat of the motion of bodies mutually 
attracting each other; considering the centripetal forces as attractions; though perhaps in a physical 
strictness they may more truly be called impulses. But these propositions are to be considered as 
purely mathematical; and therefore, laying aside all physical considerations, I make use of a familiar 
way of speaking, to make myself the more easily understood by a mathematical reader.410 																																																								
410 Newton (1687) 1726, p. 194.  
De motu corpurum viribus centripetis se motuo petentium.  
Hactenus exposui motus corporum attractorum ad centrum immobile, quale tamen vix extat in rerum 
naturâ. Attractiones enim fieri solent ad corpora; et corporum trahentium et attractorum actiones semper 
mutuae sunt et aequales; per Legem tertiam: adeo ut neq; attrahens quiescere neq; attractum, si duo sint 
corpora, sed ambo (per Legum Corollarium quartum) quasi attractione mutuâ, circum gravitatis centrum 
commune revolvantur: et si plura sint corpora , quae vel ab unico attrahantur, et idem attrahant vel 
omnia se mutuo attrahant; haec ita inter se moveri moveatur in directum. Quâ de causâ jam pergo 
motum exponere corporum se mutuo trahentium, considerando vires centripetas tanquam attractiones, 
quamvis fortasse, si physicè loquamur, verius dicantur impulsus. In mathematicis enim jam versarur; et 
propterea, missis disputationibus physicis, familiari utimur sermone, quo possimus a lectoribus 
mathematicis facilius intelligi. 
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That “immovable centre” is something which schematically represents the body on 
which the force we are taking into account exerts its power. This case should be 
considered as one in which an external force applied upon a body is equally distributed 
on its whole surface with the same strength. Using a representational picture, we should 
imagine the force as exerting its power only on the (material) centre of gravity of the 
body itself, the centre in which the mass is not only imagined to be fully concentrated, 
but the force is also acting as a unique power, or considered to be exerting its strength in 
only one point, which is labelled as the point of application of a force. 
Then, as we have already said, the technical meaning of mass as the quantity of 
matter can also be traced back to Newton, although its use was limited. In fact, as Max 
Jammer and Danilo Capecchi remind us, in the Principia ‘mass’ appears not more than 
ten times with its “new technical meaning”, and usually it seems that Newton preferred 
the use of the expression ‘quantity of matter’ instead.411 More precisely, mass entered 																																																								
411 Jammer claimed that even in the nineteen century, “despite the decisive role of this notion there was no 
formal definition of mass.” [Jammer 1961, Ch. VIII] In the introductory part of this chapter, Jammer 
mentioned that the conservation of mass was implicitly assumed in Newton’s Principia, and the basic 
assumption on the conservation of mass had been introduced by Kant [Kant, Meta Anfangsgrunde] and 
Lavoisier [Lavoisier, Traite]. Jammer mentioned further authors who do not refer to Euler: e.g. M. 
Brisson [Brisson, Dictionnaire], Sigaud de la Fond [de la Fond, Dictionnaire], despite Euler’s treatise 
was published in 1736. Jammer stated: “All the textbooks in [the] 18th century do not provide a better 
definition of mass (as “the mass of the body is the quantity of matter which it contains”). The only 
exception is Euler’s Mechanica which had been written aiming a construction of rational mechanics as a 
science based on axioms, definitions and logical deduction. [...] In the history of the notion of mass 
Euler’s Mechanica is of exceptional importance, because it demonstrates the logical transition from the 
Newtonian axiomatics, which is based on the notion of the force of inertia to a widely contemporary 
notion of mass as a numerical coefficient, which characterises the special physical body and is 
determinate by the relation of the force to the acceleration. [...] Euler followed Newton’s Principia. 
However, in the demonstration of Proposition 17 (§ 142) appeared a new idea. Euler described the force 
of inertia [...] as determined by the force which is necessary to force the body to change its state of rest or 
motion. Different bodies need different forces which are proportional to their quantity of matter (Euler 
E015/016, § 142). Therefore, the quantity of matter or the mass is determined using moving forces, an 
idea, which is of great importance in the following chapters of Mechanica as well as in the Theoria 
(1765) [Euler E289, § 154-156]. Euler stated that the matter (mass) of a body is not measured by its 
volume, but by the force which is necessary to bring the body in the given motion (acceleration). Here, 
we find, consequently, the expression of the well-known formula, ‘Force is equal to mass multiplied by 
acceleration’ which expression is used for the precise definition of mass.” Jammer continued with the 
analysis of the development in France in the nineteenth century, due to Duhamel, Resal, Paul Appell, and 
other countries, due to Saint-Venant, Reech, Andrade, Kirchhoff, Mach, Hertz and Poincare, who all used 
the same definition of mass as Euler (in most cases without reference to Euler). Jammer also mentioned 
that the new concept of mass also stimulated investigation of the concept of force (compare [Jammer, 
1957]). For further details, see Dieter 2009, p. 160, n. 143. 
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into Newton’s mechanical theory in two ways, firstly as a measure of the resistance of a 
body to be accelerated, and secondly as a measure of the force exerted on a body 
located in a gravitational field. The former meaning occurred in the laws of motion, for 
which the mass is the constant of proportionality between force and acceleration 
(‘inertial mass’), while the latter one is mainly used in the development of the theory of 
universal gravitation and is linked to the idea of attraction, where mass is the constant of 
proportionality between the centripetal force and the gravitational field (‘gravitational 
mass’).  
The definition no. VIII of the introduction represents only an anticipation of what 
Newton intended to develop and prove in the course of his masterpiece. In this 
definition, he defined the motive quantity of a centripetal force as the measure of the 
same, which is proportional to the motion which it generates in a given time.412 Thus he 
explains as follows:  
 
Thus the weight is greater in a greater body less in a less body; and, in the same body it is greater 
near to the earth, and less to remote distances. This sort of quantity is the centripetency, or 
propension to the whole body towards the centre, or, as I may say, its weight; and it is always 
known by the quantity of an equal and contrary force just sufficient to hinder descent of the body. 
This quantity of force, we may, for the sake of brevity, call by the name of motive, 
accelerative, and absolute force; and, for the sake of distinction, consider them with respect to the 
bodies that tend to the centre, to the place of those bodies, and to the centre of force towards which 
they tend; that is to say, I refer the motive force, to the body as an endeavor and propensity of the 
whole towards a centre, arising from the propensities of the several parts taken together; the 
accelerative force to the plane of the body, as a certain power diffused from the centre to all places 
around to move the bodies that are in them; and the absolute force to the centre, as endued with 
some cause, without which those motive forces would not be propagated through the space round 
about; whether that cause some natural body (such as is the magnet in the centre of the magnetic 
force, or the earth in the centre of the gravitational force), or anything else that does not yet appear. 
For I here design only to give a mathematical notion of those forces, without considering their 
physical uses and seats.  																																																								
412 Definitio VIII: Vis centripetae quantitas motrix est ipsius mensura proportionalis motui, quem dato 
tempore generat. 
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Wherefore the accelerative force will stand in the same relation to the motive, as celerity does 
to motion. For the quantity of motion arises from the celerity multiplied by the quantity of matter; 
and the motive force arises from the accelerative force multiplied by the same quantity of matter. 
For the sum of the actions of the accelerative force, upon the several particles of the body, is the 
motive force of the whole. Hence it is, that near the surface of the earth, where the accelerative 
gravity, or force productive of gravity, in all bodies is the same, the motive gravity or the wright is 
as the body; but if we should ascend to higher regions, where the accelerative gravity is less, the 
weight would be equally diminished, and would always be as the product of the body by the 
accelerative gravity. In those regions, where the accelerative gravity is diminished into one-half, the 
weight of a body two or three times less, will be four or six times less.  
I likewise call attractions and impulses, in the same sense, accelerative and motive; and use the 
word attraction, impulse, or propensity of any sort towards a centre, promiscuously, and 
indifferently, one for another; considering those forces not physically, but mathematically: 
wherefore the reader is not to imagine that by those words I anywhere take upon me to define the 
kind, or the manner of any action, that causes or the physical reason thereof or that I attribute forces, 
in a true and physical sense, to certain centres (which are only mathematical points); when at any 
time I happen to speak of centres as attracting, or as endued with attractive powers.413 																																																								
413 Newton (1687) 1726, pp. 76-77. 
Uti pondus majus in majori corpore, minus in minore; inq; corpore eodem majus prope terram, minus in 
caelis. Haec vis est corporis totius centripetentia seu propensio in centrum & (ut ita dicam) pondus, & 
innotescit semper per vim ipsi contrariam & aequalem, qua descensus corporis impediri potest.  
Hasce virium quantitates brevitatis gratia nominare licet vires absolutas, acceleratrices & motrices, 
& distinctionis gratia referre ad corpora, ad corporum loca, & ad centrum virium: Nimirum vim 
motricem ad corpus, tanquam conatum & propensionem totius in centrum, ex propensionibus omnium 
partium compositum; & vim acceleratricem ad locum corporis, tanquam efficaciam quandam, de centro 
per loca singula in circuitu diffusam, ad movenda corpora quæ in ipsis sunt; vim autem absolutam ad 
centrum, tanquam causa aliqua præditum, sine qua vires motrices non propagantur per regiones in 
circuitu; sive causa illa sit corpus aliquod centrale (quale est Magnes in centro vis Magneticæ vel Terra 
in centro vis gravitantis) sive alia aliqua qua non ap paret. Mathematicus saltem est hic conceptus.  
Nam virium causas & sedes physicas jam non expendo. Est igitur vis acceleratrix ad vim motricem 
ut celeritas ad motum. Oritur enim quantitas motus ex celeritate ducta in quantitatem Materiæ, & vis 
motrix ex vi acceleratrice ducta in quantitatem ejusdem materiae. Nam summa actionum vis 
acceleratricis in singulas corporis particulas est vis motrix totius. Unde juxta Superficiem Terrae, ubi 
gravitas acceleratrix seu vis gravitans in corporibus universis eadem est, gravitas motrix seu pondus est 
ut corpus: at si in regiones ascendatur ubi gravitas acceleratrix fit minor, pondus pariter minuetur, eritq; 
semper ut corpus in gravitatem acceleratricem ductum. Sic in regionibus ubi gravitas acceleratrix duplo 
minor est, pondus corporis duplo vel triplo minoris erit quadruplo vel sextuplo minus.  
Porro attractiones et impulsus eodem sensu acceleratrices & motrices nomino. Voces autem 
attractionis, impulsus vel propensionis cujuscunq; in centrum, indifferenter et pro se mutuo promiscue 
usurpo, has vires non physice sed Mathematice tantum considerando. Unde caveat lector ne per 
hujusmodi voces cogitet me speciem vel modum actionis causamve aut rationem physicam alicubi 
definire, vel centris (quae sunt puncta Mathematica) vires vere et physice tribuere, si forte aut centra 
trahere, aut vires centrorum esse dixero. 
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In the last paragraph of the quotation above, Newton is referring to the difference 
between mathematical and physical concepts. Until this time, mathematics and physics 
were still considered independent disciplines, because the former develops hypotheses, 
whereas the latter inspects principles and causes. Mathematics is still considered as a 
tool which has no relationship with the actual world, and does not give any description 
on the actual world. This is, by far, the clearest point in opposition with the Galilean 
reasoning.  
However, it is only between section XI and XII of Book I that the features 
characterising the entity labelled the point mass are made explicit. The theorem XXX 
says that: “[I]f the individual points of the surface of some sphere may be drawn to the 
centre by equal forces inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the 
points, I say that a corpuscle within the surface agreed upon is not attracted by these 
forces in any direction.” Its demonstration is only preliminary to theorem XXXI, which 
states that a corpuscle put in place outside the surface of the sphere is attracted to the 
centre of the sphere, by a force inversely proportional to the square of its distance from 
the same centre. From the demonstration Newton states essentially two things, both of 
which have a very important consequence. First, he says that the gravitational field 
outside a spherical shell having total mass M is the same as if the entire mass M is 
concentrated at its centre (i.e. its centre of mass). Secondly, it says that for the same 
sphere, the gravitational field inside the spherical shell is identical to 0.  
Newton is here regimenting the use of the point mass as an entity which can be 
used to represent natural phenomena. He makes explicit in this theorem the two main 
features attributed to the point mass in everyday mathematical physics. The only 
difference between this approach and the one promoted by Euler is that Newton’s 
approach is in some way still traditional; in other words, Newton’s approach is mostly 
related to the geometrical approach inherited from the Euclidean tradition and method, 
which was still much alive within his own scientific context. This Newtonian style is in 
some way related to the previous century; he was in fact extremely convinced of the 
superiority of ancient geometry, and in the Principia he always adapted it to the study 
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of figures whose sides were infinitesimal distances, movements and velocities using the 
procedures of the Calculus.  
 
 
4.2.3 Euler, Rational Mechanics and the Algebraic Representation of 
Physics 
 
The last achievement was reached by Euler, perhaps the most inventive mathematician 
of his period, who wrote the Mechanica sive motus scientia analytice exposita414, a work 
on mechanics or the science of motion demonstrated by means of either analytical 
methods or the application of the calculus.415 He aims to create – through providing 
axioms, definitions and logical deductions – a rational mechanical science that can be 
used to show the unquestionable character of Newtonian mechanics. Euler’s solution 
functioned correctly for all those problems in which the bodies’ dimensions and the 
motion of their parts are negligible in respect of more important issues. In fact, he 
clearly says in Scholium 98, which will be discussed further below, that his program for 
mechanics relies on the concept of bodies of infinitesimal magnitude.  
For the purpose at hand, we shall not give an extensive overview of the role 
fulfilled by Euler or the other scientists of his time, because we are already well aware 
of the remarkable role they played, mostly because there are numerous works and 
publications on the subject. In fact, as I have already stated at the beginning of this 
chapter, our main interest is to give an account of the historical moment in which the 
material point comes to stand as a model that is used for representing physical 
phenomena. This breakthrough was mainly due to the work of Luca Valerio and Galileo 																																																								
414 L. Euler, Mechanica sive motus scientia analytice exposita. Auctore Leonhardo Eulero academiae 
imper. scientiarum membro et matheseos sublimioris professore. Tomus I. Instar supplementi ad 
commentar. acad. scient. imper. Petropoli: Ex typographia academiae scientiarum. A. 1736.  
The whole corpus of Euler’s works can be found via the online digital resource: 
http://eulerarchive.maa.org/. 
415 The father of this type of foundational method is of course Leibniz, who, in his Nova Methodus, 
invented the operation of the calculus, defining it as the operational rules that applied to quantities. See 
Leibniz 1684.  
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Galilei. Thanks to the circulation of the Galilean works, this issue became one of great 
epistemological and metaphysical relevance for new generations of mathematicians and 
within the new field of mechanics. On the one hand, Galileo was responsible for having 
proposed again the way in which Guidobaldo del Monte used the centre of gravity as a 
moving material point, and on the other hand he was also one of the first who gave an 
epistemological and metaphysical meaning to the representational power fulfilled by 
those abstract or idealized objects, which, according to him, did not depart from 
physical reality and truth, because these abstract mathematical entities already 
constituted the very language of nature.  
Thus, this last part of the earlier Galilean research aims at completeness, and 
performs the role of giving a complete account of the methodological approach of the 
objectification of procedure. In both Newtonian and Eulerian mechanics, the material 
point is already conceived as a model and is already used in this explicit way, namely as 
a simple tool that gives to the mathematician the chance to simplify computations and 
represent in a mathematical way a large variety of phenomena that have common 
elements and properties. The program of the Mechanica focuses mainly on the basic 
concepts of i) rest and motion;416 ii) the model of an infinitely small body; and iii) the 
basic distinction between internal principles, such as the property of inertia and the 
impenetrability of bodies, and external principles.417 Every rigid body is treated as if it 
were a point mass, and in the Scholium 98 the material point stands finally as an 
explicit concept, and is deliberately used exactly for what it stands for. The bodies of 
infinitesimal magnitude are used, detached from their purely physical content:  
 
These laws of motion, which a body observes that is left to itself, either at rest or in continued 
motion, are seen particularly for these indefinitely small bodies, which can be consider as points. 
For in bodies of finite magnitudes, of which the individual parts have their own motions, the body 
will exert itself to observe these laws, but which will not always be possible to happen on account of 
the state of the body. The body therefore will follow a motion which is composed from the 																																																								
416 A basic distinction is made between i) rest, ii) uniform motion and iii) non-uniform motion, according 
to which even the smallest element of the path is able to be conceived as equably transferred. 
417 Dieter 2009, p. 118. 
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individual exertions of the parts of the body, and this hitherto on account of the insufficiency of the 
principles has not been possible to be defined, but this discussion is to be differed to the following. 
The different kinds of bodies will therefore supply the needs for the primary division of our work. 
For in the first place, we will consider very small bodies or which can be considered as points. In the 
next case we will approach these bodies of finite magnitudes which are rigid and are not allowed to 
change their shape. In the third case we will consider flexible bodies. Fourthly, we are concerned 
with these which allow extension and contraction. Fifthly, we put under our examination the 
solution of the motion of many bodies, that are impeded by others, that their own motion may be 
completed as they exert themselves. Truly in the sixth case the motion of fluids will be the agenda. 
For these bodies we will not only see, how the remainder of the motion is to be continued [p. 38]; 
but in addition we will inquire, how these are affected by the external causes or forces. Finally from 
all these inquiries the large scale variation of the whole body can be inferred, whether it is free or 
not. For a non-free state, I understand this: when bodies are impeded, by which they are unable to 
progress in that direction, and which they try to overcome; the motion of pendular bodies is of this 
kind which, since they are unable to descent directly, as they try, and so make oscillations. For the 
free state is to be understood: when bodies are progressing and which come upon no impediments to 
their motion anywhere, not only on account of their own force, or from disturbing forces pulling on 
them. Therefore it appears, from the things Mechanics will have as its agenda, and that there are 
many which have not even been touched upon. For besides the motion of points, which have been 
dealt with hitherto, nevertheless there are so few that it will be necessary to derive nearly all from 
first principles. I begin therefore with the motion of free points with any kinds of disturbing forces, 
because these left to themselves will follow the motion shown in this chapter. Hence on account of 
this I have resolved for the First Volume to be concerned with the motion of free points, and the 
following Volume truly set up to explore the motion of points which are not in free motion; in both 
of which, and which will occur, as with these already dealt with, so likewise for these that follow, I 
shall derive the motions from first principles using the analytical method.418 																																																								
418 Istae motus leges, quas corpus sibi relictum vel quietem vel motum continuando observat, spectant 
proprie ad corpora infinite parva, quae ut puncta possunt considerari. In corporibus enim finitae 
magnitudinis, quorum singulae partes alios habent motus insitos, quaelibet pars quidem has leges 
observare conibitur, quod autem non semper propter corporis statum fieri potest. Corpus igitur ipsum 
eum sequetur motum, qui ex singularum partium conatibus componitur, isque adhuc ob insufficientiam 
principiorum non potest definiri, sed haec tractatio ad sequentia est differenda. Diversitas igitur 
corporum suppeditabit nobis operis divisionem primariam. Primo enim contemplabimur corpora infinite 
parva seu quae tanquam puncta spectari possunt. Deinde corpora finitae magnitudinis aggrediemur ea, 
quae sunt rigida neque figuram suam mutari patiuntur. Tertio agemus de corporibus flexibilibus. Quarto 
de iis, quae extensionem ex contractionem admittunt. Quinto plurium corporum solutorum motus examine 
subiiciemus, quorum alia impediunt, quin motus suos possint, ut conantur, absolvere. Sexto vero de motu 
fluidorum erit agendum. De his vero corporibus non solum videbimus, quomodo sibi relicta motus 
continuent; sed praeterea inquiremus, quomodo ea a causis externis scilicet potentiis afficiantur. 
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By way of this approach, Euler deserves to be considered as the successor of a tradition 
which can be traced back to Descartes, Newton, Leibniz, Huygens, Galileo and even – 
for some aspects – to Archimedes. In fact, he clearly refers to Archimedes’ 
considerations and the Archimedean approach on the equilibrium between bodies in 
order to explain the conservation of state.419 However, Euler, in the same manner as his 
forerunners, develops simultaneously mathematics and mechanics with a preference for 
the mathematically established algorithms. The main difference between him and 
Newton thus rather lies in the fact that, although the latter in his Principia conceived a 
mechanics relying on an original and new arithmetical algorithm – which is known as 
the ‘Method of Fluxions’420 – he still preferred geometrical methods for the confirmation 
of the results that had been obtained analytically. Moreover, during the same years, an 
alternative foundation based on arithmetic had been discussed by Leibniz, in his 
Historia et origo calculi differentialis 421, who based his method on the correlated 
operations formed by differences and sums (as were already stated in his Elementa422), 																																																																																																																																																																		
Denique in his omnibus disquisitionibus magnam inferet varietatem status corporum vel liber vel non 
liber. Per statum non liberum hic intelligo, quando corpora impediuntur, quo minus in ea directione 
progrediantur, qua conantur; cuiusmodi est motus corporum pendulorum, quae, quia non possunt 
directe, uti conantur, descendere, oscillationes efficiunt. Ex quo intelligitur statum liberum esse, quando 
corpora nullum inveniung impedimentum in quamvis plagam progrediendi, in quam tum ex propria vi, 
tum a potentiis sollicitata tendunt. Apparet igitur, quibus de rebus in Mechanica sit agendum, et quam 
sint multa, quae etiam nunc nequidem sunt libata. Nam praeter motum punctorum, quae adhuc sunt 
tractata, tam pauca sunt, ut fere omnia demum invenire et ex principiis derivare necesse sit. Incipio igitur 
a motu punctorum liberorum a potentiis quibuscunque sollicitatorum, quia, quos sibi ipsa relicta 
sequantur motus, hoc capite iam est ostensum. Hanc ob rem primum istum Tomum motui punctorum 
libero destinavi, in sequente vero punctorum motum non liberum pertractare constitui; in quorum 
utroque, quae occurrent, cum ex his iam traditis, tum ex sequentibus principiis methodo analytica sum 
derivaturus. 
419 Euler, E015/016 § 56. 
420 John Wallis too developed a method of fluxions. However, he was strongly influenced by the method 
promoted by Leibniz, so much so that it can be said that Wallis developed his own method independently 
from Newton. However some key differences can be explained as follows: while Newton was affected by 
physical reasons, Leibniz was not. The latter placed a great deal of attention upon the symbolism and the 
general rules of differentiation and integration. The Newtonian approach relies on an arithmetical 
algorithm, but he still was inclined towards a geometrical method for the confirmation of the results he 
had obtained analytically. 
421 Cf. G. W. Leibniz, “Historia et origo calculi differentialis”, in Mathematische Schriften, herausgegeben 
von C. I. Gerhardt, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim New York, 1971, p. 392.  
422 G. W. Leibniz, Elementa calculi novi pro differentiis et summis, tangentibus et quadraturis, maximis et 
minimis, dimensionibus linearum, superficierum, solidorum, aliisque communem calclulum 
transcendentibus. 1669-71. 
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where the first operation resulted in a differentiation, whereas the second one resulted in 
the inverse operation, which he called ‘integration’423.  
Now, to go back to Euler, he introduced an alternative approach where the relation 
to geometry is not assumed. Geometrical truths – such as the truth deriving from the 
Euclidean approach – are still considered as necessary and obviously stand in contrast to 
the laws of mechanics or other sciences which relate to experience and contingent 
truths. As a direct consequence it follows that, although mechanics is related to 
experience, the theory has to be based on principles of the same reliability (or 
necessity) as mathematics. “The program for mechanics has to be supposed by transfer 
of mathematical principles to mechanics. Then, the mathematical principles are not 
softened or violated, but form a constructive part of the theory. As a consequence 
mathematical and mechanical principles have been not only applied or transferred into 
the other discipline, but preferentially confirmed and mutually tested in their reliability 
an applicability.”424  
Whereas on the one hand Newton proved this program for the transfer of geometrical 
principles to mechanics, Euler on the other hand stated that a core defect of the 
geometrical method was the lack of an algorithm which could be used for the modelling 
and calculation of problems which deviated only slightly in some detail from the 
standard formulation and solution. A new basis for modelling a contingent truth and 
finding the solution to a problem now arises from the application of the calculus to 
mechanics; or as Dieter writes, “the motion of bodies where the finite and infinitesimal 
quantities are interpreted not only geometrically, i.e. related to distances, but also 
temporally, i.e. to bodies travelling a certain distance in a certain time.”425 Indeed in the 
Scholium, Euler asserts: 
 
These laws of motion, which a body observes when left to itself in continuing rest or motion pertain 
properly to infinitely small bodies, which can be considered as points. [...] The diversity of bodies 
therefore will supply the primary division of our work. First indeed we shall consider infinitely 																																																								
423 Dieter 2009, xi.  
424 Ibid., ix.  
425 Ibid., xiv. 
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small bodies [...]. Then we shall attack bodies of finite magnitude which are rigid.  
 
Euler’s program may be interpreted as the unification of statics and dynamics, since rest 
and motion are always treated as correlated notions.  
Euler’s pupil, Joseph Louis de Lagrange (1736-1813), took another step forward to 
achieving a programme of the reorganisation of mechanics. In his Mècaniquie 
analytique published in 1788, an essay considered as a compendium of all branches of 
mechanics from statics to hydrostatics and from hydrodynamics to dynamics, the same 
methodology of the algebraic approach is used to treat all these different but correlated 
issues. In this work Lagrange, beyond providing a detailed historical introduction, 
managed to produce a work that systematised and organised the science of mechanics. 
Additionally, he improved upon the analytical-mathematical language of his 
predecessors.426 The combined work of Lagrange and his tutor Euler allowed mechanics 
to reach its current structure. 
The brightest insight reached by Euler was the way of his conceiving the material 
point as an explicit idealized tool and of representing its trajectory by means of 
equations with an algebraic structure instead of following a conventional geometrical 
treatment. Of course, a geometrical structure cannot be avoided, since the properties of 
surface, lines and solids were essential components of mechanics, but they were 
necessary only at the very beginning of the treatise in order to write down the equation 
of motion, and at the very end in order to interpret the results. In this way the 
intermediate phase became completely algebraic in nature. The motion of any rigid 
body follows the same treatment and rules applied to the point mass model, but it 
becomes a mechanics dominated by a phase of de-geometrization, independent so far as 
possible from a geometrical account.  
The ‘old centre of gravity’ became the ‘new centre of mass’ or ‘centre of inertia’. 
This is now a point in any body around which the mass or the inertia is equally 
distributed according to the equality of the moments. This notion is completely 																																																								
426 Dugas 1988, pp. 332-349. 
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equivalent to what we have called ‘centre of gravity’. But it is likely that the main 
conceptual difference relies on the fact that the previous notion was used without having 
in mind the precise epistemological meaning of the idealization process and its 
epistemological and theoretical consequences. In fact, the achievements reached during 
the Renaissance owed themselves most of all to their practical target; their 
simplifications were driven only by the aim to solve purely mechanical problems linked 
to practical and artisanal purposes. As Dieter writes of Euler’s discoveries, 
 
Euler introduced an alternative approach where the relation to geometry is not assumed. Therefore, 
the questions which previously emerged, if geometrical curves were analyzed, does not persist any 
longer. Euler based the calculus on the transfer of the rules, i.e. addition, subtraction, multiplication 
and division, valid for finite quantities to the operation with infinitesimal quantities. As a 
consequence, Euler considered infinitesimal quantities of different magnitude which are related to 
infinite quantities of different magnitude [Euler E387, § 84]. All these quantities are to be treated as 
numbers [Euler E101, § 1-10] and are allowed to appear in expressions composed of infinitesimal, 
finite and infinite quantities [Euler E212].427  
 
Euler replaced the geometrical representation of mechanics with the analytical one, 
using the calculus in the Leibnizian arrangement. The basic facts observed for all kinds 
of bodies – no matter how they are shaped and how large they are – were the 
preservation of the states of rest and motion due to the inertia of bodies. 
Both the approaches seen above, that followed by Newton and that followed by 
Euler, are representational, exactly because they are using the point mass model as a 
representational vehicle, or better, because their model of point mass, be it geometrical 
or algebraic, is in any case a representation which can help every competent user of the 
model to make computations and deduce some surrogative inferences from it, accruing 
knowledge that is relative to this ‘surrogate’ piece of physical reality. This new 
approach required the distinction to be made between a necessary and a contingent 
																																																								
427 Dieter 2009, p. 13. 
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statement428, according to which mechanics should rely on necessary mathematical 
principles, even though the theory aims to give a representation of experiential events, 
so both the principles should have the same reliability. In other word, as Dieter says, 
“[a]s a consequence mathematical and mechanical principles have been not only applied 
or transferred into the other discipline, but preferentially confirmed and mutually tested 
in their reliability an applicability.”429 
This new program, which aimed towards a wider application than the mechanical 
discipline that had been developed previously, related not only to mechanical problems 
strictly speaking, but also to natural phenomena in general. Euler says that “the 
shortcoming of the geometrical method is the lack of an algorithm which can be used 
for the modelling and calculation of problems, which deviated only slightly in some 
detail from the standard formulation and solution.”430 
The point mass – or the material point, as I prefer to call it – is not used as the 
elementary unit without extension, out of which all bodies are composed, but rather as 
an appropriate geometrical model – because it can be defined as a geometrical point – 
for the relation between numbers which have been assigned to geometrical objects, such 
as point, lines, surface and solids.  
 
Every material body has not only one extent, but is always extended in the so-called three 
dimensions of length, breadth and depth, and it must consequently have a definite shape in all 
directions. Whatever has extent in only one direction is called a line, and what has extent in two 
directions is called a surface; both have extent, but nevertheless they are not bodies, and we have 
here an example showing that not all things with extent can be considered to be bodies. A body must 
have threefold extent, in length, in breadth and in depth. There are no further kinds of extent, and 
consequently a body must possess all possible kinds of extent, that is to say it must have extent in all 
directions. A body is also bounded all round, and the outer circumference of its extent is called its 																																																								
428 This distinction is specified in the Specimen I, 11 and the Monadology §31-36, both of which were 
written by Leibniz, who based his program for mechanics on the assumption that geometry has to be 
completed by principles which explain the action and being acted upon of bodies. The geometrical truths 
are necessary, whereas the laws of mechanics are usually connected to the physical experience, and so 
they can be classified as contingent truths. 
429 Dieter 2009, ix.  
430 Ibid., x.  
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shape, of which there are infinitely many types, as is shown in geometry. In each individual body 
this shape is fully determined in all its parts. But when we speak of a body in general, we can 
ascribe to it no more than the property of adopting a shape, and one must regard this property as 
indeterminate. But of the parts of a body one cannot say that they have a definite shape, not even if 
one states the result of how many subdivisions the part is. This is so because one can in infinitely 
many ways cut from a given body a piece that represents half of the whole, and this piece can 
therefore have infinitely many shapes. The question as to the shape of the parts of a body is ill-put, 
and can only be raised by those who maintain that bodies have ultimate parts. But since these parts 
have no size, the concept of shape becomes inapplicable. This appears sufficient to give us a 
complete understanding of extent and its properties, so that we will now proceed to the examination 
of other general properties of material bodies.431   
 
The novelty introduced by Euler consisted of having attributed a purely numerical 
parameter to material bodies detached from any physical properties such as length, 
breadth and depth. On this basis, not only solids may have a weight – which is usually 
the volume of the body – but also simple plane figure or lines. Euler was able to 
generalise this procedure by that assuming the same modus of assignment was true for 
all other mechanical quantities.432 
Thanks to this manoeuvre we have the reply to what, already in the Quadratura 
Parabolae per Simplex Falsum, Luca Valerio had considered the legitimacy of 
abstracting the pondus from the bodies, or conversely, the legitimacy of the procedure 
of assigning a weight to idealization without physical extension, such as points and lines 
or plane figures. This attribution of physical properties to geometrical entities, which 
are generally conceived as not having the classical three-dimensional properties – the 
“threefold extent”, as Euler called them –, was all part of this new practice of 
abstraction and idealization, which at this point became consolidated, deeply rooted and 
epistemologically relevant in order to develop a new science of motion, as it were to 
“give a new face” to mechanics. 																																																								
431 Euler, E842, §15. The original title of this work is “Anleitung zur Naturlehre”, published in Opera 
Postuma 2, 1862, pp. 449-560. The classic English trans. was produced by Ernest Hirsch. The text is also 
available online: http://eulerarchive.maa.org. 
432 Dieter 2009, p. 182. 
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As Danilo Capecchi has written, “[t]he efforts of the 18th century for the 
development of a unified theory of motion of bodies, which ideally can be considered 
found their end with Lagrange’s 1788 Méchanique analitique, had given classical 
mechanics a modern aspect. Discussions upon principles passed now from their kind to 
their justification and their utility. The issue of Lagrange’s treatise and its great success, 
due mainly to the use of the principle of virtual work, was the occasion in the 19th 
century for a deep discussion on the logical status of the principles of mechanics, 
mainly statics, probably still more heated than that of half of the 18th century on the 
principles of dynamics. However, after this debate, the science of motion found itself at 
a turning point.”433 The models of point mass used by the mechanicians of the eighteenth 
century had finally exhausted their outcomes, or, as Capecchi again writes: 
 
The problems which could be solved with them are either too difficult, such as the problem of n 
bodies, or of little importance.434  
 
This turning point was reached from two different directions. On the one hand, there has 
been an enhancement in theoretical study, by examining phenomena which were not yet 
explored in classical mechanics, as those observed in moving frames, and by adopting a 
more powerful formal language for this theory. On the other hand, the point mass is no 
longer a representative tool for rigid bodies only, but assisted in the opening of new 
perspectives. The new era allowed for the introduction of the deformation of bodies, by 
adopting either a molecular or a continuum model for matter and by introducing the 
concepts of energy and dissipation of thermodynamics. 
 
But the science of force, or of power acting by law in space and time, has undergone already another 
revolution, and has become already more dynamic, by having almost dismissed the conceptions of 
solidity and cohesion, and those other material ties, or geometrically imaginably conditions, which 
Lagrange so happily reasoned on, and by tending more and more to resolve all connexions and 
actions of bodies into attractions and repulsions of points: and while the science is advancing thus in 																																																								
433 Capecchi 2014, pp. 368-369. 
434 Ibid. p. 369. 
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one direction by the improvement of physical views, it may advance in another direction also by the 
invention of mathematical methods.435  
 
It seems taken for granted that, although scientists from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were trying to find a way to represent more complex systems than that 
represented by a single body, this did not mean that for a series of simplified and 
straightforward cases, the model of the point mass cannot be used anymore. The classic 
dynamic laws of motion are still valid in the construction of inferential conclusions with 
regard to macroscopic objects and events.  
This allows us to give to the point mass as a mathematical entity an appropriate 
conventional meaning. Now we have all the elements to define the essence of a physical 
theory: i) an abstract calculus which makes sense of undefined or theoretical terms, 
definitions, principles and rules of inference; and ii) a conceptual model which more or 
less gives a traditional representation of the interested part of the world. For example, a 
mechanical theory of the solar system took as its primitive terms the point mass. Its 
principles are the Newtonian laws of motion and its rules of inference are those offered 
by the differential calculus. The conceptual model may be the set of planets, thought of 
as spheres. Then, there is a certain set of rules adopted by competent users in order to 
translate the conclusions drawn on the model into the target system’s knowledge. 
The debate over the applicability of idealized and abstract notions arose from a cluster 
of practical problems, all of which related to the Equilibrium Controversy and were 
solved with the same methodological approach, with the aid of the virtual balance. Only 
for a second time did these issues acquire additional philosophical content. We have 
seen how these authors who have appeared in our discussion tried to establish their right 
to speak on empirical matters by representing aspects of reality in purely mathematical 
terms. 
Guidobaldo, Valerio and Galileo all played the role of important mediators, who 
translated the outcomes of purely practical investigations back into a respectable 
philosophical idiom. They provided a philosophical discourse which would be used at a 																																																								
435 Hamilton 1834, p. 247. 
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later time to grant philosophical legitimacy to mathematical entities within a 
mathematical and physical context. 
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C o n c l u s i o n s  
 
 
In this research, I have worked on the boundaries between the so-called problem of 
scientific representation and the model-building practice. In particular, I have forwarded 
a hypothesis pertaining to the possible development of the idealized model of the point 
mass considered as a tool for epistemic representation, which, I have argued, is rooted 
in the formalisation of scientific practice. When we bump against some practical or 
technical difficulty in dealing with the understanding of how the world works and in 
giving an exact description of any actual situation – which is the art of doing physics – 
we can find an adequate approximate or idealized description to replace the actual 
surrounding variety of phenomena in order to simplify this representation and carry out 
computations to do with the prediction and the explanation of them.  
The present dissertation has consisted in the main of two attempted enquiries. On 
the one hand, it has aimed at showing that the model of the point mass can be 
considered as an idealized entity, having mainly an epistemic representational role. On 
the other hand, using the methodological approach – previously introduced by Giusti in 
1999 – which has been called the ‘objectification of procedure’, this research has 
forwarded a more historical claim in providing a possible reconstruction of the 
development of such a controversial mathematico-physical tool, as indeed the point 
mass is. This reconstruction has adopted the point mass as a new case study for 
supplying evidence in favour of the objectification of procedure, attempting to augment 
its consistency as a modelling technique that is mainly based on the objectification of 
scientific practice. Therefore, our case study is nothing other than a further confirmation 
of the fact that models are not always and foremost abstractions of qualitative features 
of physical objects deriving from a purely mental activity, but rather they can also be 
objectifications of pragmatic procedures having an epistemic role. 
Let me retrace the main outcomes of this research. According to the account 
presented in the first chapter – which followed in the footsteps of Giere and Contessa – 
a model, in our case the model of the point mass, was shown to merit being called an 
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epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user, if and only if the user takes 
that vehicle to denote the target, and adopts an interpretation – on the basis of a certain 
set of rules arbitrarily laid down within the scientific community – of the vehicle (in 
terms of the target). These two processes, i.e. denotation and interpretation, jointly 
account for what is known as scientific representation. Therefore any competent user 
can adopt an interpretation of the vehicle, in virtue of the fact that i) a vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of a target for her; and ii) she can perform valid inferences 
from the vehicle to the target (i.e. as surrogative inferences). In this respect, the 
inferential conclusions made of the vehicle are no more than partial, because they 
cannot account for an epistemically faithful representation of the physical phenomena 
under observation.  
For this purpose I used the point mass as a case study to exemplify the idea that an 
idealized representational model could be formalized by observing the scientific 
practice. From this there followed an attempt to give a detailed account of the 
theoretical development of this mathematical entity. The basic idea behind this 
approach was to argue that the point mass is not necessarily a mind-independent 
Platonic entity deriving from an act of abstraction from physical objects, which is used 
to represent only the underlying peculiarities common to a large variety of the most 
disparate physical objects observable in our surroundings. On the contrary, the 
perspective in which the development of my case study has been placed aims to show 
that it is likely that some models theoretically represent both practical enquiries and 
heuristic or mechanical demonstrative procedures carried out by the scientific 
community. In this respect, we have seen through three stages that the geometrical 
centre of gravity and the point mass model share some properties, a fact which becomes 
evident especially if we look at the use that ancient mathematicians – above all 
Archimedes – and the Renaissance community – above all the School of Urbino, which 
was also responsible for the restoration of a considerable part of the ancient scientific 
corpus – made of the barycentre for heuristic, mechanical and practical enquiries.  
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More precisely, in the first stage, we have seen that Archimedes operates a 
physicization of mechanics in the sense that he made use of mechanical elements (e.g. 
the balance) and principles (e.g. the law of the lever) to understand the geometrical 
proportionality among planes and solids. His demonstrative method is based on 
mechanical principles, because the geometrical features belonging to planes and solids 
whose area and volume one wants to measure are used for building up a virtual balance, 
which follows the law of the lever. Therefore, from Archimedes’ perspective, the centre 
of gravity is used as a point in which the volume (considered as weight) of the figure is 
fully concentrated, and is hung at one of the extremities of the virtual balance. This 
mechanical illustration lays the ground for an ultimately geometric proof, in helping the 
untrained audience to visualize the empirical correctness of the geometrical theorem 
which one wants to prove.   
The Renaissance scholars pointed out the practical use we can make of geometrical 
elements, and specifically they used the centre of gravity as a zero-dimensional 
geometrical point as an investigative tool for building up the foundations of modern 
statics. In fact, it was in the field of the scienza de ponderibus that the role of the 
barycentre became of central importance for a purely mathematical treatment of 
physical reality. The Urbinate Guidobaldo del Monte is held as the author who was able 
to imagine that macroscopic bodies at the extremities of the balance no longer exist, but 
that there are, instead, their centres of gravity. In other words, he thought that at the 
extremities of the balance existed only moving points, instead of physical objects. Such 
an operation releases the materials bodies of any dimensional and physical properties, 
and they can thereafter be considered as if they were moving (material) points, to which 
one can ascribe physical properties.  
Working on the cusp of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Luca Valerio was 
the first scholar who forwarded an epistemological query concerning the use of 
mathematical entities in a physical context, or, in other words, was the first to challenge 
the legitimacy of assigning weight – i.e. a physical feature – to unextended 
idealizations, such as points. The attribution of physical properties to geometrical 
	 267 
entities, which are generally conceived as not having the classical three-dimensional 
properties, was part of this new practice of abstraction and idealization, which at this 
point became epistemologically relevant in order to develop a new science of motion, 
or, as it were, to “give a new face” to mechanics. 
Within the same epistemological debate, Bernardino Baldi’s edition of the pseudo-
Aristotelian Problems of Mechanics (1621) made use of the centre of gravity for a 
slightly different epistemic purpose. Specifically he used the geometrical concept of the 
centre of gravity and the conclusions derived from the mechanical treatment of his tutor 
Guidobaldo, in order to augment the foundational principles of architecture, which was 
his main field of study and research.  He used the notion of centre of gravity, the 
Archimedean law of the lever and Euclidean mathematics to interpret geometrically any 
architectural structure, i.e. buildings, arches and architraves.  
Following in Guidobaldo’s footsteps with this geometrical approach, Bernardino Baldi 
was among the first Renaissance scholars to argue in favour of the idea that, besides a 
purely empirical approach, a theoretical treatment of the construction techniques was 
required. In this revolution the centre of gravity became now an epistemic tool that was 
useful for understanding the limitations of practical Renaissance techniques, and so 
mathematics became in turn the field of study which can help the user to analyse the 
advantages and disadvantages of our construction techniques. The centre of gravity, in 
this respect, allows for a purely mathematical treatment of any material configuration. 
This epistemological line of thought deserves to be investigated in greater depth in 
future research. 
The aim of developing a mathematical representation of nature by means of 
idealized and abstract models was thereafter pursued systematically by Galileo. It was 
with his Two New Sciences (1638) that mathematical physics began to be considered as 
the framework for the completion of the third stage of objectification of procedure, 
whereby the point mass assumes the role of being an independent object of research, 
which is useful for building the axiomatic principles of rational mechanics. By using the 
foundational principles of machines – as established in Guidobaldo’s Mechanicorum 
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Liber – Galileo shifted his attention to the working principles behind nature: the book of 
nature is now written in a mathematical form. An idealized entity is used to represent 
physical objects, and it is thanks to the power of our imagination [Hobbes 1655] that we 
can ascribe natural properties, such as volumetric extension, mass and forces, to entities 
such as points. It was thereafter only with Newton and Euler that the centre of gravity 
entered rational mechanics as a model of intelligibility, or rather as a purely theoretical 
model used to investigate natural phenomena and principles. Now, it is the centre of 
mass of any rigid body – differently shaped and moving uniformly, accelerating or 
moving in parabolic motion – that represents a series of states of affairs, which were not 
only made up of simple rigid bodies, but which were also typified by a higher level of 
complexity, in an algebraic language.   
On the basis of this historical evidence, it seems coherent to maintain that some 
mathematical entities of today’s mathematical physics do not necessarily derive from a 
simple act of abstraction from the material objects’ main features. Rather it is likely that 
some of them have their own foundation in the objectification of a series of practical 
enquires (i.e. when we understand this process of objectification as turning a scientific 
practice into a mathematical entity) which are deeply interconnected, because they all 
laid down the same principles such as the mechanical ones.  
It is only when one attempts to investigate the scientific practice that the development 
of some mathematical entities can be understood as playing a key epistemic role in 
order to understand how the world works and that therefore they need to be interpreted 
by the user on the basis of the context she is working within. Moreover, since models 
are – from the perspective I have attempted to show – generators of hypothesis upon the 
physical system under observation, their correctness, together with the truth-value of the 
inferences derived from them, can be tested only a posteriori to an empirical 
investigation.  
From this analysis it emerges that the point mass – and perhaps some other 
mathematico-physical models which should be further investigated – is created and 
developed by a dialectical series of revisions in the methodological and theoretical 
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approach to geometry and mechanics. When we study the history of scientific practice 
we find a repeated refinement of old concepts with a gradually increasing standard of 
rigor; in each of the historical periods surveyed, mathematicians have used the centre of 
gravity opportunistically for their own specific purpose at hand, be it geometrical, 
mechanical or even theoretical and epistemic. In this, each generation has discarded 
what was faddish and recast what was still fertile into new and sharper form.436  
 												
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
436 Goodman 1979, p. 545.  
	 270 
R e f e r e n c e s  
 
 
M. Abattouy, “Greek mechanics in Arabic context, Thabit ibn Qurra, al-Isfizari and the 
Arabic Traditions of Aristotelian and Euclidean Mechanics”, Science in Context, 14, 
(1/2), 2001, pp. 179-247. 
 
M. Abattouy, “The Aristotelian foundations of Arabic mechanics. From the ninth to the 
twelfth century”, in C. Leijenhorst, C. Lüthy, and H. Thijssen (eds.), The dynamics of 
Aristotelian natural philosophy: from antiquity to the seventeenth century, Brill, Leiden, 
2002, pp. 109-140.  
 
M. Abattouy, “The Arabic transformation of mechanics: the birth of the science of 
weight”, Foundation for Science, Technology and Civilization, FSTC Limited, 
Manchester, 615, 2006, pp. 1-25. 
 
M. Abattouy, “The Arabic science of weights, Textual tradition and significance in the 
history of mechanics”, in E. Calvo, M. Comes, R. Puig and M. Rius (eds.), A shared 
legacy. Islamic science East and West, Publications Edition, Barcelona, 2008, pp. 83-
114. 
 
E. A. Abbott, Flatland. A Romance of Many Dimensions, 1882. 
 
F. Acerbi, Tutte le Opere di Euclide, Bompiani, Milano, 2007.  
 
F. Acerbi, Il silenzio delle sirene. La matematica greca antica, Carocci, Roma, 2010. 
 
F. Acerbi, C. Fontanari and M. Guardini, Archimede. Metodo. Nel laboratorio del genio, 
Bollati-Boringhieri, Torino, 2013. 
 
	 271 
F. Acerbi and B. Vitrac, Héron d’Alexandrie. Metrica, Serra Edizioni, Pisa, 2014. 
 
Archimedes, “De Centris gravium vel de planis equerepentibus”, in N. Tartaglia (ed.), 
Opera Archimedis Syracusani philosophi et mathematici ingeniosissimi per Nicolaum 
Tartaleam Brixianum multis erroribus emendata, expurtaga, ac in luce posita, 
Rufinelli, Venice, 1543a, pp. 2v-19r. 
 
Archimedes, “Liber Archimedis de insidentibus aquae”, in N. Tartaglia (ed.), Opera 
Archimedis Syracusani philosophi et mathematici ingeniosissimi per Nicolaum 
Tartaleam Brixianum multis erroribus emendata, expurtaga, ac in luce posita, 
Rufinelli, Venice, 1543b, pp. 31v-35v. 
 
Archimedes, “On the Equilibrium of Planes”, in T. L. Heath (ed.), The Works of 
Archimedes Edited in Modern Notation with and Introductory Chapter by T. L. Heath, 
Dover, New York, 1953, pp. 189-220. 
 
Aristotle, “Questiones Mechanicae”, in N. L. Thomaeo (ed.), Problematum: sectiones 
duae de quadraginta; Questiones Mechanicae; De miraculis naturae; Physiognomica; 
De Lineis insecabilibus, haec & alia sequens pagina indicabit, Bruniolo, Venice, 1585.  
 
Aristotle, “Mechanical Problems”, in W. S. Hett (ed.) Aristotle minor works, William 
 Heinemann, Cambridge, 1955.  
 
Aristotle, Opere III. Fisica, Del Cielo, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1973. 
 
Aristotle, “Mechanical problems”, in Minor Works, Vol. 14 of Aristotle in Twenty-three 
Volumes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1980, pp. 329-414. 
 
Aristotle, “On Generation and Corruption”, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of 
	 272 
Aristotle, (English trans. by A. A. Joachim), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1984a. 
 
Aristotle, “Physics”, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, (English trans. 
by A. A. Joachim), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984b. 
 
Aristotle, Metaphysica, in The internet classics Archive, (English trans. by W. D. Ross);  
On-line: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html .  
 
Aristotle, Physica, in The internet classics Archive, (English trans. by R. P. Hardie, and 
R. K. Gaye); 
 On-line: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.html. 
 
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, in The internet classics Archive, (English trans. by G. R. 
G. Mure);  
On-line: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/posterior.html. 
 
B. Baldi, Cronica de matematici overo epitome dell’istoria delle vite loro, Monticelli, 
Urbino, 1707.  
 
U. Baldini, G. Zanier, P. Farina and F. Trevisani, Ricerche sull’atomismo del Seicento, 
Atto del Convegno di studio di Santa Margherita Ligure, 14-16 ottobre 1976, La Nuova 
Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1977.  
 
U. Baldini and P. D. Napolitani, “Per Una biografia di Luca Valerio. Fonti edite e 
inedite per una ricostruzione della sua carriera scientifica”, Bollettino di Storia delle 
Scienze Matematiche, XI, 1, 1991.  
 
R. W. Batterman, “Critical Phenomena and Breaking Drops: Infinite Idealizations in 
	 273 
Physics”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 36b, 2, 2005, pp. 225-
244. 
 
A. Becchi, B. D. Meli and E. Gamba, (eds.), Guidobaldo del Monte (1545-1607). 
Theory and Practice of the Mathematical Disciplines from Urbino to Europe, Max 
Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge, Berlin, 2012. 
 
G. B. Benedetti, Resolutio omnium Euclidis problematum aliorumque ad hoc necessatio 
inventorum una tantummodo circini data apertura, Bartolomeo Cesano, Venice, 1553.  
 
G. B. Benedetti, Demostratio proportionum motuum localium contra Aristotelem et 
omnes philosophos (1st ed.), Bartolomeo Cesano, Venice, 1554.  
 
G. B. Benedetti, Demostratio proportionum motuum localium contra Aristotelem et 
omnes philosophos (2st ed.), Bartolomeo Cesano, Venice, 1555. 
 
G. B. Benedetti, Diversarum Speculationum mathematicorum et physicarum liber, 
Nicolò Bevilacqua, Turin, 1585.  
 
G. B. Benedetti, Diversarum Speculationum mathematicorum et physicarum liber, 
Francesco Ziletti, Venice, 1586.  
  
J. A. Bennett, “The mechanics’ philosophy and the mechanical philosophy”, History of 
science, 24, 1986, pp. 1-28.  
 
S. Berryman, “Ancient Atomism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2016 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming; 
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/atomism-ancient/>. 
 
	 274 
D. Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with object: The trasformation of mechanics in the 
Seventheen century, Johns Hopkins Univeristy Press, Baltimore, 2006. 
 
A. Bird, “Squaring the Circle: Hobbes on Philosophy and Geometry ”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 57, 2, 1996, pp. 217-231.  
 
R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation. A Study of the function of theory, Probability 
and Law in Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968.  
 
F. Brandt, Thomas Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception of Nature, Levin and Munksgaard, 
Copenhagen, 1928. 
 
S. Brentjes, “Additions to Book I in the Arabic traditions of Euclid’s Elements”, Studies 
in History of Medicine and Science, 15, 1997–1998, pp. 55–117. 
 
S. Brentjes and J. Renn, The Arabic Transmission of Knowledge on the Balance, Max 
Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge, Berlin, 2013. 
 
J. E. Brown, The Scientia the Ponderibus in the Later Middle Ages, UMI Dissertation 
Service, Ann Arbor, 1967.  
 
S. G. Brush, The Kinetic Theory of Gases, Imperial College Press, London, 2003. 
 
J. Burckhardt, La civiltà del Rinascimento in Italia, Sansoni, Firenze, 1876.  
 
J. Büttner, Galileo’s Challenges: The origin and early conceptual Development of 
Galileo’s theory of Naturally Accelerated Motion on Inclined Plane, Ph.D. thesis, 
Humbolt-Universität su Berlin, 2004.  
 
	 275 
J. Büttner, “Big Wheel Keep on Turning”, Galilaeana, 33-62, 2008. 
 
J. Büttner, “Galilei, Galileo: Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove 
scienze attenenti alla mecanica & i movimenti locali”, in H. L. Arnold (ed.), Kindlers 
Literatur Lexikon, Vol. 6, Stuttgart, Metzler, 2009. 
 
J. Büttner, P. Damerow and J. Renn, “Galileo’s unpublished treatises. A case study on 
the role of shared knowledge in the emergence and dissemination of an early modern 
‘New science’”, in C. R. Palmerino (ed.), The Reception of the Galilean Science of 
Motion in Seventeenth-century Europe, J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2004, 
pp. 99-117. 
 
C. Callender and J. Cohen, “There Is No Special Problem About Scientific 
Representation”, Theoria, 2006, pp. 67-85.  
 
N. R. Campbell, Physics. The Element, Cambridge Unversity Press, Cambridge, 1920. 
 
D. Capecchi, History of virtual work laws, Birkhaüser, Basel, 2012. 
 
D. Capecchi, The Problem of the Motion of bodies. A historical View of the 
Development of the Classical Mechanics, Springer, Cham, Heidelberg, New York, 
Dordrecht, London, 2014.  
 
R. Carnap, “Uber die Aufgabe der Physic und die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der 
Einfachstheit”, Kant-Studien, 1923, pp. 99-107. 
 
R. Carnap, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Weltkeis-Verlag, Berlin-Schlachtensee, 
1928. 
 
	 276 
R. Carnap, “Über Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis, 3, 1932, pp. 215–228; English trans. by 
R. Creath and R. Nollan, “On Protocol Sentences”, Noûs, 21, 4, 1987, pp. 457–470. 
 
R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of the Language, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1937. 
 
R. Carnap, “Foundations of Logic and Mathematics”, International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 3, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939. 
 
R. Carnap, “The methodological character of theoretical concepts”, Feigl and Scriven, 
1956, pp. 38-76. 
 
R. Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Science, Basic Books, New York, 1966; 
reprint in 1972 as An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. 
 
N. Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983. 
 
N. Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1989. 
 
B. Cavalieri, Geometria indivisibilibus continuorum nova quadam ratione promota, ex 
typographia de Ducijs, Bononiae, 1653. 
 
R. Caverni, (1972), Storia del metodo sperimentale in Italia, 6 Vols., Stabilimento G. 
Civelli, Florence, 1891-1900. 
  
B. Centrone, Introduzione a i Pitagorici, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1996. 
 
M. Clagett, The science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, The University of Wisconsin 
	 277 
Press,  Madison, 1959.  
 
M. Clagett, Archimedes in the Middle Ages, The University of Wisconsin Press, 
 Madison, 9 Vols., 1964-1984. 
 
M. Clagett, “The works of Francesco Maurolico”, Physis, 16, 1974, pp. 149-198. 
 
M. Clavelin, La philosophie naturelle de Galilée. Essai sur les origines et la formation 
de la mécanique classique, Armand Colin, Paris, 1968; English trans. by A. J. 
Pomerans, The Natural Philosophy of Galileo. Essay on the Origins and Formation of 
Classical Mechanics, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1974. 
 
C. Clavio, Euclidis Elementorum Libri XV, Romae, 1574.  
 
I. B. Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. 
 
F. Commandino, Federici Commandini Urbinatis liber de centro gravitatis solidorum, 
Alexander Benacius, Bologna, 1565. 
 
F. Commandino, Euclidis Elementorum Libri XV, Pesaro, 1572.  
 
F. Commandino, De gli Elementi d’Euclide libri quindici con gli scholii antichi tradotti 
prima in lingia latina da M. Federico Commandino da Urbino con commentarij 
illustrati, et hora d’ordine dell’istesso trasportati nella nostra vulgare e da lui riveduti 
con provilegio, Urbino, 1575. 
 
F. Commandino, Pappi Alexandrini Mathematicae Collectiones a Federico 
Commandino urbinate in latinum conversae et commentariis illustratae, Pesaro, 1588. 
 
	 278 
G. Contessa, Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and their 
Representational Function, Ph.D. dissertation, 2007.  
 
G. Contessa, “The Ontology of Scientific Models”, Synthese, 172, 2, 2010. 
 
C. F. Craver, “Structures of Scientific Theories,” in P. K. Machamer and M. Silberstein 
(eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science,  Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pp. 
55-79.   
 
R. Creath, “Logical Empiricism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.);  
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/logical-empiricism/>. 
 
P. Damerow and J. Renn, “The transformation of Ancient Mechanics into a Mechanistic 
World View”, in G. Toepfer and H. Böhme (eds.), Transformation antiker 
Wissenschaften, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2010, pp. 243-267. 
 
A. D’Anna and P. Renno, Elementi di Meccanica Razionale, CUEN, Napoli, 1995. 
 
C. da Novara, Elementa geometriae, Venice, 1482. 
 
B. della Foresta, Vita dell’Abate del Parto D. Francesco Maurolico, Messina, 1613. 
 
G. del Monte, Guidi Ubaldi e marchionibus montis mechanicorum liber, Hieronymus 
Concordia, Pesaro, 1577.  
 
G. del Monte, Le mechaniche dell’illustriss. Sig. Guido Ubaldo de’ Marchesi Del 
Monte: Tradotte in volgare dal sig. Filippo Pigafetta, Francesco di Franceschi, Venice, 
1581.  
	 279 
G. del Monte, Meditatiunculae Guidi Ubaldi e Marchionibus Montis Santae Mariae de 
rebus mathematicis (cs. 1587-1592), Bilbiothèque Nationale de Paris, manuscript, 
catalogue no. Lat. 10246, 1587.  
 
G. del Monte, Guidi Ubaldi e marchionibus montis in duos Archimedis 
aequeponderantium libros paraphrasis scholiis illustrata, Hieronymus Concordia, 
Pesaro, 1588. 
 
G. del Monte, Giudo Ubaldi e marchionibus montis perspectivae libri sex, Hieronymus 
Concordia, Pesaro, 1600.  
 
J. Dennistoun, Memories of the Dukes of Urbino illustrationg the Arms, Arts and 
Literature of Italy, 1440-1630, 3 vols, London, 1851. 
 
A. De Pace, Niccolò Copernico e la fondazione del cosmo eliocentrico, Mondadori, 
 Milan, 2009. 
 
H. de Ridder-Symoens, A History of the University in Europe: Volume 1, Univerisities 
in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003a. 
 
H. de Ridder-Symoens, A History of the University in Europe: Volume 2, Univerisities 
in the Early Modern Europe (1500-1800), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003b. 
 
V. De Risi, “The development of Euclidean axiomatics  The systems of principles and 
the foundations of mathematics in editions of the Elements in the Early Modern Age”, 
Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 70, 2016, pp. 591- 676. 
 
S. Dieter, Euler as a Physicis, Springer, Berlin, 2009. 
	 280 
E. J. Dijksterhuis, Archimedes, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1956.  
 
E. J. Dijksterhuis, Archimedes, Pinceton University Press, Princeton, 1987; English 
trans. By c. Dikshoorn. 
 
A. G. Drachmann, “Fragments from Archimedes in Heron’s mechanics”, Centaurus, 8, 
1963, pp. 91-146. 
 
S. Drake, Galileo Studies. Personality, Tradition, and Revolution, The University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1970. 
 
S. Drake, Galileo at work. His scientific Biography, Dover Publication Inc., Mineola, 
New York, 1978.  
 
S. Drake and I. E. Drabkin (eds.), Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy, Selections from 
Tartaglia, Benedetti, Guido Ubaldo, and Galileo, The University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 1969.  
 
R. Dugas, Historie de la mécanique, Griffon, Neuchatel, 1950.  
 
R. Dugas, A History of Mechanics, Dover Publications, New York, 1988; English trans. 
by J. R. Maddox. 
 
P. Duhem, L’evolution de la mécanique, Hermann, Paris, 1905.  
 
P. Duhem, Les origines de la statique (2 Vols.), Hermann, Paris, 1905-1906. 
 
P. Duhem, Traité d’énergétique ou de thermodynamique générale, Gauthier-Villars, 
Paris, 1911. 
 
	 281 
P. Duhem, La Théorie Physique. Son object, sa structure, 2nd ed., Librarie Marcel 
Rivière, Paris, 1914. 
 
P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Problems, Academic Press, New York, 
1977.  
 
L. Euler, Mechanica sive motus scientia analytice exposita. Auctore Leonhardo Eulero 
academiae imper. scientiarum membro et matheseos sublimioris professore. Tomus I. 
Instar supplementi ad commentar. acad. scient. Imper, Ex typographia Academiae 
Scientiarum, Petropoli, 1736; 
On-line: “The Euler Archive”, http://eulerarchive.maa.org/. 
 
L. Euler, “Anleitung Zur Naturlehre”, in Opera Postuma 2, 1862, pp. 449-560. 
 
V. Fano, Comprendere la Scienza. Un’introduzione all’epistemologia delle scienze 
naturali, Liguori Editori, Napoli, 2005.  
 
V. Fano, I paradosi di Zenone, Bussole Carocci, Roma, 2012.  
 
A. Favaro, “Due lettere inedite di Guidobaldo del Monte a Giacomo Contarini”, Atti del 
Reale Istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, LIX 2, 1899-1900, pp. 307-310. 
 
A. Favaro, Archimede, Formiggini Editore, Roma, 1923.  
 
A. Favaro (ed.), Le opere di Galileo Galilei, nuova ristampa della edizione nazionale 
1890-1900, 20 Vols., Barbera, Florence, 1968.  
 
H. Feigl, “The ‘Orthodox’ View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as Well as Critique,” 
in M. Radner and S. Winokur (eds.), Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and 
	 282 
Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1970, pp. 3-16.  
 
M. Fontana, “Osservazioni Storiche sopra l’Aritmentica di Francesco Maurolico”, 
Memorie dell’Istituto Nazionale Italaino, Cl. Di Scienze Fisiche e Matematiche, 2, i, 
1808, pp. 275-296. 
 
A. Frajese, Galileo Matematico, Editrice Studium, Roma, 1964. 
 
A. Frajese, Opere di Archimede, Utet, Torino, 1974. 
 
A. Frajese and L. Maccioni (eds.), Euclide. Gli Elementi, Utet, Torino, 1970.  
 
M. Frank, Guidobaldo del Monte Mechanics in Context. Research on the Connections 
between his mechanical work and his life and environment, Ph.D. dissertation, 
2011/2012.  
 
M. Frank, Mathematics, technics, and courtly life in Late Renaissace Urbino, Springer, 
Berlin, 2013, pp. 306-330. 
 
S. French and J. Ladyman, “Superconductivity and Structures: Revisiting the London 
Account”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 28, 3, 1997, pp. 363-
393.  
 
S. French and J. Ladyman, “Reinflating the Semantic Approach”, International Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, 13, 2, 1999, pp. 103-121.  
 
S. French and J. Ladyman, “Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the 
Metaphysics of Structure,” Synthese, 136, 1, 2003, pp. 31-56.  
	 283 
G. Freudental, “A rational Controversy over Compounding forces”, in P. Machamer, M. 
Pera and A. Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies. Philosophical and Historical 
Perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
 
G. Freudental, “Perpetuum Mobile: The Leibniz-Papin Controversy”, Stud. Fil. Hist. 
Sci. 33, 2002, pp. 573-637. 
 
R. Frigg, “Models and representation: why structures are not enough”, in P. Dietsch 
(ed.), Measurement in physics and economics discussion papers, 25/02, The London 
School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2002. 
 
R. Frigg, “Fictions and Scientific Representation”, in R. Frigg and M. C. Hunter (eds.), 
Beyond Mimesis and Convention, Boston Studies in the Phylosophy of Science, 262, 
Springer, Berlin, 2010. 
 
R. Frigg and S. Hartmann, “Models in Science”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.); 
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/models-science/>. 
 
D. J. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1967. 
 
G. Galilei, Discorsi e Dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze attenti 
alla mecanica e i movimenti locali, Elsevier, Leiden, 1638. 
 
G. Galilei, Discorsi e Dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze attenti 
alla mecanica e i movimenti locali, Dozza, Bologna, 1666. 
 
G. Galilei, “De motu”, in A. Favaro (ed.), Le opere di Galileo Galileo, Vol. 1, Barbèra, 
	 284 
Florence, 1890-1909a. 
 
G. Galilei, “Le mechaniche”, in A. Favaro (ed.), Le opere di Galileo Galileo, Vol. 2, 
Barbèra, Florence, 1890-1909b. 
 
G. Galilei, Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, Leyden, 1638; English trans. by 
H. Crew and A. de Salvio, with an Introduction by A. Favaro, MacMillan Company, 
Dover Publication, Inc. New York, 1914. 
 
G. Galilei, Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems, translated and with 
revised notes by S. Drake, The Modern Library, New York, 1953. 
 
G. Galilei, “On motion”, in S. Drake and I. E. Drabkin (eds.), On motion and on 
Mechanics, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1960a, pp. 1-131. 
 
G. Galilei, “On mechanics”, in S. Drake in I. E. Drabkin (eds.), On motion and on 
Mechanics, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1960b, pp. 133-186. 
 
G, Galilei, Two New Sciences, Including Centers of Gravity and Force of Percussion. 
Wall & Thompson, Toronto, 1989.  
 
G. Galilei, Le Mecaniche. Edizione critica e saggio introduttivo di Romano Gatto, 
Olschki, Florence, 2002.  
 
G. Galilei, Opere 1, F. Brunetti (ed.), Utet, Turin, 2005a.  
 
G. Galilei, Opere 2, F. Brunetti (ed.), Utet, Turin, 2005b. 
 
P. Galluzzi, Momento. Studi Galileiani, Ed. dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri, Rome, 1979. 
	 285 
E. Gamba, “Le scienze fisiche e matematiche dal Quattrocento al Seicento”, Pesaro 
nell’età dei Della Rovere, Vol. III, 2, Marsilio ed., 2001, pp. 75-110.  
 
E. Gamba and V. Montebelli, Le scienze a Urbino nel tardo Rinascimento, 
Quattroventi, Urbino, 1988. 
 
E. Gamba and V. Montebelli, Liber de Centro Gravitatis Solidorum, Edizioni della 
Normale, Pisa, 2015. 
  
L. Gaurico, Tetragonismus id est circuli quadratura, per Campanum, Archimedem 
Syracusanum atque Boetium mathematicae perspicacissimos adinventa, Venice, 1503. 
 
L. Gaurico, Opera Archimedis Syracusani philosophi et mathematici ingeniosissimi, per 
Nicolaum Tartaleam Brixianum (mathematicarum scientiarum cultorem) multis 
erroribus emendata, expurgata ac in luce posita multisque necessariis additis... 
Appositisque manu propria guris quae graeco exemplari deformatae ac depravatae 
erant, Venice, 1543. 
 
V. Gavagna, “Euclide a Venezia”, in E. Giusti and M. Martelli (ed.), Pacioli 500 anni 
dopo. Celebrazioni cinquecentenario Divinae Proportione. 1509-2009, Atti del 
Convegno di studi Sansepolcro, 22-23 maggio 2009, pp. 97-124. 
 
V. Gavagna, La storia della matematica in classe: dalle materne alle superiori. Testi 
classici: Euclide gli Elementi, Relazione secondo convegno nazionale Ivrea, 2013. 
 
S. George, “Isaac Newton”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.); 
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/newton/>. 
 
	 286 
T. Geschauff, Archimedis Syracusani philosophi ac geometrae excellentissimi Opera, 
quae qui- dem extant, omnia multis iam seculis desiderata atque a quam paucissimis 
hactenus visa, nuncque primum et graece et latine in lucem edita. Adiecta quoque sunt 
Eutocii Ascalonitae in eosdem Archimedis libros Commentaria, item graece et latine, 
nunquam antea excusa, Basel, 1544. 
 
R. N. Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1988. 
 
R. N. Giere, “Using Models to Represent Reality”, in L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian and 
P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer Academic, 
Plenum Publisher, New York, 1999, pp. 41-57. 
 
R. N. Giere, “How Models Are Used to Represent Reality”, Philosophy of Science, 71, 
Supplement, 2004, pp. 742-752.   
 
R. N. Giere, “Models, Metaphyisics, and Methodology”, in S. Hartman, C. Hoefer and 
L. Bovens (eds.), Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science, Routleg, New York, 2008, 
pp. 123-133. 
 
R. N. Giere, “Why Scientific Models should not be regarded as Works of fiction”, in M. 
Suárez (ed.), Fictions in Science. Philosophical Essays on Modelling and Idealization, 
Routledge, London, 2009, pp. 248-258.  
 
R. N. Giere, “An Agent-based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation”, 
Synthese, 172, 2, 2010, pp. 269-281. 
 
R. N. Giere, “Representing with Physical Models”, in P. Humphreys and C. Imbert 
(eds.), Model, Simulation and Representation, Routleg, New York, 2011, pp. 209-215. 
	 287 
R. N. Giere, B. Bickle, and R. Mauldin, Understanding Scientific Reasoning, 
Thomson/Wadsworth, Belmont CA, 5th edition, 2006. 
 
M. Giunti, A. Ledda and G. Sergioli, I modelli nelle teorie scientifiche, Carocci, Roma, 
2016.  
 
E. Giusti, Ipotesi sulla natura degli oggetti matematici, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 
1999. 
 
E. Giusti, Piccola introduzione alla storia del calcolo inifinitesimale dall’antichità al 
Novecento, Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, Pisa-Roma, 2007. 
 
N. D. Goodman, “Mathematics as an Objective Science”, The American Mathematical 
Montly, 86, 7, 1979, pp. 540-551. 
 
I. Grattan-Guinnes, “Numbers, Magnitudes, Ratios, and Proportions in Euclid’s 
Elements: How Did He Handle Them?”, Historia Mathematica, 23, 1996, pp. 355-375.  
 
W. R. Grønfeldt, “The Structure of Scientific Theories”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.); 
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/structure-scientific-
theories/>. 
 
C. Grossi, Degli Uomini Illustri di Urbino, Urbino, 1819. 
 
C. Guasti, Le lettere di Torquato Tasso, Le Monnier, Firenze, 1952.  
 
W. R. Hamilton, “On a general method in dynamics; by which the study of the motions 
 of all free systems of attracting or repelling points is reduced to the search and 
	 288 
differentiation  of one central relation, or characteristic function”, Philos. Trans. R. 
Soc. Lond., 124, 1834, pp. 247-308. 
 
T. L. Heath, The Works of Archimedes, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1897. 
 
T. L. Heath, The Thirten books of Euclid’s Element, translated from the text of Heiberg, 
3 Vols., Introduction and book I, II, Cambridge Univesity Press, Cambridge, 1908. 
 
T. L. Heath, The Method of Archimedes recentely discovered by Heiberg, a supplement 
to the Works of Archimedes 1897, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1912. 
 
C. G. Hempel, “The Theoretician’s dilemma”, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell 
(eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 2), University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis,1958, pp. 142-163. 
 
C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of 
Science, Free Press, New York, 1965. 
 
C. G. Hempel, “On the ‘Standard Conception’ of Scientific Theories,” in M. Radner and 
S. Winokur (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 4), University 
of Minnesota Press,  Minneapolis, 1970, pp. 142-163.   
 
C. G. Hempel, “Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives”, in T. F. 
Geraets (ed.), Rationality To-Day, The University of Ottowa Press, Ottawa, 1979, pp. 
46–58. 
 
H. R. Hertz, The Principles of Mechanics presented in a new form; English trans. by D. 
E. Jones and J. T. Walley, Macmillan and Co., London, 1899.  
 
	 289 
H. R. Hertz, I principi della meccanica delineati in una nuova forma, Bibliopolis, 
Naples, 2010.  
 
T. Holden, The Architecture of Matter. Galileo to Kant, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004. 
 
J. L. Heiberg, Quaestiones Archimedeae, Copenhagen, 1879. 
 
J. L. Heiberg, Archimedis opera omnia cum commentariis Eutocii, 3 Vols., B. G. 
Teubner, Leipzig, 1880-1881.  
 
J. L. Heiberg, “Eine Neue Archimedesschrift”, Hermes, 42, 1907, pp. 234-303.  
 
J. L. Heiberg, Archimedes/Opera (3 Vols.) (2nd ed.), Leipzig, 1910-15. 
 
J. L. Heiberg and H. Menghe, Euclidis opera omnia, ediderunt, in aedibus G. B. 
Teubneri, Lipsiae, 1883-1895. 
 
G. B. Herbert , “Hobbes’s Phenomenology of Space ”, Journal of the History of 
Ideas , 48, 4, 1987, pp. 709-717. 
 
M. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science, Sheed and Ward, London, 1963. 
 
T. Hobbes, Elementorum Philosophae Sectio Prima de Corpore, London, 1655. 
 
T. Hobbes, On the Body, London, 1656.  
 
T. Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Sir William 
Molesworth (ed.), 11 Vols., London, 1839-45.  
	 290 
N. Huggett, “Zeno’s Paradoxes”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2010 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.); 
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/paradox-zeno/>. 
 
R. Hughes, “Models and Representation”, Philosophy of Science, 64, 1997, pp. 325-
336. 
 
F. Hultsch (ed.), Heronis Alexandrini geoetricorum et stereometricorum reliquiae, 
Berlin, 1864. 
 
G. Israel, “Lo strano concetto di punto materiale”, in M. Emmer (ed.), Matematica e 
Cultura, Springer-Verlag, Italia, 2007, pp. 11-27,  
 
M. Jammer, Concepts of Force: a study in the foundations of dynamics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1957.  
 
M. Jammer, Concepts of Mass in Contemporary Physics and Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1961. 
 
K. Jaouiche, Le livre du Qarastun de Thabit Ibn Qurra, Brill, Leiden, 1976. 
 
M. R. Jones, “Idealization and Abstraction: a Framework”, in M. R. Jones and N. 
Cartwright (eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting the Model. Idealization and Abstraction 
in the Sciences (Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities), 
Vol. 86, pp. 173-217, Amsterdam/New York, Rodopi, 2005. 
 
A. Jones (ed.), Book 7 of the Collection/Pappus, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1986. 
 
H. Kesten, Copernicus and his world, Secker & Warburg, London , 1945. 
	 291 
P. Kitcher, “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World”, in P. 
Kitcher and W. E. Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1989, pp. 410-505. 
 
W. R. Knorr, Ancient sources of the medieval traditn of mechanics: Greek, Arabic and 
Latin studies of the balance, Istituto e museo di storia della scienza, Florence, 1982. 
 
E. Knox, “Abstraction and its Limits: Finding Space for Novel Explanation”, Noûs, 50, 
1, 2012, pp. 41-60.  
 
P. O. Kristeller, Studies in the Renaissance Thought and Letters, Edizioni di Storia e 
Letteratura, Rome, 1956.  
 
P. O. Kristeller, La tradizione classica nel Rinascimento, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 
1965. 
 
P. O. Kristeller, Reinassance Thought and the Arts. Collected Essays, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1990.  
 
T. S. Kuhn, The structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1962. 
 
S. Kusukawa, Picturing the book of nature: image, text and argument in sixteenth-
century human anatomy and medical botany, The Chicago University Press, Chicago , 
2012.  
 
J. A. C. Ladyman and S. French,”Reinflating the Semantic Approach”, International 
Studies in Philosphy of Science, 13, 1999, p. 99-117. 
 
	 292 
J. A. C. Ladyman, “Review: Unifying Scientific Theories: Physical Concepts and 
Mathematical Structures”, The Journal of Economic Methodology, 10, 2002, pp. 91-96. 
 
W. R. Laird, “The Scope of Renaissance Mechanics”, Osiris, 2(II), 1986, pp. 43-68.  
 
W. R. Laird, “Guidobaldo del Monte and Renaissance”, in A. Becchi, D. Bertoloni Meli 
and E. Gamba (eds.), Guidobaldo Del Monte (1545-1607). Theory and Practice of the 
Mathematical Disciplines from Urbino to Europe, Max Planck Research Library for the 
History and Development of Knowledge, Berlin, 2013, pp. 35-52. 
 
G. W. Leibniz, Elementa calculi novi pro differentiis et summis, tangentibus et 
quadraturis, maximis et minimis, dimensionibus linearum, superficierum, solidorum, 
aliisque communem calclulum transcendentibus. 1669-71a.  
 
G. W. Leibniz, Elementa Juris Naturalis, 1669-71b. 
 
G. W. Leibniz, “Historia et origo calculi differentialis”, in Mathematische Schriften, 
herausgegeben von C. I. Gerhardt, Georg Olms-Verlag, Hildesheim New York, 1971.  
 
G. W. Leibniz, Nova Methodus pro maximis et minimis, 1684; English trans. in D. J. 
Struik, A Source Book in Mathematics, 1200-1800, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 
1969, pp. 271-281. 
 
T. Levi-Civita and U. Amaldi, Lezioni di meccanica razionale, Zanichelli, Bologna, 
1929.  
 
S. Lutz, “The Semantic of Scientific Theories”, in A. Brożek and J. Jadacki (eds.), 
Księga pamiątkowa Marianowi Przełęckiemu w darze na 90-lecie urodzin, 
Norbertinum, Lublin, 2014, pp. 33-67.  
	 293 
P. Machamer, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Galileo, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998a. 
 
P. Machamer, Galileo’s machines, his experiments, and his mathematics, 1998b, pp. 53- 
79.  
 
P. Machamer and B. Hepburn, “Galileo and the pendulum: Latching on to time”, 
Science & Education, 13, 2004, pp. 333-347. 
 
P. Machamer, “Galileo Galilei”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2017 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming; 
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/galileo/>.  
 
U. Mäki, “Isolation, Idealization and Truth in Economics”, in B. Hamminga and N. B. 
De Marchi (eds.), Idealization VI: Idealization in Economics, (Poznan Studies in the 
Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities),, Vol. 38, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1994 
pp. 147-168. 
 
G. Mamiani, Elogi Storici di Federico Commandino, G. Ubaldo del Monte, Giulio 
Carlo Fagnani, letti all’Accademia Pesarese, Pesaro, 1828, pp. 4-42. 
 
D. Martines, Origine e Progressi dell’Aritmentica: Sunto Istorico, Messina, 1865, pp. 
65-89. 
 
F. Maurolico, (1548), “Archimedis de momentis aequalibus, ex traditione Francisci 
Maurolico”, in Monumenta omnia mathematica quae extant quorumque catalogum 
inversa pagina demonstrat, ex traditione Francisci Maurolici, Panomi, Hesperius, 
1685a, pp. 86-180. 
 
	 294 
F. Maurolico, Monumenta omnia mathematica quae extant quorumque catalogum 
inversa pagina demonstrat, ex traditione Francisci Maurolici, Panomi, Hesperius, 
1685b. 
 
E. McMullin, “Galilean Idealization”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 
16, 1985, pp. 247-73. 
 
H. Meyer, “On the Heuristic value of Scientific models”, Philosophy of Science, 18, 2, 
1951, pp. 111-123. 
 
R. Migliorato, Archimede. Alle radici della modernità tra storia scienza e mito, 
Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica Università di Messina, 2013. 
 
E. A. Moody, and M. Clagett (eds.), The medieval Science of Weight, University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1960. 
 
M. Morgan  and M. Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural 
and Social Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.  
 
M. Morgan and M. Morrison, “Models as Mediating Instruments” in M. Morgan and M. 
Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 10-37.  
 
C. Moulines, “Approximate Application of Empirical Theories: A General Explication”, 
Erkenntnis, 10, 2, 1976, pp. 201-227. 
 
C. Moulines, “Introduction: Structuralism as a Program for Modelling Theoretical 
Science”, Synthese, 130, 1, 2002, pp. 1-11.  
 
	 295 
C. Mugler, Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie géométrique des Grecs, Paris, 
1958. 
 
A. Musgrave, “‘Unreal Assumptions’ in Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted”, 
Kyklos, 34, 1981, pp. 377–387.  
 
P. Musso, Rom Harré e il problema del Realismo Scientifico, Franco Angeli, Milan, 
1993.  
 
P. D. Napolitani, “La tradizione Archimedea”, in E. Giusti (ed.), Luca Pacioli e la 
matematica nel Rinasciemnto, Petruzzi, Sansepolcro, 1998, pp. 77-102.  
 
P. D. Napolitani, “Archimede alle radici della scienza moderna”, I grandi della scienza 
(Le Scienze), IV, 22, 2001. 
 
P. D. Napolitani and K. Saito, “Royal Road or Labirinth? Luca Valerio’s De Centro 
Gravitatis Solidorum and the beginnings of modern mathematics”, Bollettino di Storia 
delle Scienze Matematiche, 24, 2004, pp. 68-69. 
 
E. Nenci (ed.), Le vite de’ matematici. Edizione annotata e commentata della parte 
medievale e rinasciemntale, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1998. 
 
E. Nenci, (ed), Bernardino Baldi, In Mechanica Aristotelis problemata exercitationes, 
Max Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge, Source 
3, Berlin, 2001. 
 
R. Netz, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: A Study in Cognitive 
History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 
 
	 296 
R. Netz, The works of Archimedes, Translated into English, together with Eutocius’ 
commentaries, with commentary, and critical edition of the diagrams; Vol. I, The Two 
Books On the Sphere and the Cylinder, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 2004.  
 
R. Netz and W. Noel, Il codice perduto di Archimede, Rizzoli, Milano, 2007. 
 
O. Neurath, (1932), “Protocol Statements”, in R. S. Cohen and M. Neurath (eds.), 
Philosophical Papers 1913-1946, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1983, pp. 91-99. 
 
I. Newton, The Principia: The Authoritative Translation: Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy, 1687; English trans. by I. B. Cohen and A. Whitman, University of 
Califonia Press, California, 2016 (based on the 1726 (A. Motte) edition). 
 
P. Nolan, Fondamenti di Fisica. Meccanica, Onde, Termodinamica, Elettromagnetismo, 
Ottica, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1996. 
 
J. D. Norton, “Approximation and Idealization: Why the difference matters”, 
Philosophy of Science, 79, 2012, pp. 207-232. 
 
P. Palmieri, “Breaking the circle: the emergence of Archimedean mechanics in the late 
Renaissance”, Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 62, 2008, pp. 301-346. 
 
M. Panza and A. Sereni, Il Problema di Platone. Un’introduzione storica alla filosofia 
della matematica, Carocci, Roma, 2010.  
 
Pappus of Alexandria, Pappi Alexandri mathematicae collections a Federico 
Commandino Urbinate in Latinum conversae, et commentariis illustrate, Hieronymus 
Concordia, Pesaro, 1588. 
 
	 297 
Pappus of Alexandria, Pappi Alexandri mathematicae collections a Federico 
Commandino Urbinate in Latinum conversae, et commentariis illustrate. In hae nostra 
edition ab innumeris, quibus scatebant mendis, et praecipue in Graeco contextu 
diligenter vindicatae, Ducius, Bologna, 1660.  
 
Pappus of Alexandria, Collectio, instruxit, in F. Hultsh (ed.), 3 Vols., Berolini, 
Weidmannos, 1876-78. 
 
R. Pisano, Brief historical notes on the theory of centres of gravity, The Global and The 
Local: The History of Science and the Cultural Integration of Europe, proceedings of 
the 2nd ICHEHS, (Cracow, Poland, September 6-9, 2006), M. Kokowski (ed.), pp. 934-
941. 
 
R. Pisano and P. Bussotti, “On Popularization of Scientific Education in Italy Between 
12nd And 16th Centuries”, Problems of Education in the 21st Century, 57, 2013, pp. 
90-101. 
 
R. Pisano and P. Bussotti, “Fibonacci and the Reception of the Abacus Schools in Italy. 
Mathematical Conceptual Streams and their Changing Relationship with society”, 
Almagest, 2015, pp. 126-164.  
 
R. Pisano and D. Capecchi, Tartaglia’s Science of Weights and Mechanics in the  
Sixteenth Century,  Springer, Dordrecht, 2016. 
 
Platone, Timeo, G. Reale (ed.), Bompiani, Milano, 2000.  
 
M. Proclus, The Philosophical and Mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first 
Book of Euclid’s Elements, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1788. 
 
	 298 
M. Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Elementorum librum commentarii, Friedlein ed., 
Teubner, Leipzig, 1873. 
 
M. Proclus, A commentary of the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, by G. R. Morrow 
(ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970.  
 
M. Proclus, Commento al I libro degli Elementi di Euclide, M. Timpanaro Cardini (ed.), 
Giardini editori e stampatori, Pisa, 1978. 
 
H. Putnam, “What Theories Are Not”, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski (eds.), 
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1962, pp. 240-51; (Reprinted in Mathematics, Matter and Method, 1975, pp. 215-27). 
 
H. M. Pycior, “Mathematics and Philosophy: Wallis, Hobbes, Barrow, and Berkeley”, 
 Journal of the History of Ideas, 48, 2, 1987, pp. 265-286 . 
 
M. Redhead, “Models in Physics”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 31, 
1980, pp. 145-163. 
 
Regiomontanus, Tabulae Primi Mobilis, Rupprich, Frühzeit, 1514. 
 
H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the 
Structure of Knowledge, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938. 
 
J. Renn, and P. Damerow, Guidobaldo del Monte’s Mechanicorum Liber, Max Planck 
Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge, Source 1, Berlin, 
2010.  
 
	 299 
J. Renn, and P. Damerow, The Equilibrium Controversy. Guidobaldo del Monte’s 
Critical Notes on the Mechanics of Jordanus and Benedetti and their Historical and 
Conceptual Background, Max Planck Research Library for the History and 
Development of Knowledge. Source 2, Berlin, 2012.  
 
J. Renn and P. D. Omodeo, “Guidobaldo del Monte’s Controversy with Giovan Battista 
Benedetti on Positional Heaviness”, in A. Becchi, D. Bertoloni Meli and E. Gamba 
(eds.), Guidobaldo Del Monte (1545-1607). Theory and Practice of the Mathematical 
Disciplines from Urbino to Europe, Max Plank Research Library for the History and 
Development of Knowledge, Berlin, 2013, pp. 53-94. 
 
P. L. Rose, “The origins of the proportional Compass from Mordente to Galileo”, 
Physis, 10, 1968, pp. 53-69; together with corrections by Edward Rosen, “The invention 
of the Reduction Compass”, Physis, 10, 1968, pp. 377-400. 
 
P. L. Rose, The Italian Renaissance of Mathematics: Studies on Humanists and 
Mathematicians from Petrarch to Galileo, Droz, Geneve, 1975. 
 
W. Rüegg, “Universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”, in S. de 
 Ridder and W. Rüegg (eds.) (1992-2011), A history of the University in Europe 4 
 Vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004  
 
L. Russo, La rivoluzione dimenticata, VII edizione, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2013. 
 
W. Sacksteder , “Hobbes: Geometrical Objects” , Philosophy of Science, 48, 4, 1981, 
pp. 573-590 . 
 
W. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1984. 
	 300 
D. Scinà, U. Bottazzini and P. Nastasi, Elogio di Francesco Maurolico, Dalla Reale 
Stamperia, Palermo, 1808. 
 
A. Seidenberg and J. Casey, “The ritual origin of Balance”, Archive of History of 
Science, 23, 1980. 
 
L. Sklar, Theory and Truth: Philosophical Critique within Foundational Scinece, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2000. 
 
W. Stegmüller, The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, Springer, New York, 1976.  
 
W. Stein, “Der Begriff des Schwerpunktes bei Archimedes”, Quellen und Studien zur 
Geschichte der Mathematik, Physik und Astronomie, Abt. B: Quellen, I, 1930, pp. 221-
244. 
 
D. Stewart, “Thomas Hobbes”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2017 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming;  
On-line: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/hobbes/>. 
 
M. Suárez, “The Role of Models in the Application of Scientific Theories: 
Epistemological Implications,” in M. S. Morgan and M. Morrison (eds), Models as 
Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999, pp. 168-196. 
 
M. Suárez, The pragmatics of scientific representation, Discussion paper, DP 66/02, 
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London, 2002.  
 
M. Suárez, “Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism”, 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 17, 2003, pp. 225-244.  
	 301 
M. Suárez, “Representation in Science”, in P. Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophy of Science, 2016, pp. 440-459. 
 
F. Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 
1977. 
 
F. Suppe, The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism, University of 
Illinois Press, Chicago, 1989. 
 
F. Suppe, “Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments”, 1969-
1998, Philosophy of Science, 67, Supplement, 2000, pp. 102-115.  
 
P. Suppes, “Models of Data”, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (eds.), Logic, 
Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International 
Congress, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962, pp. 252-261; (Reprinted in P. 
Suppes, Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science. Selected Papers from 
1951 to 1969, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969, pp. 24-35). 
 
P. Suppes, “A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the 
Empirical Sciences”, Synthèse, 12, 1969, pp. 287-301; (Reprinted in Freudenthal, 1961, 
pp. 163-177, and in P. Suppes, Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science. 
Selected Papers from 1951 to 1969, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969, pp. 10-23.  
 
C. Swoyer, “Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning”, Synthese, 87, 1991, 
pp. 449-508. 
 
N. Tartaglia, Euclide megarense philosopho: solo introduttore delle scientie 
mathematice: diligentemente reassettato et alla integrita ridotto per il degno orifessore 
di tal scientie Nicolo Tartarea Brisciano, Venice, 1543. 
	 302 
N. Tartaglia, La prima [-sesta] parte del general trattato di numeri, et misure di Nicolo 
Tartaglia, nella quale in diecisette libri si dichiara tutti gli atti operativi, pratiche, et 
regole necessarie non solamente in tutta l’arte negotiaria, & mercantile, ma anchorin 
ogni altra arte, scientia, over disciplina, dove interuenghi il calculo. In Vinegia per 
Curtio Troiano de i Navò. MDLVI [MDLX], Curzio Troiano, Venice, 1556-60. 
 
R. Tassora, Le Meditatiunculae de rebus mathematicis di Guidobaldo del Monte, Ph.D. 
dissertation, 2001. 
 
P. Teller, “Quantum Mechanics and the Nature of Continuous Physical Quantities”, The 
Journal of Philosophy, 76, 9, 1979, pp. 345-361. 
 
F. Ugolino, Storia dei conti e Duchi d’Urbino, Florence, 1859, II, 271, 273 f. 
 
E. Ulivi, “Scuole e maestri d’abaco in Italia tra Medioevo e Rinascimento”, in E. Giusti 
et al. (eds.), Un ponte sul Mediterraneo. Leonardo Pisano, la scienza araba e la 
rinascita della matematica in occidente, Polistampa, Florence, 2002, pp 121-159. 
 
G. Vailati, Del concetto di centro di gravità nella Statica d’Archimede, Atti della R. 
Accad. d. Scienze di Torino, 32, 1996-97, pp. 742-758. 
 
L. Valerio, De Centro Gravitatis Solidorum Libri Tres, Bonfadini, Rome, 1604. 
 
L. Valerio, Quadratura parabolae per simplex falsum, Rome, 1606. 
 
G. Valla, De expetendis et fugiendis rebus opus, Aldo Manuzio ed., Venice, 1501.  
 
M. Valleriani, Galileo engineer, Volume 269 of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, Springer, Dordrecht, 2010.  
	 303 
M. van Dyck, An Archeology of Galileo’s Science of Motion, Ph.D. dissertation, 2006a. 
 
M. van Dyck, “Gravitating towards stability: Guidobaldo’s Aristotelian-Archimedean 
Synthesis”, History of Science, 44/3, 146, 2006b, pp. 373-407. 
 
M. van Dyck, “Argumentandi modus huius scientiae maxime proprius.” Guidobaldo’s 
Mechanics and the Question of Mathematical Principles”, in A. Becchi, D. Bertoloni 
Meli and E. Gamba (eds.), Guidobaldo Del Monte (1545-1607). Theory and Practice of 
the Mathematical Disciplines from Urbino to Europe, Max Planck Research Library for 
the History and Development of Knowledge, Berlin, 2013, pp. 7-33. 
 
B. van Fraassen “On the Extension of Beth’s Semantics of Physical Theories”, 
Philosophy of Science, 37, 3, 1970, pp. 325-339.   
 
B. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980. 
 
B. van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford university Press, New York, 1989. 
 
B. van Fraassen, “Science as Representation: Flouting the Criteria”, Philosophy of 
Science, 71, Supplement, 2004, pp. 794-804. 
 
Vespasiano da Bisticci, Vite di uomini illustri del secolo XV, Barbèra, Florence, 1859. 
 
V. Vita, “Il punto nella terminologia matematica greca”, Archive for the History of 
Exact Sciences, 27, 1982, pp. 101-14.  
 
G. Volpe, Urbino e i Luoghi della scienza, Vol. 1, I Quaderni del Centro Internazionale 
di Studi Urbino e la Prospettiva. 
 
	 304 
A. Wayne, “Expanding the Scope of Explanatory Idealization”, Philosophy of Science, 
78, 5, 2011, pp. 830-841. 
 
M. Weisberg, Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2013.   
 
L. Wessels, “Laws and Meaning Postulates in van Fraassen’s View of Theories”, in 
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science  Association 
1974, 1976, pp. 215-234.   
 
W. L. Wisan, “The new science of motion: A study of Galileo’s De motu locali”, 
Archive for the History of Exact Sciences, 13, 1974, pp. 103-306.  
 
B. Zamberti, Euclidis Megarensis mathematici clarissimi Elementorum Geometricorum 
Lib. XV, Basileae, 1537. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 305 
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s  
 
 
 
I owe too much to too many people. 
 
My first admission of heartfelt thanks goes to Pearl Jam. I have realized that I cannot 
live without their music. I am aware that Pearl Jam’s music is quite gloomy, but it 
represents for me quite literally a refuge from pains, worries, and sadness. I feel that the 
only metaphysical entity that can understand me is Pearl Jam’s music. They have 
already written, sung and played everything that you would like to hear to feel 
comforted and understood.  
 
Besides Pearl Jam I ought to thank The Sound of Silence. Thanks for your power of 
touching my heart and my mind. Thanks to music! It has the answer to all my questions 
and doubts. Maybe a still greater set of thanks has to be given to those people who 
transmitted to me a love and fascination for music and poetry – many many thanks to 
those people! Andrea and Silvia, I suppose this gratitude will be never enough! 
  
Just remember what Shakespeare said: “The man that hath no music in himself, nor is 
not moved with concord of sweet sound, is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils, the 
motions of his spirit are dull as night, and his affections dark as Erebus. Let no such 
man be trusted. Mark the music.” (The Merchant of Venice, Act 5.1) 
 
To those people who have argued and disagreed – maybe the majority have disagreed – 
with me during the past three years, and have thus forced me to improve both the matter 
and the manner of thinking upon the philosophy of science. I have done it thanks to 
those people who thought that I was able to do it.   
 
To my supervisors Guido Bacciagaluppi and Vincenzo Fano (the order is purely 
	 306 
alphabetical). They were too much patient with me, especially because I have realized I 
am a quite trying student. However, they have never desisted in trusting in me, and 
indeed have used to do it more than I do myself! It was thanks to the Dutch period that I 
have recovered the enthusiasm for this research and this job too, so thanks, Vincenzo 
and Guido, for giving me such a chance.  
 
To Pierluigi Graziani, who had always a few words for motivating me. In these three 
years I think I had more phone calls with him than I did with my boyfriend or even with 
my Mum; and it was so even when I was in Netherlands!  
 
To F. A. Muller, and not only for the Talking Head’s compact disc! 
 
To Enrico, who taught me everything I know in that field of study which is commonly 
seen as a static museum piece, that is the history of science. I have learned how to 
appreciate it, and I began to see it as the first source for the development of our critical 
philosophical thought. 
 
To my mentor Umberto Spadoni who showed me the road. 
 
To my lovely friends Silvia, Carol, Nicolas, Silvia, Eleonora, Costanza and Arianna, 
because they have never let me felt as an annoying or logorrhoeic or pedantic person. 
We have all discussed a lot on the difference between these last two, and at the end they 
jointly convey that I am none of them! Thanks still further to their limitless imagination, 
which has the power to dream up crazy adventures and travels, aware that we will never 
have enough time to realize all of them. 
 
To Sara, who has taught me how to live in the status of crisis that characterises every 
Ph.D. student. 
 
	 307 
To my English-language proofreader, Jonnie, whom I first met in London, and who has 
been so very patient with me and my level of English. Even Shakespeare could have 
improved his faulty spelling, even Dante his translation into 21st-century Penguin 
Classics, even Galileo on his deathbed, could have been helped and saved by this most 
heroic man.  
 
To the editor of the images of this dissertation. He helped me to realize that there is 
someone who really appraised me for my intellectual brilliance. He is currently 
investigating the epistemological consistency of the representational role fulfilled by the 
map of the London underground network. So, it is likely that after his return in Italy, I 
will use his feedback for arguing in favour – or not – Contessa’s arguments relating to 
the difference between epistemological representation and faithful epistemological 
representation of models! 
 
To my little nieces, Martina and Giada, for the inestimable chance to be an everlasting 
child. To their parents Alex – the other half of my heart – and Sonia. 
 
To Andrea, the recipient of my poems! He waited for me in silence. Always. He 
observed me carving out my little piece of the future without hesitation, and I think that 
it is thanks to his encouragement that all my wandering over the world has been 
possible.  
 
To Mum and Dad, for giving me such a beautiful teaching, strength and bravery. 
Without you nothing would be the same. For every smile you dedicated to me, for every 
word of support you gave me every day I was sad, far away and feeling alone or even 
desperate. It was a really long period, a really stressful experience, it took all my 
energies away from me at points – but I can definitely say: “Great, I did it!”. And I am 
sure that it was all because of you. 
 
	 308 
My gratitude will never be enough. 
 
 
